Name index

Andrade, R., 51
Aquinas, T., 184, 186, 187
Aristotle, 10, 28
Austin, J. L., 49
Bacon, F., 4
Batali, J., 94
Berkeley, G., 63, 64, 107
Block, N., 91, 97
Borash, D., 35
Bourdieu, P., 29
Bradly, F., 63
Chisholm, R., 111, 114
Chomsky, N., 102
Dennett, D., 73, 96
Descartes, R., 4–6, 63, 64, 138
De Soto, H., 38
Durkheim, E., 28–29
Eccles, J., 138
Einstein, A., 11
Feyerabend, P., 7, 24, 77
Follesdal, D., 112, 115
Foucault, M., 29
Frege, G., 18, 111, 112, 117, 183–187, 190–192
Gazzaniga, M., 142
Goedel, K., 80
Goel, V., 94
Grice, P., 173
Habermas, J., 29
Haugeland, J., 97
Heidegger, M., 107, 112, 117–119, 125–126
Hegel, G., 63
Hempel, C., 19, 23
Hofstadter, D., 73
Hume, D., 21, 28, 138, 147, 148
Husserl, E., 107–113, 124–125
Johnson-Laird, P., 91
Kafka, F., 139
Kant, I., 22, 142–143, 147, 148, 150, 184, 186, 187
Kasparov, G., 81
Kelsen, H., 161
Kinwashner, N., 145
Kuhn, T., 6, 23–24, 76–77, 132
Kurzweil, K., 80
Linias, R., 145
Locke, J., 4, 139, 140, 145–147
Marr, D., 95
Merleau-Ponty, M., 107, 110, 112–113, 121, 125
Moural, J., 51
Penfield, W., 120
Penrose, R., 80, 90
Plato, 10
Polt, R., 126
Popper, K., 23, 76
Pylyshyn, Z., 92
Quine, W., 195
Rawls, J., 19–22
Rosaldo, M., 45
Ross, D., 178
Royce, J., 63
Russell, B., 117
Ryle, G., 114
Searle, D., 51
Searle, J. R., 45, 110, 117

© Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-51591-7 - Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays
John R. Searle
Index

Cambridge University Press
www.cambridge.org
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sellars, W., 111, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen, A., 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shutz, A., 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simmel, G., 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, A., 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, B., 39, 49–51, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socrates, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sperry, R., 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turing, A., 65, 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber, M., 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, E., 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wittgenstein, L., 10, 110, 112, 114, 117, 180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subject index

Artificial Intelligence, 57–58
authorisation, 43
and certification, 44

basic facts
as “contemporary given”, 132
basic reality, 108–109
behaviorism, 54
as form of verificationism, 64
biological naturalism, 152
and epiphenomenalism, 157
brains
as digital computers, 86–106
as information processing, 103–105
causal self-referentiality, 119–120
causation
and neurobiological processes, 70
Chinese Room Argument, 15, 59, 67–71, 87, 94
and connectionism, 15, 16
as refutation of Turing Test, 77
Church’s Thesis, 87
Church-Turing Thesis, 88
Cognitive Science, 14, 15
Cognitivism, 88–89
and homunculus fallacy, 95–97
collective acceptance, 27, 36, 38, 41
collective intentionality, 30–32
computation
as abstract process, 73
and assignment of interpretation, 95
definition of, 91, 105
as observer-relative, 105
and sufficiency for thought, 61
commitment, 169–170
and the possibility of lying, 171–173
public, 174
computer functionalism, 56–57
as Strong Artificial Intelligence, 27, 57, 58
concepts,
and existential statements, 186

first-level, 186
second-level, 185, 186
second-level expressions, 185
conditions of improvement, 95–97
as conditions of satisfaction, 122–123
conditions of satisfaction, 114
and aspects, 114
consciousness, 11
as artificially produced, 72–73
building block theory of, 13
and causal reduction, 155–156
definition of, 141
and epistemic objectivity, 12
NCC theory of, 13
neurobiological problem of, 140–141
and privacy, 12
as qualitative and subjective, 141
as unified conscious field, 142
and unity, 13
correspondence theory of truth, 194–195
decomposition, 6
Deep Blue, 81
deontic power, 34
and desire-independent reasons, 34
deontology, 38
desire-independent reasons, 171–172
direct reference theory, 181
and doctrine of singular propositions, 181
dualism, 75
and computationalism, 76–77
epistemic objectivity, 8, 12, 29–30
epistemic subjectivity, 12
epistemology, 5, 6
and incorrigibility, 7
and philosophy, 4–25
real life, 6
Epoche, 113
ethics, 21–22
existential statements, 186–187
externalism, 18

fact–value distinction, 162
and descriptive utterance, 162
and evaluative utterance, 162
and Hume, 162–165
and linguistic description, 162–163
features
observer-dependent, 78–79
observer-independent, 27–28, 78
observer-relative, 27–28, 166–167
freestanding-Y terms, 39
and corporations, 41
free will, 147
function
assignment of, 32
the problem of, 118–119
functionalism, 56–57
black box, 56
and cognition, 56
and computation, 56
homunculus, 101, 102, 105
homunculus fallacy, 95–97
Husserl’s method, 112–113
and intuition of essences, 113
and Noema, 115, 116
and transcendental reduction, 113, 115
hypothetico-deductive method, 23

idealism
definition of, 107
and de re reference, 107
and perspectivalism, 108
and phenomenology, 107
institutional facts, 31–32
types of, 43–44
institutional power, 43–44
institutional reality
and declarations, 49–51
and language, 35–38
institutions
recognition of, 38
types of, 48
intelligence
as ambiguous concept, 57
intensionality–intentionality distinction, 111
intentionality
structure of, 167–168
internalism, 18
is–ought distinction

language
constitutive role of, 29
and institutional reality, 35–38

Subject index

and recognition of institutions, 38
and social reality, 28–29
Locke’s consciousness criterion, 139, 146, 147
and coherence of spatial-temporal continuity, 140
and continuity of personality, 140
Logical Positivism, 74
machines
and thought, 72
Mind-Body problem, 10, 153
and Cartesian dualism, 11
and neurobiology, 10, 11
modernism, 9
money, 39–40
Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, 163
and Hume’s guillotine, 163, 171–173
motor intentionality, 121
multiple realizability, 15
implications of, 92
Neuronal Correlate of Consciousness (NCC), 13, 143–144
as building block approach, 13, 144
object
and correspondence theory of truth, 194–195
and facts, 195
as observer-relative, 194
objectivity–subjectivity distinction, 167
ontological subjectivity–objectivity distinction, 29–30
personal identity, 139
perspectivalism, 108, 128–132
and Heidegger, 128–130
phenomenological illusion, 116–124
diagnosis of, 124
philosophy
of language, 14, 17–19
of mind, 14
of science, 9–22
of society, 21
Phineas Gage, 140
post-modernism, 6–7
and extreme skepticism, 6
practical reason, 22
programs
as constitutive of minds, 68
and lack of ontology, 98
promises, 174–176
and obligations, 178–179
and prima facie obligation, 178
property dualism, 153–154
and causal overdeterminism, 153–154
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject index</th>
<th>201</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>proposition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and autonomy of syntax, 182</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>characterization, 188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as constitutive of intentionality, 193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as derivative of conditions of satisfaction, 190–191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and perception, 188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>problem of unity, 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>purpose of, 187–188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reductionism, 55, 68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relativism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Heidegger, 128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rules</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constitutive, 31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and status functions, 33–34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell’s theory of descriptions, 113, 195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as fundamental to language, 190–192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truth as special case of, 192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as formal feature of conscious field, 149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and homunculus fallacy, 147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as principle of unity, 149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the problem of, 137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skillful coping, 121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and conditions of improvement, 121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social facts, 27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social ontology, 20, 26–52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>problem of, 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social reality, 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and language, 28–29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and norms, 134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the problem of, 118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logical structure of, 30–38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech Acts, 119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and commitments, 169–170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and communication, 169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and promising, 174–176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status functions, 32, 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and power,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status indicators, 38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Artificial Intelligence, 27, 57, 58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as dualism, 73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refutations of, 59–63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>syntax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and lack of causal power, 97–100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as observer-relative, 94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>syntax–semantics distinction, 62, 68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems Reply, 69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transcendental reduction, 113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contrasted with aspectual shape, 114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as Epoche, 113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and intuition of essences, 113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truth, 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correspondence theory of, 194–195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as special case of satisfaction, 192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synthetic, contingent, 9–22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turing machine, 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turing Test, 53, 68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and computer functionalism, 57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and logical behaviorism, 53–54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified, 27, 56, 62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong, 27, 55, 58, 62, 64–65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak, 54, 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unified conscious field, 142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and shift of attentional focus, 142–143</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Field approach, 144–145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal realizability, 93, 94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal Turing Machine, 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as observer-relative, 177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>