

CHAPTER 1

THE FLAVIANS

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I. VESPASIAN

'During the whole period of his rule he considered nothing more essential than first to make firm the state, which was tottering and almost in ruins, and then to adorn it.' This characterization of Vespasian by his biographer Suetonius contrasts sharply with his description, in similar words, of the emperor Claudius attempting to erase from memory the mere two days of instability that had succeeded the assassination of his predecessor.¹ Indeed, nothing comparable to the disruption of A.D. 69, with three emperors meeting violent deaths, had confronted any of the successors of Augustus.

The natural comparison to make is between Vespasian and Augustus himself, for the civil wars which ended the Republic were much in people's thoughts at the time.² Those had been worse in that they were prolonged and had involved much suffering in the provinces, where huge armies had fought, and in Italy, where large numbers of veterans had to be settled. But the later ones weakened Roman prestige on the Rhine and Danube frontier and left Vespasian with a Gallic secession still in progress. Worse still, there was actual fighting in Rome itself, which moved Tacitus to draw parallels with the earlier civil wars between Sulla and Marius.³ Not surprisingly, grim omens and religious superstitions gained credence, and the civil war itself could be viewed as a giant expiation and purification of the whole

Again, Vespasian might appear more fortunate than Augustus in that he did not have to devise a new political system. But the old one had exhibited tensions that had contributed to Nero's fall, and his short-lived successors had not resolved them or found new ways of maintaining equilibrium. What was the correct image for the *princeps* who was in fact, but not in

¹ See now Levick (1999), from which this chapter, revised in 1994 and again in 1997, unfortunately could not benefit. Suet. *Vesp.* 8.1: 'per totum imperii tempus nihil habuit antiquius quam prope afflictam nutantemque rem publicam stabilire primo, deinde et ornare'. Cf. *Claud.* 11: 'imperio stabilito nihil antiquius duxit quam id biduum, quo de mutando rei publicae status haesitatum erat, memoriae eximere'.

² Tac. *Hist.* 1.50, cf. 11.6; 111.66.3. ³ Tac. *Hist.* 1.89; 111.51; 72; 83; 11.38.

⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 1.3; IV.3.3: 'civilia arma... postquam... omnis provincias exercitusque *lustraverant*, *velut expiato terrarum orbe* cepisse finem videbantur'.



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theory, a monarch? What of the many rival claimants encouraged by a system with no formal method of designating a successor? How was the Senate to be given importance without power? How was the *princeps* to practise liberality without rapacity? How were the emperor's freedmen, powerful through proximity, to be kept in their traditional social place? How was the candidate of the eastern legions to satisfy the aspirations of eastern provincials without retarding the steady rise of men from the western provinces?

1. Vespasian before his accession

Tacitus with justice describes the rise of Titus Flavius Vespasianus to the position of princeps as the work of fortune. His undistinguished family background was his chief liability, but, as his confederate Mucianus is made to say, standards had dropped by the time he made his claim, and Vitellius, though of the imperial nobility and patriciate, was not, like Nero and Galba, of the republican aristocracy.⁵ Tacitus underlines the fact by starting his Histories, which told the story of the Flavian dynasty and its rise to power, on the day of Vitellius' acclamation as princeps. Vespasian, born on 17 November A.D. 9, was nearly sixty when he made his bid. He was the second son of T. Flavius Sabinus and Vespasia Polla, from whom he derived his cognomen. He never attempted to hide the fact that his background was, at most, equestrian on his father's side, for even as emperor, he continued to visit regularly the house in Cosa where his paternal grandmother Tertulla had raised him after his father's early death. His mother's family, however, was more distinguished: her father was an equestrian army officer, and her brother entered the Senate and reached the rank of praetor.

Some traced his frugality as emperor to the financial expertise he inherited from his father, a tax-collector and a money-lender, and to his own experience of straitened circumstances which led him to seek help from his older brother in the later years of Nero.⁶ He had acquired military experience and success, though the latter can be exaggerated. He served as a military tribune, probably of equestrian rank, in Thrace, and after securing the *latus clavus* from Tiberius and holding the offices of quaestor, aedile and praetor was put in charge of the legion II Augusta stationed at Argentoratum (Strasbourg) in Upper Germany under Claudius. The legion took part in the invasion of Britain in 43, and Vespasian received triumphal honours which were normally reserved for consular commanders. Claudius, however, was notoriously generous with such awards, and Vespasian had courted Claudius' powerful secretary Narcissus.⁷ He may

⁵ Tac. Hist. 11.1; 76. Suet. Vesp. 1–2; 12.1; Tac. Hist. 111.65; Suet. Vesp. 4-3.

⁷ Suet. Vesp. 4.1–2; Tac. Hist. 111.44, cf. Suet. Claud. 24.3.



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also have helped him achieve his suffect consulship in the last two months of 51 and his two priesthoods, the augurate and one of the minor colleges. At the appropriate time, he became proconsul of Africa, the usual honourable end to a senatorial career. He was, however, unpopular there because, without being seriously extortionate, he had neither the means nor the will to be generous: he was unlucky to be in Africa in the 60s, the same period as the rich Vitellii. The crisis of the Jewish revolt, which broke out in 66, combined with Nero's increasing fear of ambitious and well-born army commanders unexpectedly revived Vespasian's chance for military glory, and he was sent to Judaea at the head of three legions.

Vespasian's career had not so far suggested outstanding qualities of leadership. His reluctance to assume the latus clavus in early life foreshadowed the caution he showed in making his bid for the throne: he was lucky to have dynamic and impetuous allies. He was a survivor, flexible to the point of sycophancy in dealing with tyrants like Gaius or Nero, though later he was to lay claim to Nero's displeasure. Even the sons who were his greatest asset as a claimant to imperial power were the fruits of an unambitious marriage. Early in the reign of Gaius, Vespasian had married a freedwoman of Junian Latin status, who had been claimed by her father and vindicated as originally of free birth: otherwise Vespasian, as a senator, would have been debarred by the Augustan marriage legislation from entering such a union. She and her daughter, both called Flavia Domitilla, had died before Vespasian became princeps, leaving him two sons considerably distant in age, Titus, now nearly thirty years old, and Domitian, now approaching eighteen. As princeps, Vespasian continued to act cautiously and gradually – a matter of temperament and of his awareness that he had time. For, though nearly sixty when he acceded, he was establishing a dynasty.9

2. Source problems

The nature of our literary sources makes it impossible to reconstruct the detailed chronology of the reign of Vespasian. His biographer Suetonius used a non-chronological structure and the chronological account of Dio is only preserved in fragments. The sequence of events is most nearly recoverable for the period before the autumn of A.D. 70 when the surviving portion of Tacitus' *Histories* breaks off and Josephus finishes his account of the Jewish War. On the other hand, the problem of bias in our accounts is here at its most acute, because it reflects the rivalry among

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 $^{^{8}}$ Suet. Vesp. 4.2–3, cf. Tac. Hist. 11.97. The riot at Hadrumetum suggests that Vespasian could not help in a crisis.

⁶ Under Nero: Suet. Vesp. 4.4, cf. Tac. Ann. xvi.5; Hist. iv.7. Marriage: Suet. Vesp. 3; Epit. de Caesaribus



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supporters of Vespasian claiming the principal credit for his victory, ¹⁰ as well as the competition among pretenders to the throne. Though the Flavian emperors themselves did not commission or encourage historical accounts of their reigns, to judge by the fact that the elder Pliny left his flattering historical work unpublished when he died in August 79,11 the partiality towards the Flavians that works written under that dynasty displayed is attested by Tacitus at *Histories* 11 101 and exemplified in an extreme form by Josephus in his Jewish War.

Unlike Suetonius or Dio, Tacitus tried to adopt a critical approach towards this material. Even the quarter of the work that survives gives clear indications that his portrait of Vespasian was a very mixed one. It was best for Rome that Vespasian won the civil war (111.86) and he turned out better than had been expected (1.50; 11.97). But there were darker aspects: Vespasian overcame inhibitions about the methods for obtaining money (11.84), and his close associates were no better than the discredited minions of Otho and Vitellius (11.95.3). Two are named there, T. Clodius Eprius Marcellus and C. Licinius Mucianus, and the first makes a plea, clearly meant to be prophetic, for a curb on liberty (IV.8.4).

3. Rome in the absence of Vespasian

Vespasian was acclaimed by the two legions at Alexandria, under the command of Tiberius Iulius Alexander, on 1 July 69 and by the three legions in Judaea on 3 July. 12 By the middle of the month he had been recognized by the three legions in Syria, under the command of Mucianus, and by the surrounding client kings. At the end of July a council of war was held at Berytus. Meanwhile Vitellius had entered Rome. In the middle of August Mucianus set out for Italy. A month or so later Vespasian and Titus started for Egypt, where they heard the news of the Flavian victory at Cremona, won by Antonius Primus and the Danubian legions on 24-5 October. They then moved on to Alexandria where they heard of the death of Vitellius on 20 December. There Vespasian remained until September 70, though Titus left to prosecute the war in Judaea in late March or early April of that year. Vespasian left when Jerusalem was under siege; he did not wait until the news of its fall on 8 September reached Alexandria. He probably arrived in Rome in late September or early October 70.13

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¹⁰ Hence conflicting representations of Antonius Primus in Tac. Hist. 111 and IV (e.g. 111.28; IV.2; 39.3): Wellesley (1972) 3-5. On *Hist.* IV.1-2; II.1 w Joseph. *BJ* IV.654: Chilver (1984) I.31-2.

11 Tac. *Hist.* II.101; Pliny, HN I, pref. 20, telling Titus of the favourable bias of his unpublished

history. 12 Suet. Vesp. 6.3; Tac. Ĥist. 11.79; Dio LXVI.8; cf. Joseph. BJ 1V.601; 617.

¹³ Tac. Hist. 111.48; IV.51, cf. Suet. Vesp. 7. Vespasian was probably in Alexandria for the rising of the Nile in late June/July but not for news of the fall of Jerusalem on 8 Sept. 70 (Joseph. BJ VII.21); he was not back in Rome by 21 June (Tac. Hist. IV.53): Chilver's (1984) commentary on Hist. IV.81.



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Why did Vespasian go to Egypt, thus delaying his appearance in the capital for over a year from his proclamation as *princeps*? Tacitus says that it was decided at the council of war that Vespasian would hold on to the points of access to Egypt, and he later hints of a plan to cut corn supplies to Rome and to raise money in the rich province; Josephus speaks of the strategic importance of Egypt as a defensive position and of making the Vitellians in Rome surrender through the threat of starvation.¹⁴ It is hard to see how an embargo on grain could have been very effective quickly enough or, indeed, at all given the popularity of the Vitellian cause in Africa, a more important source of corn in this period for Rome, as Josephus himself tells us. The aim of sending Egyptian corn to Rome, adduced by Dio and realized by Vespasian early in 70 when shortages were falsely attributed to the Vitellians in Africa, fits the situation better than the idea of a Flavian embargo.¹⁵ That story may belong with other attempts to emphasize the Flavian hope of a bloodless victory.

Even if control of Egypt was important strategically and financially, why was it necessary for Vespasian to go there himself rather than send others? That the enthusiasm initially aroused by his visit – the first by a Roman princeps since Augustus – would be dampened by his exactions could have been predicted. 16 Suetonius suggests that the new emperor acquired some of the authority and majesty that he lacked through the miracles of healing that he performed in Alexandria, while Tacitus notes that eye-witnesses went on recounting them years later. Though they report differently Vespasian's visit to the Serapeum to seek confirmation of his chances of becoming emperor, both agree that divine sanction was conferred: Tacitus gives the name of the priest as Basilides, Suetonius notes the presentation of items associated with Egyptian kingship. Yet these miracles seem to have been organized by the loyal prefect of Egypt, Tiberius Iulius Alexander, mostly for Egyptian and eastern consumption, perhaps to counter the appearance of a false Nero there in spring 69.¹⁷ Vespasian himself was not apparently eager to stress the eastern basis of his early support: of our literary authorities, only Philostratus mentions Vespasian's visit after the Serapeum to the Hippodrome, where, a papyrus records, the Alexandrians at the prompting of their prefect hailed Vespasian as son of Ammon, hence legal sovereign of Egypt, and 'Divine Caesar', 'Lord Augustus'. 18 Philostratus is only interested in the incident as a good background to Vespasian's fictitious meeting with his hero, the sage Apollonius of Tyana. Josephus ignores all these

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Tac. Hist. II.82, cf. Suet. Vesp. 7 ('claustra Aegypti'); Tac. Hist. III.48; cf. III.8; Joseph BJ IV.605 ff.
 Tac, Hist. II.97; IV.49; II.58; cf. Joseph. BJ II.383; 386: Africa supplies two thirds, Egypt one third, of Roman corn imports. Sending of corn to Rome: Dio LXV.9.2; Tac. Hist. IV.38; 52.2.

¹⁶ Dio LXVI.8. 17 Suet. Vesp. 7; Tac. Hist. IV.81-2: Heinrichs (1968). False Nero: Hist. II.8.

¹⁸ P. Fouad 8=MW 41; Philostr. VA v.27–36; cf. Titus' visit in P. J. Parsons, Oxyrhynchus Papyri 34 (1968), no. 2725, 127–9.



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events, and though he probably wished to avoid overshadowing his own prophecy of Vespasian's elevation, he may also reflect Flavian reluctance to have Vespasian's entry into Rome overshadowed. Vespasian will have been aware of Roman sentiment, reflected in Tacitus, who specifically notes the lack of success of Romans whose base of support in civil wars was in the East and postpones his account of the miracles until long after the *princeps'* recognition at Rome. Only later did Vespasian put in his Temple of Peace, not completed until 75, a statue of the River God Nile. 19

Then again, even if it made sense for Vespasian to visit Egypt in person, why did he stay there so long? He was not back on 21 June for the religious ceremony of moving the Terminus stone, the first step towards the restoration of the great Capitoline temple which had been burned during the defeat of the Vitellians. Yet he had sent a letter specifying the arrangements for the ceremony, and, on his return to Rome, he was to make a great point of initiating the rebuilding in person (see p. 14). Tacitus says that he was waiting for favourable winds, but he could have gone at the start of the sailing season in the spring. Dio says that he originally wanted to return with Titus after the capture of Jerusalem, but then why did he not wait a little longer?²⁰

The answer may emerge if we consider not why Vespasian *wished* to be in Egypt, but why he might *not wish* to be in Rome. Suetonius provides a hint when he says that Vespasian put no innocent person to death in his reign except when he was absent or unaware, while Dio notes that Mucianus, who could use the imperial seal and had the real authority to act, collected money for the Roman treasury, sparing Vespasian the *invidia*.²¹

Then again, the conduct of the Flavian armies in Rome after the death of Vitellius, and earlier in Italy where they sacked Cremona, had made Antonius Primus a liability to the Flavian cause. It was Mucianus who had to break the power of this hero of the soldiers, already the recipient of consular insignia from the Senate, first by promoting his supporters and hinting at an honourable term as governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, a position left vacant by Cluvius Rufus, then by sending away from Rome his own legion on which he most depended. This was not a matter of personal envy on the part of Mucianus, for when Primus fled to Vespasian he was not reinstated. Primus was suspected by Mucianus of encouraging one of the remaining members of the republican aristocratic clan from which the luckless adoptive son of Galba came. This man, Licinius Crassus Scribonianus, was apparently killed in this period, along with Calpurnius Piso Galerianus, the son of the Neronian conspirator, and his father-in-law,

 $^{^{19}}$ Joseph BJ vII.63–74; Tac. Hist. II.6; IV.81 (the miracles are not even placed at the start of the visit to Alexandria); Pliny, HN xxxvI.58.

²⁰ Tac. Hist. IV.53; Suet. Vesp. 8.5; Dio LXVI.10.2; Hist. IV.81 with Chilver's (1984) commentary.

²¹ Suet. Vesp. 15 (cf. 12 'civilis et clemens'); Dio LXVI.2.1-2; 5, cf. Tac. Hist. IV.11.1; 39.2.



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L. Calpurnius Piso, the proconsul of Africa.²² Even if none of these was ambitious, they could, as the few remaining survivors of the Republican nobility, offer alternatives for those unhappy with a new upstart *princeps*.

Similar considerations will have dictated the elimination of the young son of Vitellius, who was only six or seven years old when presented by his father to the soldiers, entitled and accoutred as the heir apparent. To Vespasian was left the more grateful task of sparing Vitellius' daughter and finding her a suitable husband while, under Mucianus, Vitellius' praetorian prefect Iulius Priscus was driven to death and his trusted freedman Asiaticus crucified as a slave, despite having been given equestrian rank by his former master.²³

The praetorian guard also presented a problem. Vitellius had dismissed the old members who had murdered Galba and supported Otho, and Vespasian had ordered his army commanders to approach them with offers of reinstatement. In the meantime, Vitellius had enrolled sixteen cohorts from the German legions and even from his auxiliary troops, and now there were also Flavian soldiers who demanded service in the guard as a reward for their victory. Financial pressures made it imperative, moreover, that the number of cohorts be reduced from the sixteen to which Vitellius had increased them, even from Nero's twelve. Mucianus first tried demoralizing the Vitellians and then sending Domitian as Vespasian's representative with promises of honourable discharge and land. Eventually, he had to reenroll them all en masse and then discharge or retain them individually. Inscriptions duly show Vitellian legionaries dismissed after three, eight or fifteen years of praetorian service, two of them having served even beyond A.D. 76, the date by which the number of cohorts was reduced to nine. By such gradual dismissals, Mucianus clearly hoped to avoid the trouble produced by the partisan treatment of the praetorians at the hands of Galba and Vitellius.24

The hardest task facing Mucianus, however, was the disappointment of senatorial expectations, or rather the expectations of a small but very vocal minority in the Senate. Vespasian had written, probably before Mucianus even reached Rome, to promise the reinstatement of those, alive and dead, whom Nero had condemned for *maiestas* and the abolition of trials for the 'un-republican' verbal or trivial charges that had come to be covered by that charge. ²⁵ In this he was following the example of Galba and Otho who pardoned Nero's victims. But there remained the question of punishing those

²² Antonius Primus: Tac, *Hist.* IV.39, cf. 4; 80. Republican aristocrats: *Hist.* IV.11; 39.3–4; 49–50.

²³ Tac. Hist. 11.59; cf. Suet. Vesp. 14; Hist. 1V.11, cf. 11.47; 95.

²⁴ Suet. Vit. 10.1; Tac. Hist. 11.67.2; 82, 93.9; IV. 46; ILS 2036=MW 382; ILS 2034=MW 375; ILS 2035=MW 381; ILS 1993=MW 400.

²⁵ Dio LXVI.9.1, cf. Tac. *Hist.* IV.3.4. On $\alpha \sigma \epsilon \beta \epsilon \iota a$, Dio's word for 'unrepublican' treason charges, see Brunt (1084a).



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responsible for the convictions. In 68, probably even before Galba had entered the Capitol, the Senate had set in train the trials of Neronian accusers, but Galba, moved by pleas from vulnerable senators, had been unenthusiastic and the issue had lapsed. Now it was renewed, and in a form that the new emperor might find hard to reject: whereas, under Galba, Helvidius Priscus intended to try Eprius Marcellus, the prosecutor of Thrasea Paetus, himself, now the *eques* Musonius Rufus was invited to speak against Publius Egnatius Celer, a philosopher who had testified against his pupil and friend, Q. Marcius Barea Soranus, a respected senator whose daughter had once been married to Titus.²⁶

There can be no real doubt that Vespasian was the architect of the policy that Mucianus, with the help of Domitian, now gradually revealed to the Senate. While Mucianus, surrounded by his bodyguard, was clearly the person in authority, it was the younger son of the princeps, then only eighteen, who guaranteed the legitimacy of what he did, a role from which his reputation was never to recover. In the last days of 69, Domitian had been called Caesar by the soldiers and named praetor designate by senatorial decree, and early in 70 he replaced Iulius Frontinus as urban praetor, after which his name appeared on the letters and edicts implementing the princeps' wishes. It was he who presided over the Senate on 9 January when Egnatius Celer was condemned and Iunius Mauricus, the brother of one of Thrasea Paetus' close associates, asked that access to the notebooks of previous emperors be granted to the Senate so that accusers could be brought to justice.²⁷ Each of the magistrates and the senators then, individually, took an oath that he had not used his influence to harm any of the victims or profited from a condemnation. This led to allegations of perjury, threats of prosecution, and denunciation of Aquillius Regulus, one of the younger generation of Neronian informers, who was to flourish again in Domitian's reign. Helvidius Priscus renewed his attack on Eprius Marcellus, though such a revival of a charge by the same prosecutor was illegal. Less than a week later, Domitian broke the news: there were to be no prosecutions of Neronian accusers. Although, in deference to senatorial sentiment, an informer was one of two Neronian exiles excluded from the amnesty, the point was brought home by the appointment of Eprius Marcellus to be proconsul of Asia where he was retained for three years, an appointment that could only have been made by interference with the system of allocation by lot by the *princeps* or his representatives.²⁸

There is evidence of consultation with Vespasian over such matters as the restoration of the Capitol and the securing of copies of old laws for

²⁶ Tac. *Hist.* 1.4.3; 11.10.1; IV 42.6; IV.6; IV.10.1. See Evans (1979).

²⁷ Epit. de Caesaribus 9.2; Aur. Vict. Caes. 9.2. Domitian: Tac. Hist. 111.86; IV.2; 39.2; 40.

²⁸ Tac. *Hist.* IV.41–4, cf. Tac. *Ann.* XVI.14; Eprius Marcellus: *ILS* 992=MW 271; cf. Dio LXVI.2.2.



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the archives, but the distance involved must have made detailed referral difficult.²⁹ In the sphere of appointments, signs of a lack of coordination between the distant *princeps* and his representatives at Rome are sometimes divined. A notable example is Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus, a patrician related by marriage to Claudius, whom we find presiding over the ceremony on 21 June, perhaps as senior pontifex in the absence of the princeps (who was in any case not yet *pontifex maximus*). He was then sent out to the consular Spanish province, which still lacked a governor. Vespasian apparently had other ideas: he wanted to appoint Plautius Silvanus as prefect of the city in succession to his murdered brother. As his funerary inscription shows, Plautius Silvanus was recalled to hold the prefecture. More than that, on his return to Rome, Vespasian proposed that he receive triumphal honours for his outstanding service as governor of Moesia under Nero, whose lack of generosity is implicitly condemned.³⁰ Vespasian clearly wanted to have, on permanent display as his prefect, this show-piece of Flavian magnanimity: Plautius Aelianus went on to a second consulship in 74, which he shared with the emperor's elder son.³¹

Similar lack of harmony has been suggested in the case of the prefecture of the praetorian guard. An Egyptian papyrus describes Tiberius Iulius Alexander as praetorian prefect, though there is no parallel for an office held outside the province by a former prefect of Egypt being recorded there. However, he is unlikely to have held the post in Egypt, simultaneously with being prefect. The reference on the papyrus would be best explained if Alexander became praetorian prefect before he reached Rome and while still in the vicinity of Egypt. The praetorian prefecture is generally taken to be a separate post from the prefecture of the Judaean army, mentioned by Josephus: that was an exceptional post created by Vespasian because of Titus' inexperience as a commander. Alexander could have held these two posts simultaneously while still with Titus in Judaea, or he could have assumed the praetorian post later when he accompanied Titus on his visit to Egypt in the spring of 71. Members of the ruling house were often escorted by praetorians led by one prefect, and though Titus had his two legions with him in Egypt and presumably had no actual praetorians escorting him to Rome either, it may have been thought appropriate for him, as the emperor's son, to have a praetorian prefect in attendance.³²

On the return of Titus and Ti. Iulius Alexander to Rome in the summer

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²⁹ Tac. *Hist.* IV.53.1; IV.40, cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 8. The voyage from Egypt to Rome would take about 80 days in November to March; about 30 days from April to October: Duncan-Jones, *Structure* ch. 1.

³⁰ Tac. *Hist.* IV.53; *ILS* 986=MW 261; on *AE* 1989 no. 425, see Eck (1993b) 249 n. 13.

³¹ On consuls of 74: L. Vidman, Fasti Ostienses 43 (Prague, 1982).

³² *PHib* 215=MW 329; cf. Joseph. *BJ* v.46; v1.237; ν s the restoration of *OGIS* II 586=MW 330 as $\epsilon \pi/\alpha \rho \chi o \nu$ ($\tau/\sigma \hat{v}$ *Tovδαι*[$\kappa o \hat{v}$ στρατο \hat{v} : Kokkinos (1990) 131. See Turner (1954); Syme (1977) 1071; 1277 n. 9; Jones, *Titus* 85.



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of 71, a complex situation would have arisen. At the end of 69 Arrius Varus had been appointed to the post, perhaps by Domitian, while Antonius Primus was in charge of Rome. In the spring or summer of 70 Mucianus replaced Varus by Arrecinus Clemens, the uncle to Titus' daughter Iulia, though Clemens was of senatorial standing. Some time after Titus returned home, he himself became praetorian prefect, and Alexander may have served as prefect in Rome at some point. What happened to Clemens? His tenure must have been short, to judge from the embarrassment contemporaries still felt about a non-equestrian holding the post when Titus took it over. Dio reports that Vespasian's ironic message to Domitian, thanking him for allowing him to hold office, was provoked by the appointments, including prefectures, given by Mucianus and his son. Yet Clemens became suffect consul in 73 and went on to a distinguished career, probably before as well as during the reign of Domitian. There is no need to posit disharmony. Vespasian could have sanctioned two prefects early in his reign, one (Alexander) for Vespasian and Titus in the East and one (Clemens) in Rome. Then Ti. Iulius Alexander may have served briefly with Clemens in Rome and perhaps even went on to serve jointly with Titus.³³

A more serious area of possible tension between Vespasian and his representatives in Rome concerns the repute of Galba. While in the East, Vespasian and Mucianus had recognized Galba, Otho and Vitellius in turn. By the time Vespasian was acclaimed by the eastern legions, the first two were dead but Vespasian had bid for and received substantial help from previous adherents of Otho, who naturally hated Vitellius. Otho had to be treated with some respect, but what was to be done about the memory of Otho's enemy Galba, from whom the Senate had removed the stain of usurpation by declaring his predecessor a public enemy?

The letter that Vespasian sent to Rome in December 69 clearly said nothing on this point or nothing favourable to Galba, on the assumption that the inscribed Lex de Imperio Vespasiani was passed in reaction to that letter (see pp. 11–12 below). For Galba is omitted, along with Nero, Otho and Vitellius, from the respectable precedents cited in that law. However, on the Acts of the Arval Brothers for 69, which had been inscribed before Vitellius' death, only the name of that emperor has been erased, and when Domitian took the chair of the Senate on 9 January 70, he proposed the restoration of Galba's honours, a restoration which, unlike the simultaneous decision to revive Piso's memory, actually took effect. He Suetonius says that, when the Senate voted, apparently on this occasion, to put up a naval monument in Galba's honour on the spot where he was slain,

 $^{^{33}}$ Arrius Varus: Tac. Hist. Iv.2; cf. Iv.68; Arrecinus Clemens: Tac. Hist. Iv.68, cf. Iv.11.1; Dio LXVI.2; MW 302. Embarrassment: Suet. Tit. 6; Pliny, HN1, pref. 3.

³⁴ Tac. Hist. IV.3.3,cf. ILS 244=MW 1; Acta Fratrum Arvalium (MW 2-3); Hist. IV.40.