Over the last decade, economists have been making much greater use of experimental methods in their research. The award of the Nobel Prize in 2002 to Vernon Smith confirmed that the use of such methods is now seen as an important and credible part of the economist’s toolkit. In Experiments and Competition Policy, leading scholars in the field of experimental economics survey the use of experimental methods and show how they can help us understand the behavior of firms in relation to various forms of competition policy. Chapters are organized in terms of the main fields of competition policy — collusion, abusive practices and mergers — and there is also a separate section dealing with auctions and procurement. Written in a clear and nontechnical style, this volume is an excellent introduction to what the increasingly important field of experimental economics can bring to the theory and practice of competition policy.

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Experiments and Competition Policy

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