

Cambridge University Press

0521476410 - Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics

Gisela Striker

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

The doctrines of the Hellenistic Schools – Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism – are known to have had a formative influence on later thought, but because the primary sources are lost, they have to be reconstructed from later reports. This important collection of essays by one of the foremost interpreters of Hellenistic philosophy focuses on key questions in epistemology and ethics debated by Greek and Roman philosophers of the Hellenistic period.

The collection falls into two parts. The first part opens with a chapter on the predecessors of the Greek Sceptics in the fifth century B.C. This is followed by a detailed study of the concept of ‘a criterion of truth’, central to all epistemological theories of the period. Individual chapters treat Epicurean, Stoic, and Skeptical arguments. The second part offers a general outline of Stoic ethics supplemented by detailed source studies, as well as chapters that consider Stoicism and other Hellenistic theories in a larger context by tracing some developments from the time of Socrates to the later Hellenistic period. Two essays, originally written in German, have never appeared before in English.

There is currently a new awareness of the great interest and influence of Hellenistic philosophy. In bringing together a major collection of scholarly and interpretative studies by a leading figure in the field, this volume is a boon to philosophers and classicists who work on the Hellenistic period, but also to students keen to enrich their understanding of the history of epistemology and ethics.

Cambridge University Press
0521476410 - Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics
Gisela Striker
Frontmatter
[More information](#)

ESSAYS ON
HELLENISTIC
EPISTEMOLOGY
AND ETHICS

Cambridge University Press
0521476410 - Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics
Gisela Striker
Frontmatter
[More information](#)

ESSAYS ON
HELLENISTIC
EPISTEMOLOGY
AND ETHICS

Gisela Striker
Harvard University



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge University Press
0521476410 - Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics
Gisela Striker
Frontmatter
[More information](#)

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

© Cambridge University Press 1996

First published 1996

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Essays on Hellenistic epistemology and ethics/Gisela Striker.

p. cm.

The essays were published in various journals and books, 1974–1994.

ISBN 0-521-47051-X (hard). – ISBN 0-521-47641-0 (pbk.)

1. Philosophy, Ancient. 2. Sceptics (Greek philosophy)
3. Knowledge, Theory of. 4. Ethics, Greek. I. Striker, Gisela.
B505.E88 1996

180—dc20

95-6150

CIP

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 0-521-47051-X Hardback

ISBN 0-521-47641-0 Paperback

Transferred to digital printing 2004

Cambridge University Press
0521476410 - Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics
Gisela Striker
Frontmatter
[More information](#)

For Timothy and Leah

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments and essay sources</i>	xiv
<i>List of abbreviations: Frequently cited names and titles</i>	xvi

EPISTEMOLOGY

1 Methods of sophistry	3
2 Κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας	22
3 Epicurus on the truth of sense impressions	77
4 Sceptical strategies	92
5 The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus	116
6 On the difference between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics	135
7 The problem of the criterion	150

ETHICS

8 Greek ethics and moral theory	169
9 <i>Ataraxia</i> : Happiness as tranquillity	183
10 Epicurean hedonism	196
11 Origins of the concept of natural law	209
12 Following nature: A study in Stoic ethics	221
13 The role of <i>oikeiōsis</i> in Stoic ethics	281
14 Antipater, or the art of living	298
15 Plato's Socrates and the Stoics	316
<i>Name index</i>	325
<i>Index of passages cited</i>	329

Preface

This volume brings together papers and monographs on Hellenistic philosophy I have written over a period of almost twenty years. Some of them have been hard to find; two were published in German and appear here in translation. I hope that the collection will make it easier to see some of the connections between the different topics taken up in individual essays. With the exception of Chapter 2, my first venture into Hellenistic philosophy, each of the issues discussed here arose from a question left open in an earlier paper. The introductory chapter, previously unpublished, deals with the Sophists of the fifth century B.C., and hence a much earlier period. It started out, however, from a question about the predecessors of the Greek Skeptics: How is it that most of the arguments used by the Pyrrhonists seem to be available at the end of the fifth century, yet Skepticism – at least according to the ancient accounts – begins only with Pyrrho, at the end of the fourth century? I think that a look at the similarities and differences between the Sophists and Skeptics can help one better to understand the role of the skeptical movement in the larger framework of Greek epistemology in general.

A collection of this kind would hardly make sense were it not for the remarkable revival of interest in Hellenistic philosophy inaugurated by the two conferences at Chantilly (1976) and Oxford (1978).¹ Some of us had been working on Hellenistic topics for a while and were delighted to see that others had begun to pursue the same questions; those who were new to the field felt encouraged and inspired by the exchanges of ideas that developed out of these encounters. The publications arising out of these conferences and the subsequent series of triennial Symposia Hellenistica attracted more scholars and students, so that Hellenistic philosophy is now once again recognized as an exciting and significant chapter in the development of Greek thought. Most important for myself, however, have been the lasting friendships among colleagues who mostly live and work far apart in different countries. My essays owe much more to these friends than acknowledgments can express.

As a series of studies in Hellenistic philosophy, these essays are first and foremost a contribution to the history of philosophy. They deal with an era that is known to have been very influential, but that has also been somewhat more

Thanks to Michael Hardimon for help with the preface.

¹ See *Les Stoïciens et leur logique*, ed. J. Brunschwig, Vrin, Paris, 1978; *Doubt and Dogmatism*, eds. M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980.

PREFACE

difficult to explore than, for example, the fourth century, because the works of its most important representatives are lost. Reconstructing the doctrines of Epicurus or Chrysippus involves more guesswork than the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, as well as quite a lot of philological and historical background investigation. This kind of detective work made me realize that philosophers should not be treated in isolation from their social, political, and literary context. It also forced me to take a closer look at some historical figures that are less awe-inspiring than the Great Classics, but for that very reason more easily comparable to scholars and teachers working today – namely, the authors of our so-called sources. It has been both instructive and entertaining to follow the philosophical tradition through some of its lesser known twists and turns. The history of philosophy is after all a part of intellectual history more broadly construed. I have learned a great deal from my colleagues in classical philology and history, and I hope that they may also occasionally find these studies helpful when reading Cicero and Seneca, Plutarch and Epictetus. In the last five years I have had the privilege of being a member of both a classics and a philosophy department, and this makes me confident in thinking that the lines between disciplines, at least in historical studies, are mainly a matter of administrative convenience.

Still, these essays are written from a philosopher's perspective, not just in the sense that they focus on philosophical arguments and theories, but also in the sense that they go beyond a description or recording of philosophical theses in attempting to find the most philosophically plausible or coherent way of fitting them together, and in discussing the philosophical merits and weaknesses of the Hellenistic theories. So they are also discussions of questions in epistemology and ethics, addressed, as publishers' catalogues hopefully tend to put it, to a wider philosophical audience.

I am aware that this is probably a pious wish: specialized books like this one will in most cases not be read by nonspecialists. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is practical: given the enormous number of books and articles published on every imaginable topic each year, most people, students as well as professors and scholars in philosophy, simply do not have the time to read much beyond their more or less narrowly defined fields of specialization. Just about everyone professes to find this deplorable, but I do not see what can be done about it.

The second reason has to do with the usual division of philosophical studies, including university curricula, into "systematic" and "historical." The thought behind this, as I have often heard it expressed, is that systematic philosophers think about "the problems themselves," while historians think about what earlier philosophers thought; so how can they be expected to come up with anything that might advance the discipline?

I would grant, of course, that historians are not likely to come up with novel ideas, at least not in their role as historians. But how many philosophers do? Most of the thousands of philosophy teachers working today would not pretend to be of

PREFACE

the rank of a Descartes or Kant, Aristotle or Wittgenstein. What they do, and what they teach their students to do, is to think about philosophical problems in as clear and disciplined, or as deep and imaginative, a way as they can. It would be a mistake, I think, to see the point of their activity only in the books and articles that are its tangible results. Most systematic philosophers, whether by inclination or under the constraints of academic teaching schedules, have come to concentrate on a particular set of questions in some more or less traditional field – ethics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and so on – but they do not therefore conclude that their colleagues who work in different areas are not really doing philosophy. It seems to me that as far as thinking about philosophical problems is concerned, historians of philosophy are doing much the same as specialists in systematic fields. In trying to make sense of the arguments and theories of older philosophers, we cannot help but think about the problems they were thinking about – problems which are often versions or interesting variants of questions that are discussed in contemporary systematic debates. One polemical way of describing the difference between historians and systematic philosophers would be to say that it's a matter of taste: historians tend to be those who prefer to read, say, Hume rather than the latest issue of a philosophical journal, or who prefer to do ethics with Aristotle (to borrow a phrase from Sarah Broadie²) to doing it with the latest school of consequentialists or deontologists. Their prejudice is that there may often be more to be learned from these authors than from our technically more sophisticated contemporaries. It seems highly implausible to suggest that the historian is thinking about Hume or Aristotle *rather than* ethics or epistemology, and if she does she will not get very far.

One might object that this will not eliminate the difference between the exegetical exercise of figuring out what Aristotle was saying about virtue, for example, and a straightforward discussion of questions of desert or moral responsibility. But the line between exegesis and argument is less clear than these labels suggest. The historian who wants to understand a classical author will have to rely on her own sense of what is philosophically plausible, what counts as a strong or a weak argument, and in this respect she will of course be guided by her training as a philosopher, which can only be that of a contemporary philosopher. This also determines to a large extent which authors or texts she will choose to study: historians of logic or ethics are motivated as much by an interest in logic or ethics as by an interest in intellectual history. Obviously, historical interpretations will be constrained both by the texts they are setting out to explain and by historical background information about the author, if only in order to avoid blatant anachronisms. But whether this should be seen as an intellectual limitation seems to me to be an open question. One could also see it as a challenge to the imagination.

² Sarah Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991.

PREFACE

But what can historical exegesis contribute to present-day philosophical debate? I would like to argue that the historian's contribution consists in keeping available the thought of past philosophers as a resource that would otherwise be lost or inaccessible. In order to engage in a serious discussion with a classical author, to find out what his views were on a given question, or whether his perspective was different from ours, it is usually not enough to read his relevant works, not even if one can read them in the original language. It is the task of historical exegesis to spell out, in contemporary language, what exactly the questions were, how the arguments were supposed to work, and what answers were being offered. Systematic philosophers tend to find historians' debates tedious and exasperating, but since historical exegesis is a matter of interpretation, the historian's work is open to critical scrutiny by others in the same business. (Historians are apt to find the highly scholastic debates of their systematic contemporaries equally tedious and exasperating.) Such debates are needed to keep the historians honest – assuming, as I would, that there is a point in trying to find the correct interpretation of a classical text, and not just to come up with some fanciful or exciting story about what the author might have thought. Generally speaking, Aristotle and Hume are likely to have been more interesting than their commentators. Debates about questions of interpretation can also be fascinating for those engaged in them, and indeed most historians are no doubt interested in exegetical questions in their own right. It can also be fascinating to follow the development of a historical debate – such as the epistemological dispute between the Stoics and the Skeptics – while temporarily suspending disbelief in some of the premises involved. But this is not all there is to historical research in philosophy, and it seems important to me to emphasize that the invitation to study historical texts with their accompanying burden of commentary need not be understood as an invitation to join this particular kind of debate. Philosophers who don't read Greek may still take a serious interest in Aristotle, or so we hope, even though they cannot enter into disputes about fine points of translation.

The assumption that there is little to be learned from philosophical authors of the past could be justified only by the very implausible claim that philosophy has finally reached the sure path of a science, or that we have come up with the one and only correct way of thinking about philosophical questions. It may well be that many people believe just this today, as some of their predecessors have done in the past, but here the history of philosophy provides a strong counterargument. I do not wish to deny, of course, that there has been a lot of progress over more than two thousand years, but progress in philosophy does not appear to be of the cumulative sort. It seems to consist, rather, in the recognition of some egregious errors, the refinement of concepts and terminology, and the invention of alternative explanations and theories – much of which is due to the development of other disciplines, especially the sciences. Given this kind of situation, there can be no guarantee that all that was valuable has been absorbed into subsequent theories, all

Cambridge University Press
0521476410 - Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics
Gisela Striker
Frontmatter
[More information](#)

PREFACE

that was muddled or mistaken has been discarded. Hence there seem to be several reasons why it makes sense to keep historical texts and theories accessible. One is, of course, that it may help us to avoid repeating past mistakes. Others are more interesting. Sometimes a philosopher may want to find out why her contemporaries are asking the peculiar questions they do ask, by looking at the development that led to the present situation. This accounts, I think, for the relatively greater interest taken in the more recent past – the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – as compared to more distant historical periods. On the other hand, the Greeks, and especially the Presocratics, have sometimes been studied by those who wished to see “how it all began.” Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the possibility of finding in an older author different and illuminating perspectives on questions of contemporary concern; perspectives that have, for one reason or another, been forgotten or neglected by the more recent tradition. This has happened, for example, with Aristotle and Kant in recent work on ethics. It has also happened in psychology, where philosophers have tried to look back beyond Descartes for theories that are not tied to the dualism of mind and body; and in epistemology, where empiricism, at least in the Anglophone tradition, seems to have reached the status of an obvious fact rather than a philosophical theory. I tend to believe, naturally enough, that some present-day philosophers might find it useful to compare notes, as it were, with their Hellenistic predecessors. It is in this modest sense that I hope these essays may also be a contribution to philosophy *simpliciter*.

G. S.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
August 1995

Acknowledgments and essay sources

I am grateful to Cambridge University Press, and to Terence Moore in particular, for making this collection possible. Edith Feinstein and Genevieve Scandone did an admirable job in preparing the manuscript for the press. Mitzi Lee and Benson Smith translated Chapters 6 and 2, respectively, and gracefully put up with the naggings of an opinionated author. I thank the publishers and editors of the journals and collections in which Chapters 2–15 were first published for granting me the permission to reprint them here.

Apart from Chapter 1, the essays in this volume were previously published as follows:

- Chapter 2. κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας, *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, I. Phil.-hist. Klasse, 2 (1974), pp. 48–110.
- Chapter 3. Epicurus on the Truth of Sense Impressions, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 59 (1977), pp. 125–142.
- Chapter 4. Sceptical Strategies, in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (eds.), *Doubt and Dogmatism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1980, pp. 54–83.
- Chapter 5. The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus, in M. Burnyeat (ed.), *The Skeptical Tradition*, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1983, pp. 95–115.
- Chapter 6. On the Difference between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics [Über den Unterschied zwischen den Pyrrhonicern und den Akademikern], *Phronesis* 26 (1981), pp. 153–71.
- Chapter 7. The Problem of the Criterion, in S. Everson (ed.), *Epistemology* (Companions to Ancient Thought 1), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 143–60.
- Chapter 8. Greek Ethics and Moral Theory, *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, IX (1988), pp. 181–202.
- Chapter 9. *Ataraxia*: Happiness as Tranquillity, *The Monist* 73 (1990), pp. 97–110.
- Chapter 10. Epicurean Hedonism, in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum (eds.), *Passions and Perceptions*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 3–17.
- Chapter 11. Origins of the Concept of Natural Law, in J. Cleary (ed.), *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, II, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 79–94.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND ESSAY SOURCES

- Chapter 12. Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* IX (1991), pp. 1–73.
- Chapter 13. The Role of *Oikeiosis* in Stoic Ethics, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* I (1983), pp. 145–67.
- Chapter 14. Antipater, or the Art of Living, in M. Schofield and G. Striker (eds.), *The Norms of Nature*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 185–204.
- Chapter 15. Plato's Socrates and the Stoics, in P. Vander Waerdt (ed.), *The Socratic Movement*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1994.

Abbreviations: Frequently cited names and titles

<i>Acad.</i>	Cicero, <i>Academica</i>
<i>ad Luc.</i>	Seneca, <i>Epistulae ad Lucilium</i>
<i>Adv. Col.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Adversus Colotem</i>
Alex. Aphr.	Alexander of Aphrodisias
<i>An. Po.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Analytica Posteriora</i>
Ar. Did.	Arius Didymus
Arr.	G. Arrighetti, <i>Epicuro opere</i> (first publ. Turin, 1960; 2nd ed., 1973)
Athen.	Athenaeus
<i>Bibl.</i>	Photius, <i>Bibliotheca</i>
Cic.	Cicero
Clemens Alex.	Clement of Alexandria
<i>Comm. not.</i>	Plutarch, <i>De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos</i>
<i>const.</i>	Seneca, <i>De constantia sapientis</i>
Damox. com.	Damoxenus comicus
<i>De an.</i>	Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>De anima</i> ; Aristotle, <i>De anima</i> [as specified]
<i>De an. mant.</i>	Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>De anima mantissa</i>
<i>De crit.</i>	Ptolemy, <i>Peri kritériou</i>
<i>De ebr.</i>	Philo Alexandrinus, <i>De ebrietate</i>
<i>De fin.</i>	Cicero, <i>De finibus</i>
<i>De Hipp. et</i>	Galen, <i>De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (De Hippocratis et</i>
<i>Plat. decr.</i>	<i>Platonis decretis)</i>
Demosth.	Demosthenes
<i>De nat.</i>	Epicurus, <i>De natura</i> (G. Arrighetti)
<i>De off.</i>	Cicero, <i>De officiis</i>
<i>De plac. Hipp.</i>	Galen, <i>De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis</i>
<i>et Plat.</i>	
<i>De rep.</i>	Cicero, <i>De republica</i>
<i>De sens.</i>	Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>De sensu</i> ; Theophrastus, <i>De sensibus</i>
<i>De stoic. repugn.</i>	Plutarch, <i>De Stoicorum repugnantiiis</i>
<i>De vet. med.</i>	Hippocrates, <i>Ancient Medicine</i>
Diels	Hermann Diels, <i>Doxographi Graeci</i> (Berlin, 1879)
<i>Diss.</i>	Epictetus, <i>Dissertationes or Discourses</i>
<i>Div.</i>	Cicero, <i>De divinatione</i>
DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> (14th ed., Weidmann 1968).
D.L.	Diogenes Laertius, <i>Lives of the Philosophers</i>

ABBREVIATIONS: FREQUENTLY CITED NAMES AND TITLES

<i>Ecl.</i>	Stobaeus, <i>Eclogae</i>
<i>EN</i>	Aristotle, <i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>
<i>Ep.</i>	Seneca, <i>Epistulae ad Lucilium</i>
<i>Ep. ad Herod.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Epistula ad Herodotum</i>
<i>Ep. ad Men.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Epistula ad Menoeceum</i>
<i>Epict.</i>	Epictetus
<i>Euth.</i>	Plato, <i>Euthyphro</i>
<i>Euthyd.</i>	Plato, <i>Euthydemus</i>
<i>Fat.</i>	Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>De fato</i> ; Cicero, <i>De fato</i> [as specified]
<i>Fin.</i>	Cicero, <i>De finibus bonorum et malorum</i>
<i>Grg.</i>	Plato, <i>Gorgias</i>
<i>Haer.</i>	Hippolytus, <i>Refutatio omnium haeresium</i>
<i>Hipp. Maj.</i>	Plato, <i>Hippias Major</i>
<i>Hipp. Mi.</i>	Plato, <i>Hippias Minor</i>
<i>In Arist.</i>	Philoponus, <i>In Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora</i>
<i>An. Post.</i>	
<i>In de sens.</i>	Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>In Aristotelis De Sensu</i>
<i>In met.</i>	Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>In Aristotelis Metaphysica</i>
<i>In Plat. Phaed.</i>	Olympiodorus, <i>In Platonis Phaedonem commentaria</i>
<i>Inst.</i>	Lactantius, <i>Divine institutes</i>
<i>In Top.</i>	Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>In Aristotelis Topica</i>
<i>K.D.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Kuriai doxai</i>
<i>Leg.</i>	Cicero, <i>De legibus</i>
<i>Leg. alleg.</i>	Philo Alexandrinus, <i>Legum allegoriae</i>
<i>Legg.</i>	Plato, <i>De legibus</i>
<i>LSJ</i>	<i>Greek-English Lexicon</i> , H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, rev. Jones and McKenzie (1968).
<i>Luc.</i>	Cicero, <i>Lucullus</i>
<i>M</i>	Sextus Empiricus, <i>Adversus mathematicos</i>
<i>Met.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Metaphysica</i>
<i>MXG</i>	Pseudo-Aristotle, <i>De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia</i>
<i>Nat. hom.</i>	Nemesius, <i>De natura hominis</i>
<i>ND</i>	Cicero, <i>De natura deorum</i>
<i>Off.</i>	Cicero, <i>De officiis</i>
<i>Opt. doctr.</i>	Galen, <i>De optima doctrina</i>
<i>P.D.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Principal Doctrines</i>
<i>PH</i>	Sextus Empiricus, <i>Pyrrhoniae hypotyposesis</i>
<i>Phd.</i>	Plato, <i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Philosoph.</i>	Hippolytus, <i>Philosophoumena</i>
<i>PHP</i>	Galen, <i>De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis</i>
<i>Phys.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Physica</i>
<i>Plac.</i>	Aëtius, <i>Placita</i>
<i>Plut.</i>	Plutarch
<i>Pol.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Politica</i>

ABBREVIATIONS: FREQUENTLY CITED NAMES AND TITLES

<i>Praep. ev.</i>	Eusebius, <i>Praeparatio evangelica</i>
<i>Prt.</i>	Plato, <i>Protagoras</i>
<i>Quaest.</i>	Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>Quaestiones</i>
<i>quaest. plat.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Quaestiones Platonicae</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	Plato, <i>Republic</i>
<i>Rhet.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Rhetorica</i> ; Philodemus, <i>Rhetorica</i> [as specified]
<i>RS</i>	Epicurus, <i>Ratae sententiae</i>
<i>S.E.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Sophistici Elenchi</i>
S.E.	Sextus Empiricus
Sen.	Seneca
<i>Soph. El.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Sophistici Elenchi</i>
<i>Sph.</i>	Plato, <i>Sophist</i>
Stob.	Stobaeus
<i>Strom.</i>	Clement of Alexandria, <i>Stromateis</i>
<i>Subfig. emp.</i>	Galen, <i>Subfiguratio empirica</i>
<i>SVF</i>	H. von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> , 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1903–5); vol. 4, indexes by M. Adler (Leipzig, 1924)
<i>Tht.</i>	Plato, <i>Theaetetus</i>
<i>Top.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Topics</i>
<i>tranqu.</i>	Seneca, <i>De tranquillitate animi</i>
<i>Tusc.</i>	Cicero, <i>Tusculanae disputationes</i>
Usener	H. Usener, <i>Epicurea</i> (Leipzig, 1887).
<i>virt. mor.</i>	Plutarch, <i>De virtute morali</i>
<i>vita</i>	Seneca, <i>De vita beata</i>