DEATH-RITUAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

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CHAPTER I

The anthropology of a dead world

This book is about how a particular sort of evidence, burials, can be used to write a particular sort of history, that of the social structures of classical antiquity. Most of what I say is based on a simple proposition: a burial is part of a funeral, and a funeral is part of a set of rituals by which the living deal with death. All very obvious, perhaps, but it has one major consequence for the historian. Whether we look at graves with religious, economic, social or artistic questions in mind, the analysis of burials is the analysis of symbolic action.

My argument is as follows. In rituals people use symbols to make explicit social structure, an interpretation of the meaning of daily life. Such structure should be central to any attempt to write social history, but on the whole ancient historians have neglected it. This is largely due to the nature of the written sources, which encourages other approaches. Burials are difficult to interpret, but they can be used to augment the written record, giving us for the first time a dynamic account of social structure and how it changed in antiquity.

These are big claims to make in a small book. Most works of ancient history take little account of graves; even the excellent collection *Sources for Ancient History* only gives seven pages to the topic.[1] When historians do look at burials, it is usually in a 'bits-and-pieces' manner, picking out the spectacular or the supposedly 'typical' to illustrate arguments based on texts. It is widely assumed that the rigour which philological historians bring to their sources is only required by archaeologists for dating and classifying material. I hope to overturn such assumptions. I set out the argument in this first chapter, which is rather abstract and theoretical,

[1] Crawford, ed., 1983: 150–2, 166, 179–81, dealing mainly with chronology.

but it is worth taking the time to make the premises clear. It used to be said (and perhaps still is in some quarters) that social history is real history with the politics left out, and there can be a grain of truth in this, since without methodological rigour we quickly descend into fuzziness and platitudes. We have an ever-growing body of evidence, emanating from wider social and geographical groups than those who produced the surviving texts. I believe that it has the potential to transform the way we do ancient social history, but it requires careful handling and constant reflection.

I begin by saying what I mean by social structure and then move on to discuss how rituals create it. 'Create' is a strong word. I use it deliberately, to distinguish my argument from two other approaches to ancient rituals. Both might be called 'common-sense' perspectives, but both, I think, miss much of the potential of ritual evidence. The first is that ritual can only be analysed as part of religious belief, and that this in turn has little to do with 'external' phenomena such as power, conflict, class, ideology and so on. The second is that rituals somehow 'reflect' an underlying social 'reality'. In a famous essay published twenty-five years ago, Clifford Geertz suggested that in rituals people not only set up models *of* proper roles and relationships but also models *for* them.[2] That is, we interpret ritual as a model *of* the world through the prism of our own experiences, and interpret our own experiences through the prism of ritual as a model *for* the world. It was through ceremonies such as funerals that Greeks and Romans constructed and debated the meanings of their worlds.

I wrote this book not just because a lot of graves have been excavated and we need to do something with them, but because social structure is crucially important for the ancient historian. Consequently some ways of using burials are treated only briefly, if at all. My emphasis is on 'total' analysis of burials as part of a ritual system. The core of the book consists of five chapters, grouped loosely around two topics, the body and display. I could have chosen other topics and written different chapters, but these seem to me to provide the most useful introduction. In each chapter I take a specific type of evidence – disposal methods, skeletal remains, grave goods, grave markers, tombstone inscriptions – and

[2] Models of and for, Geertz 1973 (1966): 63–4. Debates over meaning in rituals, e.g. Kertzer 1988: 31, 44, 71–2, 102–50.

examine what can be done with it. My method is to provide concrete examples rather than programmatic statements, and my argument in each case is that no single feature of burial evidence can be isolated and treated on its own. In chapters 2–6 I emphasise the 'big picture', looking at how large samples of data contribute to central questions in social history. In each case I discuss ways to identify patterns and to relate them to other aspects of the evidence, and ways not to use the material, although I try not to waste time on straw men. In chapter 7 I give an example of the kind of nitty-gritty detailed empirical analysis of burials that I am advocating as the key to ancient social structures, with a close study of the archaic Greek site of Vroulia on Rhodes. To begin with, though, I will explain more carefully what I mean by social structure and why it is important, before going on to discuss how burials can help us understand it.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

This is why poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history: poetry speaks rather of the universal, history of the particular. By universal I mean the sorts of things that a certain type of person will probably or necessarily do or say ... the particular is about what Alcibiades did or what happened to him. (Aristotle, *Poetics* 1.1451b5–11)

This is no book of verse, but, like Aristotle, I am uncomfortable with accounts of the world that look only at the individual actor. We are social animals, and truly free beings doing whatever they want have only existed in the dreams of philosophers. Everyone is born into a more or less structured world, and is socialised in its ways. It is often hard to predict how people will act, but with hindsight even the most unexpected events can turn out to be comprehensible. From the mass of experiences which rush by each day, nearly everyone is able to pick out a pattern of how the world around them works. These unverbalised models are the essence of my subject matter. Social structure, in the sense that I use it, consists of taken-for-granted norms about the roles and rules which make up society – relationships of power, affection, deference, rights, duties and so on. I do not mean a metaphysical 'collective consciousness' or an undifferentiated 'mentality'; nor Aristotle's

monolithic and static *koinos logos*, 'that which everyone agrees is right' (*Rhet.* 1.1368b7–9). Ideas of social structure vary from individual to individual and from day to day. No two points of view are the same, but there is enough overlap for an observer to be able to distil an abstraction which can be called an Athenian or Spartan social structure at this or that particular moment in time; while there is sufficient difference that we can break these generalisations down along age, sex, class, race or many other lines, depending on the level of detail we wish to work at.[3]

The first question to ask is what social structure *does*. Only after we have decided what we are looking for can we try to find it. Many of the giants of social theory have butted heads over this. To some, social structure is merely a shorthand way to summarise 'real', empirically observable events; to others, it is an almost Platonic ideal form with a purer kind of reality than everyday happenings. Some of the debates are mutual misunderstandings, and others rapidly move off into the terrain of the philosopher; but how we answer the question has important consequences for social history.[4]

From the 1920s to 1950s, the social sciences were dominated by a school of thought called functionalism, nowadays normally used as a pejorative label. The true functionalist (if such a creature ever existed) took a strong view of social structure: it not only existed 'out there' as well as in the scholar's head, but it also provided the glue which held society together. Society was seen as a system which tried to maintain its own stability. Equilibrium was explained by dividing life into subsystems – economic, religious, and so on – which operated checks and balances to keep the whole on an even keel. Threats from outside the system or 'pathological' disorders within (like food riots, labour unrest or racial conflict) would be met by adjustments to the relevant subsystems, again to the benefit of the whole. Paradoxically, the 'vulgar' forms of Marxism popular in this period took a similar position. Instead of the functionalists' beneficial invisible hand, Marxists found sinister 'ideologies' which were straitjackets on thought and action; but the mechanisms which created stability were essentially the same for

[3] Mentality, Vovelle 1990. Levels of generalisation, Ober 1989a; Hunt 1989: 15–16.

[4] E.g. Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 9–11, 188–204; Lévi-Strauss 1953; E. R. Leach 1954; Gellner 1958; Kelly 1974; Bloch 1977; Asad 1979.

both groups.[5] Gellner's summary of functionalism applies equally well to pre-war Marxism:

> The idea was that a tribal society has a certain structure or organisation, each part of which imposed such pressures and sanctions on the individuals within it as to ensure that they behaved in a way that sustained that structure, and so on forever, or at any rate for quite a long time. Structure was important, a matter of serious concern for men (inside the society or among investigators). Culture, on the other hand, was relatively ephemeral, accidental, epiphenomenal, and altogether suitable for women (inside the society or among investigators). Structure was, for instance, whom one could marry; culture was what the bride wore. (Gellner 1985: 135–6)

In the sixties and seventies, culture struck back. Functionalist analyses were increasingly seen as tautologous or just plain silly. Perhaps saying that Hindus refuse to eat cows and the Kwakiutl burn their blankets as adaptive mechanisms to maintain equilibrium does not tell us much after all. Structure in this crude sense lost much of its appeal. In a 1981 survey of British social anthropologists, 52.5% of those born before 1925 gave social structure as their primary research interest, while only 21.5% of those born after 1945 gave this answer. Most of the loss went to various forms of cognitive anthropology, which rose from 13% among the older group to 32% among the post-war generation. Anthropologists and historians were rejecting the need to explain rituals, speech acts or texts in terms of underlying social structures. Michel Foucault, one of the most influential writers of the 1960s, argued that we should discard the very idea of 'total' social history as an organising scheme for human experience, and instead write general history, abandoning 'an overall shape' in favour of 'the space of dispersion' (1972: 9–10). The term social history began to carry some of the same taint as functionalism, and a new wave of cultural historians increasingly sought inspiration in literary theory, not sociology. One result has been an 'inability to move toward any overarching interpretation ... even more significantly, rather than there being vigorous competition between schools, each confidently pressing

[5] Marxism and functionalism, Asad 1979; Abercrombie et al. 1980: 7–58; Bloch 1983: 95–140.

the claims of its own scheme, potential contenders seem to be in the process of breaking down' (Novick 1988: 457–8).[6]

Over the last ten years there have been attempts to find a middle ground, and these provide the best way for the ancient historian to think about social structure. Anthony Giddens has developed what he calls a 'theory of structuration', the process by which people create a social structure which is neither a fiction made by sociologists nor a mystified 'spirit of the age'. The social structure we are born into and socialised within is a set of assumptions about what we should say, do and even think in given situations, but it does not determine our behaviour. Everything we do is informed by learned social structure, but the structure itself is only transmitted through time and space by real people as they repeat what they themselves have learned, or react against it. It has no independent, extra-human existence. Our own input into this process will affect it, perhaps ever so little; but in the course of just a few years completely new ways of thinking about society may appear. Alternatively, the pace of structural change may be glacially slow, but in either case it is the combination of pre-existing rules and individual actions based on them which transmits and transforms structure through time. Marshall Sahlins explains it in a neat turn of phrase: 'the historical process unfolds as a continuous and reciprocal movement between the practice of the structure and the structure of the practice' (1981: 72). That is, each event puts social structure into practice and recreates or challenges it, while social structure simultaneously gives form and meaning to events. Geertz's definition of culture sums up the way I want to use 'social structure': 'Though ideational, it does not exist in someone's head; though unphysical, it is not an occult entity ... the question as to whether culture is patterned conduct or a frame of mind, or even the two somehow mixed together, loses sense' (Geertz 1973: 10).[7]

[6] Cows and blankets, M. Harris 1974; 1985. Survey, Kuper 1983: 206–10. Breakdown, Ortner 1984; Novick 1988: 415–629; Hunt 1989. Challenge to total history paradigms, Furet 1983; Stearns 1985; Hunt 1986. Pejorative use of 'social history', La Capra 1983; 1985. Literary criticism as a model, Kramer 1989. These changes are often linked to the rise of post-modernist epistemics: see Marcus & Fischer 1986: 7–44; Connor 1989a; Gallagher 1990; Manville 1990: ix–xi.

[7] Structuration, Giddens 1981: 26–68; 1984, with excellent comments in Thompson 1984: 48–72; Karp 1986; Cohen 1987; Lloyd 1986: 306–17. On the relationship between 'culture' and 'structure' in the functionalist sense, Geertz 1973: 142–6. Debates, Silverman 1990, with an extensive bibliography, to which add Chartier 1985; 1989; Darnton 1986; Bloch 1987; Biersack 1989; Pecora 1990.



3. Alföldy's model of social relations at Rome in the first two centuries A.D. (after Alföldy 1985: fig. 1)

As an example of what I am talking about, we might take Alföldy's model of Roman society in the first two centuries A.D. (fig. 3). This is a well thought out diagram showing stratification by wealth and power and the way status groups and personal ties crosscut class lines. I will observe certain shortcomings in the next section; but it seems to capture the implicit assumptions of men like Cassius Dio and Aelius Aristides, who describe their world in similar terms, stressing fixity and the boundedness of the orders. Yet we now know – perhaps better than the Romans did – that these orders were anything but rigid. Senatorial families disappeared and were replaced at a rate of 75% per generation, and the equestrian order was still more fluid. The reasons were both social and biological. Roman law gave rich families the potential to secure their status in the next generation and to conform to this ideal model through adoption and trusts; yet on the whole they chose not to. This situation, where people seem to say one thing and do another, is

often called the 'Nuer paradox' after a Sudanese people famous for the gap between their strongly articulated principle that life is based on rigid clans and the fluidity of their actual kinship patterns. But if we look at social structure in the sense described above, the paradox disappears. Social structure is neither a catalogue of marriages nor an ideal of *pietas*; the interaction between the two 'levels' provides the field of structuration, and we have to work at both to understand social structure.[8]

But this is easier said than done. One reason why so few ancient historians have tried to study social structure is because it is so difficult to generalise to broad patterns from the individualised literary and epigraphic sources. Even in contemporary settings, identifying the structures of an unfamiliar world is no walkover – 'as graduate students ... have found to their cost, it is not all that easy to see or hear bits of social structure in the stream of events which the anthropologist witnesses' (Bloch 1977: 286). Next, we must consider how we can reach ancient social structure.

RITUAL

Bloch lets his student in on the game: *it is rituals which make social structure*. '[O]nce the bewildered fieldworker has realised that it is in this type of behaviour, and in this type of behaviour alone, that he needs to look for social structure, the problems disappear and the task is made strangely easy' (ibid.). Well, not quite that easy. Ritual is one of those words where we all know what it means but no one can define it. Most would agree that ritual involves action, and is governed by rules of who should do what. It should be repeatable, but ritual and custom are not the same. Nor is just any regularised behaviour ritual, although all activity may be said to have ritual aspects. At the margins, observers and participants may dispute what is or is not ritual, but in any culture there is a central

[8] Aristides, *To Rome*; Dio 51.19.1–4; cf. Pliny, *Letters* 9.5; *Paneg*. 88.1–2. Structure, Alföldy 1985: 146–56; Garnsey & Saller 1987: 112–25; Saller, forthcoming. Replacement, M. Hammond 1957; Hopkins 1983: 120–200, with criticisms in Hahn & Leunissen 1990. Trusts, Johnston 1988; Saller 1991. Nuer paradox, Evans-Pritchard 1951; Schneider 1966; Kelly 1974: 290–8. I am grateful to Richard Saller for allowing me to read two unpublished papers.



4. The tripartite structure of the rite of passage (after E. R. Leach 1976: fig. 7)

field where all intuitively know they are in its presence.[9] And rituals say something, even if those taking part or watching do not agree what it is, or cannot put it into words at all. One of the most influential analysts of symbolism, Dan Sperber, suggests that rituals 'evoke a picture of the world that, were it made explicit, could only itself be put in quotes' (1975: 140). Ritual action is not a code or a defective language, but produces its own kind of symbolic knowledge. Social structure, as a set of internalised but constantly renegotiated roles and rules, is an artefact of this knowledge.[10]

I will come back to the ambiguities of ritual action later on. First, though, we should look at how we can analyse funerals. Customs vary enormously around the world, but eighty years ago Hertz and Van Gennep drew attention to a consistent pattern underlying them. In almost all cases, the actions can be broken down into a three-stage pattern known as a *rite of passage* (fig. 4). The biological death of an individual sets off a more prolonged social process of

[9] To some people 'ritual' implies external actions carried out without any commitment to the values and ideas they express. Our pejorative use of ritualist is largely a product of the sixteenth-century Reformation; but even if we think ancient rituals were 'ritualised' in this sense, they are still significant. Luther himself noted this in words which uncannily echo modern writings: 'ceremonies are to be given the same place in the life of a Christian as models and plans have among builders and artisans' (*Christian Liberty* (Grimm, ed., 1957: 38)).

[10] G. Lewis (1980: 6–38) gives the richest discussion. See also Goody 1961; La Fontaine 1985: 11–18; Kertzer 1988: 8–12.

dying. The first stage, the 'rite of separation', is a ceremony which moves those involved out of their normal conditions of life into the second stage, a liminal status. Some of the survivors take on the role of mourners, while the deceased moves from being a person to a corpse and some kind of soul is usually liberated from the body. These transitions may happen at the moment death is announced, or at some later point; all at once, or more gradually. The actors are often secluded and polluted, and reverse much of their normal behaviour. The mourners may wear very formal clothing, or may be dishevelled; they may be solemnly silent, or they may cry hysterically; they may combine all these acts. In some places these statuses last only moments; in others, years. Their length and intensity vary according to who is involved. The third stage, the 'rite of aggregation', restores normalcy. The mourners return to social life, but without the deceased; the corpse is finally laid to rest; and the soul joins the ancestors. This tripartite rite-of-passage sequence is prominent in ancient descriptions of funerals, and the rituals effecting these changes in status repeatedly remind all involved of the relationships they are involved in, through the inversion and affirmation of norms.[11]

The next question must be how we can study ancient rituals. We might construct a hierarchy of sources.

1. Direct observation/participation in the rituals
2. Verbal testimony, oral or written, describing or explaining the rituals
3. Artistic representations of the rituals
4. The material remains of rituals

This is the obvious way to rank the materials, but in practice their value gets mixed up. The first class is unavailable. The second is undeniably the most informative, but its scarcity makes it difficult to use. There are two broad responses to the shortage of texts. The first is the 'synchronic' method. Often sources allude only to parts of rituals, and to create a fuller picture we have to stitch together

[11] Hertz 1960 (1907); Van Gennep 1960 (1909). The literature on funerals and rites of passage is immense. I find E. R. Leach (1976), Huntington & Metcalf (1979), G. Lewis (1980), Bloch & Parry, eds. (1982) and La Fontaine (1985) among the best. The rite-of-passage structure of funerals is described for Greece by R. Garland (1985), and for Rome by Scheid (1984) and Maurin (1984).

texts spanning long periods of time. At best, we can describe 'the' ritual, but lose all chance of analysing how it changed through time or how different groups used it; at worst, we create a 'composite' ritual bearing little relationship to the actual experiences of actors at any stage in its history. For some scholars this is not a problem, and several studies of 'Greek' marriage, myth and initiation throw together sources from different states and centuries. But moving from dynamic, constantly recreated social structure to stable long-term mentalities is a step backwards, albeit one which the fragmentary sources encourage. There have been some excellent reconstructions of the ritual setting of Athenian drama, but as Connor shows, it is difficult to fix the chronology of the various features of the festivals, and the dates *do* make a difference to how we understand the rituals. Similarly, Loraux's work on Athenian funeral orations is powerfully persuasive when treating the texts (dated *c.* 440–322 B.C.) as a single body or comparing 'the' Athenian ideology of death with 'the' Roman, but much less so when looking at changes through time.[12]

The second method is the 'one-off' analysis of a single episode. The problem here is how to extrapolate from one event – for example, Agrippa's funeral as discussed by Fraschetti – to wider patterns of ritual action. Strauss shows both these methods at their best in a paper providing a composite picture of the rituals of the Athenian assembly spanning the whole fourth century B.C. and a study of a 'one-off' procession to the acropolis in October 403. The two examples are revealing and complement each other, but only allow us to talk about *normative* practices. It would be as if an ethnographer watched a single marriage or funeral and then came home to write a monograph about ritual. Recent studies of the regulations for seating in Roman amphitheatres run into the same problems. We get a glimpse into the hierarchy of the orders, but it is static, rather like Alföldy's model. We can learn that the Spanish town of Irni kept its own seating order, but we cannot observe how these rules were renegotiated in ritual practice. We can compare it with the classical Athenian theatre, with its more democratic layout; but in both cases we see a single, stable picture. Temporal and

[12] Statements of the 'synchronic' method in ancient Greece come from scholars as diverse as Detienne (1979: 6–7) and Burkert (1985: 6). Drama, Cartledge 1985; Goldhill 1987; 1988; Winkler & Zeitlin, eds. 1990. Orations, Connor 1989b; Loraux 1986; cf. R. Thomas 1989: 206–21 (see also ch. 5 below). Loraux draws on Polybius 6.53–6 for Roman ideology.

regional contrasts disappear, along with disputes over meaning within communities. Again, we get 'the' Athenian and then 'the' Roman mentality. We need to enter into actual practices, reconstructing the variations between ritual performances as well as the constants. But even in the exceptional cases where this can be done, as with the hundred or so lawcourt speeches from fourth-century Athens, historians find it difficult to avoid treating the whole corpus as a single group. Ober and Strauss have argued persuasively that similar principles of analysis can be applied to the speeches and to drama, allowing us 'to extend the study of Athenian political culture on an ideological plane from the later fourth century . . . back into the early or mid-fifth century' (1990: 269–70), but we are still only able to lengthen the period to which the static model is relevant, rather than to study a constantly evolving ritual structure. Beard's paper on the Acta of the Arval Brethren is a rare case where change through time is more apparent. She draws fascinating conclusions about the symbolic significance of the inscribing of these texts, but their very peculiarity limits their value. Hopkins responds to the source problem boldly with empathetic imagination, but abandoning evidence altogether is hardly satisfactory.[13]

The third class of evidence, images, can be used to flesh out the textual evidence or studied in its own right, but to some extent this material has to be treated in the light of the fourth class. The debate over whether the sculptural scenes on imperial Roman sarcophagi were 'religious' or 'profane' illustrates the problem: much of our artistic evidence was itself created for the very rituals we wish to understand. Sarcophagi only became common around A.D. 200, when the Latin parts of the empire adopted inhumation. Ideas of what this change 'meant' necessarily colour perception of the iconography (see ch. 2).[14]

[13] Agrippa, Fraschetti 1984. Athens, Strauss, forthcoming. I am grateful to Barry Strauss for sending me a copy of this paper. Social structure and change through time in Roman rituals, North 1976; 1989; Liebeschuetz 1979; Beard 1987; 1989, esp. pp. 45–7; Eck 1984; Price 1984; 1987; Zanker 1988; papers in Beard & North, eds., 1990, esp. Gordon 1990a. Seating regulations, Seutonius, *Aug.* 44; *Claud.* 21.3; Tacitus, *Ann.* 13.54; 15.32; Dio 60.7.3–4; Kolendo 1981; Polacco 1982; Gonzalez 1986; Williamson 1987; Rawson 1987; Zanker 1988: 147–53. Athenian theatre seating, Pickard-Cambridge 1968: 269–72; Ober 1989b: 152–5. Athenian legal evidence, R. G. Osborne 1985a; Humphreys 1986; 1988; Ober 1989b. Synchronic approach, Ober 1989b: 36–8. Problems, J. K. Davies 1978: 165–87. Arval Acta, Beard 1985. Empathy, Hopkins 1983: xv.

[14] There are excellent studies in Bérard, ed., 1989. Sarcophagi, Turcan 1978; Froning 1980; Koch & Sichtermann 1982; Wrede 1989.

Fine work has been done on representations of death and the afterlife on Athenian painted pottery, the most abundant class of evidence, but the vases only rarely come from a well-documented context, and (as we will see in chapter 4) this is a major problem. Snodgrass stresses that almost all the earliest figured scenes, dating from about 750 B.C. and often showing funerals, come from a single cemetery. We cannot understand these paintings without explaining why they entered the archaeological record here and hardly anywhere else: and that can only mean a detailed study of burials. Similarly, many sixth-century Athenian vases were found in tombs in Etruria. Any interpretation of them must begin with Etruscan burial practices.[15]

The final class of evidence, material remains of actual rituals, lets us reconstruct the variability of symbols in concrete actions, and follow this as far through space and time as archaeological fieldwork has been taken. Ritual action created much of the patterning in the archaeological record. I am not claiming that archaeological evidence is somehow 'better' than written or pictorial evidence, or that it constitutes an alternative source. It can be used to augment the surviving texts, and it has two great virtues: there is a lot of it, and we can find a lot more still. But it has equally great drawbacks, stemming from the fact that it is only part of the death ritual, and not necessarily even the most important part. Only certain aspects of that part of the burial process itself produce a recognisable material residue. In a famous story, Homer (*Od.* 19.141–7; 24.131–7) has Penelope weave, and secretly unwind, a fabulous shroud for her father-in-law; but this would not normally survive in the Greek soil.[16] Textiles and the number and noise of mourners were probably crucial aspects of ritual statements in at least some periods, but cannot be excavated. This obviously casts some doubt on archaeologists' attempts to infer much from their finds, and general

[15] Vase painting, e.g. H. Hoffmann 1977; 1986; 1988; 1989; Vermeule 1979; Burn 1985; Sourvinou-Inwood 1987; R. G. Osborne 1988; Lissarrague 1988; Baldassarre 1988. Kurtz (1984) surveys the themes. R. G. Osborne (1989) argues for the priority of pictures over the fourth class of evidence, but pays little attention to contextual problems. Eighth-century vases, Snodgrass 1987: 146–67; Whitley 1991. Etruria, Vickers 1985/6; 1987; Arafat & Morgan, forthcoming; cf. d'Agostino 1989. Some recent studies of Athenian funerary sculpture (e.g. D'Onofrio 1982; 1988; Vedder 1988) show great sensitivity to context.

[16] Shrouds do sometimes survive, as in the 'Homeric' burial at Lefkandi, of *c.* 1000 B.C. (Popham et al. 1982).