Introduction

In the aftermath of traumatic conflicts, why have some former enemy countries managed to establish durable peace whereas others remain mired in animosity? Does historical memory play an important role in shaping postconflict interstate relationships? This book has two main goals: to explore the origins of interstate reconciliation and to generalize causal links between historical ideas and international relations. Both are understudied but extremely important subjects in the field of international relations.

I argue that the key to realizing deep reconciliation is the harmonization of national memories between the parties involved. The memory divergence that comes about as a result of national mythmaking tends to harm the long-term prospects of reconciliation. As H. Richard Niebuhr says in *The Meaning of Revelation*, "Where common memory is lacking, where [people] do not share in the same past, there can be no real community, and where community is to be formed common memory must be created. . . . [T]he measure of our unity is the extent of our common memory."[1]

This line of argument directly challenges the standard realist explanation of international relations. For a hard-nosed realist concerned primarily about power, reconciliation is equated with political and military cooperation that should occur when states have common strategic interests, and the remembering and forgetting of traumatic history are irrelevant to reconciliation. This book, on the other hand, proposes the concept of *deep interstate reconciliation*, which is posited on the assumption that

[1] Quoted in Shriver, "Long Road to Reconciliation," 210.

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countries share the understanding that war is unthinkable and hold generally amicable feelings toward each other. Deep reconciliation is a kind of relationship that has to be cemented not only by shared short-run security needs but also by sustainable mutual understanding and trust. Because the enduring memory of past trauma can fuel mutual grievances and mistrust, nations cannot avoid addressing historical memory when searching for a path to reconciliation.

Deep reconciliation matters. It is almost a truism that peace means the absence of war, so ending war should bring about peace. Social scientists have long emphasized the importance of conflict resolution measures, such as negotiation, good offices, arbitration, conciliation, and mediation, as the main pathway from conflict to peace.[2] Viewing the end of conflict as the result of settling clashing interests, however, the conflict resolution perspective rarely addresses "how peace, once obtained, can be stabilized and maintained."[3] A world without armed conflicts is not inherently peaceful. Beyond bringing war to an end, much more work is needed to dispel the psychological and emotional shadows of past trauma that could again cause the use of force. Studies on "enduring rivalries" show that a great proportion of international militarized conflicts are concentrated in a small number of dyadic relationships.[4] A rivalry becomes enduring not necessarily because the same conflict of interest does not get resolved, but often because the psychological wounds suffered in the last traumatic conflict were never treated in a timely and satisfactory manner, begetting new conflicts time and again. Deep reconciliation, aiming at the removal of this historical burden, offers a solution to such a vicious cycle. As Nadler and Saguy remind us, sustainable peace is realized through both resolving the actual problems between enemies and "addressing the emotional barriers that separate them through processes of reconciliation."[5]

The importance of deep reconciliation is illuminated by post–Cold War international relations. When the East-West ideological and strategic

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[2] For some recent peace study works emphasizing the conflict resolution approach, see Deutsch and Coleman, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution*; Greig, "Moments of Opportunity"; Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies*; and Kriesberg and Thorson, *Timing the De-escalation*.

[3] Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov, "Stable Peace," 13.

[4] Diehl and Goertz, *War and Peace*.

[5] Nadler and Saguy, "Reconciliation between Nations," 30. Other recent works devoting attention to reconciliation, not just conflict resolution, include Bar-Tal, "From Intractable Conflict"; Keogh and Haltzel, *Northern Ireland*; and Krepon and Sevak, *Crisis Prevention*.

confrontation receded, ancient bitterness about historical trauma reemerged as a major threat to international peace. East Asia saw a resurgence of vivid memories of Japanese aggression in the early twentieth century.[6] The lack of deep reconciliation between Japan and its neighbors has cast a dismal shadow over the prospect of regional security cooperation in Asia.[7] Likewise, long-standing rivals in other regions, such as the Israelis and Palestinians and the people of India and Pakistan, have not overcome their hereditary feuds to attain true peace.

But history also provides reasons to be optimistic. Deep reconciliation has come to the postwar Franco-German relationship. After the end of World War II, the two countries formed a security alliance, engaged in European integration, and even jointly wrote history textbooks. Similarly, despite brutal fighting that was ended by the use of nuclear weapons, the United States and Japan put the past behind them and established the most solid alliance in the postwar Asian-Pacific region.[8] Profound changes signaling reconciliation have also emerged between Germany and its Central and Eastern European neighbors, including Poland and the Czech Republic.[9] In some other cases where deep reconciliation has yet to materialize, such as that of Greece and Turkey, various governmental and civilian efforts toward this goal are gaining momentum.[10]

To study the path to deep reconciliation, this book considers mainly two competing theories. The first is a realist theory that focuses on external material threats as the driving forces in international relations. Proponents of this theory assume that states exist in an anarchic world in which the self-help principle prompts competitive security policies and in which cooperation is a rare phenomenon. Only states with the shared goal of balancing against a common external threat would develop solid cooperation. This logic of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" has wide

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[6] Fujiwara, "Sensō no Kioku"; "Japan's Murky Past Catches Up," *Economist*, July 8, 2000; "Not Bought Off: Former Sex Slaves Want Compensation, Not Charity," *Far East Economic Review* 159, No. 30 (1996); and Tanaka, "Asia Demanding Postwar Compensation."

[7] Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik"; Kristof, "Problem of Memory"; Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*.

[8] To understand the enormous hatred and contempt of the United States and Japan for one another during the Pacific War and the terror of American atomic bombing that left an irremovable scar on the Japanese national psyche, see Dower, *War without Mercy* and "The Bombed," as well as Orr, *Victim as Hero*, ch. 3.

[9] Handl, "Czech-German Declaration"; Phillips, "Politics of Reconciliation" and *Power and Influence*, chs. 3 and 4.

[10] On the Greek-Turkish peace process, see Demirel, "Need for Dialogue"; "Let's Be Friends; Turkey and Greece," *Economist*, April 13, 2002.

currency in international relations academic and policy circles. As long as the common enemy, *defined by its threatening capabilities*, remains strong, states should maintain durable political and economic cooperation, and their popular relations should also be friendly, because realists believe that states are unitary actors and that public feeling has no separate dynamics from government policy. Thus, deep reconciliation materializes, but it is conditioned on the continuity of international systemic patterns.[11] Conversely, states should be less likely to reach reconciliation if they face no common threat or if they pose a mutual threat to one another, either directly or by their external alignment.

This realist theory treats historical ideas as a reflection or justification of structurally defined national interest. That is, memories and myths are epiphenomenal, changing in accordance with the external environment: If posing a mutual threat, states will demonize one another and grow mutual hatred; if a common threat arises, they will forget the past, discard hatred, and develop cooperation.

National mythmaking theory, the second theory considered in this book, disagrees. It contends that not only international constraints, but also domestic political needs and societal context can shape the ways in which a nation remembers its past; once formed, historical memory can take on a life of its own, exerting a significant impact on interstate relations.

Mythmaking is a common practice in political and social life. I formulate national mythmaking theory to address a two-part question: first, why and how are myths of traumatic history made? And second, how does mythmaking affect interstate reconciliation outcomes? According to the theory, the ruling elites, harboring special political-ideological goals, tend to construct historical myths that glorify or whitewash the actions of its own nation during a past conflict while blaming others for causing the tragedy. The prevalence of such myths in national consciousness causes a sharp disagreement between two former enemy states on the interpretation of their past conflict. By embracing divergent historical narratives, both the elite and the general public will engender strong mistrust against each other's country, and emotions of grievances and frustration will prevail in both societies, often degenerating into a spiral of finger-pointing and negative stereotyping. In addition, intergovernmental disputes over issues other than history become harder to resolve

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[11] As Magnus Ericson points out, the concept of stable peace has no necessary relation to duration. See "Birds of a Feather," 132.

because the prevailing public resentments tend to increase the political cost for the government to make any conciliatory policies. Conversely, if former combatant states by and large agree on the basic interpretation of their past conflict and take substantial measures to redress the trauma, they are more likely to remove the historical roots of popular grievances and intergovernmental friction, significantly promoting deep reconciliation.

Comparative case study is the primary methodology used in this book to evaluate realist theory and national mythmaking theory. I examine two post-WWII cases: Sino-Japanese and (West) German–Polish relations. (For the sake of convenience, I refer at times to "German-Polish relations," with the understanding that prior to reunification one must speak of either West German–Polish relations or East German–Polish relations.) The two dyads are similar in their geographic proximity, traditional economic and cultural ties, and recent history of traumatic conflict; they also share the Cold War structural environment that immediately followed the conflict.[12] Yet the outcomes of their reconciliation processes are quite different: Today, the united Germany and Poland have approached deep reconciliation, whereas the Sino-Japanese relationship is still marred by serious mistrust and simmering animosity. Thus, comparing the two cases is ideal for investigating when interstate reconciliation occurs and why its degree varies across cases.

Another significant implication of studying these cases is that doing so addresses several outstanding puzzles in contemporary East Asian and European international relations. One is ascertaining the underlying causes of the so-called history problem in Sino-Japanese relations. Why did China and Japan quarrel over history not immediately after the war but only from the early 1980s, when the majority of their populations had no direct experience of the war and the two countries had normalized diplomatic relations and developed close bilateral economic and social ties? Second, during WWII, Germany and Japan both committed horrendous atrocities against neighboring countries. Why are the Germans far more forthright regarding their responsibility for these war crimes than are the Japanese? Existing studies of the Germany-Japan

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[12] Granted, China has an aspiration for great power status that Poland lacks, but China and Poland faced similar structural constraints during the Cold War era. China's power ambition directly affected Japan only after the Cold War, when the superpower-dominated structure gave way to a more multipolar setting in East Asia. This change, however, will be captured by my measurement of the post–Cold War structural environment for Sino-Japanese relations.

comparison have not presented a convincing answer in a systematic, scholarly fashion.[13]

Another puzzle is the different ways in which Poland and China have treated history. Both were victim countries in WWII, but both had an inglorious aspect in their national histories: Poland had an anti-Semitic culture, and quite a few Poles collaborated with the Nazis against the Jews, whereas the Communist regimes in both Poland and China were oppressive, and at times violent, against their own people. So both nations would be disgraced by critically examining their past. But why has Poland carried out deep soul-searching regarding national history in recent decades, whereas the Chinese historiography has remained highly mythologized?

Case studies in this book follow mainly the congruence procedure and process-tracing methods. My congruence tests rely on both cross-case and within-case comparisons. That German-Polish and Sino-Japanese relations have large within-case variance in both independent and dependent variables over time allows the causal argument to be tested repeatedly with just two cases. Specifically, I divide the two cases into four phases: the 1950s–1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s–present. When testing the two competing theories against each subcase, I make paired observations of values on the independent and dependent variables and then assess whether these values covary in a manner consistent with the predictions of the theories. To confirm that the observed correlation is causal and not spurious, I also process trace the chain of events "by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes."[14]

Yet my investigation of the two cases is far from mechanistic. When examining postwar Sino-Japanese relations, I draw widely on primary sources in the Japanese and Chinese languages, including government documents, interviews, memoirs, elite statements, media data, and

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[13] Ian Buruma's *Wages of Guilt*, which compares how Germany and Japan have dealt with war guilt, is written more in a journalistic than an academic style, and the materials in the book need to be updated. Thomas Berger's *Cultures of Antimilitarism* also compares Germany and Japan, but does not directly address the war guilt issue. Okabe Tatsumi ascribes the difference in German and Japanese war memories to two "objective" factors in "Historical Remembering and Forgetting": the difficulty of blaming a few individual leaders in Japan for the war as in Germany and the lack of a regional community in Asia similar to the European Union. This explanation overlooks the domestic power dynamics and different political choices made by elites in Germany and Japan that significantly shaped national memories.

[14] On theory testing using qualitative case study methods, see George, "Case Studies and Theories"; King, *Designing Social Inquiry*; and Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 55–67.

schoolbook texts. In this book, I define "elites" as national leaders and high-ranking government officials directly involved in policy making as well as foreign policy specialists (including military analysts) who play an advisory role. The case study of German-Polish relations relies mainly on English-language sources. Next, I briefly introduce the case study results.

Realist theory fully explains the total lack of Sino-Japanese reconciliation in the 1950s–60s. China and Japan posed a mutual threat because of their antagonistic positions in the bipolar world system. This determined their mutual expectation of immediate war, Tokyo's policy of nonrecognition of Beijing, and restrictions on bilateral trade and societal contacts. As for war memory, ruling elites in both countries created and perpetuated pernicious national myths. But, surprisingly, the war narratives of the perpetrator state, Japan, and the victim state, China, converged on a mythical distinction between a small handful of Japanese militarists and the vast majority of innocent Japanese people. Chinese official propaganda actually downplayed areas of disagreement with Japanese historiography. Instead, China tried to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people through "People's Diplomacy," to obtain Japanese official recognition of the Communist regime. So mythmaking theory better explains the policy preferences of the two governments, which wished to develop a certain degree of cooperation, than it does their actual policies. This is the case because their preferences were trumped by the negative international structure.

During the 1970s, Sino-Japanese bilateral relations progressed to a "honeymoon" phase, largely propelled by the appearance of a common Soviet threat. But this positive structural environment never produced deep reconciliation between the two countries, as realists would predict, because Chinese and Japanese elites did not try to settle their memory disagreement but simply set it aside to clear the way for their immediate strategic cooperation. Political gestures substituted for sincere, concrete restitution, and the propaganda of national myths prevented rigorous investigation of historical facts and clarification of war responsibility. National mythmaking theory correctly predicts the limitations of bilateral official cooperation and the superficiality of popular friendship because of the still-deep-seated Chinese antipathy toward Japan stemming from bitter war memories.

The period after the early 1980s again presents a puzzle to realists because the Sino-Japanese honeymoon came to an end despite the continuation of the Soviet threat. Chinese leaders felt severe power insecurity domestically because of growing societal discontent with the Communist

regime and an elite split on the reform agenda. By "othering" Japan in diplomatic friction over history issues and through domestic patriotic education, they tried to divert public resentment and consolidate the re- form coalition. Moreover, the memory contestation between Japanese progressives and conservatives was publicized internationally during this period. The polarization of Japanese historical memory, especially when involving blatant denials and whitewashing of past aggression, frequently incited the Chinese public; it actually made elite mythmaking about an evil and dangerous Japan self-fulfilling and widely accepted among the Chi- nese people. Consequently, war narratives of the two countries directly clashed, starting from their first textbook controversy in 1982. Since then, the "history problem" has seriously strained bilateral official and popu- lar relations. Historical grievances about Chinese wartime suffering and the lack of Japanese contrition became a major source of Chinese pop- ular animosity toward Japan. Reacting to Chinese criticism, feelings of disgust and frustration with China spread widely in Japan. Besides these emotions, a clear tendency existed among the Chinese public and strate- gic elites to associate Japan's historical memory with its intention to act aggressively again.

In the 1990s, realist factors, including post–Cold War structural uncer- tainty as well as China's and Japan's pursuit of military buildup and assertive international strategy, contributed to the heightened tension in bilateral relations. But the five-year time lag between the end of the Cold War and the sharp increase in these countries' mutual threat perception, as well as the absence of a major shift in their power balance, suggest that the troubled bilateral relations between China and Japan were shaped not just by power distribution but also by the impact of the history problem. On one hand, Chinese suspicion of Japanese intentions and anti-Japanese popular sentiment were exacerbated because of frequent history disputes. On the other hand, more and more Japanese people rejected China's suspicion of and demands on Japan based on history, believing that China was simply using the "history card" to bully Japan. Such negative mutual emotions and perceptions of intentions also hard- ened elite and popular attitudes during bilateral disputes, preventing the governments from reaching a compromise on economic friction and set- tling various sovereignty controversies, despite the lack of vital strategic interest in these disputes. Since 2006, official relations have considerably improved, thanks to the willingness of the two governments to down- play the history issue and emphasize practical cooperation. But whether China and Japan can forge a truly deep reconciliation rather than repeat

the short-lived "honeymoon" in the 1970s still hinges on the efforts to bridge the wide gap between their historical memories.

In contrast to Sino-Japanese relations, German-Polish relations are a case of reconciliation success. As in the Asian case, the Cold War structure initially locked West Germany and Poland into mutual hostility. By the mid-1960s, ruling elites in both countries had created historical myths that demonized the other nation and clashed head on regarding the eastern frontier and the postwar expulsion of Germans from the eastern territories. Such intense historiographic conflict aggravated the structural barriers to bilateral reconciliation.

Since the late 1960s, however, East-West détente in Europe has allowed West German–Polish cooperation to emerge under more favorable structural conditions. National mythmaking theory also applies: From this period, bilateral memory divergence began to shrink because of Germany's actions of contrition as part of its *Ostpolitik* and the program of bilateral historians' dialogues. It is also noteworthy that liberal intellectuals in Poland attacked Soviet-style history education from the 1970s. In the 1980s, they even began to critically reflect on the sensitive parts of their own national history, such as the Communist rule of Poland and the troubled relationship between Poles and Jews. This historiographic liberalization resulted from both the domestic political upheavals in Poland during this period and Germany's frank apologies for its war guilt to Poland, which considerably mitigated the Poles' obsession with their victimhood and freed up their national soul to ponder their own victimization of other peoples.

In the next two phases of German-Polish relations, national mythmaking theory performs better than realist theory. In the 1980s, the trend of historical settlement through restitution and joint history writing persisted, cushioning the negative impact of the decline of détente on bilateral relations. Since the end of the Cold War, both countries have committed to fostering mutual understanding and trust through comprehensive exchange programs and efforts to construct a shared history about their past traumatic conflicts. So even in the absence of a pressing common security threat, greater memory convergence contributed to institutionalized security and economic cooperation between Germany and Poland and their amicable popular relations, indicative of deep reconciliation.

Overall, the case studies show that deep reconciliation will be absent if national mythmaking prevails because it generates considerable memory divergence between nations and causes mistrust and mutual antipathy. Even if governments agree on a mythical interpretation of history for the

sake of expediency, a truly friendly popular tie is unattainable because the intergovernmental agreement on historical lies is fragile, shattering easily as the political context changes.

To emphasize the importance of historical memory is not to reject the explanatory power of realist theory entirely. Realist theory correctly points out that cooperation is unlikely for strategic adversaries locked in mutual balancing. Although positive systemic conditions alone cannot bring about deep reconciliation, this book shows that at least some degree of compatibility between two states' security interests is helpful for the reconciliation process to burgeon in the first place. But it also finds that a critical step toward deep interstate reconciliation is to stop national mythmaking and construct shared memory, which can begin to take root even when two sides are still strategic adversaries (as in West German–Polish relations in the 1970s) and, if greatly encouraged by governments, will flourish when their strategic conflict lessens.

Neither does this book argue that historical ideas are the only force shaping foreign policy and interstate relations between former enemy countries. Even in those subcases when national mythmaking theory proves a powerful explanation, numerous contingent factors also play a role in bringing about certain policy outcomes. My main goal is to demonstrate that historical ideas can have an independent influence over foreign policy as well as to consider when and how this influence actually matters.

The structure of the book is as follows: Chapter 1 defines interstate reconciliation and lays out realist and national mythmaking explanations for reconciliation. Chapter 2 studies German-Polish relations since the end of WWII to show how interstate reconciliation might be accomplished in a real case. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 examine Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s–60s, the 1970s, the 1980s, and from the 1990s to the present, respectively. In each case study, I first illustrate the international structural conditions and war memories of the relevant countries and infer two sets of predictions from realist and national mythmaking theories regarding interstate reconciliation development. Then I examine the evolution of bilateral relations during each period to compare the relative validity of the predictions.

The conclusion summarizes the case-study findings and compares the domestic and external contexts of Germany versus Japan and China versus Poland that caused their different attitudes toward historical legacies. I argue that the different institutional legacies in postwar West Germany and Japan had a path-dependent impact on their memory construction.