War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe

The Eurocentric conventional wisdom holds that the West is unique in having a multistate system in international relations and liberal democracy in state-society relations. At the same time, the Sinocentric perspective maintains that China is destined to have authoritarian rule under a unified empire. In fact, China in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (656–221 BC) was a system of sovereign territorial states similar to Europe in the early modern period. In both cases this formative period witnessed the prevalence of war, formation of alliances, development of centralized bureaucracy, emergence of citizenship rights, and expansion of international trade. This book examines why China and Europe shared similar processes but experienced opposite outcomes. This historical comparison of China and Europe challenges the presumption that Europe was destined to enjoy checks and balances while China was preordained to suffer under a coercive universal empire.

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To Mike and Mom, who give me unconditional support
To Hana Meihan, who grows up with this project
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1 Chinese names follow the Chinese convention by beginning with surnames.
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