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Introduction

Analysts of comparative politics share some fundamental assumptions about political economy. One is that states on the periphery of the world economy strive to promote capitalist development. Liberal scholars study the "developing" world, equate economic development with growth, and identify investment of capital in production as the driving force. Underdevelopment and dependency theorists analyzed emergent forms of capitalism. They took the integration of the Third World into the world capitalist economy as their object of study. Marxist scholars have concentrated on the related emergence of capitalist class relations in these societies. In the 1980s political economists turned to the study of entrepreneurial states and dependent development. For better or worse, "the late developing world" is assumed to be on the road of capitalist transformation.

We tend to take for granted that governments are playing a central role in this process. States strive to accelerate economic growth, industrialize, and promote "green revolutions." Their motives seem to be obvious: Governments are either promoting the national interest or the interests of powerful social groups. Because the developmentalist impulse is assumed to be universal, analysts proceed to compare states in terms of their success. Some have argued that the capacity of rulers to promote development is a function of modernizing ideologies and growing institutional capacities of the state. Others look behind changes in the state itself, seeking structural explanations for phenomena observed at the level of institutions and ideology. They often point to the logic of capital that works aggressively to harness land, labor, and natural resources to the world economy. Its dynamics come to dominate peripheral economies and states embedded in them. Indigenous capitalist classes emerge, assert their political power, and accelerate the transformation.

African states born of decolonization in the late 1950s and 1960s have been viewed as one type of peripheral capitalist state. Like their counterparts elsewhere in the Third World, they had far-reaching ambitions for economic growth and development. To achieve growth, most regimes created by the peaceful transfers of power of the early 1960s pursued economic strategies that were decidedly neocolonial: They relied upon international capital to sustain processes of capitalist development set in motion under colonial rule. Production of export crops, an open door to foreign capital, generous subsidies for investors, pro-

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tected markets for light industry, and close links to the metropolitan powers – these were the cornerstones of the neocolonial project in Africa. Some African regimes appeared to be so devoted to this project that they were viewed as hand-picked agents of capitalist imperialism. Most analysts expected the neocolonial form of capitalist development (or exploitation) to continue as long as societal tensions could be suppressed or defused.

Africa's economic history, however, has not followed the anticipated scenario. Regimes vigorously pursued the neocolonial project only to find in the 1980s that capital was retreating, giving up on sub-Saharan Africa. In international flows of trade and investment, the subcontinent became more and more marginal. Foreign investors lost confidence, and they began to lose interest. In most cases national capital has not emerged to take its place. Stagnant rates of economic growth in the 1970s turned negative toward the end of the decade. Analysts and Africa's creditors watched with growing unease as changes unfolding in sub-Saharan Africa no longer seemed to fit into the developmentalist paradigm. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Africa's current crisis erupted.

The crisis is marked by the decay of neocolonial economic structures that tied production to the international economy. Across much of the continent, export-oriented agricultural sectors are shrinking as peasants turn their energies to cultivating food crops for family consumption. As exports decline, imports fall because countries can no longer pay for the foreign goods that they consume. With the decline in national economies, roads, bridges, dams, and railways are disintegrating. Much of sub-Saharan Africa has been abandoned by private capital, left to international debt collectors who will extract as much as they can and write off the rest.

Why did open-door policies fail to entice capital to invest and expand in the ex-colonies? Analysis of African states must figure centrally into the answer. After thirty years of political independence, it seems that even the continent's most neocolonial regimes have not served capital very well.

Students of African political economy now speak of the "economic dysfunctionality" of the African state. Bates (1981) has argued that regimes use state controls over the economy to enhance their ability to remain in power. The resulting patterns of resource allocation are inefficient and wasteful. They hurt peasant agriculture, and thus limit possibilities for expanding production, consumption, and investment. Others have described how predatory regimes use state power to drain resources out of productive sectors and into the hands of rulers, bleeding economies dry.[1] Sandbrook (1985) goes furthest in showing how "parasitic" capitalism can degenerate into complete economic collapse, driven by ruling classes that seem unconstrained in their pursuit of plunder. In the historical era of developmentalist states, state entrepreneurialism, and dependent development, in Africa we observe ruling classes that use state power in strikingly unproductive, counterproductive, and even antiproductionist ways.

Growing recognition of these processes has shifted African studies away from

1. See, for example, Ergas 1982; Schatz 1984.

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analyses of economic and institutional structures. Scholars now advocate more microscopic and disaggregated approaches to understanding states and societies. This shift comes at a time when most students of comparative politics are moving in precisely the opposite direction: toward the analysis of states and institutions as "actors." If the current crisis has raised new questions for African studies, it then raises even more vexing questions for comparativists who do not focus on this part of the world. What is happening in much of sub-Saharan Africa does not square with near axiomatic assumptions about states, development, and developmentalist states. Doubt creeps into the assumption that all states work to guarantee the existing socioeconomic order. The idea that capitalist development is bound to occur everywhere becomes difficult to sustain. And the assumption that states on the periphery of the world economy are developmentalist states becomes untenable. Analysts are forced back to the drawing board to seek more basic and broadly comparative explanations for the existence of developmentalist states and capitalist development.

This book attempts to explain why the deepening and sustained expansion of capital did not occur in a single African state: Senegal. The analysis will show that explanations of capitalist development or its absence cannot begin with the institutional capacities and ideologies of government, for states and institutions cannot explain their own origins. And the explanation cannot rest on the logic of capital, for just as capitalist states need capital, capital needs a state to create and sustain conditions for its expansion. The postcolonial experience in sub-Saharan Africa shows that the formation of such states is a tenuous and uncertain process. Underdevelopment theory was not discriminating enough to tackle the problem at hand, for it assumed that all states and societies on the periphery of the world economy were "capitalist." Liberal theory missed a large part of the story by thinking that promoting development and social transformation was the *raison d'être* of postcolonial regimes. And state-centered and society-centered theorists of the 1980s neglected a critical factor when they spoke as if all social forces were, a priori, external to the state. They forgot about ruling classes. The explanation of capitalist development (or its absence) in particular national contexts must lie in an analysis of the social origins, material bases, and political underpinnings of states and dominant social strata.

The central task of this book lies in unraveling the paradoxical relationship between the postcolonial state in Africa and capitalist development. The relationship is paradoxical because these states, like others on the periphery of the international economy, are structurally dependent upon deepening integration into the world capitalist system. In spite of this dependence, state power has proved to be a most unreliable instrument for sustaining economic growth, capital accumulation, and on-going integration into worldwide systems of production and exchange. It even appears that postcolonial regimes have forged and exercised state power in ways that circumscribe possibilities for the growth and expansion of capital. As economic stagnation gives way to economic decay, the material bases of the postcolonial order erode along with the political arrange-

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ments that were built upon them. Regimes seem to use state prerogatives in ways that erode the bases of their own power.

Understanding this paradox requires an analysis of the political and economic processes that promoted the rise of postcolonial African states and ruling classes. My argument is that these processes compromised possibilities for capitalist development. Through decolonization in the 1960s, what Roger Murray (1967) called "unformed social classes" acceded to state power. They would emerge as new ruling classes whose power was rooted in control over the state itself, rather than in direct control over property or production. Dependent upon interests and forms of power inherent in the established economic order, regimes would try to protect the status quo at the cost of changes that could have cleared the way for the further development of capitalism. The political needs and economic bases of postcolonial ruling strata gave the state its compromised character as an agent of capitalist transformation.

In order to protect the established order, these regimes were forced to consolidate power and to govern. To do so, they were destined "to innovate in their own interests."[2] Regimes ordained to protect the neocolonial order would be forced, because they had no alternative material base, to use it instead as a resource for consolidating their own power. This process inadvertently altered the dynamics of the neocolonial economy in ways that made established forms of production increasingly difficult to sustain. At the same time, using state power to reproduce the political status quo compromised the capacity of regimes to create some alternative economic foundation for their power. For African regimes born of the peaceful decolonizations of the 1960s, consolidating power and promoting economic growth proved to be contradictory imperatives.

This argument is developed through an analysis of Senegal. In this case, the paradoxical outcome of a dependent state that does not sustain the productive activities that tie it into the international economy presents itself clearly. Senegal is the former French colony marked by sub-Saharan Africa's "smoothest transition to neocolonialism."[3] The regime was acutely dependent upon the success of the neocolonial project. Yet in the late 1970s and 1980s, the production of export crops declined along with industrial production. Private foreign capital began to disinvest. Bankrupt, the government cut expenditures, accelerating the downward spiral. Senegal, like much of the continent, found itself in the throes of a profound crisis of state and economy.

What makes this case particularly intriguing is the degree to which political order, stability, and openness accompanied the long process of economic decline. The forces that figure so prominently in Sandbrook's (1985) account of "why capitalism fails" in sub-Saharan Africa – wars, state terror, recurrent military coups, wanton plunder – are not part of Senegal's postcolonial story. Indeed, Senegal produced one of the continent's most stable political systems, along with forms and degrees of democratic practice that are extraordinary in postcolonial

2. This phrase is borrowed from Markovitz 1987:8.
3. See Ly 1981.

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Africa. In Senegal, patterns of ruling class and state formation that compromise the process of capitalist development reveal themselves in an unusually clear way: They developed incrementally, systematically, and within the framework of a single, well-consolidated regime.

How the process of ruling class- and state-formation affected possibilities for the development of light industry in Senegal is the specific focus of the study. In the industrial sector, one finds capital in an organized and developed form. Its relationship with the postcolonial state is direct and overt. A study of the rise and demise of the Dakar textile industry provides the vehicle for analysis. This foreign-owned industry included some of Senegal's largest, oldest, and most powerful privately owned firms. As one of the most imposing creations of private capital in the postcolonial period, the Dakar textile industry was long viewed as a structural feature of neocolonialism in Senegal.

Its history is a textbook case of import-substitution industrialization as it was pursued in Senegal and in much of sub-Saharan Africa. By protecting the domestic market and subsidizing foreign capital, Senegal's governments promoted industrial growth and diversification. In the early 1970s the World Bank (1974) viewed the Dakar textile industry as one of the most successful and dynamic branches of local manufacturing. Suddenly, during a period of expansive state spending and relative economic stability, the Dakar textile industry began to collapse. Interfirm linkages disintegrated and many firms closed. In the mid-1980s the few surviving firms teetered on the brink of bankruptcy in the context of a political economy now near total disintegration. All the while, the government's formal commitment to the survival and expansion of the textile industry never waned.

Why did sub-Saharan Africa's most successful transition to neocolonialism not sustain one of the most imposing structures of the neocolonial economy? Although external forces were unpropitious for the expansion of the textile industry in the 1970s and 1980s, they did not ruin it. The intensely competitive nature of the international market for textile goods is a constant in the industry's history. And although the demands of Senegal's external creditors hardened at the end of the 1970s, lenders' pressures for policy reform did not lead to a dismantling of the restrictive trade regime governing textile imports during the period of the industry's precipitous decline: 1975–85. Senegal's droughts of the 1970s also limited possibilities for industrial expansion, but the poverty of the vast majority of Senegal's population is another constant in the industry's history. A captive market of impoverished consumers provided the base for the industry's growth.

The decisive changes were manifest most conspicuously in the uses of state power. Incrementally, with no formal change in policy, the Senegalese government ceased to enforce foreign industrialists' monopoly over the sale of staple textile goods on the local market. Parallel markets developed freely, without state efforts to suppress them. Powerful members of the political and economic elite became importers, circumventing import restrictions and taxes. The formidable system of quotas and tariffs that had protected the industry from the start broke down. Dakar's textile industry, like much of light industry in Senegal, lost its

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once captive market. The process of light industrialization was reversed. In this case, a regime ordained to protect the neocolonial economic order proved unable to sustain existing industrial structures or to create conditions that would have given rise to new ones.

Like other instances of economic decay that became hallmarks of the continental crisis, the decay of light industry in Dakar raises questions about the administrative capacities of government. And like other cases that expose a persistent contradiction between official development goals and actual patterns of government action, this case raises questions about why state power is used in seemingly counterproductive ways.

The case resonates with previous analyses that have focused on the relationship between state power and Africa's current economic crisis. At the same time, it illustrates their limits. Society-centered analysts (e.g. Hyden 1980; Rothchild and Chazan 1987; Migdal 1988) have described patterns of political practice that erode the organizational coherence of the state and the efficacy of public policy. They show how competing social groups permeate the state, fracture its organizational coherence, and paralyze the state's capacity to sustain programmatic initiatives. At the same time, patterns of grassroots resistance – evident, for example, in the rise of parallel markets – subvert rulers' capacity to control economies, undercutting the hegemonic drives of the state. These processes have been played out in full in Senegal. The problem with what has become known as the society-centered perspective is that it does not tell us enough about the state itself. Ruling coalitions contain powerful and privileged interests vested in sustaining (or undermining) the coherence of state policy. Meanwhile, the interests and political strategies of dominant social strata help to explain why state institutions become so fragmented and permeable in the first place.

By taking the political rationality of rulers as a point of departure, Bates (1981) sheds light on forces at work within the state. Rulers, he argues, use the state coherently and in deliberate ways to promote powerful and privileged interests. They rely on clientelism, policies that produce "divisible gains" rather than economically optimal outcomes, and the particularistic distribution of state resources in order to cement alliances and build political support. These strategies of rule make the state apparatus more permeable and more vulnerable to capture by powerful social elements. By relying in part on resources extracted from agriculture to finance this process, regimes invite the resistance of those most penalized by it. Often the ones most penalized are peasants who turn to parallel markets in order to escape de facto taxation.

Starting from Bates' position, it is possible to see the connections between the political imperatives of rule and the kind of state weakening described by society-centered analysts. It is also possible to see how these processes can lead to the kind of economic and political collapse described by Sandbrook (1985). The connections are logical, but they cannot account for the fundamental contradictions inherent in the processes described. Why would regimes choose and then

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stick to strategies for remaining in power when these strategies so clearly erode their capacity to rule?

Society-centered and rational choice approaches do not grapple with the issues that one confronts at the structural level, where it becomes possible to see how strategies of rule are shaped by the material and social foundations of postcolonial state power. Analysts drawing upon Marxism have framed the basic issues in these terms. In the 1970s underdevelopment and world-system theorists identified a structural relationship between the postcolonial state and capital: They argued that African regimes were structurally dependent on the "development of underdevelopment" (e.g. Gutkind and Wallerstein 1976:11). State power derived from the economic processes that subordinated African economies to international capital; ruling classes emerged out of patterns of social stratification produced by capitalist development; and state revenues were generated by tapping a share of the wealth extracted by capital. Self-interest and structural imperatives would lead regimes to use state power in ways that perpetuate and intensify the exploitation of African economies by international capital. Others on the left made similar arguments, but they drew no distinction between underdevelopment and capitalist development (e.g. Warren 1973).

Marxist approaches explained why states born of capitalist imperialism would sustain the uneven process of capitalist exploitation, and argued that the inescapable contradictions of this process would shape state structures and class relations. These approaches advanced broadly comparative arguments about the relationship between capital accumulation and the reproduction of state power. Because this is the task at hand, previous arguments about the postcolonial state and capital serve as a point of departure. They do not resolve the paradox of the current period, however, because they do not explain why so many postcolonial African states did not follow the structural imperative of creating conditions required for the expansion of capital.

An analysis of political process is needed to square the long tradition of work aimed at understanding capitalism in Africa with the fact that so many regimes have not served capital very well. The decisive process is regime consolidation; it is the concrete, political corollary of postcolonial ruling class and state formation. Regime consolidation involves on-going efforts to use state power to forge a ruling coalition, to sustain it in the face of challenge, and to secure for its members a larger claim on society's economic surplus. From this vantage point, distinctions between state and society blur. The ruling class can be understood in terms of the disparate social elements it contains, and in terms of the mechanisms for extracting wealth and reproducing power that ground it in society. State power can be analyzed in terms of its organization within the state apparatus and the needs and interests that it serves. Where institutions are conspicuously fragile and where they often fail to contain struggles for power, they no longer appear to be "independent" variables. Institutional structures can be seen for what they are: products of the exercise of state power and objects of political competition.

The notion of power consolidation focuses attention on the insecurities and

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uncertainties of postcolonial rule, making it possible to see how the contingencies of power came to be expressed in "modes of domination" that ruling classes sought to sustain and elaborate. The structures of postcolonial regimes, their ways of functioning, and their willingness and capacity to promote capitalist development were shaped through the uncertain process of consolidation.

This approach represents a departure from more familiar ways of understanding the relationship between African states and capitalist development. Many political economists have viewed regime consolidation as a narrowly political dimension of Africa's postcolonial situation, one that was overdetermined by circumstances attending the peaceful transfer of power to neocolonial regimes. Processes that worked to consolidate state power in the hands of postcolonial regimes have not been considered determinant in themselves, for many analysts held that the nature of ruling classes was determined by forces outside the political sphere. It is necessary to move beyond this view. This study demonstrates how the process of consolidation – of gathering, institutionalizing, and reproducing political power – shaped class and economic structures. Efforts to gather and maintain power reduced the capacity of regimes to sustain processes of capitalist development set in motion under colonial rule.

The focus on political process is not, however, an alternative to structural logic. I see it as an extension or deepening of structural logic. Structural analysts working in Marxist traditions provided space for such an approach, even when specifically political processes were not a prime concern. Some did so by flagging the "exceptional" autonomy of the African state from local capital.[4] Because local capital was so weak, African capitalists could not ensure that state power would be used on their behalf, much less at their behest. Other analysts stressed the "relative" autonomy of postcolonial states vis-à-vis foreign capital.[5] They created space for an analysis of contradictions inherent in political processes by showing that postcolonial ruling classes had interests and needs that could not be defined solely in terms of serving foreign capital, in spite of the power of foreign capital and regimes' structural dependence upon it.

In identifying forms of autonomy vis-à-vis capital, structural analyses drawing upon Marxism contain the key to explaining the paradox of Africa's current predicament. Decolonization and the weakness of local capital cleared the way for the political ascendancy of social strata that were neither the bearers nor the representatives of indigenous capitalist interests. As Shivji (1976:66–7) writes, decolonization created historically anomalous situations: "power and property were separated." New ruling classes were structurally dependent upon the continuing vitality and functioning of forms of capital established locally, and upon the international capitalist economy. Yet the conditions under which this struc-

4. This position, some of it influenced by Alavi's (1972) notion of an "overdeveloped" postcolonial state, is developed in analyses of Bonapartism in Africa. See, for example, Leys 1975:207–12; and Shivji 1976.
5. For example, Swainson 1980, and Beckman 1982.

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tural dependency would be translated into political actions that would guarantee the expansion of capital were by no means assured.[6]

One correlate of the postcolonial state's particular forms of autonomy vis-à-vis capital was a striking lack of autonomy in the face of the disparate and sometimes contradictory interests and political needs of social groups who consolidated their power by capturing the postcolonial state. The coherence of these elements as a ruling stratum rested on forms of political domination and surplus extraction that were rooted in existing economic structures, economic structures that would have been destabilized and transformed by efforts to accelerate the process of capitalist development. To preserve the coalitional structure of the ruling class and its economic bases, regimes shied away from the developmentalist project. Meanwhile, tensions within ruling coalitions came to be expressed in the structures and functioning of the state apparatus, shaping the nature of state power and the mechanisms of social control that underpinned it. As the state moved steadily away from its colonial form, it became increasingly difficult to reproduce economic structures and patterns of economic growth that were, in large part, artifacts of the exercise of colonial and neocolonial state power.

This argument shows how internal political structures, shaped by the needs and interests of rulers, worked to circumscribe possibilities for the growth and expansion of capital. Can this internal focus be justified, given the adverse changes in the international economy (inflation, rising interest rates, declining terms of trade for African commodities) and adverse environmental changes (such as drought) that assaulted sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1970s and 1980s? The premise and implication of this study is that an internal focus is necessary in explaining the outcomes of the present. Actions, interests, and political needs of postcolonial rulers played a critical role in reproducing economic structures that proved so vulnerable to the "exogenous shocks" of the 1970s and 1980s. In Senegal the very success of the regime consolidation process worked to reproduce and exacerbate economic weaknesses and vulnerabilities that were obvious in the 1950s, if not before. Adverse changes in the international economy and drought help to explain the timing of the current crisis in Senegal, and also explain why Senegal's most dramatic period of economic collapse coincided with the emergence of severe economic crises across much of the subcontinent. International forces have made the current crisis more intractable, but a complete answer to why this is so cannot be found at the international level.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF POWER IN SENEGAL

French colonial rule in Senegal left three legacies that would prove to be critical in shaping the postcolonial political economy: peasant production of an export crop, the primacy of trading networks rather than production itself as a locus of

6. See Murray 1967, and Saul 1979. To extend this reasoning to the colonial period, see Phillips 1989.

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capital accumulation, and the weakness of the indigenous business class. With the help of the colonial state, merchant capital controlled the commercial circuits that integrated the economy, dominating the pace and rhythm of development.

Colonial merchant capital played no direct role in production. The commercial conglomerates that controlled colonial trade did not seek to establish plantations, agricultural estates, or agro-industries. They did not appropriate land, invest in agriculture, or create a wage labor force. Peasants produced the wealth that drew the European trading houses to trade with the colony. Rural families worked together to plant, cultivate, and harvest Senegal's export crop, groundnuts. Like agricultural producers across most of the continent, their lives as producers were not organized completely around the logic of the capitalist marketplace. Their land was not bought and sold as a commodity, and wage labor was rare. Peasant households produced a large share of their own necessities of life, including foodstuffs. Using revenues they earned from the sale of groundnuts, they purchased imported manufactured goods, especially textile goods, from the commercial houses that exported their crops. Over time, Senegal's peasants bought more and more imported rice.

Merchant capital was confined to what Marx called "the sphere of circulation" (Kay 1975:86–95). Profits were generated through the dual flux of colonial trade: buying groundnuts cheap and selling imports dear. Merchant capital's social agents were the colonial commercial houses, independent traders operating in the import-export circuit, and middlemen of all sorts. Unlike industrialists or farmers, these economic actors did not operate in the "sphere of production" – they did not control land or land use, technologies, laborers, or the labor process. Although merchant capital dominated the colonial economy, it did not master production.

The weakness of the indigenous business class at the time of Senegal's political independence in 1960 was, in part, a reflection of the weaknesses of capital itself in structuring the social relations and forces of production. Peasant households were responsible for producing most of the colony's marketed agricultural surplus. Industry barely existed before World War II. The profitability of the European trading houses rested upon monopolistic forms of control over exchange, and these monopolies worked to circumscribe possibilities for the development of local capital both within and outside of agriculture.

The shallowness of capital's penetration of the productive bases of the economy represented a limit upon the colonizers' ability to remold the colony to serve metropolitan interests. Once the territory was conquered by the French, the colonial administration and the commercial houses sought ways to increase production and expand markets. Their zeal, however, was tempered. A sweeping project aimed at reorganizing agriculture to enhance productivity and enlarge the internal market would involve a restructuring of labor relations and land tenure systems. Such a project promised to disrupt or even undermine the ever tenuous social, economic, and political order established by the French rulers. It would require more violence, and the risk of failure was prohibitively high. Merchant capital, for its part, had no way of controlling the outcome of such a process, no

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