CHAPTER 1

Introduction: impure aesthetics

The purely aesthetic is in other words indissolubly linked to the requirement that it be ultimately impure.¹

Fredric Jameson

Art perceived strictly aesthetically is art aesthetically misperceived.²

Theodor W. Adorno

To speak of the aesthetic in the early twenty-first century within English studies is to risk multiple misunderstandings. The word has been a suspect one in recent years and has served as the subordinated member of key binary opposites in contemporary critical practice. For nearly a generation, in an era dominated by French poststructuralist theory, the aesthetic has been the opposite of the political. It identified the discredited critical practice of Northrop Frye and the New Critics before him; it meant discussing literature decontextualized from its larger social milieu, purposes, and intertextuality.³ As John Joughin wrote, ‘For most radical critics, aesthetics still tends to be discarded as part of the “problem” rather than the “solution.”’⁴ For many recent radical critics, art has been understood either as a version of ideology,⁵ or as an

⁵ This position can be found in Communist-influenced critical writings like Norman Rudich, ‘Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan”: His Anti-Political Vision’, in Norman Rudich (ed.), Weapons of Criticism: Marxism in America and the Literary Tradition (Palo Alto, Calif.: Ramparts, 1976), 215–41; and in structuralist Marxism like that of Etienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey, ‘On
Introduction

irrationalist practice through which contemporary Postmodernist critics have undermined rationality.6

There have been a number of critics, however, and fortunately some major ones, who have resisted this reductive binary thinking in their use of the concept of the aesthetic. Fredric Jameson is one example, and a major influence on this book. Terry Eagleton recovered from an early anti-aesthetic phase to write the appreciatory, if flawed The Ideology of the Aesthetic and the more recent Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic. And Stephen Greenblatt has also consistently kept the aesthetic an important and autonomous category for critical analysis and for understanding the interactions of the work of art and its larger social and cultural context.7

All of these critics knew something that had escaped many of their contemporaries: that the Marxist tradition – and German post-Kantian philosophy generally – contained an extensive, appreciative archive of writings on the aesthetic which valued art as a highly significant human practice in itself and, in the case of Marxist aesthetics, specifically refused to reduce art to ideology.8 At the same time, this pro-art current within Marxism – there is as well a pronounced ‘art-as-ideology’ tendency – resisted the many extant versions of Romantic aesthetics emphasizing art as transcendent, mystical, or quasi-religious. Theodor Adorno has been exemplary in both regards, writing, for example, that ‘Art is rationality that criticizes rationality without withdrawing from it; art is not something prerational or irrational, which would peremptorily condemn it as untruth … Rational and irrational theories of art are therefore equally faulty.’9

For many people, of course, aesthetic discourse is invariably a discourse about beauty and unity, and this narrow conception gives the

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6 Christopher Norris, The Truth about Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); see especially pp. 60–64.
9 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 55.
term a certain *fin-de-siècle* mauveness, a radical separation from reality that denies rather than challenges existing reality. But ‘aesthetics’ as used here contains the ugly as well as the beautiful, and references rather than denies reality while acknowledging an element of domination within it as well as one of emancipation. Again Adorno is eloquent on this point:

The definition of aesthetics as the theory of the beautiful is so unfruitful because the formal character of the concept of beauty is inadequate to the full content … of the aesthetic. If aesthetics were nothing but a systematic catalogue of whatever is called beautiful, it would give no idea of the life that transpires in the concept of beauty.10

And while the unity of the artwork was a highly valued characteristic among all the classical aesthetic writers, contemporary Postmodernist art and contemporary critical theory have constructed an aesthetics of disunity, of incompleteness, and fragmentation; and aesthetic theorists like Walter Benjamin have challenged the notion that what the Romantics called ‘organic unity’ is the sole form aesthetic productions can manifest. It was Benjamin’s friend and intellectual partner Theodor Adorno who most memorably criticized received ideas of the sanctity of the idea of unity when he parodied Hegel’s dictum ‘The whole is the true’ by insisting, ‘The whole is the false’.11

Unavoidably the term ‘aesthetic’ in what follows will be a polysemous one, but I want to declare from the outset that the main meanings of the word as I understand it devolve from an expansion of the term beyond its traditional attributes, the purely beautiful and the organically unified. The older classical emphasis on unity tended to create an Apollonian aesthetic, one that imposed order by suppressing or marginalizing the Dionysian, ‘dangerous’ content of art. Jonathan Dollimore has argued that it is precisely the relatively recent development in critical practice of a hermeneutics which celebrates disunity that has opened the text up to reveal its fissures, its faultlines, its ‘other’12 – and this amounts to a shift from one kind of aesthetics to another. A challenge to this idea of aesthetic unity is basic to my argument here. In fact, one way to think about ‘impure aesthetics’ is to understand such aesthetics to be possible only in our Postmodernist present, when the various new critical methodologies of our times have permitted

10 Ibid., 50–51.
Introduction

us to think of the artwork as disunified, as constituted by internal clashes of discourse and by the insubordination of repressed materials.13 In that sense the whole array of new critical approaches of the last thirty years has been based on a shift of aesthetic perception.14 The ‘impure aesthetics’ I am elucidating thus can be seen as a part of the ‘new aestheticism’ defined and exemplified in several varieties in John Joughin and Simon Malpas’s 2003 collection of essays, The New Aestheticism, including Dollimore’s contribution just mentioned. It also has affinities with one strain of a largely American movement that has been called ‘the new formalism’ and which was recently championed by Marjorie Levinson15 – a subject to which I will return briefly in the Conclusion.

The aesthetic, it is important to emphasize, can and does often have political effects and intentions; indeed, a major line of aesthetic practice from the Romantics to Baudelaire, through Rimbaud, through critical realism and Modernism, through surrealism up to contemporary writers and artists, takes many of its central concepts and much of its justification from political ideals of several kinds, often revolutionary, socialist ones. Although Theodor Adorno voiced criticism of a certain conception of political art,16 I would argue that finally Adorno’s argument for detached rather than committed art is a variation within this larger political tradition, inasmuch as it affirms a broad socially critical role for all art worthy of the name, while warning against artists’ falling into over-simplifying ideologies based on short-sighted commitments. Above all, his is a conception of the aesthetic as always already distanced from the empirical and as such always already an implicit critique of the empirical.

I understand the aesthetic, as a concept, to be a product of modernity;17 indeed, as Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno each argued, it is a concept

13 The idea of an aesthetics of fragmentation, however, goes back at least to Benjamin’s theory of the allegory from the 1920s in his The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: New Left Books, 1977), to be discussed in detail below in Chapter 4. However, the theory languished in obscurity until the 1970s.
15 Marjorie Levinson, ‘What is New Formalism?’, PMLA 122.2 (March 2007), 59–69. In early modern studies its major developers include Heather Dubrow and Mark David Rasmussen. See the Conclusion below for further discussion.
16 For example, Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 103–5, 123, and 246–48.
Kant and ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ aesthetics

interwined very closely with the development of commodity-production under capitalism, simultaneously a mirror-image of and a site of resistance to it. Not coincidentally, the reception of Shakespeare, especially in late eighteenth-century Germany, has been intimately entangled within the production of the idea of the aesthetic as well.

To be sure, in one sense the category of the aesthetic seems to be as old as the human race itself. But in other and central ways, it is of recent origin, and one symptom of this relatively recent birth of the aesthetic is that the word itself and several important senses of the term only came into existence in the mid-eighteenth century. The age of Shakespeare, in this connection (among many others), is a very transitional one.

The idea of the aesthetic emerged during the Enlightenment in the same societies which also experienced the economic ‘take-off’ during which a recognizably capitalist economy, with banks, stock exchanges, and investment funds, had come into being. To note this connection, however, is not the same thing as reducing aesthetics to a simple reflex of a capitalist economy. The idea of the aesthetic has its own history, its own complications – and its own potential for contributing to human liberation.

In sketching some of the crucial ideas of what I am calling ‘impure aesthetics’ – based primarily on concepts from Frankfurt School theorists Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin, but including contributions from several other sources as well – I want to look briefly at the development of aesthetic ideas in Western Europe, with special attention to the seminal aesthetic theory of Immanuel Kant who, perhaps surprisingly, remained an important source of aesthetic ideas for Adorno, despite Kant’s largely ahistorical approach to the issue. Then I will continue the historical sketch with a brief look at how Hegel and Marx (and very briefly Nietzsche) contributed to aesthetics. The Introduction continues with a sketch of how Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno developed several of the ideas of Kant, Hegel, and Marx into the most consequential version of the broad project of ‘impure aesthetics’ at issue here and then situates this critical approach in contemporary Shakespeare studies.

KANT AND ‘PURE’ AND ‘IMPURE’ AESTHETICS

Some forty years after Alexander Baumgarten coined the term ‘aesthetics’ in his 1750 Aesthetica,18 Immanuel Kant published what would prove to

18 Baumgarten based the word on the Greek aisthesthai, ‘to sense’, and used it to argue for the idea that sensory perceptions could produce a kind of knowledge or cognition. In the second volume of the work, he extended the term to refer to sensory perception of the beautiful, and this became
be the most consequential and influential formulation of aesthetic theory in his so-called ‘Third Critique,’ the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) – a work which completed, as he notes in the introduction, the trilogy begun by his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) – and thus inaugurated a central discourse of modern philosophy.

Because Kant is not often associated with the Marxist tradition of the Frankfurt School, I want to describe Kant’s crucial contribution to the idea of the aesthetic and bring out what proved to be essential and what proved misleading in the subsequent formation of impure aesthetics. Both his strengths and his weaknesses are crucial to this subsequent development.

Kant’s initial assertions about aesthetic experiences are surprisingly simple, but they entail a raft of complications and ramifications. He is struck by the singularity of what he calls ‘this strange ability we have’ to make judgments of taste, or aesthetic judgments – the non-verbal decision constituted by our pleasurable reactions to a beautiful object, like a rose.\(^{19}\) According to Kant, we judge, without any conscious thinking about it, that what we have just perceived is beautiful, through a feeling of pleasure. Unlike Baumgarten and a number of subsequent theorists, Kant insists that there is nothing cognitive or intellectual about this judgment in itself. But, following the British skeptical empiricist David Hume (in this as in many other matters), he asserts that the judgment does have a cognitive implication. The truly beautiful, Kant says, will be universally perceived as such by all human beings if they are not disabled by some prejudice, interest, or handicap. And it is at this point that his argument begins to ramify into various complexities.

Kant argues that we have to distinguish between the truly beautiful (in principle universal) and the merely attractive (a quality of an object that is desirable to us because of some merely subjective interest). This argument constitutes Kant’s notorious doctrine of aesthetic disinterest, and he soon finds himself disallowing the ‘lower senses’ of taste, touch, and smell; sexual or erotic desire; and any merely subjective associations. Furthermore, because the truly aesthetic is non-cognitive for Kant, it must exclude any conceptual dimension or ‘teleological’ pre-conceptions

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\(^{19}\) Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (1790), trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1987), § 31; 144. Subsequent references will, like this one, include the number of the section of the treatise from which the quotation or summary is taken as well as the page numbers from this edn.
Kant and ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ aesthetics

(by which he means a judgment that something is a perfect specimen of its type – an excellent horse or human figure, for example). Such judgments, he writes, often accompany aesthetic pleasure in the perception of some object, but he insists they are logically separate.\textsuperscript{20}

In other words, Kantian aesthetics is ‘pure.’\textsuperscript{21} Stripped of any erotic or personal charm, its content deemed irrelevant to its aesthetic purity, Kant’s aesthetic is primarily a formalism (with the understanding that form involves a peculiar kind of non-utilitarian ‘purposiveness’): ‘A pure judgment of taste’, Kant writes, ‘is one not influenced by charm or emotion (though these may be connected with a liking for the beautiful), and whose determining basis is therefore merely the purposiveness of the form.’\textsuperscript{22} The discussion of the sublime later in the argument complicates this, but Kant argues that because it lacks specific cognitive content and creates a pleasurable aesthetic feeling, the sublime is in the same category as the beautiful.\textsuperscript{23}

The great bulk of Kant’s ingenious argumentation consists in making the necessary distinctions and exceptions to keep aesthetics pure. To be sure, Kant recurs from time to time to the thesis, announced in his introduction, that aesthetics constitutes a kind of ‘bridge’ between pure and practical reason, between epistemology and morality. He argues that the beautiful is the ‘symbol’ of the morally good: in aesthetic pleasure we become conscious of a certain ‘ennoblement’ or ‘elevation’ above the mere pleasure of sensations, thus inculcating a kind of humanizing training or discipline analogous to that of the moral order.\textsuperscript{24} But these claims of Kant have been among the least satisfactory ones to subsequent aesthetic theorists.\textsuperscript{25} It has been Kant’s separation of knowledge into three separate categories, rather than his attempt to link them, that has proved most fruitful for subsequent thinkers, notably including Adorno, for whom the autonomy of art from the other ‘spheres’ gives it much of its critical, negative power.

For Kant, aesthetic experience is a crucial enough aspect of modern life that it demands to be defined as a third area of human judgment,

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., § 2; 45–46 and throughout.
\textsuperscript{22} Kant, Critique of Judgment, § 13; 69.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., § 23; 97–98.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., § 39; 225–32.
along with ‘pure’ and ‘practical’ (i.e. ethical) reason – each constituting a separate sphere of human interaction with the world. And although Kant tried to link the aesthetic with pure and practical reason, it remains extraordinarily autonomous, uncontaminated by judgments of right or wrong (the matter of practical reason) or of truth or falsity (the matter of pure reason) – and, as noted, in many ways uncontaminated by thought itself.

There is, however, some give in these claims. Although aesthetic judgment in itself is non-cognitive, it can involve what Kant calls ‘aesthetic ideas’. Thus, poetry, although it uses language and concepts, is essentially aesthetic because such ideas are ‘inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely adequate’. But aesthetic experience leads, crucially for Kant, into a consciousness of our cognitive abilities, a kind of awareness of our own powers, and it is pleasurable in itself. This quality in turn allows Kant to say that the aesthetic experience thus harmonizes the whole person, laying the basis for Kant’s disciple Friedrich Schiller to claim in his *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* that aesthetics should therefore be at the heart of humanistic education – and subsequently providing to the young Karl Marx a concept to help define an ideal of all-round human development.

Kant’s aesthetic theory was thus more than an attempt to conceptualize the specific states of mind associated with the beautiful and the sublime in Enlightenment culture. As Andrew Bowie argues, Kant became taken with the aesthetic in an attempt to ‘save’ a concept of freedom and of subjecthood from the imperializing encroachments of the developing natural sciences. In effect, Kant’s notions of subjectivity and aesthetics could act as a counter to the agenda of empirical science, which threatened to turn nature and human subjectivity into mechanistic, rule-bound assemblages of serialized empirical data. Aesthetic judgment was fascinating to Kant because it operated outside of a narrow, rule-bound rationality and because it intuited a unity and a teleology within the object – say a poem or painting – for which there was no purely cognitive ground. It thus appeared to be a kind of non-cognitive knowledge, and this is a concept of art which will prove central to both Benjamin and Adorno.

The idea of non-cognitive knowledge in turn raised the issue for Kant as to whether this unifying and teleological principle had the status of the transcendental *a priori* he had famously defined in *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

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26 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, § 49; 182.
27 Ibid., § 9; 61–64.
28 Ibid., § 59; 228–30.
Kant and ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ aesthetics

Reason. Kant stopped short of granting aesthetic judgement this status – as would the Frankfurt School theorists. But Romantic artist–philosophers would go beyond Kant in this, making the (aesthetic) Imagination the most truth-revealing mental capacity. But Kant himself argued that ‘(Independent) natural beauty carries with it a purposiveness in its form, by which the object seems as it were pre-determined for our power of judgment, so that this beauty constitutes in itself an object of our liking.’ 30 That is, the beautiful creates a delightful ‘as if’, a premonition which reason cannot confirm, of the permeability of nature to human perception, as if the world had achieved its end in being apprehended as beautiful by us. Aesthetic judgment, then, constitutes a wholly fictive realm where natural objects are humanized and whereby human perception is made completely adequate to noumena. Of course Kantian transcendental philosophy was founded on the notion that the thing-in-itself remained categorically beyond the realm of human perception. Kant’s ‘as it were’ is crucial in conveying this fictionality of the aesthetic.

This claim of Kant’s is an important one, and one easily misconstrued. Terry Eagleton, for example, has argued in reference to this passage that this notion turns Kant’s aesthetics into ‘the very essence of the ideological’. Even though Kant’s premise is self-consciously figurative or fictional, Eagleton says, ‘it is the kind of heuristic fiction which permits us a sense of purposiveness, centredness, and significance, and thus one which is of the very essence of the ideological’.31

But because in the Marxist tradition the concept of ideology always raises suspicion, implying a ‘false consciousness’ produced under the influence of power and interest, Eagleton’s use of it in this context disables him from seeing the utopian quality of Kant’s description central to Frankfurt School aesthetics. Precisely because modern cultures fragment human experience into separate spheres and privilege individuality over collectivity, both ideology and the aesthetic come into existence in the strict sense only within modernity. But perhaps what is most germane here is the way Eagleton passes over the very fictionality of Kantian aesthetic perception, its counter-factual status. What kind of ideology, we might ask, is held permanently suspended, to be tentative, hypothetical – to be enjoyed and played with rather than uncritically assumed and identified with? Kant’s notions of fictionality and playfulness are among the most valuable aspects of his seminal theory, still valuable precisely in

this emphasis on beauty as an idealized representation of the intimate link between the human and the natural. It is this quality, in fact, which makes Kant an important source for ‘green criticism’ or Ecocriticism – a topic to which I will return briefly in the next chapter and in the Conclusion. It is possible to move this insight into a concept of the utopian, making art not a model for a really existing human world, but instead an idealized space from which the real can be measured and judged, not least in terms of humanity’s relation to the natural world.

Kant’s theory is considered by most historians of aesthetic discourse to be of founding importance. It is, wrote Eva Schaper, a contribution without which ‘aesthetics would not exist in its modern form’.32 Despite the earlier work of Baumgarten, Leibniz, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Burke, and Hume, among others, Kant’s is the first work to incorporate aesthetics into a larger philosophical system, and it is almost every aesthetic theorist’s starting point because it raised the issues and defined the terms still discussed today.

But for all that, it is also important to note that Kantian aesthetics today cannot stand without considerable supplementation. The doctrine of aesthetic disinterestedness, so crucial to Kant’s entire theoretical edifice, has in particular struck any number of twentieth-century commentators as indefensible.33 The elaborate attempts to keep aesthetic experience non-cognitive by separating it from ‘teleological judgments’ and by insisting that only form is truly aesthetic, with content a complete irrelevance, found a formidable critic in G. W. F. Hegel and several subsequent theorists.34 In our own time, it seems, only ‘impure’ aesthetics are viable, and Kant’s achievement seems in many ways one of having raised the issues which others have had both to criticize and develop. As Fredric Jameson wrote, generalizing beyond Kant to the entire discipline of philosophical aesthetics of which Kant’s writings are a formative discourse, ‘what gives

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34 This point is well developed in Alan Singer, Aesthetic Reason: Artworks and the Deliberative Ethos (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 5. Aesthetic theorists, Singer notes, can be divided into two camps: those who view the aesthetic as cognitive or with cognitive dimensions (Baumgarten, Herder, Hegel, Fichte, and Adorno) and those who view the aesthetic as essentially non-cognitive (neo-Platonists, Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and, ultimately, Kant).