Introduction

The image of the Jew and the Holy Land, moulded by millenarian Evangelicals, was what remained for Lloyd George and his contemporaries, long after the concepts of eschatology had vanished. And when we remember this, we see how influential biblical prophecy and the Evangelical movement was in the Restoration of the Jews to Palestine.¹

Sarah Kochav

The [Balfour] declaration was the product of neither military nor diplomatic interests but of prejudice, faith, and sleight of hand.²

Tom Segev

In a letter consisting of three sentences, Arthur Balfour changed the course of twentieth-century history. Writing to Lord Rothschild on 2 November 1917, the British Foreign Secretary informed the most prominent British Jew that the Cabinet “viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” (Figure 1). The statement, however, went much further in promising that the government would “use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object.” Balfour then invited Rothschild to pass on this news to the Zionist Federation. The “Balfour Declaration” was the single most significant political development in the history of Zionism between the First Zionist Conference of 1897 and the United Nations’ vote in 1948 establishing the state of Israel. In this short, typewritten letter, the most powerful and expansive empire known in human history committed

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Foreign Office,
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

“His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

1. The Balfour Declaration, 1917.

This letter from the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, signaled the British government’s commitment to the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine just weeks before Jerusalem fell into Allied hands in December 1917. Its publication is regarded as the most important event in the history of Zionism between the rise of Jewish Zionism in the 1880s and the establishment of the state of Israel by the United Nations in 1948.

...
explicit responsibility to enable the Jews to establish a national home in the
country.\textsuperscript{3}

In 1925 David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister under whom Balfour
served at the time of the declaration, spoke to the Jewish Historical Society
of England concerning the motives behind the declaration, admitting that
they represented a mixture of both genuine sympathy and self-interest.
Historians have been debating the mixture ever since. Lloyd George
highlighted how his upbringing (in a Welsh Baptist home), his schooling,
and his Sunday school had inculcated in him a “natural sympathy” toward
the Jews and Zionism: “you must remember, we had been trained even more
in Hebrew history than in the history of our own country.” His schooling
in north Wales “taught far more about the history of the Jews than about
the history of my own land. I could tell you all the kings of Israel. But I
doubt whether I could have named half a dozen of the kings of England,
and not more of the kings of Wales.” And that was only the diet of his day
schooling:

\begin{quote}
On five days a week in the day school, and on Sundays in our Sunday
schools, we were thoroughly trained in the history of the Hebrews. We
used to recite great passages from the prophets and the Psalms. We were
thoroughly imbued with the history of your race in the days of its greatest
glory, when it founded that great literature which will echo to the last days
of this old world, influencing, moulding, fashioning human character,
inspiring and sustaining human motive, for not only Jews, but Gentiles as
well. We absorbed it and made it part of the best of the Gentile character.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

Arthur Balfour was raised in a strongly evangelical Scottish Presbyterian
home and was nurtured in a Calvinistic evangelicalism similar to that of
the Welsh Baptist upbringing of Lloyd George. Historians in trying to
make sense of the religious impulse behind Christian Zionism have failed
to appreciate the significance of this shared Calvinistic heritage, totally
unaware that Scottish Presbyterians and Welsh Baptists lived and moved in
a religious world which had much more in common than the social, ethnic,
and denominational barriers that divided them. Balfour’s mother, née Lady
Blanche Gascoyne-Cecil, was the sister of Lord Salisbury, who served three
times as British Prime Minister (1885–6, 1886–92, 1895–1902) before being
succeeded as Prime Minister by his nephew, Arthur Balfour. Although a
wealthy Scottish aristocrat, Lady Blanche was an earnest evangelical who

\begin{footnotes}
\item[4] David Lloyd George, “Afterword” to Philip Guedalla, \textit{Napoleon and Palestine} (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1925), 48.
\end{footnotes}
taught her children in daily Bible classes, instilling in her son a remarkable knowledge of the geography of Palestine and familiarizing him with stories of the Old Testament. She was also known for her personal evangelistic efforts, undoubtedly scandalizing those of her own social rank and astounding those of more humble birth by distributing Gospel tracts at the railway station in East Linton near the sprawling Balfour family estate in East Lothian in Scotland.5

The language that Balfour and Lloyd George repeatedly use concerning the Jews is significant: “the Jewish nation,” “the Jewish people,” the “Jewish races,” and a “Jewish national home.” Such language was, more often than not, resisted by British Jews in the nineteenth century for they generally had adopted the view enunciated by the Great Sanhedrin of 1806, which had affirmed that the Jews were no longer a polity and had ceased to have a “national” identity. For British Jews, “Nationalism came to be regarded as a dangerous heresy which could have perpetuated their alienage.” And yet, the idea of a Jewish national identity, and of world Jewry as constituting a “race” and a “nation,” was widespread among British Protestants in the nineteenth century. Recent historians have argued that the popularity of these ideas concerning the Jews among the British political elite was profoundly indebted to the rise of racial nationalism in the late nineteenth century. It was because of these identity constructions that British policy makers “so readily and steadfastly believe[d] that Zionism was the key to the Jewish imagination.” Such was possible only by positing “the belief that there existed a dominant and unchanging Jewish identity, which was fixed upon the restoration of national life in Palestine. Jewry was therefore perceived to be a very specific type of imagined community, a national community.” James Renton regards this as a fundamentally mistaken belief promoted by an influential Zionist lobby. “By playing upon policy-makers’ perceptions of Jews and ethnic groups, with their portrayal of Jewry as a largely anti-Allied, influential and Zionist Diaspora, they successfully persuaded members of the British Government to pursue a pro-Zionist policy.”7 This perception of the Jews as a “nation” needs to be set, Renton argues, in the context of the emergence of racial nationalist thought as it developed in European culture in the late nineteenth century. While

not denying the significance of racial nationalist thought, the acceptance of these characterizations or imagining of the Jews as “a people,” “a race,” and “a nation” was widespread in Protestant evangelical circles by the 1830s, well before the rise of racial nationalism, and, as will be seen, these characterizations were most effectively promoted in Victorian England by Jews who had converted to forms of Protestant evangelicalism. The most effective exponents of Christian Zionism – the belief that the Jewish people were destined by God to have a national homeland in Palestine and that Christians were obliged to use means to enable this to take place – were Jewish converts to evangelical Christianity who did much to shape the development of popular evangelical thinking in these matters. It was this Protestant religious discourse that marked the family backgrounds of many of the key members of the British political elite responsible for formulating the Balfour Declaration.

It is generally agreed that Balfour and Lloyd George were the two most powerful figures in the British war cabinet; their support of the declaration was crucial. The Lloyd George government formed in December 1916 placed its decision-making power in the hands of the men who constituted the coalition war cabinet. Among the ten men who served in this cabinet between December 1916 and November 1917 were three who had served, or were to serve, as British Prime Ministers during their lifetimes: Arthur Balfour (1902–5), Lloyd George (1916–22), and Andrew Bonar Law (1922–3). The Balfour Declaration came, as it were, ex cathedra from on high; the coalition cabinet represented all the parties – save the Asquith Liberals – and had a much greater degree of autonomy than any peacetime cabinet. It operated enshrouded in secrecy, gave no reasons for the Declaration, outlined no conditions – other than those in the Declaration itself – and expected no accountability. The Declaration was not debated in either of the Houses of Parliament and like most foreign policy issues, was never approved by the British legislature.

A vigorous historical debate has raged for decades as to the British cabinet’s motivation in making this declaration. This study engages with the multifaceted complexity of the motives behind the Balfour Declaration. Early explanations in the wake of the Great War emphasized the idealism of the
British political elite and the religious sympathy among British Protestants for the idea of the restoration of the Jews. This view was most effectively expounded by leading Zionist historians such as Albert Hyamson and Nahum Sokolow who extolled British benevolence as “driven by a mixture of idealism, religious belief, and a desire to redress the past suffering of the Jewish people.”

James Renton has recently argued in *The Zionist Masquerade, The Birth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance, 1914–1918* (2007), that a myth of British “proto-Zionism” was created; it served the purposes of the Zionist propagandists employed by the British government. The image was linear, progressive, and vaguely providentialist; history had unfolded in favor of the Jews as a people, Zionist identity strengthened, and Britain was to be praised for its role as the protector of God’s ancient people.

Leonard Stein’s 1961 work *The Balfour Declaration* took a very different tack, arguing that the two leading motives behind the declaration were related to strategic interests: British propaganda efforts to win American- and Russian-Jewish support for the war effort, and the advantages such a Jewish homeland would give to British national security, ensuring its strategic military control of the Near East. The availability from the late 1960s of new government documentation led to a downplaying of the propaganda motive and to an increased focus on Palestine; yet more recently the propaganda motive has come back into vogue with some historians – such as Tom Segev – focusing on what they see as an anti-Semitic impulse.

James Renton has argued that the British government’s rationale in promoting Zionism in the hopes of influencing world Jewry was based on a series of faulty assumptions. Anti-Semitism has been blamed for imagining a united, powerful Jewry who were largely pro-German and either pacifist or supportive of Russian bolshevism. Renton contends, however, that the emphasis on anti-Semitism does not explain why policy makers were so eager to accept that Zionism was the means of winning over Jews to the British side when Zionism was a minority opinion among world Jewry and certainly not the leading view in Jewish political thought at the time. Indeed, in Palestine in 1917, David Ben-Gurion was trying to set up a Jewish battalion in the Ottoman army to fight against the British, and Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, the father of the revival of modern Hebrew, also a Zionist, was urging Palestinian Jews to accept the offer of Ottoman citizenship and to enlist in the Ottoman army. Renton argues that the Balfour Declaration was not particularly focused on British strategic interests in the Near East, but rather

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10 Segev, *One Palestine*, 16.
was primarily concerned with winning the hearts and minds of American Jews in support of American involvement in the Great War. And yet Renton’s approach is not incompatible with an exploration of the religious dimension affecting the Balfour Declaration, as his interpretation stresses “the degree to which the culture of policy-makers, the world-views through which they perceived reality, determined their political choices and strategy.”

If we are to understand the Protestant religious culture in the backgrounds of many of those responsible for issuing the Balfour Declaration, we have to delve into the ethos of the mid-Victorian era and in particular into the mindset of Victorian evangelicalism. As Eitan Bar-Yosef has observed “it has become a commonplace to see the Balfour Declaration as the culmination of a rich tradition of Christian Zionism in British culture: a tradition which emerged in the seventeenth century, slumbered in the eighteenth and re-emerged, with a vengeance, in the nineteenth.” But as he also points out, “it has proved extremely difficult to assess the actual circulation or influence of these ideas” in Victorian Britain. Bar-Yosef is surely right to distinguish between the highly committed students of biblical prophecy and a more general and diffused “Sunday-School” interest in the Jews. As Sarah Kochav suggests, however, the two are linked. The former focused on concepts derived from a literal reading of Scripture; the latter tended to retain images that such readings had created, while also often moving from a literal to a metaphorical interpretation of Scripture.

Lloyd George, in his speech to the Jewish Historical Society, never mentions any concern with biblical prophecy but only the impact of his day- and Sunday-school training. However, it is clear that this training was the product of a distinctly Protestant reading of the Bible and influenced deeply by what Bar-Yosef has called a “vernacular biblical culture.” This reflected the fact that Victorian England was overwhelmingly both Christian and Protestant, and most deeply influenced by that expression of Protestantism known as “evangelicalism,” which greatly valued the study of the Bible by the individual Christian. The evangelicals were largely responsible for the phenomenon of Sunday schools which, beginning in the 1780s, provided working-class children with literacy and helped to create the demand for universal public education by 1870. The masses of Victorian England thereby came to share common hymns, doctrines, images, and practices and – especially important – acquired a shared Biblical vocabulary that was both ubiquitous and

11 Renton, Zionist Masquerade, 5.
13 Bar-Yosef, The Holy Land in English Culture, 11.
elastic. This work seeks to map and explore the contours of this evangelical mindset and thereby account for the distinctive influence that this religious culture had on popular attitudes to the Jews, and particularly on the idea of their “restoration” to Palestine. In setting out the background, the first chapter of this book explores briefly how the idea of a return of the Jews became prominent in Calvinist thinking – especially among the English Puritans – in the seventeenth century. The idea of Jewish “restoration” was strong in both Britain and colonial America in the seventeenth century, but went into decline in the eighteenth century and then burst on the scene with new vigour beginning in the 1790s – first in Britain and then in America.

The main body of this work then seeks to explore the origins and significance of Christian Zionism as it emerged in nineteenth-century Britain, in an effort to understand why Christian support for the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine was so prevalent in Victorian Britain and how this forms an important part of the background to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. This resurgence of Christian Zionism occurred well before the emergence of modern Zionism as a political force in the Jewish world. Central to the argument of the book is that an understanding of Victorian Christian Zionism is essential if we are to understand the religious impulses that influenced the Balfour Declaration. In focusing on Christian Zionism, this work examines the broader theme of philosemitism characteristic of so much of nineteenth-century English-speaking evangelicalism and then traces the impact of this impulse on nineteenth-century Palestine and Jews in the West. It tries to account for why these emphases emerged in the nineteenth century and what role philosemitism and Christian Zionism played within evangelicalism. The scepticism of Jewish scholars who look for a self-serving, recondivite explanation of both evangelical philosemitism and Christian Zionism is understandable, and it is hoped that this work will help make sense of these puzzling aspects of evangelical Protestant attitudes toward the Jews.

In Philosemitism: Admiration and Support in the English-Speaking World for Jews, 1840–1939, William and Hilary Rubinstein have argued that Gentile philosemitism has largely been dismissed out of hand by Jewish scholars or marginalized in modern accounts of Jewish history. Paul Merkley goes further and suggests that “anti-evangelical prejudice” is at work amongst some contemporary American Jewish leaders, which serves to obscure the issues. Gentile philosemitism and Christian Zionism both need to be better

understood, and an appreciation of their origins is the place to begin. In terms of approach, this work seeks to study these themes primarily through an examination of the life and career of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury (1801–85) (Figure 2). Shaftesbury is well known as the leading social reformer of the Victorian era, working for the regulation

2. Lord Shaftesbury.

Anthony Ashley Cooper (1801–1885) was known by the title Lord Ashley until he succeeded his father as the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury in 1851. A philanthropist and social reformer, Shaftesbury is best known for leading the movement for improving conditions in factories and collieries. He labored ceaselessly on behalf of the underprivileged and marginalized – especially the most desperately poor, laboring women, exploited children, and the insane – and did more than anyone else in the Victorian era to create the concept of social welfare. A memorial in his honor was erected in Piccadilly Circus in London in 1893. Although popularly known as “Eros,” the figure atop the monument was intended to represent “The Angel of Christian Charity.”

Anthony Ashley Cooper was known as Lord Ashley until he succeeded his father as the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury in 1851. Throughout this book, I will follow the convention of referring to him as Lord Shaftesbury; references to his father will be to the sixth Earl of Shaftesbury.
of working conditions in factories and mines, for protection of women and children from exploitation, for sanitary legislation and for humane treatment of the insane – among many other causes.\(^7\) He is also the best-known lay representative of Victorian evangelicalism; it is less appreciated that he was widely acknowledged as the leading Christian Zionist of the nineteenth century.

The themes of Christian philosemitism and Christian Zionism are the central concerns of this book. It is the contention of this work that only by understanding these two phenomena can one make sense of the religious and cultural influences that worked together to create a climate of opinion among the political elite of Britain that was well disposed to the Balfour Declaration. These two themes cannot be properly understood without examining three issues related to the development of British evangelicalism in the early nineteenth century. The three include (1) the development of evangelical identity; (2) the evangelicals’ relationship to power, and specifically to British exercise of power in the development of the empire; and (3) the cultural impact of the evangelicals. Central to this book’s thesis is the contention that by the middle of the nineteenth century philosemitism and Christian Zionism became important “identity markers” for large numbers of British evangelicals. We must therefore, at the outset, signal clearly how the terms “evangelical” and “evangelicalism” are being used. The origins of the term are to be found in the Greek word \textit{euangelion}, meaning “good news” or “gospel” that is used frequently in the New Testament to describe the proclamation of Christ, and sometimes to refer to the first four books of the New Testament (the four gospels). In the sixteenth century, the term “evangelical” was applied to many advocating reformation of the church along Protestant lines. (To add to the confusion, the term “evangelical” in the German-speaking world has come to mean “Protestant”; it has a different meaning in the English-speaking world and this often leads to confusion.)\(^8\) In the early 1700s, however, a new phenomenon emerged in the English-speaking world: a popular movement that shared many characteristics of earlier Protestant reform movements but that was unique and had its own sources of inspiration and its own transdenominational character.


\(^8\) An example of this confusion can be seen in Yaakov Ariel’s otherwise excellent pamphlet “Philosemites or Antisemites?: Evangelical Christian Attitudes toward Jews, Judaism and the State of Israel,” \textit{Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism Series 20} (Jerusalem: Vidal Sasson Center, 2005), 9.