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EARLY GREEK VIEWS OF
POETS AND POETRY

Histories of criticism in early Greece are usually based on surveys of those relatively few passages where the Greek poets speak about themselves and their poetry. Although this chapter will comment on many of these passages, the publication of a new history offers an opportunity to go beyond this fragmentary evidence by considering it in the wider framework of the society or societies for which this poetry existed. In what follows, the primary evidence is not restricted to whatever the poets say about themselves and their world: rather, it embraces the context in which they say what they say. The task will be to describe the social function of early Greek poetry and to present a picture of the traditional thought-patterns that shape the very concept of poet and poetry. It is through these thought-patterns that early Greek poetry defines itself and the poet as well, making it ultimately possible for critics of later times to talk about poetry.

The very notion of 'critics' and 'criticism' can best be seen in the post-Classical context of a great period of scholarship, in Hellenistic Alexandria. The Alexandrian concept of *krisis*, in the sense of 'separating', 'discriminating', 'judging' those works and those authors that are to be preserved and those that are not, is crucial to the concept of 'canon' in the Classical world. Literally, *kanōn* means 'rod', 'straight-edge rule', then by synecdoche a 'standard', 'model'. The Alexandrian scholars who were in charge of this process of separation, discrimination, judgement, were the *kritikoi*, while the Classical authors who were 'judged worthy of inclusion' within the canon were called the *enkrithentes*, a term that corresponds to the Roman concept of the *classici*, who are authors of the 'first class', *primae classis*.[1] The *krisis* of the *enkrithentes*, however, starts not with the Alexandrian scholars, nor even with Aristotle. It is already under way in the Archaic period of Greece, the point of departure for this inquiry. As we shall see in more detail at a later point, songs and poetry were traditionally performed in a context of competition. A striking example is the tradition of dramatic festivals at Athens, with the *krisis*, 'judgement', of winners by *kritai*, 'judges' (cf. Plato, *Laws* 659a–b).

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[1] Pfeiffer, *Classical Scholarship*, pp. 206–7.

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But the criteria of the *krisis*, as we shall see, are different at different times. In the earlier periods of Greek literary development, what is at stake is the survival or non-survival not merely of specific works or specific authors but of tradition itself.

Of particular concern, then, for an understanding of early Greek views about poets and poetry, is the ongoing crisis in the formation of canons. In time, this crisis leads to an impulse that we know as classicism. Another area of major concern is the development of genres, a phenomenon that shapes much of subsequent Greek trends in literary criticism. Still another is the differentiation and individualisation of authorship. These concerns will be addressed in the context of early Greek views about myth, truth, and inspiration. Also pertinent are the Greek notions about *mimēsis*, 'imitation, representation', and about how poetry was taught, especially in the watershed of the fifth century BC.

1 *Poetry, myth, and ritual*

It is important to begin with an examination of the very concept of 'poetry'. A fundamental question is: how is the language of poetry distinct from everyday language?

The distinction can best be comprehended in terms of the qualifications 'marked' and 'unmarked' as formulated by Roman Jakobson.[2] These terms have been defined as follows: 'The general meaning of a marked category states the presence of a certain (whether positive or negative) property A; the general meaning of the corresponding unmarked category states nothing about the presence of A, and is used chiefly, but not exclusively, to indicate the absence of A'.[3] The unmarked category is the general category, which can include the marked category, whereas the reverse situation cannot hold. For example, in an opposition of the English words 'long' and 'short', the unmarked member of the opposition is 'long' because the word can be used not only as the opposite of 'short' when we say 'This is long, not short', but also as a general category, when we say 'How long is this?' Such a question does not judge whether something is long or short, whereas 'How short is this?' does.

From a cross-cultural survey of a broad range of societies, we find a general pattern of opposition between marked and unmarked speech.[4] The function of marked speech is to convey meaning in the context of ritual and myth. Before we may proceed, it is important to stress that the words 'ritual' and 'myth' are used here not in terms of our own cultural preconceptions but in

[2] Discussion and bibliography in Waugh, 'Marked and unmarked'.
[3] Jakobson, 'Signe zéro', p. 136.
[4] Ben-Amos, 'Analytical categories', p. 228.

terms of the broadest possible anthropological perspective. For 'ritual' we may use the working definition of Walter Burkert: 'Ritual, in its outward aspect, is a programme of demonstrative acts to be performed in set sequence and often at a set place and time – sacred insofar as every omission or deviation arouses deep anxiety and calls forth sanctions. As communication and social imprinting, ritual establishes and secures the solidarity of the closed group.'[5] As for 'myth', it can be defined as 'a traditional narrative that is used as a designation of reality. Myth is applied narrative. Myth describes a meaningful and important reality that applies to the aggregate, going beyond the individual.'[6]

It is in small-scale rather than complex societies that we can observe most clearly the symbiosis of ritual and myth, how neither is to be derived from the other, and how the language of ritual and myth is 'marked', while everyday language is 'unmarked'. The perception of plain or everyday speech is a variable abstraction that depends on the concrete realisation of whatever special speech is set apart for a special context. In small-scale societies, the setting apart would normally happen in ritual and myth, and the ritual may include such diverse activities as hunting, gathering, farming, building, travelling, meeting, eating and drinking, courtship, and the like. Internal criteria for marked acts and speech-acts can be expected to vary from society to society: what may be marked in one may be unmarked or 'everyday' in another. In complex societies, and the situation in Archaic Greece can already be described as such, the pervasiveness of myth and ritual, as well as their interconnections with each other, may be considerably weakened. Still, the marking of speech, that is, the turning of unmarked speech into marked, may persist as the basic way to convey meaning in the context of ritual and myth.

There is a reflex of this pattern in the usage of the Greek verb *muō*, which means 'I have my mouth closed' or 'I have my eyes closed' from the standpoint of everyday situations, but 'I say in a special way' or 'I see in a special way' from the standpoint of marked situations in ritual. The latter meaning is evident in the derivatives *mustēs*, 'one who is initiated', and *mustērion*, 'that in which one is initiated, mystery (Latin *mysterium*)'. So also in *muthos*, 'myth', which is a derivative of the same root from which *muō* is derived and the special meaning of which seems to be 'special speech' as opposed to everyday speech.[7] For an illustration of the semantics underlying the usage of these Greek words, let us consider Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 1641–4: the visualisation and the verbalisation of whatever it was that finally happened to Oedipus in the precinct of the Eumenides at Colonus is restricted, in that the precise location of his corpse is a sacred secret (1545–6; 1761–3).

[5] Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 8.
[6] Modified translation of Burkert, 'Mythisches Denken', p. 29.
[7] Chantraine, *Dictionnaire*, pp. 718, 728.

Only Theseus, by virtue of being the proto-priest for the Athenians of the here-and-now, is to witness what happened, which is called the *drōmena* (1644). Thus the visualisation and the verbalisation of the myth, what happened to Oedipus, is restricted to the sacred context of ritual, controlled by the heritage of priestly authority from Theseus.

From an anthropological standpoint, to repeat, 'myth' is indeed 'special speech' in that it is a given society's way of affirming its own reality through narrative. Let us for the moment take it as a given, then, that the function of marked speech is to convey meaning in the context of ritual and myth. In most societies the pattern of opposition between marked and unmarked speech takes the form of an opposition between singing and speaking respectively, with 'singing' being marked by a wide variety of constraints on available features of the given language. From the standpoint of our own cultural preconceptions, 'singing' is a combination of melody (stylised tone or intonation) and rhythm (stylised stress, duration, intensity, or any combination of the three).[8] From a cross-cultural survey of a variety of societies, however, we find that 'singing' may be a matter of melody alone or rhythm alone, or of even less, such as isosyllabism or other types of stylised formal parallelism.[9] In Plato's *Laws* (653e – 4a; 665a) the combination of rhythmic and melodic idiom is synthetically visualised as *khoreia*, 'choral song and dance'. But the essential characteristic of song is the actual markedness from everyday speech, and the markedness may be reinforced by not only dance but also instrumental accompaniment. It appears that patterns of convergence and reinforcement between language and dance or musical accompaniment are primary, while patterns of divergence and contrast are secondary. Moreover, instrumental accompaniment tends to be primary, while instrumental solo is secondary. There is a tendency, in both dance and instrumental accompaniment, for transition from marking speech as special to imitating special speech.

2 Poetry and song

In the case of Greek traditions, as in many others, there is a further complication: singing as distinct from speaking is further differentiated into what we know as song as distinct from poetry. This differentiation is most evident in the attested fifth-century institution of Athenian tragedy, where the numerous metres of song are distinct from the one metre that represents everyday speech, iambic trimeter, in that the metres of song are marked by

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[8] For cross-cultural linguistic and ethnographical criteria, see Nettl, *Music*, p. 136, and *Theory*, pp. 281–92; Merriam, *Anthropology*, p. 285.

[9] Guillén, *Introducción*, pp. 93–121; Jakobson, 'Linguistics and poetics', p. 358; Tambiah, 'Performative approach', pp. 164–5.

vocal melody, instrumental accompaniment, or dance, whereas iambic trimeter is recited and not sung, not accompanied, not danced. Thus the opposition between what we may call song and poetry is a mimesis or 'imitation' of the fundamental opposition between singing and speaking. Even the uniqueness of the iambic trimeter as the medium of recitative presentation reinforces this imitation, since the experience of ethnographic fieldwork suggests that unmarked speech tends to be perceived as unique in any given social context, whereas marked speech is clearly perceived as multiple or potentially multiple.[10]

The major formal categories of ancient Greek poetry are traditionally classified according to the following metrical types: (1) dactylic hexameter (Homeric epic and hymns, Hesiodic wisdom and catalogue poetry); (2) elegiac distich = dactylic hexameter + 'pentameter' (as in Archilochus, Callinus, Mimnermus, Tyrtaeus, Theognis, Solon, Xenophanes); (3) iambic trimeter (as in Archilochus, Hipponax, Semonides, Solon, or in fifth-century Attic tragedy and comedy). Paradoxically, what we call poetry, namely the compositions framed by these three metrical forms, is historically further removed from everyday speech than what we call song, in that all three of these metres are apparently derived from the rhythms of song.[11] That is, these three metrical forms are derived from earlier forms of song with built-in melody as well as built-in rhythm. Such forms, in gradually losing the melodic component of song, could compensate for that loss with a tightening up of prosodic features. Yet Aristotle can say that the iambic trimeter of tragedy is closest to every-day speech (*Po*. 1449a22; cf. *Rh*. 1408b33) because it is the medium of mimesis for everyday speech. The paradox is extended, in that poetry becomes finally differentiated into verse as opposed to prose. Along the present lines of thought, as we shall see later, the development of the art of prose would represent a stage even further removed from everyday speech.

That the major types of ancient Greek poetry were recited and not sung may at first seem startling in view of such internal testimony as Homer's bidding his muse to *sing* the anger of Achilles (*Il*. 1.1) or Archilochus' boasting that he knows how to lead off a choral performance of a dithyramb (fr. 120 West). Such evidence, however, may be misleading. To begin, the internal evidence of Homeric and Hesiodic diction tells us that the word *aeidō*, 'sing', (as in *Il*. 1.1) is a functional synonym, in contexts where the medium refers to its own performance, of the word *e(n)nepō*, 'narrate, recite' (as in *Od*. 1.1), which does not explicitly designate singing.[12] The equating of a word that

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[10] Ben-Amos, 'Analytical categories', p. 228.
[11] Nagy, 'Origins of the hexameter'.
[12] Thus the *aoidē* of the muses at Hesiod, *Theogony* 104, is in the context of the poet's bidding them to 'narrate' (*espete*, 114) and to 'say' (*eipate*, 115).

refers to recitation with a word that refers to the format of singing accompanied by a lyre proves only that such poetry had the latter format in some phase of its evolution. Self-references in Archaic Greek poetry may be diachronically valid without being synchronically 'true'. For example, the epic poetry of Homer refers to epic poetry as a medium that was performed in the context of an evening's feast. And yet, we know that the two epic poems of Homer, by virtue of their sheer length alone, defy this context. If we look for the earliest historical evidence, we see that the actually attested context for performing the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was already in the sixth century not the informal occasion of an evening's feast but rather the formal occasion of a festival such as the Panathenaia.[13] The performers at such festivals were *rhapsōidoi*, 'rhapsodes'. In Plato the rhapsode Ion is dramatised as just having arrived at Athens in order to compete in the rhapsodic contest of the Panathenaia (*Ion* 530a – b).

In the case of Homeric poetry, the earliest phases of rhapsodic transmission are associated with the *Homēridai*, a corporation of rhapsodes who traced themselves back to an ancestor called 'Homēros'.[14] The sources make it explicit that the rhapsodes, in performing Homeric poetry at the Panathenaia, were legally constrained to take turns in narrating the poetry in its proper sequence.[15] In other words, even if the size of either the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* ultimately defied performance by any one person at any one sitting, the monumental proportions of these compositions could evolve in a social context where the sequence of performance, and thereby the sequence of narrative, could be regulated, as in the case of the Panathenaia. Thus the simultaneous composition and performance of the oral poet at a feast can be viewed as organically evolving into the continuity of composed narrative achieved through a continuum of performance by rhapsodes who take turns at occasions like the Panathenaia.

The point that is being made here about the context of performance applies also to the medium of performance. Just as the Homeric testimony about the performance of epic by singers at feasts belies the synchronic reality of the performance of epic by rhapsodes at festivals, so also the Homeric testimony about the singer's singing to the accompaniment of the lyre belies the synchronic reality of the rhapsode's reciting without any accompaniment at all. On the basis of available evidence, it appears that rhapsodes did not sing the compositions that they performed but rather recited them without the accompaniment of the lyre.[16] So also with Hesiodic poetry: the internal

[13] Lycurgus, *Against Leokrates* 102; Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 159; Plato (?), *Hipparchus* 228b; Diog. Laert. 1.57.
[14] Scholia to Pindar, *Nemean* 2.1c (III, p. 29 Drachmann).
[15] Plato (?), *Hipparchus* 228b; Diog. Laert. 1.57.
[16] West, *Theogony*, p. 163. The iconographic testimony of vase paintings showing rhapsodes either with a lyre or with a staff can be viewed as a parallel phenomenon of diachronic perspective on an evolving institution.

testimony of the composition represents a theogony that is simultaneously sung and danced by the local muses of Helikon (*Theogony* 3 – 4, 8), and yet we know that the *Theogony* itself, as also the other Hesiodic compositions, was in fact recited by rhapsodes.[17] This is not to say that hexameter could not be sung in the Archaic period,[18] only that hexameter evolved into *poetry* as distinct from *song*, and that its fundamental form of rendition, as poetry, was recitation.[19]

Similarly with old iambic and elegiac poetry. We see that the internal testimony refers to choral singing and dancing to the accompaniment of the lyre (as in Theognis 791; cf. 776 – 9), or singing to both the lyre and *aulos*, 'reed' (531 – 4, 759 – 64), or singing to the reed alone (825 – 30, 943 – 4, 1055 – 8, 1065 – 8). But in point of fact, the external evidence of historical testimony establishes that the attested traditional format of performing the iambic trimeter and the elegiac distich was simply recitative.[20] Also, the professional performers of such poetry were not singers but rhapsodes.[21] This is not to say that the references made in Archaic iambic or elegiac poetry to choral performance or instrumental accompaniment are diachronically wrong: as we already had occasion to see, they are in fact diachronically correct, and it is not without reason that even the performance of a rhapsode is from a traditional point of view an act of 'singing' (Plato, *Ion* 535b). Still, such references are synchronically misleading.

We can be satisfied with the diachronic correctness of ancient Greek poetry's references to itself as song by noting that these self-references are traditional, not innovative. The formulas in Homeric poetry and elsewhere about the subject of singing and song have an ancestry going back to an Indo-European heritage.[22] Even the word 'rhapsode', designating the professional reciter of poetry, is built on a concept of artistic self-reference ('he who stitches together the song'; cf. Pindar, *Nemean* 2.1 – 3) that is likewise of Indo-European provenience.[23] The institutional reality of formal competition among rhapsodes, immortalised for us in Plato's dialogue *Ion* (530a), seems to be a direct heritage of formal competition among singers, as reflected directly in passages like *Homeric Hymn* 6.19 – 20 and indirectly in the numerous myths about such competitions. Most famous is the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*.[24] The word for such competition is *agōn* (*Hymn* 6.19), the semantics of which are best

[17] Plato, *Ion* 531a, 532a; *Laws* 658d. Conversely, the concept of rhapsode can be retrojected to Homer and Hesiod, *Rep*. 600d.

[18] E.g., the hexameters of Terpander; pseudo-Plutarch, *On Music* 1132c; Barker, *Greek Music*, p. 208, n. 18.

[19] Aristotle, *Po*. 1447a29 – b8, 1448a11, 1449b29; Plato, *Laws* 2.669d – 70a.

[20] Aristotle, *Po*. 1447b9 – 23; Else, *Aristotle's Poetics*, pp. 56 – 7.

[21] Plato, *Ion* 531a, 532a; Athenaeus 620c – d, 632d.

[22] Nagy, *Comparative Studies*, p. 10, n. 29, and pp. 244 – 61.

[23] Schmitt, *Dichtung*, pp. 300 – 1.

[24] Tr. by E. G. Evelyn-White in Loeb Classical Library Hesiod, pp. 567 – 97.

reflected in two English borrowings: 'antagonism' and 'agony'. The ritual dimensions of this concept will be explored further below.

There is enough evidence, then, to conclude that what the rhapsodes recited was directly descended from what earlier singers had sung.[25] It is important to add that there is no compelling reason to believe that the medium of writing had anything to do with the traditions of the rhapsodes. This is not to say that in historical times they could not have owned texts of what they recited (cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.10); in any case, it is clear that the rhapsodes recited from memory (Xenophon, *Symposium* 3.6).

3 Occasion and authority

In light of the preceding sketch of poetry as differentiated from song, let us now consider the references to these categories in Greek song and poetry. It is easiest to start with a further differentiation, that of prose as distinct from poetry, and then to work backward to poetry as distinct from song.

From the earliest evidence, it is clear that prose assumes the prior existence of poetry. A prime illustration is the first sentence of Herodotus' *Histories*, where the diction and the conventions can be analysed as a set of reactions to corresponding poetic norms.[26]

This is the public display [*apodeixis*] of the inquiry [*historia*] of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, with the purpose of bringing it about that whatever results from men may not, with the passage of time, become evanescent, and that great and wondrous deeds – some of them publicly performed [*apodeiknumai*] by Hellenes, others by barbarians – may not become *aklea* [without *kleos*].

The prose of Herodotus is here presenting itself as an extension of the poetry of Homer. In Homeric poetry, we find that *kleos* means not only 'fame' or 'glory' but also, more specifically, 'the fame or glory that is conferred by the medium of poetry' (as in *Il.* 2.486, 11.227). In the prooemium of Herodotus, it is implied that *kleos* is 'the fame or glory that is conferred by the medium of poetry or prose'. Thus the prose of Herodotus does not differentiate itself, in self-reference, from the poetry of Homer. The language of early Greek prose may look more like everyday speech, but it imitates the most highly developed special language, poetry. In this sense, the prose of Herodotus is even further removed from everyday speech than poetry itself.

The medium of Herodotus, in calling itself *apodeixis* in the prooemion, is public. By contrast, Thucydides presents his writings as a private possession, a *ktēma*, of permanent value, something that is not the product of a 'competitive public performance meant to be heard and intended merely for the

[25] For further arguments, see Nagy, 'Hesiod', pp. 43–9.
[26] Krischer, 'Herodots Prooimion', pp. 159–67.

here-and-now' (1.22.4). The word here for 'competitive public performance' is *agōnisma*, derived from *agōn*, 'assembly, contest'. This concept of *agōn*, throughout what follows, is crucial for understanding the Archaic Greek performance-traditions of prose, poetry, and song.

Having seen that both early prose and poetry refer to themselves as *kleos*, 'fame', we come to the medium of song as distinct from poetry. Here again, self-reference is in terms of *kleos*, as when the voice of Pindar declares: 'keeping away dark blame and bringing genuine *kleos*, like streams of water, to a man who is near and dear [*philos*], I will praise him' (*Nemean* 7.61–3). Thus song, like poetry, can call itself *kleos*. All Greek literature – song, poetry, prose – originates in *kleos*, the act of praising famous deeds, and never entirely loses that focus. It reasserts itself in the dominance of epideictic rhetoric in later antiquity. The traditional concern with praise, together with the phenomenon of mimesis, to be discussed below, goes far toward explaining Plato's criticism of poetry and its dangers. Moreover, song, like prose, can refer to its own medium as *apodeixis*. In the diction of song, the three distinct media of song, poetry, and prose are all a matter of *apodeixis*, but there is an explicit distinction between song and poetry on one hand and prose on the other: there are references to two kinds of masters of *kleos*, the *aoidoi*, 'those who sing', and the *logioi*, 'those who speak' (Pindar, *Nemean* 6.45–7). From the language of Herodotus in the sentence that immediately follows the prooemium and from related passages, it is clear that Herodotus considers himself a *logios*, or, at least, as someone who supersedes the *logioi*. The dichotomy of *aoidos*, 'he who sings', and *logios*, 'he who speaks', is paralleled, again in the language of Herodotus, by the dichotomy of *mousopoios*, 'artisan of singing' (e.g., Sappho: Herodotus 2.135.1), and *logopoios*, 'artisan of speaking' (e.g., Hecataeus: Herodotus 2.143.1). In sum, the language of both prose and song indicates that prose is to be performed by *logioi*, 'those who speak', while poetry and song are both performed by *aoidoi*, 'those who sing'.

The strategy of Herodotus' first sentence assumes the existence of traditions of singing or reciting or speaking before a public, not of writing for readers. That in itself is enough to justify calling such traditions 'oral'. For many, however, this same word, 'oral', has a much more narrow meaning, restricted by our own cultural preconceptions about writing and reading. If something is 'oral', we tend to assume a conflict with the notion of 'written'. From the standpoint of cultural anthropology, however, it is 'written' that has to be defined in terms of 'oral'. 'Written' is not something that is not 'oral', rather, it is something *in addition* to being oral, and that additional something will vary from society to society. It is dangerous to universalise the phenomenon of literacy.

In the case of Archaic Greece, as is evident from the heritage of words like *apodeixis*, the traditions of song, poetry, and prose, all three, are fundamentally a matter of performance. As such, they are oral traditions. Such a description

is compatible with the cumulative experience of cultural anthropologists, who have found that various forms of song, poetry, and prose have functioned and continue to function in various ways in various societies without the aid of – in most cases without the existence of – writing.[27] From this vantage point, to repeat, we should not even be talking about oral poetry, for example, as distinct from poetry but rather about written poetry as possibly distinct from poetry: in other words, written poetry is the marked member of the opposition, and the poetry that we call 'oral' is the unmarked.

It can be argued in general that the traditions of Archaic Greek song, poetry, and prose required the medium of writing neither for composition nor for performance or reperformance. The reasons for this argument are founded on the central observation of Albert Lord, based primarily on ethnographic fieldwork in South Slavic traditions, that composition and performance in oral poetry are aspects of the same process, in that each performance is an act of recomposition.[28] So long as the traditions of oral poetry are alive in a given society, a written record cannot by itself affect a composition or a performance, and it does not necessarily stop the process of recomposition-in-performance.

In order to grasp the essence of oral tradition in composition and perform-ance, we must understand the social context, specifically, the requirements of the actual occasions for composing and performing. The occasionality of any given medium of poetry and song is reflected in a word used in Pindar's diction to designate his own medium: the word is *ainos* or *epainos*, which may be translated primarily as 'praise', indicative of Pindar's overarching purpose.[29] We have seen that another word used in Pindar's diction to designate his medium is *kleos*, which can be interpreted to mean 'glory' or 'fame' – as conferred by song or poetry. From the epic poetry of Homer, we have also seen that this medium too refers to itself as *kleos*. But it does not refer to itself as *ainos*.

By contrast with *kleos*, the word *ainos* is more exclusive in its applications. It is concerned more with the *function* of poetry and song, rather than the *form*. Or, to put it another way, it stresses the *occasion* for which a given form is used. As we see from Pindar's traditional diction, the *ainos* as a medium is osten-sibly restricted to those who have specific qualifications: (1) the *sophoi*, that is, those who are 'skilled' in decoding the message encoded by the poet in his poetry;[30] (2) the *agathoi*, that is, those who are intrinsically 'noble' by virtue of having been raised on proper ethical standards, which are the message

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[27] Zumthor, *Introduction*, p. 34.
[28] Lord, *Singer of Tales*, pp. 3–29, 99–123. The intellectual and emotional resistance to the findings of Milman Parry (*Collected Papers*) and Lord stems for the most part from cultural preconceptions of our own times concerning 'folk poetry'; Bausinger, *Formen*, pp. 41–55.
[29] Bundy, *Studia*, pp. 1–5.
[30] E.g., Pindar, *Isthmian* 2.12–13; see discussion in Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans*, pp. 236–8.