THE MORALS OF MODERNITY

CHARLES LARMORE
Columbia University

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INTRODUCTION

Moral Philosophy and Modernity

The essays in this volume are devoted to exploring a single problem, the relation between moral philosophy and modernity. At bottom, this problem consists in defining the way distinctive forms of modern experience should orient our moral thinking. But it also gives rise to the further question of whether the dominant forms of modern philosophy have themselves been blind to important dimensions of the moral life. These are among the issues I took up in an earlier book, *Patterns of Moral Complexity* (1987), but though I have developed some of that material further, I have also had to branch out in new directions. Moreover, many of the present essays, while published before, appear here in a significantly revised and expanded form. Besides determining the claims that modern experience and philosophy should have on our moral self-understanding, this book also, I hope, gives some sense of the difficulty I have felt in finding my way through this subject to where my own convictions lie.

The meaning of the term "modernity" is far from obvious, of course. Though I trust my understanding of it emerges from the course of this book, I can help the reader by clearing away at the outset some possible misconceptions. First of all, I should emphasize that I am not principally interested here in modern culture and society as an *object* of moral evaluation. Necessary though such evaluation be, I am concerned with what I regard as a more fundamental connection between moral philosophy and modernity. My aim is to examine the way modern forms of experience should *constitute* or be reflected in the very categories of our moral thinking. Clearly, modernity, so understood, must figure as something morally positive, as an essential element in what I believe we should value. I hope the reader will not wrongly assume that I identify modernity in this sense with modern life as a whole and that I celebrate everything that is distinctively modern. For who would deny that modern times have not only known their fair share of the usual horrors, but invented new ones all their own? It is in the cross of the present that I, like Hegel, look for the rose.

In addition, since my concern lies with the import of modern experience and modern philosophy for our moral thinking today, the aesthetic aspects of modernity, particularly the developments known as "modernism," play a role (Chapter 9) only to the extent they connect with this moral problematic. A further warning is that though I view modernity as a phenomenon that begins to be prominent in the sixteenth century, I do not suppose there occurred at that time some sharp and massive swerve of the *Zeitgeist,* producing hitherto unknown forms of belief and experience that swept away all "premodern" conceptions. In this, I break with the image modern thought has often had of itself. Early modern thinkers such as Descartes and Bacon often saw themselves as beginning from scratch, setting aside inherited ideas and starting out anew. The same ambition fueled the philosophies of autonomous subjectivity in which the German Idealists announced that modern self-consciousness can draw from itself the norms for guiding our thought and action.[1] It is clear today how exaggerated such self-stylizations were, and how dependent the forms of thought we might consider distinctively modern really were on what came before. Still, an eye for continuities should not keep us from also seeing the significant changes modernity expresses, even if they amount more to shifts in emphasis than to absolute breaks. In this book I try to steer a middle way between the extremes that philosophical discussions of this subject often take. Modernity is not a Promethean act of self-legislation, but neither is its sense of being new a pure illusion. It represents, moreover, a condition that is still our own. I must confess little sympathy with the idea of the "postmodern," which, for all its recent popularity, is very obscure. Where it does make some sense, it seems to me (as I observe in Chapter 2) still a prisoner of the very difficulties in modern thought to which it is alert.

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[1] For this understanding of the aims and difficulties of German Idealism, see the fine book by Robert Pippin, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

However, probably the greatest source of misunderstanding will be the suspicion that having moral philosophy respond to something called "modernity" is a peculiarly German preoccupation, of little interest to more sober minds unimpressed by speculative philosophies of history. In reality, this project is not so parochial. The history of modern ethics since the sixteenth century, in the English-speaking world as on the Continent, cannot be understood except as the effort to devise a conception of morality appropriate to the emerging features of modern life. Nor have worries about the moral adequacy of modern ethics been confined to a German philosophical culture all too often given to antimodern rancor. After all, one of the most salient features of Anglo-American ethics today is a dissatisfaction with the dominant obligation-centered strands of modern ethics – Kantian and utilitarian – and a wish to return to ancient and medieval theories of virtue. As the essays in Part I make plain, I do not share this enthusiasm for putting notions of virtue and self-realization once again at the center of morality. And I look to ancient models, if at all, because of a different and more unusual sort of discontent with modern ethical thought, namely, with its reigning naturalism and its refusal to acknowledge the authentically normative dimension of reality. But the "neo-Aristotelian revival," as it is often called, may serve here to show that the philosophical problem of modernity is not unknown to Anglo-American ethics.

Nonetheless, the idea that moral philosophy should draw its bearings from historically specific phenomena has been rare this century in the English-speaking world. In recent years, there have been signs of a shift in this direction. (I think of such figures as Alasdair MacIntyre, John Rawls, Charles Taylor, and Bernard Williams.) But such developments stand out against the prevailing modes of thought. The dominant orthodoxy is due in no small part to the influence of "analytic philosophy." What this conception of philosophy has come to mean today is undoubtedly vague. But the specific meaning it once bore is unmistakable, and the powerful form it gave to long-standing habits of unhistorical thinking is with us still. I can best make clear the kind of project I pursue in these essays if I explain why I reject the analytic conception. Though my reasons are not unprecedented, I do not go on to draw from them the same conclusions that many others do. The different idea of philosophy to which I am led will show why I take so seriously the import of modernity for moral philosophy. As will become evident, I do not think much can be said positively about the nature of philosophy in general. But that very fact belongs to the spirit in which I have written this book.

The End of First Philosophy

Analytic philosophy, in the early part of this century, was guided by the conviction that philosophy must distinguish itself, in its objects as well as in its methods, from other forms of thought, and particularly from the empirical sciences. Otherwise, it would have no raison d'être. (This idea it shared, incidentally, with its Continental cousin, "phenomenology.")[2] Philosophy would focus on the "meaning" of the key concepts of our thinking, leaving to experience or to the sciences the task of determining the objects to which these concepts apply. To this domain of its own it was supposed to apply a special philosophical method, the "analysis" of concepts. Having its peculiar domain and method, philosophy could thus determine in advance whether a given problem was indeed "philosophical" or should be consigned to some other area of inquiry. But most important of all, the domain of meaning seemed to be independent of the vicissitudes of experience. That is why analytic philosophy, in investigating the meaning of our fundamental concepts, hoped to establish the necessary features of our experience, the structures our understanding of the world and of ourselves must necessarily embody.

Applied to the area of ethics, the analytic conception focused on the analysis of key concepts such as "ought" and "good." Meta-ethics, as this enterprise was called, aimed at determining the meaning of these concepts without assuming the validity of any first-order claims (or at least any disputable ones) about what one ought to do or what things are morally good; first-order issues were to be taken up (if at all) only on the basis of this conceptual analysis. These fundamental moral concepts were supposed to possess an invariable meaning, untouched by historical changes in our ideas about the moral life. G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903), usually considered the inaugural work of analytic ethics, fits this paradigm perfectly. Moore displayed an easy confidence in the idea that the meaning of the core ethical concepts could be settled once and for all. Nowhere did he show any inkling of the possibility that there have been in the history of ethics fundamental shifts in the content and relative centrality of these concepts. Such an awareness was not absent from the writings of his teacher at Cambridge, Henry Sidgwick (in Chapter 1 of this book I point out just how insightful Sidgwick was on this score). But not only did Moore never write, as Sidgwick did, an *Outline of the History of Ethics;* it is inconceivable he would have thought it worth his while to do so. That Moore's book did not really demonstrate any greater philosophical clarity or argumentative prowess than Sidgwick's own *Methods of Ethics* might have led one to suspect that Moore's "analytic" revolution in ethics was not all it was cracked up to be. Some indeed drew this conclusion early on. But the only decisive way to attack the rationale of analytic ethics, of course, was to show why the analytic conception in general cannot stand.

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[2] Some of the material in this introduction is drawn from the essay "Convictions philosophiques" in my *Modernité et morale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993). There I examine in detail the similarity between phenomenology and analytic philosophy as forms of first philosophy.

Like many others, I have always regarded W. V. O. Quine's famous essay, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), as sounding the death knell of the analytic idea.[3] Quine revealed the failure of the best attempts to make sense of the notion of an analytic proposition – that is, a proposition that would be true or false in virtue of the meaning of its concepts and would thus be the sort of result sought by analytic philosophy. He urged that we do better to look at the supposed distinction between "truths of meaning" and experience-dependent "truths of fact" as actually forming a continuum. All are modifiable in the light of experience, though some are more directly tied to experience than others. The "meaning" of a concept is, in reality, an especially firm, if not inalterable, belief we hold about the objects to which it applies. Even our most fundamental concepts cannot be immunized against the possibility that we will find, in the light of our experience, good reason to revise them. As a result, we can no longer suppose, as Michael Dummett, for example, would like to believe, that analytic philosophy has replaced epistemology with the theory of meaning as the proper form of "first philosophy."[4] Such was indeed the goal of the analytic project. But if propositions about the meanings of concepts really express those beliefs about the world that we are least inclined to modify and that thus guide our more direct dealings with experience, epistemology has not lost at all its central role, being concerned as it is with why some beliefs should be considered more solid than others.

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[3] W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," pp. 20–46 in his *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). It is important to note that much the same point was made more or less simultaneously by Nelson Goodman, "On Likeness of Meaning" (1949), pp. 221–30 in his *Problems and Projects* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), and by Morton White, "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," pp. 316–30 in Sidney Hook (ed.), *John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom* (New York: Dial, 1950).

More important than this reshuffling, however, is that Quine's essay challenges the very idea of there being such a thing as "first philosophy." That is, we may regard his essay as demolishing the idea that philosophy should aim at knowledge of the a priori, an idea that reaches further back than the origins of analytic philosophy itself. Even before Kant, who first gave this search for the a priori something of a systematic formulation, philosophers assumed there exists some set of fundamental concepts and forms of thinking, necessary for understanding the world, that are to be determined and analyzed once and for all. "Analytic philosophy" has been but a recent and no doubt the most refined expression of this age-old ambition.

We must give up that aspiration, however, once we recognize that even our most basic ways of making sense of the world answer to the movement of experience. The point is not simply (as many would acknowledge today) that we must abandon dreams of philosophical certainty. The consequences go much deeper. The end of first philosophy means that not just the character, but also the object of philosophical reflection must be seen in the light of a new sense of contingency. Our fundamental ways of understanding the world must themselves be recognized as mutable and thus as historically contingent through and through. In reflecting upon them, philosophy can no longer sensibly aspire to stand above history. It must instead make clear the historical situation in which it proceeds. This will be as true in ethics as elsewhere.

Others before me, among them some of the most eminent moral philosophers today, such as John Rawls and Alasdair MacIntyre, have drawn encouragement from Quine's arguments for their own belief that moral philosophy cannot hope for much from the timeless analysis of moral concepts.[5] Readers of this book can judge how far my way of building on this common negative result agrees with theirs. But it will be helpful if I explain why I think some of the better known "postanalytic" conceptions of philosophy in general do not point in the proper direction or offer the right sort of guidance for moral philosophy.

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[4] Michael Dummett, "Can Analytical Philosophy Be Systematic, and Ought It to Be?" (1977), pp. 441, 454 in his *Truth and Other Enigmas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978).

From the rejection of first philosophy Quine himself concluded that philosophy should assume the form of a thoroughgoing naturalism, surrendering any thought of having a subject matter distinct from that of the natural sciences. Quine's naturalism is really more a *parti pris* than a direct consequence of leaving behind the idea of first philosophy. Moreover, naturalism in general, widely espoused though it is in philosophy today, forms an ultimately untenable view of the world.[6] In Chapter 5, I explain what I find wrong in the naturalistic *Weltanschauung*. It founders for reasons that are important for moral philosophy, though not for it alone. Naturalism necessarily regards our moral judgments as expressions of preference and not as potentially a form of knowledge. But it does so on a basis that ultimately must entail denying that there are truths about how we ought not just to act, but to think as well. In this regard, it turns out to differ from the notorious irrationalism Nietzsche espoused (Chapter 4) only by being less clear about where it leads in the end. We can save the authority of reason, I argue, only if we reject modern naturalism and admit a truth the ancients more often saw – that the world must be conceived broadly enough to encompass an authentically normative dimension as well. I expect this argument will be controversial. But it should be clear, in any case, that recognizing how our ways of thinking are, even at the most basic level, subject to revision by experience says nothing by itself about the conception of reality, naturalistic or not, that we should adopt.

Another reaction to the demise of analytic philosophy as the latest avatar of first philosophy has been the "pragmatism" Richard Rorty has made so famous. My own debts to Rorty's writings are profound. I would probably not see in the breakdown of the analytic project quite the significance I do if it were not for his great book, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979). But for all that, what I owe to Rorty is far more negative than positive. His conception of what remains for philosophy, once the charms of the a priori have been dispelled, is one in which the very idea of there being philosophical problems seems to have disappeared. Problems arise where our thought encounters demands that are independent of itself. A problem we have simply invented is no problem at all. According to Rorty's book, however, philosophy should now view itself above all, not as the "epistemological" search for truth, but as the "hermeneutic" quest for ever new, interesting, and productive ways of talking.[7] In reality, this conception does not move beyond the idea of first philosophy it disowns. It expresses instead an inability to think of philosophy in any other way. To call for "hermeneutics" to replace epistemology supposes the only way there could be such a thing as philosophical knowledge is that it be of the a priori. Why must the end of first philosophy spell the end of philosophy itself?

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[5] See the appeals to Quine's critique of analyticity in John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 579, and Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 70.

[6] In my opposition to naturalism, I have been inspired by the writings of Charles Taylor, particularly his *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), and by parts of Thomas Nagel's *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford University Press, 1986).

I admit that understanding how there can be such a thing as philosophical knowledge is not an easy matter. The problem is particularly acute once we admit that philosophy cannot hope to find a realm for itself that is secure from the changing tides of experience. If none of our beliefs can avoid having to answer to experience, what can philosophy tell us about the world that would not be more properly explored by the sciences? In my view, the single greatest difficulty here is, once again, the undue authority that naturalism exercises upon our thinking. We need to recognize how the world is not exhausted by what the sciences can tell us of it. Reality also contains a normative dimension, constituted by reasons for belief and action. On the basis of this broader idea of the world, we can see how *reflection*, too – reflection upon reasons for belief and action – can be an organ of knowledge. Morality involves one species of such reflective knowledge, and philosophy itself typically involves another. It seeks knowledge of how we should understand our fundamental ways of making sense of the world.

By the standards of the reigning naturalism, this conception of the world will no doubt count as "metaphysical," and I will not disown the term. But I see no reason why this metaphysics sits ill with the sense of contingency and openness to experience that the end of first philosophy demands. A "metaphysical," quasi-Platonistic view of reality can joins forces with, if you will, a "nonmetaphysical" conception of how we get in tune with the world. This eclectic outlook is perhaps unusual (it represents the extent of my defection from characteristically modern forms of thought), but it is not incoherent.

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[7] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 318–21, 359–64. Rorty also employs a very peculiar notion of hermeneutics. H. G. Gadamer's great book, *Wahrheit und Methode*, which Rorty frequently invokes as an authority (pp. 357–60), is devoted to the idea that hermeneutic thinking, though it cannot be understood in accord with the modern idea of method, gives us access nonetheless to truth.

On his own image of philosophy Rorty bestows the name of "pragmatism," a term much in vogue today. (Quine has invoked it for his own philosophy, too.) I also feel an allegiance to the pragmatist tradition, but since this term has come to be so closely linked with Rorty's usage, I risk causing confusion if I make much of it. I will observe only that the classical pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey was always keen to undo philosophical dichotomies – not just that between the empirical and the a priori, but also ones of the sort Rorty himself exploits. For example, is not a new way of talking interesting and productive precisely because of its capacity to solve problems and hook up with truth? The same goes for the dichotomy Rorty has deployed more recently between the ideal of "solidarity" he espouses, where we align our thinking with some intellectual community, and the goal of "objectivity" he rejects, where we aim to uncover the nature of things, the way things really are, and not just the way our community pictures them.[8] As I argue in Chapters 2 and 10, we do need to rethink conventional ideas about the opposition between reason and history. But Rorty's dichotomy is likely only to perpetuate these ideas. For is it not more promising to think about how solidarity can enhance objectivity, and how by relying on what we already believe, shaped by our historical situation as we are, we can make sense of the way things really are?

Philosophy and Historical Context

This last remark brings me to the very different lessons I draw from the end of first philosophy. If even our most fundamental concepts and forms of understanding follow the vicissitudes of experience, then only by attending to why we have inherited the patterns of belief and experience we have, can we see clearly how we are to go on from there. We need, that is, a conception of philosophy that recognizes the historically conditioned character both of the problems it confronts and of the knowledge it can acquire. For other areas of inquiry, this kind of historical sensitivity may not be necessary, and a blinkered focus on isolated parts of experience may be more productive. But philosophy strives to be as reflective as possible, regarding a full awareness of any problem's complexities as not just praiseworthy, but essential to the proper investigation of it. (This, if anything, we could take as the essence of the philosophical attitude.) It cannot afford to pass by, therefore, the givens of the historical situation in which it operates.

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[8] Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" pp. 3–19 in J. Rajchman and C. West (eds.), *Post-Analytic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

To explain this conception of philosophy further, I should say something first about taking into account the historical circumstances that have made certain philosophical problems our own. This involves two things. It means, to begin with, that we take an undoctrinaire view of why these problems have come to count as "philosophical" ones. No doubt, philosophical problems are all, in some sense, fundamental in nature, focused on concepts and themes whose implications spread through wide stretches of experience. But that is really all that can be said about philosophy's domain by way of definition. So, too, there is little to say about philosophical method in general, except that, as I have noted, it typically aims at being maximally reflective, bringing together into consideration all the various aspects of any given problem. To give up the idea of first philosophy is to see that there is no timeless essence of philosophy, and in particular no special methods or subject matter peculiar to it. The only adequate definition of philosophy is an "extensional" one, that is, the simple enumeration of problems that for diverse, contingent reasons have come to be classified as "philosophical." Is this not, after all, what we should expect? Philosophy has a long and complex history, full of discoveries and dead ends, dynamic traditions and new beginnings. It is only reasonable to suppose that it forms a heterogeneous mixture rather than a unified discipline.

Recognizing the historical character of philosophical problems also means paying attention to the circumstances that have made certain problems truly problems – not mere curiosities, that is, but real challenges to our existing views and expectations. As our beliefs change, some problems disappear and others emerge. If even the fundamental areas of our experience that give rise to philosophical problems are not immutable, we cannot hope to understand these problems without a sense of the historical circumstances that produce them. This point is closely connected with the other part of the conception of philosophy I espouse, namely, the conviction that philosophical knowledge, like all knowledge, is historically conditioned in character.

This conviction, as I understand it, does not signal a surrender to historical relativism. On the contrary, the essential point is that we overcome the deep-seated notion that history and reason are like oil and water. The pursuit of objectivity is often assumed to require that we neutralize the effects of historical contingency on our thinking and strive to see the world from something like the standpoint of eternity. This aspiration has many sources, but one of them is not that it expresses a demand of reason itself. In Chapter 2, I present a "contextualist" theory of rational belief that dispels the supposed antagonism between objective inquiry and the recognition of historical context. It applies not just to philosophical knowledge, but to knowledge in general. Its key principle, by which I mean to break with much of traditional epistemology (and not just with so-called foundationalism, which almost everyone these days is keen to dismiss), is that no existing belief stands as such in need of justification. That need arises only when we have uncovered some positive reason, based on other things we believe, for thinking that the belief might be false. The object of justification is not belief, but rather changes in belief. And so the claims of reason govern how we go on from where we are, not whether we are entitled to be where we are at all, as that might be judged from some Archimedean standpoint transcending our historical situation.

Modern Ethics and Reasonable Disagreement

In this book I pursue these epistemological reflections not simply for their own sake, but chiefly to show how moral philosophy, on one of the pivotal issues it faces today, must come to terms with modernity. The most distinctive element of modern ethics is the idea that we all are subject to certain "categorical" moral obligations, binding on us whatever may be our various interests. Yet there has always been an undercurrent of doubt, ever more pronounced in recent years, about whether such a moral outlook can truly be authoritative for us, particularly given the waning of religious worldviews. This concern is the source of that nostalgia for "virtue-ethics," *ancien style,* mentioned earlier. As I argue in Chapters 1 and 2, insuperable difficulties stand in the way of such a return to ancient models. We can grasp the importance of these obstacles, however, only in the light of a historically sensitive conception of philosophy such as I have described, for they involve a central ingredient of our modern self-understanding.

That crucial element of modern experience is the realization that on the meaning of life reasonable people tend naturally to disagree with one another. We have come to expect that in a free and open discussion about the fulfilled life, the human good, the nature of self-realization – notions essential to the virtue-centered conceptions of ancient ethics – the more we converse, the more we disagree, even with ourselves. This outlook (see Chapter 7) is not the same as what is often called "pluralism," or the conviction that in the end the human good is not one, but many, its different forms irreducible to any single basis such as pleasure, freedom, or knowledge. Pluralism itself is one of the things about which reasonable people disagree. The expectation of reasonable disagreement is, in fact, a more unsettling view than pluralism, one that runs contrary to some of the deepest preconceptions in the Western tradition. It is the recognition that, on matters of supreme importance, reason is not likely to bring us together, but tends rather to drive us apart.

This experience was absent from ancient and medieval virtue ethics, but it loomed large in early modern thought. It was a lesson hammered home, for example, by more than a century of religious wars. In modern ethics, the expectation of disagreement has turned attention toward a core morality on which reasonable people, despite their differences about the good life, can nonetheless agree. This is the demand that the idea of categorical obligation is meant to meet. Though we associate that idea with the famous exposition Kant gave it, the "priority of the right over the good," to use his words, is by no means limited to Kantian ethics. It has also shaped the utilitarian tradition, that other great current of modern moral philosophy. We cannot, it is true, understand the whole of our moral life in terms of categorical obligations. To this extent, we may learn much from the resources of ancient ethics. But we lose touch with one of the formative experiences of modernity if we miss the importance of a core morality, binding on all whatever their views of the human good. It is an integral part of our form of life.

Clearly, this need for a core morality is particularly urgent in the political realm. The essays in Part III explore how the modern experience of reasonable disagreement has played an essential role in the liberal political tradition. The guiding liberal ideal has been that the terms of political association must be rationally transparent to those they are supposed to bind, for only so can individuals enjoy respect as persons in their own right.[9] This ideal of equal respect takes to heart the way in which political principles differ from the other moral principles we may invoke. Political principles are not just ones by which we judge people, but also ones where force may be used to ensure compliance. We therefore treat others as having the same right as ourselves to set the terms of political association – we regard them as *free and equal citizens,* only if we assume that the coercive principles we propose as binding on all would also be the object of reasonable agreement. The expectation that reasonable people tend naturally to disagree about the good life has therefore impelled the liberal tradition to seek the rules of political life within a core morality all may affirm. No doubt, that expectation has also fostered the very ideal of political transparency.

Responding to this modern experience has proven to be, however, a more complex task than liberal thinkers have often supposed. Many have cast their political principles in terms of an individualist philosophy of life, urging a critical detachment toward inherited forms of belief and cultural traditions. But such theories have themselves become the object of reasonable disagreement, particularly in the wake of the Romantic movement. As a result, this general individualism, whatever may be its truth, can no longer serve as the public philosophy of a liberal political order. Now more than ever, liberalism must take on the character of a *political* doctrine (see Chapter 6). This does not mean it ceases to be a moral conception. But the value of equal respect that is its spirit requires us to distinguish carefully between the political principles that unite us as citizens and the broader, if divergent, ideals and commitments we also affirm.

Little will be clear, therefore, about the guiding aims of modern ethics and the fundamental problems in moral philosophy we face today unless we keep in mind and understand this formative experience of modernity. The expectation of reasonable disagreement, and so the ideas of categorical obligation and political liberalism, do not,

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[9] On the liberal ideal of transparency, see Jeremy Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism" (1987), pp. 35–62, in his *Liberal Rights* (Cambridge University Press, 1993). I do not follow Waldron, however, in extending the liberal ideal beyond the terms of political association to social life as a whole. The "political liberalism" I espouse does not assume that a general social transparency is necessary or even desirable.