ARCHITECTURE IN THE AGE OF STALIN

CULTURE TWO

Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two examines the cultural mechanisms that affected the evolution of architecture in Russia during the Stalinist period. Defining two conflicting trends – Culture One and Culture Two – that have alternately prevailed in Russian culture, Vladimir Paperny argues that the shift away from the architectural avant-garde of the 1920s was not entirely the result of Stalin's will. Rather, he demonstrates how the aesthetic choices of Stalin and his architects were conditioned by the prevailing cultural mechanisms of the 1930s and 1940s. Combining academic precision with engaging narrative, and using previously unavailable archival materials published in the West for the first time in this edition, Paperny leads the reader through the remarkable trajectory of architectural and cultural transformation that marked a pivotal moment of Russia's history.

Vladimir Paperny received his doctorate from the Russian State University for Humanities. Currently a Los Angeles–based designer, he is former fellow of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. He has taught at the University of Southern California and has contributed to a variety of journals and publications on aspects of Russian modern architecture and culture.

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CULTURE TWO

Vladimir Paperny

Translated by John Hill and Roann Barris
in collaboration with the author

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– Do you consider yourself the continuer of the work of
  Peter the Great?
– Not at all. Historical parallels are always risky. The given
  parallel is meaningless.

Stalin in a conversation with Emil Ludwig

And now the boy saw the prints of the stiff foot on the door-
jamb and saw them on the pale rug behind the machinelike
deliberation of the foot which seemed to bear (or transmit)
three times the weight which the body compassed.

William Faulkner, *Barn Burning*

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Foreword

I don't know how many books on cultural history or history of architecture made such a strong impression on their first readers as Vladimir Paperny's *Culture Two*. I read his manuscript in 1979 in Moscow, and it felt like breathing fresh air in the stale intellectual atmosphere there at the time. Aesthetical problems of Soviet culture were discussed then only in suffocatingly boring official publications, devoid of any traces of analytical thinking or even of mere academic or journalistic professionalism. Dissident intelligentsia, on the other hand, was trying hard to ignore Soviet reality, to pretend that it did not exist at all. For the opposition-minded intelligentsia, the Soviet regime was only a source of oppression, limitations, and censorship. The reaction to it was moral indignation, either open or clandestine (depending on the level of personal bravery). Legitimate objects of cultural studies had to be not only sufficiently removed from the "dirty" Soviet ideology and reality, but also purified from any radical political and aesthetical connotations. In this respect, moderate modernists like the poets Pasternak and Akhmatova were the most comfortable objects of cultural studies. It was believed at that time that the best achievements of twentieth-century Russian culture were created in spite of the Soviet regime. As a result, Soviet culture was interpreted by dissident intelligentsia – which would have vehemently denied such a connection – through the official theory (Lenin's) of two cultures within any given culture. According to this theory, everything good in a culture of the past was created despite the policies of the ruling class.

Generally, liberal Russian intelligentsia in the 1970s was under a strong influence of structuralism, whose main thrust was to seek intrinsic unity in any given culture. But applying this structuralist approach to Soviet culture was taboo: It would have meant equating executioners with victims and erasing the border between culture and nonculture. At first glance, it could not prevent a structuralist analysis of the Soviet culture, because structuralism usually deals with oppositions; but for the liberal Russian intelligentsia, "Soviet versus non-Soviet" could not be thought of as belonging to any more general system of oppositions.

The question of what was good in that part of the Russian culture, which was censored and suppressed by the Soviet ideology, was answered by the Moscow intellectuals of the 1970s in a very restricting way, itself bordering on the official censorship. For example, the 1920s avant-garde was not considered a worthy object of cultural studies, thus becoming a double victim of the official and the oppositional censorship. For the official Soviet culture, with its emphasis on realism, the avant-garde was unacceptable on aesthetical grounds. For the liberal intelligentsia, it was unacceptable on political grounds, since the theoreticians and the artists of the 1920s shared Marxist ideology to which liberal intelligentsia became allergic. In the complex web of the official and unofficial taboos, the impossibility of talking about the evolving nature of Soviet ideology (which had always been trying to forget its avant-garde roots) was perhaps the biggest obstacle in the way of objective, unbiased study of Soviet culture.

Against this background of almost total theoretical paralysis, Paperny's manuscript struck me because its author obviously had been able to eliminate all the aforementioned taboos and superstitions (as well as some others) – not one by one, but once and for all. Without hesitation or excuses, Paperny subjected the totality of Soviet culture to structuralist analysis, and all the boring positive and negative clichés about Soviet culture disappeared as if by magic. This book emanates the spirit of joy, freedom, discovery. Paperny seems to be amazed himself how well every part of his theoretical construction falls into place, and this spirit is immediately shared by the reader. It's not easy to imagine today what unexpected joy it was in the early 1980s to find a description of Soviet culture (seemingly the incarnation of boredom itself) that was exciting and funny.

At the same time, *Culture Two* is a serious professional study of architecture in the age of Stalin. It is still the best text written on the subject precisely because history of architecture is placed here within a more general cultural context. Paperny demonstrates his extraordinary ability to uncover and to make obvious for the reader the hidden connections between events of everyday life and ideological trends, on the one hand, and shapes, forms, and spatial solutions created by both the avant-garde and Stalinist artists, designers, and planners, on the other.

The general theory of Soviet culture introduced by Paperny influenced many authors writing on various aspects of Soviet culture, especially those who, like myself, later argued with his theory. The English edition of the book, vitally important for all interested in the cultural history of the twentieth century, is long overdue. It will give the English-speaking reader an opportunity to understand better not only Soviet culture but also the political discussions of the past two decades about the fate of Russian culture – discussions for which Vladimir Paperny's book was one of the most powerful and fruitful catalysts.

BORIS GROYS, *Köln, 2000*

Preface

One of the reasons for writing this book was the pseudosignificant tone in which "progressive" Soviet art historians of the 1960s described the sudden change in the development of Soviet art and architecture of the late 1920s–early 1930s: "Then," they say, "*for reasons that everybody is quite aware of,* the development of Soviet art went in a different direction." I often asked them what these reasons were, but was given no answer; although, judging by their knowing glances, the phrase "reasons that everybody is quite aware of" contained a complex cluster of associations. This cluster, I suppose, implied a force that may be described in one word as They, a force hostile to the "proper" and "natural" development of Soviet art: All had been going well until They came along and spoiled it all.

I was astonished by the words of Selim Khan-Magomedov, one of the best historians of Soviet art of the 1920s: "Followers of Constructivism," he wrote in his biography of Moisei Ginzburg, "*were forced* to compete in areas of architectural activity which were the least known to them – namely in the creation of monumental compositions."[1]

Who was the villain that forced them to compete in these areas? I remember how Anatolii Strigalev, another specialist on the art of the 1920s, in one of his lectures given in 1976, expressed the idea that constructivism, by the end of the 1920s, had gained such a strong position that, *had it been allowed* to develop a little further, it would surely have become the dominant architectural school in the 1940s–50s. Khan-Magomedov, who was present at the time, supported him by saying that it was a pity that Strigalev had expressed this in such a tentative form, and also a pity that Paperny had attacked him with aggressive questions, because Strigalev's idea was quite interesting and worthy of our attention.

These ideas, Strigalev's as well as Khan-Magomedov's, are certainly worth our attention – initially because of the grammatical construction of each. "Were forced to compete" and "allowed to develop" are impersonal and indirect forms marked by the blatant absence of the organization, event, or person who did the "forcing" and "not allowing."

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I am convinced that the Soviet art historians with whom I spoke in the 1960s and 1970s did not say who They were not because of any political constraints, not because they did not dare say so, but simply because they *did not know.* "Reasons that everybody is quite aware of" became for them a kind of medieval *causa finalis* without which their world model could not operate.

When Western scholars, in contrast, were faced with the task of explaining the sudden turn from constructivism to what they perceived as the wedding cakes of high Stalinism, they did not hesitate to name the villain. It would be "the Central Committee of the Communist Party" or "Stalin" or at least "*political forces.*" For example, back in 1949, Peter Blake wrote that "Russian architects who showed the highest promise during the late twenties *were ordered* by the Central Committee of the Party to turn to the classical orders."[2] John Fizer reiterated this viewpoint in 1975: "The cyclical evolution of aesthetic preferences was halted by political force."[3] John Willet echoed them in 1978, suggesting that "behind this harmlessly vague sounding principle [of socialist realism – V.P.] lay the views of *Stalin himself.*"[4]

In a sense, this position is similar to the official Soviet line, which maintained that artists and architects needed the party's guidance; and the party kindly provided it. For example: "The Central Committee of the Party and Council of People's Commissars *reject* the proposals for demolishing the existing city."[5] Or "The Party and the State will continue to *nurture* good taste among the people."[6]

There is one and the same scheme here: People engaged in artistic endeavors follow instructions. The only difference is that in Soviet documents this is viewed in a positive light, whereas Western critics see it as something negative. It must be said that the pseudosignificant tone of the Soviet art historians is a bit more attractive than the borrowed schematism of their Western colleagues. In terms of accuracy, both leave too many questions unanswered. The mysticism of Soviet art history is altogether not disposed to rational explanations – everything stays on the level of knowing glances and the sense of community that thereafter arises – but one wants to ask the Western authors cited here: If the natural inclinations in the aesthetic process were disrupted by political interference, why did the majority of architects greet this change with such enthusiasm? "The dams made by canons and dogmas have burst."[7] And if the meaning of this revolution of the early 1930s was that, as constructivist Viktor Vesnin sadly observed, *everything is allowed,*[8] then what sorts of *classical* models are meant here?

One of the earliest attempts at interpreting the phenomenon of Soviet architecture in the 1930s and 1940s was made by Helmut Lehman-Haupt in his book *Art under a Dictatorship.* In both Russia and Germany in the 1930s, he argued, identical totalitarian societies arose. The function of art in these societies was to "serve as a means for the total dissolution of the individual,"[9] and so-called modern art is not adequate for this purpose because it is "a powerful symbol of anti-totalitarian impulses."[10] The art of both states is very similar, and while

"superficially it may seem that there are certain differences between both the positive and negative parts of the programs of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia . . . the content of the struggle was (and is) essentially the struggle of the totalitarian society against the individual."[11]

As proof of the resemblance between the two styles of art, Lehman-Haupt cites the following example. In 1947 in the House of Soviet Culture in Berlin, Soviet colonel A. Dymshits gave a speech called "Soviet art and its relationship to bourgeois art." German artists, having listened to the speech, said: "Just like under the Nazis, from the ideas right down to how it was phrased."[12]

We can add that Soviet people had the very same reaction to Nazi culture, a resemblance often exploited in the 1960s in fighting the censorship with allusions and allegories: The foreign They were spoken of, but the viewer or reader understood that the subject was really Us. Mikhail Romm's film *Ordinary Fascism* (*Obyknovennyi fashizm*, 1965), after a screenplay by Maia Turovskaia and Iurii Khaniutin, and Fazil' Iskander's short story "A Summer's Day"[13] both used this approach.

We shall not, however, put too much credit in the ease with which allusions and allegories emerged; they can be explained ultimately by a certain common orientation shared by the author and audience, a situation where the author could talk about *anything at all* and the audience would correctly guess that the author was speaking about Them only out of concern for the censor, that in reality he was referring to Us.

A principally different approach to the phenomenon of Soviet architecture in the 1930s and 1940s is contained in Adolf Max Vogt's book *Russische und französische Revolutions-Architektur 1917–1789* (Russian and French Revolutionary Architecture), in which the author shows that changes in Soviet architecture at the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s are similar to changes in the architecture of the French Revolution. Similarities in architectural processes, in Vogt's opinion, are based on similarities in sociopolitical changes. In most cases the same scheme applies to both periods:

Internal political changes lead to revolution	Internal political stabilization
A new class comes to power.	The new class becomes hierarchically stratified and its foreign policy leads to annexation of foreign lands (Napoleon reaches Moscow, Stalin captures Berlin).
Economic crisis arises, which leads to a construction crisis.	The economy stabilizes, leading to construction contracts.
Architects, losing contracts, begin to design the architecture of the future, envisioned as purely geometric.	New contracts cease and preference is given to conservative, representative forms.[14]

Lehman-Haupt started from the premise that in the twentieth century a phe-
nomenon unprecedented in history arose, one that appeared equally in various
geographical points. The analogies Lehman-Haupt provides can be considered
synchronous (or geographical).

Vogt's analogy is social: He assumes that certain sociopolitical structures can
exist in various periods and various places and produce similar phenomena in
the sphere of spatial thinking. This is close to the Marxist tradition.

In my opinion, none of the approaches described here allows for the com-
plex and contradictory phenomena that make up what is known as "Stalinist
architecture." What Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia had in common, as
noted by Lehman-Haupt, was the "state apparatus's struggle with the individ-
ual." This phrase is so vague, however, that one wonders if Achilles' conflict with
Agamemnon described in the *Iliad* would not fit right in. Lehman-Haupt's asser-
tion that modern art is a powerful symbol of antitotalitarian tendencies is abso-
lutely inapplicable to the Russian avant-garde. The manifesto of the communist-
futurists, for instance, called for "the rejection of all democratic illusions" and
the subjection of culture to "a new ideology."[15] Artists demanded power because
"now there is no power, nor can there be any power, other than the power of
the minority."[16] They dreamed – analogous to the Bolsheviks' rout of the Con-
stituent Assembly in 1918 – of overthrowing "the assembly of representatives of
Persian Shahs alive and dead"[17] that had taken shape in art. The new art's love
of power and of the authorities was noted several times. Viktor Khovin wrote
with irritation about the "timid and flattering tone" of the Moscow futurists and
of the "appeal of power" to which they succumbed.[18] Boris Pasternak broke with
Mayakovsky's LEF since "LEF depressed and repulsed ... by its excessive
Soviet-ness, that is, its disgusting servility, that is a tendency towards unruliness
with an official mandate."[19] As far as the "dissolution of the individual" that
Lehman-Haupt discussed is concerned, the Russian avant-garde would have
pleased any dictator – any number of examples can be cited starting from Male-
vich's anti-individualist statements ("any internal, any individual and 'I under-
stand' has no place"[20]) and ending with V. Kuz'min's collective bedrooms and
Mel'nikov's Sleep Laboratory (discussed in section 5, "Collective–Individual").

The scheme at the base of Vogt's excellent book is also of too general a char-
acter for it to capture the specific nature of Stalinist architecture. Strictly speak-
ing, Vogt did not try to do this; nevertheless, he does discuss several works of
this era, and here certain inaccuracies emerge. In trying to demonstrate that ar-
chitectural development in both the era of the French Revolution and the pre-
war Soviet period ended with classical columns, Vogt uses as a typical example
of Soviet architecture of the 1930s Ivan Zholtovskii's building on Mokhovaia
Street. Careful study of this era, however, shows that neoclassicism (and specif-
ically Zholtovskii's building) was never officially canonized and that the style
closest to the spirit of the culture was Boris Iofan's (and not Zholtovskii's or
Rudnev's), and Iofan has no classical colonnades. Structures vitally important

for the Soviet architecture of the 1930s such as the Moscow Metro and All-Union Agricultural Exhibition (VSKhV) do not fit into Vogt's basic scheme.[21]

Vogt centers his attention on European classicism; Stalinist architecture interests him only inasmuch as he succeeds in finding echoes of this classicism. These echoes are rather easy to find − but a researcher of the gothic style could just as easily find gothic motifs in this architecture, a specialist in Babylonian architecture could find features similar to the ziggurats, someone knowledgeable about American skyscrapers would see in the Stalinist high rises merely an unsuccessful imitation of early twentieth-century skyscrapers, and so on. Truly, in the Moscow State University building one can find examples of almost every existing architectural motif and construction method. Once Stalinist architecture itself becomes the center of attention, however, the researcher no longer has the right to limit him- or herself to noting this or that borrowed element or echo of a European style; rather, attention should be paid to *how they are combined.*

The process of borrowing has always been extremely important in Russian culture. Beginning in the tenth century when Prince Vladimir was faced with the problem of choosing a religion and ending in 1917 with the adoption of Marxism, ideologies were borrowed. Industrial and economic structures were borrowed also, factory production under Peter the Great or industrial design under Khrushchev. Artistic styles were borrowed (classicism under Catherine the Great), social institutions (trial by jury under Alexander II), and so on. The answer to the question "Is Russian communism Russian?" should, I believe, be sought where the answer lies to the question "What connection is there between 'Naryshkin baroque' in Moscow and the Italian baroque of the seventeenth century?"

I believe that to understand Russian culture of any period it is more important to consider the character of the transformation of the borrowed ideology (organization, style) than the ideology itself. Maintaining that in 1917 a rebellion of paganism against Christianity took place (as some historians did)[22] would be possible only if culture prior to 1917 had had a blatantly Christian character. This hypothesis is flawed first by the remarkable stability of the common people's "dual belief" (a mixture of Christian and pagan elements)[23] and, second, by that ease with which the institutions of Christianity were destroyed in Soviet culture.

Actually, one could find in Soviet culture elements of Christianity, paganism, Marxism, imperialism, and many others. However, if for students of religion, sociology, and politics these elements would be the objects of research, then the student of Soviet culture is correct in concentrating on that mosaic that emerges upon the assembly of all these parts.

This work formally belongs to the realm of art history, since the main object of analysis is architecture; but architecture here has been dissolved into the culture to a significantly greater degree than it was in, say, the Vienna school of art history. We shall start with the premise that the changes that occurred in archi-

tecture and the changes that occurred in other art forms, in the economy, in life-styles, types of social organization, newspaper lexicon, and so on, can be assigned to certain general factors. We assume that it was not the work of individual architects, critics, bureaucrats, and leaders who, through their efforts, made a radical turn in the direction of architecture (literature, cinema), but, on the contrary, that this movement existed prior to the efforts of certain individuals, that there exists something that causes such movements, drawing people along with it, "playing," as Arnold Hauser put it, "with their motivations and interests and giving them a sense of freedom."[24] We shall call this "something" culture.

A century ago Heinrich Wölfflin's question of what the connection was between the gothic style and scholasticism[25] seemed purely rhetorical. "It is really absurd to see in the Gothic style some exclusive connection with the feudal order and scholasticism," the famous Russian art historian Grabar' answered Wölfflin in 1912.[26] Indeed, by observing only the gothic style and only scholasticism – an architectural style and a philosophical school – such a connection is impossible. When Erwin Panofsky, however, added a third element, style of thought, in his celebrated book *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism*, the connection became clear. Panofsky succeeded in answering another of Wölfflin's seemingly rhetorical questions: "Where exactly is the path leading from the scholastic's cell to the architect's studio?"[27] This path led through the *monopoly on education*, that is, through the special form of social organization by which a style of thought was transformed from philosophy into architecture. Philosophy and architecture in Panofsky came to be "primary and secondary spiritual forms."[28] This, as Panofsky himself noted, is warranted only in a specific spatial and temporal continuum: between 1130 and 1270 and in a hundred-mile zone around Paris.[29] Even with these restrictions, however, the leading role of philosophy was called into doubt by Panofsky's critics.[30]

If we try to apply Panofsky's scheme across the space–time continuum to, let's say, the territory of Muscovy under Ivan III ("the Great") and during a period from Ivan's time to our day, we find that our search for "primary spiritual forms," having developed a certain universal modus operandi and subsequently translated to all levels of culture (specifically to the level of aesthetics), has become rather difficult. The aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic are not united by cause-and-effect connections in this continuum, they do not flow parallel to each other, and they do not exist independently but are rather altogether not separated from each other. Life has always been too artificial in Russia, and art has always been too lifelike. Therefore the method used in this work consists, roughly speaking, of the use of binary oppositions like those Wölfflin invented for his description of *style* applied to *culture* as a whole.

The totality of the binary opposites used here must ultimately produce two main poles: Culture One versus Culture Two. Just what are Culture One and Culture Two?

First of all, it must be conceded that Culture One and Culture Two do not exist in reality. They were invented by the author. Although this disclaimer may appear to be a truism, I make it all the same in order to avoid many misunderstandings. The concept of Culture One is constructed here primarily based on materials from the 1920s, whereas Culture Two is based on materials from the 1930s to 1950s, and at a certain point the reader may get the impression that Culture Two is really what happened between the years 1932 and 1954. Culture Two (like Culture One) is an artificial construction; therefore I refute in advance all objections of the type, "There were other things happening as well in the 1930s." In the 1930s and 1940s many things did indeed take place that are beyond the scope of Culture Two. Furthermore, I am convinced that the 1920s and 1930s were nowhere near as antipodal as it might appear if one equates Culture One with the 1920s and Culture Two with the 1930s–50s.

Culture Two is a model, a tool for the description and systematization of certain events that took place during 1932–54. This is not all, though. The juxtaposition of Cultures One and Two is a convenient way to describe the events that transpired in the same space but at different times. This work voices the hypothesis that a certain portion of the events in Russian history (including events having to do with changes in spatial conceptions) can be described in terms of an alternation of the ascendancy of Culture One and Culture Two. Therefore, because I wish to trace a unifying principle throughout history, my attention is primarily focused on the territory of the Muscovite State under Ivan III, and especially Moscow. (In section 4, "Uniform–Hierarchical," it is shown that, in a certain sense, Moscow is equivalent to the territory of the entire country.) Territories colonized later are not considered inasmuch as they have their own traditions and the picture there is significantly more complicated.

The idea of cyclical processes in Russian history is not new. Vasilii Kliuchevskii spoke of the alternation of the dispersal of the population across territory and the suppression of this process: "the sequence of these periods – is the sequence of stops or suspensions with which the movement of the Russian people across the plains was interrupted. . . ."[31] It is true that Kliuchevskii had in mind cycles with periods of several centuries; we are interested considerably smaller cycles.

An attempt to create a three-phase cyclic model of Russian history is contained in Alexander Yanov's book *The Origins of the Autocracy: Ivan the Terrible in Russian History*.[32]

Perhaps the idea of the alternation of the population's running across the country and the government's attempts to stop it occurs in its most vivid form in the numerous but as-yet unpublished (to my knowledge) works of Aider Kurkchi. He is perhaps the only student of the cyclic processes of Russian history who linked these processes with changes in spatial conceptions. Although he was sooner interested in the scale not of individual architectural construc-

tions but of population dispersal in Russia, some of his observations about the periodicity of changes in construction activities of the authorities nonetheless were exceptionally useful to me.

Obviously, no historical process can be portrayed as a simple sinusoid. It always contains an infinite number of axes along which changes describing the most varied curves possible can occur. If we take the history of Russian architecture, then such processes as the secularization of construction, the rise of professional architectural activity, the borrowing of styles and technical methods, the appearance of social groups capable of functioning as clients, and so on, can be found there. On the time line such processes may occupy a few years or several centuries.

None of those processes is considered here. The one goal of this work is to trace what is behind all of them: the cyclic process of the alternation of Culture One and Culture Two, "melting" and "hardening," the population's uninhibited dispersal across the country and the government's attempts to curb it through architecture – or, in the words of Sergei Solov'ev, the alternating dominance of "the habit of dispersion in the population" and "the government's efforts to catch, settle, and secure."[33]

Characteristic of Culture One is a horizontal quality. This means that the values of the periphery become more important than those of the center. People's consciousness and people themselves strive in a horizontal direction away from the center. In this phase, the authorities are not concerned with architecture, or are concerned with it only to a minimal degree. Architects (in the period where professional architects already appear) are left to themselves and generate ideas that are almost never realized.

Culture Two is characterized by the transfer of values to the center. Society ossifies and crystallizes. The authorities start showing an interest in architecture both as a practical means for securing the population and as the spatial expression of a new center-based system of values. Architecture becomes symmetrical.

My main thesis comprises two assertions.

1. Most of the processes that occurred in Soviet architecture in the late 1920s–early 1930s can be seen as the expression of more general cultural processes, the most important of which is the victory of Culture Two over Culture One.
2. Certain processes in Russian history and especially the history of Russian architecture have a cyclic character that can be explained in terms of the alternation of Cultures One and Two.

The reader will note that the first assertion receives the most attention in this volume; the second is addressed only in passing. If one is to accept my certainty in the model Culture One–Culture Two at 100 percent, then my certainty about the applicability of this model to all of Russian history would be expressed at approximately 60 percent. Strictly speaking, the second assertion still requires a great deal of further research.

The approach adopted in this work presumes that the political forces themselves were manifestations of some other forces, more general in nature − namely, cultural forces. It is true that the Central Committee of the Communist Party on many occasions ordered architects to turn to specific architectural styles or to specific planning solutions; but analysis of documents shows that these orders very often were drafted by the same architects who were supposed to carry them out. It would be idle to try to find out "who forced whom." Instead, it may be more productive to concentrate on the general pattern of changes.

The years 1932 (the government resolution "On the Restructuring of Literary-Artistic Organizations") and 1954 (the All-Union Conference of Builders, Architects, and Construction Industry Workers in November−December) cannot, of course, be considered the beginning and the end of Culture Two. Although between cultures there is always a certain temporal boundary, this does not mean that the boundary can be marked by one point on the time line. It is rather a stretch of time over which the two cultures coexist and conflict with each other until one devours the other. This stretch of coexistence and conflict is the most interesting to the researcher because both cultures, as they struggle for survival, blurt out many things about which they would have preferred, in more settled times, to remain silent.

For a start let us take the period 1932−4 when the very same objects − the results of the Palace of the Soviets competition, Ivan Zholtovskii's building on Mokhovaia Street, and the Mossovet Hotel on Okhotnyi Riad − provoked not merely a differing but so incomparable a reaction among representatives of Cultures One and Two that it could seem the two cultures were speaking of two different things. Since the objects were one and the same, though, we must assume that discussion of them took place in two different languages. This was a discussion between two cultures that totally did not understand each other and often used the same words with completely different meanings. It was a conversation that reminds contemporary researchers of Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*. This absurd dialogue, beginning in the 1930s, has lasted so long that it seems it is high time for Godot to appear and clear things up. While fully cognizant of his unfitness for this role, the author, in view of the lack of someone more suitable, takes it upon himself.

MATERIALS

Materials used in this study can be divided into three groups:

1. Materials concerning the *history of Soviet architecture*, primarily the journals *Sovremennaia Arkhitektura* (Contemporary Architecture), *Sovietskaia Arkhitektura* (Soviet Architecture), and *Arkhitektura SSSR* (Architecture of the USSR), which I read (or at least skimmed) through, from the first issues to the last (with insignificant omissions due to the lack of a few issues of *AS*

in the library I used). All other architectural publications and individual monographs (see Bibliography) were used selectively. In addition, the following sources were also used: the archives of the Union of Soviet Architects, housed in the Central State Archive of Literature and Art (TsGALI [now RGALI]), the photo library of the Shchusev Museum of Architecture, individual materials from private archives, and various oral traditions and legends existing in architectural circles. Finally, certain materials were used concerning other art forms − theater, literature, cinema, and painting.

2. Documents concerning the *activities of governmental authorities,* primarily collections of Soviet laws and resolutions (*SU, SZ, SP, SURP*), which (with insignificant omissions) were also looked through completely. Furthermore, periodicals and certain specialized political studies were used selectively.

3. Materials concerning *Russian history* (including the history of architecture) up to 1917. These are, first, the *Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire* (*PSZ*), of which the first eight volumes were examined; second, various works on Russian history in general (Solov'ev, Kliuchevskii, Miliukov, Pipes, etc.); and, third, works on the history of Russian architecture: Grabar's five-volume *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva* (History of Russian Art; 1910−15), the thirty-volume set of the same title (Grabar' et al., 1954−65), and certain other specialized publications.

The semantic field to emerge upon the parallel analysis of the materials of the first two groups furnished the framework for the construction of the dichotomous model Culture One−Culture Two. The semantic field to emerge upon the comparison of the materials of the first two groups with materials of the third group serves as the basis for thoughts of the single cultural tradition of the alternation of Culture One and Culture Two.

NOTE ON THE ORTHOGRAPHY

With the exception of certain well-known names with established English spellings (e.g., Wassily Kandinsky, Alexander Nevsky, Joseph Stalin), the Library of Congress system of transliteration has been used throughout.

Acknowledgments

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