

CHAPTER I

*Socrates in Hellenistic philosophy**

INTRODUCTION

In what sense did the Hellenistic philosophers see themselves as the heirs or critics of Socrates? Was Socrates, in their view, a philosopher on whom Plato was the decisive authority? What doctrines or strategies of Socrates were thoroughly alive in this period? These are the principal questions I shall be asking in this paper, particularly the third. To introduce them, and to set the scene, I begin with some general points, starting from two passages which present an image of Socrates at the beginning and at the end of the Hellenistic era. Here first are three lines from the *Silloi* of the Pyrrhonian Timon of Phlius:

From these matters [i.e. the inquiry into nature] he turned aside, the people-chiselling moralising chatterer, the wizard of Greece, whose assertions were sharply pointed, master of the well-turned sneer, a pretty good ironist.¹

Next Epictetus (*Discourses* IV.5.1–4):

The honourable and good man neither fights with anyone himself, nor, so far as he can, does he let anyone else do so. Of this as of everything

* The original version of this chapter was first read to a meeting of the Southern Association for Ancient Philosophy, held at Cambridge University in September 1986; further versions of it were given at the University of Washington, at Cornell and at Berkeley. I am grateful for the discussion that took place on all these occasions, and particularly to Myles Burnyeat, who also gave me written comments. My principal indebtedness is to Gregory Vlastos, both for the stimulus of his published work and for the time we spent together discussing issues raised in the later part of the chapter. I also gratefully acknowledge the award of a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, which gave me the leisure to work on this subject.

¹ D.L. II.19 = Timon fr. 799 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons 1983: ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινεν ὁ λαξόος, ἔνομολέσχης, | Ἑλλήνων ἐπαισιδός, ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας, | μυκτῆρ ῥητορόμυκτος, ὑπαττικὸς εἰρωνευτής. For the interpretation of the opening phrase as an allusion to Socrates' disavowal of physics, cf. Sextus Empiricus, *M* VII.8 and Clem. Alex., *Strom.* 1.14.63.3. Details of the whole passage are well discussed by Cortassa 1978, pp. 140–6.

else the life of Socrates is available to us as a model (*paradeigma*), who not only himself avoided fighting everywhere, but did not let others fight. Notice in Xenophon's *Symposium* how many fights he has resolved, and again how he put up with Thrasymachus, Polus and Callicles ... For he kept utterly secure in mind the thought that no one controls another's commanding-faculty (*hēgemonikon*).

In the *Discourses* of Epictetus, Socrates is *the* philosopher, a figure canonised more regularly and with more attention to detail than any other Stoic saint, whether Diogenes, Antisthenes or Zeno. The reader who knew the history of Greek philosophy only from Epictetus would form the impression that Stoicism was the philosophy of Socrates. He would also, by Epictetus' quotations from Plato and Xenophon, learn some of the salient moments of Socrates' life – his divine mission, trial, imprisonment etc. Moreover, what Epictetus says about the elenchus (I.26.17–18, II.1.32, II.26.4), the impossibility of *akrasia* (III.3.2–4), removal of the false conceit of knowledge (II.17.1, III.14.9), and definition (IV.1.41) reveals as deep a perception or utilisation of Socrates' philosophy as we find in any ancient thinker after Plato.

Socrates' presence in Epictetus' *Discourses* – which I must pass over here – could be the topic of a monograph.² But, to repeat, Epictetus' Socrates is the Stoics' patron || saint. He is no ironist, no sharp talker, no gadfly or sting-ray, no lover or symposiast or philosopher chiefly characterised by self-confessed ignorance (see n. 29 below). If, as I think certain, Epictetus has reflected hard on the Socratic writings of Plato and Xenophon, what he culls from those writings is an ideal of the philosophical life, as he himself conceives of it: 'Now that Socrates is dead, the memory of what he did or said when alive is no less or even more beneficial to men' (*Discourses* IV.1.169).

² See also I.9.22–4 (paraphrase of Plato, *Ap.* 29c as in III.1.19–21), I.12.3 (S. coupled with Odysseus), I.12.23 (S. was not in prison since he was there voluntarily), I.29.16–19 (Plato, *Ap.* 30c–d, as in II.2.15–18), I.29.65–6 (Plato, *Phd.* 116d), II.1.32 (S. *did* write, for self-examination), II.12.5 (How did S. behave? He forced his interlocutor to give him testimony, and had no need of any other; cf. *Gorg.* 474a), III.24.60–1 (S. behaving as a free man, dear to the gods), IV.1.159–60 (S.'s life as a paradigm of making everything subordinate to the laws, drawing on Xen. *Mem.* I.1.18), IV.4.21–2 (Plato, *Crito* 43d), IV.11.19–21 (S.'s toilet habits, rejecting Aristophanes, *Nub.* 103). Other refs. to Socrates in Plato and Xenophon: I.26.18, III.12.15 (Plato, *Ap.* 38a); II.1.15 (*Phd.* 77e, *Crito* 46c); II.2.8–9 (Xen. *Ap.* 2); II.5.18–20 (Plato, *Ap.* 26e); III.1.42 (*Ale.* I, 131d); III.22.26 (Plato, *Clitopho* 407a–b); III.23.20–6 (Plato, *Ap.* 30c, 17c, *Crito* 46b); III.24.99 (Plato, *Ap.* 28d–29a); IV.1.41 (Xen. *Mem.* IV.6.1). Döring 1979, pp. 43–79, includes a chapter on Epictetus, but misses an opportunity to deal with the subject in a searching way; cf. Long 1981.

Four hundred years of Stoicism had contributed to the preservation and interpretation of that memory. According to Philodemus, the Stoics actually wanted to be called ‘Socratics’.³ In the later part of this paper I will show, albeit selectively, how their philosophy in its earliest phase represents a self-conscious attempt to fulfil that wish. But before approaching this topic and the role of Socrates in other Hellenistic schools, let us return to Timon. His lampooning purposes do not cast doubt on the historical interest of his remarks. Timon is a caricaturist who never fails to capture one or two recognisable and dominant features of the philosophers who form his subjects. Hence his evidence is valuable both for what it includes and for what it omits – and all the more so since Timon was writing from a non-doctrinaire perspective at a time when the new Hellenistic philosophies were still in the process of fashioning their identities. His brief remarks deserve closer scrutiny.

Timon associates Socrates’ concentration upon ethics with his repudiation of the inquiry into nature. This, as we shall see in more detail shortly, is the most fundamental characteristic of Socrates in the doxographical tradition. I have the impression that Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.11–16, rather than Plato’s *Apology* or *Phaedo*, was the text that made this mark of Socrates so prominent. Timon’s nicely coined term *ennomoleschēs* should mean not, as is standardly supposed, ‘chatterer about laws’, but someone who chatters in an *ennomos* way – i.e. a moralist.⁴ The expression *Hellenōn epaoidos*, ‘Wizard of Greece’, could owe something to Plato, *Charm.* 157a, a passage in which the soul’s ‘fair discourses’ are described as *epōidai*; but it is probably a general reminiscence of the Aristophanic Socrates, to whom Timon is also indebted for *akribologous apophēnas*.⁵ In his third line Timon focuses upon Socrates’ powers of wit, censure, and irony.

The witty, sometimes caustic and ironical Socrates – Plato’s Socrates, not Xenophon’s – drops completely out of the early Stoic tradition.⁶ The prominence of these features in Timon’s vignette is interesting. As the mentor of Antisthenes, and, through him, of

³ *De Stoicis* cols. 12–13, Σωκρατ[ι]κοὶ καλεῖσθαι θέ[λο]υσιν; see Giannantoni 1983–5, vol. II, Diogenes V B 126.

⁴ Cf. Plato’s use of *ennomos* in combination with *spoudaios*, *Rep.* IV, 424e.

⁵ Cf. *Nub.* 130, where Strepsiades wonders how he will learn *logōn akribōn skindalamous*.

⁶ Irony for the Stoics was exclusively a feature of the inferior man; cf. *SVF* III.630.

Diogenes and Crates, a censorious and caustic Socrates was cherished || by the Cynics, with whom Timon felt some sympathy.⁷ Even Epictetus, in his dialectical practice and choice of vivid metaphors, was implicitly following their lead. Unfortunately, the reliable evidence on Cynics is insufficient to provide much material for speculating on the extent to which they had any theoretical views about the connexion between Socratic irony and the way philosophical discourse should be conducted. On this, as on everything else, Socrates was attacked by the Epicureans (see below). But irony cannot be said to constitute a dominant feature of Socrates when we are considering his positive role in the main stream of Hellenistic philosophy.

From our perspective, indelibly coloured by Plato's Socrates, this is remarkable. But the irony of Socrates, together with all the other glittering characteristics of his discourse and argumentative style – what the Epicurean Colotes witheringly calls his *alazones logoi* (Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1117d) – was inimitable and quite inseparable from Plato's dialogues. Xenophon's often stodgy Socrates is no ironist. Though Socrates' philosophical principles clamoured for replication and interpretation, there could be no dissemination of the whole man, on the basis of all the sources, either as a paradigm on whom to model one's life or as a more abstract set of theories. Socrates was too complex, too individualistically contoured, to be appropriated in full by any single philosophical school. One of his closest approximations, Diogenes of Sinope, earned the description from Plato, 'a Socrates gone mad' (D.L. VI.54).

Timon's Socrates and that of Epictetus are composite but partial portraits, derived both from books and from Socrates' philosophical afterlife. A hundred years after Socrates' death – the time of the foundation of the Garden and the Stoa – a detailed oral tradition concerning the historical figure can probably be excluded. Even if stories about the man himself were passed on by word of mouth, the Socrates of my inquiry is the subject of the 'Socratic discourses' composed by his associates, Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, Aeschines. In general, it seems, neither Hellenistic philosophers with an allegiance to Socrates, nor biographers and doxographers, addressed the 'Socratic problem' of modern schol-

⁷ I discuss Timon's Cynic leanings in Long 1978a. See also Brancacci 1981.

arship. If they were aware of discrepancies between Xenophon's accounts and Plato's dialogues, these were not regarded as any reason for having to prefer one account to the other. Control of the material, we can conjecture, was determined not by preconceptions about the superiority in historicity or philosophical sophistication of Plato to Xenophon, but by the need to derive from both of them a well-founded philosophical paradigm that would be internally coherent and consistent with the Hellenistic philosopher's own stance.

Timon's observation that Socrates concentrated on ethics and repudiated physics is the best starting-point for viewing the Hellenistic philosophers' attitude and approach to the great man. The point had already been made in similar brevity by Aristotle: 'Socrates occupied himself with ethics and not at all with nature as a whole' (*Metaph.* A 6, 987b1–2); and it would become the most commonly repeated Socratic characteristic in the doxographical tradition. Here, for instance, is the pseudo-Galenic article on Socrates:

The original philosophers opted only for the study of nature and made this the goal of their philosophy. Socrates, who succeeded them much later, said that this was inaccessible to people (for he regarded secure cognition of non-evident things as most difficult), and that investigation of how one might best conduct one's life and avoid bad things and get the greatest possible share of fine things was more useful. Believing this more useful he ignored the study of nature ... and devoted his thought to an ethical disposition that would distinguish good and bad, right and wrong ... Observing that authorities in these matters would need to be persuasive and would || achieve this if they were evidently good at using dialectical arguments in dealings with their interlocutors, he elaborated dialectic.⁸

The incorporation of dialectic in this account will concern us later. For the present I call attention to the passage from Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.1.11–16, which by the Hellenistic period had become

⁸ Ps.-Galen, *Hist. phil.* ap. Diels 1879, p. 597, 1–17: τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς φιλοσοφούντων φυσιολογεῖν μόνον προελομένους καὶ τοῦτο τέλος τῆς κατ' αὐτοὺς φιλοσοφίας πεποιτημένων ἐπιγεγονώς πολλοῖς ὑπερον χρόνοις Σωκράτης τοῦτο μὲν ἀνέφικτον ἔφησεν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχειν (τῶν γὰρ ἀδῆλων κατάληψιν βεβαίαν λαβεῖν τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ἐνόμισε), τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ὅπως ἀμεινον διάγοι τις, καὶ τῶν μὲν κακῶν ἀποτραπείη τῶν δὲ καλῶν ὡς πλείστον μετάσχοι, τοῦτο μᾶλλον συνοίσειν. καὶ τοῦτο νομίσας χρησιμώτερον τῆς μὲν φυσιολογίας ἠμέληκεν ... ἠθικὴν δὲ τινα διάθεσιν ἐπινενοηκῶς διαγνωστικὴν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν αἰσχρῶν τε καὶ καλῶν ... κατιδῶν δὲ ὅτι δεήσει τοὺς τούτων προεστησομένους εὐπειθείας μετέχειν, τοῦτο δ' ἂν ὑπάρξειεν εἰ λόγοις διαλεκτικοῖς φαίνοντο πρὸς τοὺς προσιόντας καλῶς κερημένοι, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπινευόηκεν.

the principal authority for Socrates' exclusively ethical orientation. Xenophon is defending Socrates from the charge of impiety. He supports this by saying that Socrates differed from the majority of other philosophers in not studying the nature of everything and showed up such people as fools. Did they come to the study of nature thinking they had an adequate understanding of human affairs, or did they think they were acting properly in neglecting the human and studying the divine? Socrates found it amazing that they did not find the indiscoverability of these things obvious, and cited in support of this the failure of scientific pundits to reach agreement with one another. Xenophon then develops Socrates' exploitation of discrepant opinions with a brief survey of pre-Socratic theories and indicates his indictment of the uselessness of such inquiries. Finally, says Xenophon, Socrates himself was constantly discussing human affairs, investigating the nature of piety, justice and other ethical concepts: he regarded people who knew them as noble and good, and thought that those who did not would rightly be called slavish (*andrapodōdēs*).

If this passage strikes us as a travesty of the Platonic Socrates, it possibly captures the Hellenistic Socrates more aptly than any single text of Plato. In essence Xenophon is describing the Socrates whom Antisthenes, Aristippus and Diogenes claimed to be following, and whom the Stoic Aristo would take as his model.⁹ Probably all of these, like Xenophon's Socrates, connected their interest in ethics to the repudiation of any concern with physics. The sometimes hectoring tone of the passage – e.g., 'slavish' (*andrapodōdēs*) – is redolent of Cynic moralising. Notice too the attribution to Socrates of 'disagreement' as an argumentative strategy for disposing of the physicists' credentials; Socrates is already being represented as a sceptic, so far as non-ethical knowledge is concerned. Ethical expertise, however, is precisely his province. His general confession of ignorance is never mentioned by Xenophon. Nor does that feature of Socrates seem to belong to the most basic Hellenistic portrait. Like his dialectic, it is a characteristic to be mentioned or omitted according to the kind of paradigm his inheritors want him to instantiate.

Ancient writers were well aware of the fact that Socrates, as

⁹ For Aristippus' repudiation of mathematics, dialectic and physics, cf. Giannantoni 1983–85, vol. 1, Aristippus IV A 170, 172. Antisthenes, at least as viewed by the Cynics, disparaged the study of *grammata* (D.L. vi.103).

here portrayed in Xenophon, did not square well with the Socrates of Plato's later dialogues (according to modern chronology) or even with some of Xenophon's remarks elsewhere about his theological interests. By the end of the Hellenistic period it is a commonplace that Plato attributed to Socrates interests and theories which were entirely Plato's own (cf. Cicero, *Rep.* 1.15–16). The same is true implicitly as early as Aristotle. Only in late antiquity do we find Socrates credited with Platonist metaphysics (e.g., by ps.-Plutarch, *Plac.* 878b). The absence of an ancient Socratic problem on this issue will only occasion surprise or difficulty if Plato's dialogues are treated as the standard reference-point for Socrates' philosophy, taking priority over the writings of Xenophon, Antisthenes and others. In fact Plato, or what we call Plato's Socratic dialogues, appears to have been widely regarded as neither a more nor a less authentic witness to Socrates than Xenophon's writings.

The correctness of this last point, if it is correct, should not be interpreted as reducing the importance of Plato's Socrates in the eyes of pre-eminent philosophers such as Zeno, Chrysippus and Arcesilaus. In the later parts of this paper, I hope to show that it was Plato's Socrates, rather than any other, that stimulated serious philosophy, as we understand it today. But for the fourth century bc and for less demanding readers Xenophon had two advantages over Plato. First, it was easier to discover what the opinions of his Socrates were. Secondly, Xenophon's readers, in Antisthenes and Diogenes, had living embodiments of the self-mastery (*enkrateia*) which he so constantly emphasises as Socrates' dominant characteristic. No ancient writer, I think, ever regarded the *life* of Plato as emblematic of Socrates. It was not too difficult, on the other hand, to think of the Cynics as his genuine if one-sided imitators.¹⁰

Such a perception will have been encouraged by the activities of the Academy immediately after Plato's death and by the direction and style of Aristotle's philosophy. If Plato's later philosophy was readily seen as a considerable departure from that of Socrates, his immediate successors can hardly have struck their contemporaries as Socratic in any sense. Epictetus' Socrates, however Stoicised, is utterly recognisable as the man whose life and arguments and moral passion constituted an ethical revolution. Aristotle, by con-

¹⁰ Cf. Grote 1885, vol. III, p. 505: 'Antisthenes and his disciple Diogenes were in many respects closer approximations to Socrates than Plato or any of the other Socratic companions.'

trast, is decidedly reticent on all of this. His interest in Plato of course ensures that ‘our’ Socrates is an important presence implicitly in the ethical treatises; and there is the well-known handful of passages which report and criticise Socrates by name. But Aristotle scarcely even hints at the moral significance of Socrates, as we moderns perceive it, or as it was perceived in the Hellenistic period. In a sense, we learn more about Socrates from this brief remark by Plutarch: ‘Socrates was the first to show that life accommodates philosophy at every time and part and in all states and affairs without qualification.’¹¹

Possibly Aristotle gave a more rounded account of Socrates in some of his exoteric writings.¹² Even so, the absence of anything comparable from his ethical treatises is remarkable. Did Aristotle himself help to set the tone for the hostile biographies of Socrates that Aristoxenus and other Peripatetics wrote, and that the Stoic Panaetius later contested? The question cannot be answered; but the fact that it can be posed at all is relevant to our inquiry. Socrates was not universally admired by Hellenistic philosophers. Before turning to his positive role in Stoicism and Academic Scepticism, something must be said about his detractors. ||

CRITICISM OF SOCRATES IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

We have no record, so far as I know, concerning any views of Theophrastus on Socrates. That silence may at least suggest substantial lack of interest.¹³ Some of his fellow Peripatetics and successors were more outspoken. According to Porphyry, Aristoxenus’ life of Socrates was more malevolent than the accusations of Meletus and Anytus (fr. 51 Wehrli). Most famously, it made out Socrates to be a bigamist, and also described him as the boyfriend of Archelaus. The charge of bigamy, repeated by other Peripatetics – Callisthenes, Demetrius of Phalerum and Satirus (Athenaeus XIII, 555d) – acquired sufficient currency to provoke the Stoic Panaetius into writing what Plutarch calls an adequate refuta-

¹¹ *Moral.* 796e: πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθει καὶ πράγμασιν ἀπλῶς ἅπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον.

¹² Cf. *On philosophy* fr. 1 Ross (Plutarch, *Moral.* 1118c), in which Aristotle reported the Delphic ‘know yourself’ as the starting-point of Socrates’ philosophy.

¹³ I have noticed only two inconsequential references to Socrates in the material collected by Fortenbaugh 1984: L 74 B, and L 106.

tion.¹⁴ Such tittle-tattle, if it were confined to Aristoxenus, would merit no further comment. The fact that it became a common Peripatetic practice suggests a more studied attempt to undermine the ethical integrity of Socrates' life. We may probably conclude that a good many Peripatetics sought to combat the tendency of the other Socratic schools to set up Socrates as the paradigm of how a philosophical life should be lived. The more Socrates' exclusive concentration on ethics was stressed, the less at home he could be in the research environment of the Lyceum.

Socrates' repudiation of physics and theological speculation was one, but only one, of the many charges levelled against him by the Epicureans. Thanks to Knut Kleve, evidence of the range and intensity of this Epicurean criticism has now been thoroughly marshalled.¹⁵ In the case of Epicurus himself it amounts to no more than an objection to Socratic irony.¹⁶ Yet if Epicurus was fairly restrained in his remarks about Socrates, his immediate followers were not. From Metrodorus and Idomeneus, extending through Zeno of Sidon and Philodemus down to Diogenes of Oenoanda, a tradition of hostility to Socrates was established that is virulent even by the standards of ancient polemic. In their writings, Socrates was portrayed as the complete anti-Epicurean – a sophist, a rhetorician, a sceptic, and someone whose ethical inquiries turn human life into chaos.

Kleve (1983, pp. 249–50) explains this unmitigated hostility with the observation that Socrates and the Epicureans represent 'two different human types'. By this he seems to mean that their views of the world were diametrically opposed. However, this cannot be a sufficiently penetrating explanation. Both Socrates and Epicurus were in the business of curing people's souls. From Xenophon's Socrates especially, the Epicureans could have derived excellent support for much of their ethical practice – their concern with frugality, self-sufficiency, control of vain and unnecessary desires.¹⁷ That they chose instead to attack aspects of Socrates' ethics, and

¹⁴ Plutarch, *Aristides* 335c–d (= Panaetius fr. 132 van Straaten), which includes Hieronymus of Rhodes as another of the Peripatetic scandalmongers: πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺτους ἰκανῶς ὁ Παναίτιος ἐν τοῖς περὶ Σωκράτους ἀντεῖρηκεν.

¹⁵ Cf. Kleve 1983.

¹⁶ Cicero, *Brutus* 292 (Usener 231).

¹⁷ Socrates' hardiness and self-control: Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.1, 1.2.14, 1.3.5, 1.5.4–6, 1.6.1–3; Socrates made those of his associates who had *ponēras epithumias* give them up: *ibid.* 1.2.64.

to treat him as a thoroughgoing sceptic, indicates a view of Socrates as transmitted by contemporary Stoics and Academics.

Early Epicureans wrote books against various Platonic dialogues – *Euthyphro*, || *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Gorgias*.¹⁸ The latter two, especially the protreptic passage in the *Euthydemus*, were texts which the Stoics seem to have particularly prized (see below). It is legitimate to guess that much of the basis for Epicurean criticism of Socrates should be sought in the central role he was now playing as a paradigm for their Stoic rivals. This suggestion, or rather the general probability that Epicurean attacks on Socrates had a contemporary rather than a historical target, is confirmed by Colotes' criticism in his books against the *Lysis* and the *Euthydemus*. There he maintained that Socrates ignored what is self-evident (*enarges*) and suspended judgement (*epochōs prattein*).¹⁹ Here Socrates, *au pied de la lettre*, has been turned into a prototype of the Academic Arcesilaus. *epochē* at this date points specifically to the Academic sceptics; and the Stoic Aristo commented on Arcesilaus' interest in arguments against *enargeia*.²⁰ Arcesilaus and the Cyrenaics (another Socratic school) were the two contemporary targets of Colotes' book, *Conformity to the doctrines of the other philosophers makes life impossible*.²¹

The Stoics and the sceptical Academics were the Epicureans' main professional rivals.²² Both sets of opponents laid claim to being followers of Socrates. We have yet to see what they meant by this claim, and how, being rivals themselves, they could appropriate a dogmatic Socrates in the one case and a sceptical Socrates in the other. For the present it is sufficient to note their joint concern to establish their identity as Socratics. This justifies the suggestion that Epicurean criticism of Socrates be seen, at least in part, as a means of undercutting the most obvious alternative

¹⁸ For Colotes' books *Against Plato's Lysis* and *Against Plato's Euthydemus*, cf. Crönert 1906, pp. 163–70. Colotes also wrote against the myth of Er in *Republic* x (cf. Plutarch, *Moral.* xiv, B. Einarson and P. De Lacy (edd.), pp. 154–5). Metrodorus wrote *Against Plato's Euthyphro* (Philodemus, *Piet.*, col. 77, iff.), and Zeno of Sidon, *Against Plato's Gorgias* (fr. 25, Angeli-Colaizzo (*Cronache Ercolanesi.* 9, 1979, 80)). Nor was it just Plato's Socrates that was attacked. In his *Peri oikonomias*, Philodemus objected point by point to the Socrates of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. On all of this, cf. Kleve 1983.

¹⁹ For the Greek text, cf. Mancini, 1976, pp. 61–6; and see also Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1118a.

²⁰ D.L. vii.162–3. Cf. my remarks in Long 1986b, p. 442.

²¹ Cf. Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1120c.

²² They fall outside the scope of Sedley's article (1976), which is largely concerned with the attitude of Epicurus himself to earlier philosophers and to his elder contemporaries.