Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England
Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics

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Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England

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Foreword

For help in checking references and in proof-reading, the author is indebted to Mr James Gale, Mr John Gale, Mr John Plowright and Mr John Parry. He is indebted to Mrs E. D. Beebe and Mrs J. G. W. Davies for typing, to the Cambridge History Faculty for a grant from its Political Science Fund, to Dr P. Hunter Blair, Mr W. A. Camps, Mr D. J. V. Fisher, Professor Michael Oakeshott, Mr Graeme Rennie, Mr E. Ray and Mr Hywel Williams for items of information, and to librarians in the Peterhouse and Cambridge University libraries (especially Mr G. W. Stannard) for help in tracing articles and books. He is indebted to Mrs A. J. Toynbee for permission to examine some of the Toynbee papers in the Bodleian Library and to Mrs R. G. Collingwood for permission to use, and to quote from, the papers of her late husband, also in the Bodleian. He is indebted to Mrs H. M. Dunn, the Fellows’ Secretary at Peterhouse, and to Mrs Elizabeth Wetton and Mr Francis Brooke of the Cambridge University Press for their assistance in preparing the book for publication. For the index he is indebted to Mrs Ann Hall. Above all, he is indebted to the Master and Fellows of Peterhouse for continuing to provide conditions in which work can be done.

For reading and commenting on parts of the book during the process of composition between 1976 and 1979, the author is grateful to Dr David Cannadine, Mr J. C. D. Clark, Professor Timothy Fuller, Mr Martin Golding, Dr Peter Linehan, Dr Roger Lovatt, Dr David Newsome, Sir Charles Pickthorn, the Rt Hon. J. Enoch Powell MP, Mr Geoffrey Scammell, Dr Roger Scruton, the Reverend Canon Charles Smyth, the Reverend John Sweet, Professor Walter Ullmann, Professor John Vincent and Mr Ian Willson. For reading and commenting on the whole book he is grateful to the Reverend Professor W. O. Chadwick, Professor G. R. Elton, Professor E. Kedourie, Mrs John Vincent and Mr B. H. G. Wormald.

Some of those who have read parts or the whole of the book are themselves discussed in it. Such correction as they have suggested, however, has been about factual detail; they have not offered, and the
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The author did not invite, criticism of his view of their significance. It is also the case that Dr Norman, whose writings are discussed in chapter 14, had no knowledge of the contents of chapter 14 until the book had gone to press and, in spite of being a friend and colleague, bears no responsibility for them.

Maurice Cowling

Peterhouse, Cambridge
February 1980

NOTE. Footnotes have been kept to a minimum, being normally biographies of persons mentioned in the text. The notes at the back of the book indicate the locations of all the quotations contained in the sections of the text to which they refer, as well as the sources from which the book has been constructed.
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"Renan . . . illustrates a problem which we have met in another context; whether the advance of learning outside the natural sciences . . . was identified so necessarily with the suspension of belief in anything (not merely belief in religion) that lack of commitment began itself to resemble a moral quality; or, to put it thus, that the detachment of mind, without which no historian could hope to come near to impartial treatment of the past, was elevated into a principle which might look as though it contained detachment from commitments necessary to the full life of a man, whether in politics, society, or ethics. Renan's mind showed how the ethical basis of scholarship in that age engendered vacillation, nostalgia, wish-fulfilment and then suspicion of wish-fulfilment, perpetual questioning of the self and its judgement, at times (if he had worn his heart less frequently upon his sleeve) near to self-torment." The Reverend Professor W. O. Chadwick The Secularisation of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century 1975 p. 218.

"People are fully alive to the danger of superstition in priests - in course of time they will find out that . . . professors may be just as bad." Robert, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury to Sir L. Mallet December 26 1876 in Smith (ed.) Lord Salisbury on Politics 1972 p. 19.
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The subject of this work is doctrine, and the doctrines it will discuss are the public doctrines which have been propagated in England in the last century and a half. A public doctrine adumbrates the assumptions that constitute the framework within which teaching, writing and public action are conducted. In England all participants in the public realm have had a doctrine, whether they have known it or not. Almost all of them have had a doctrine about England, whether the subjects they have written or talked about have been English or not. They have all had a message, whether they have wished to or not, and they have all implied views about the direction which the public mind ought to take. In England, public doctrine has emerged from a national consciousness, and the intention is to write its history since 1840.

Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England will be an extensive work of which only one volume is being published at present. Volume I is a preliminary, an examination of the author’s relation to the events of which the main work will provide a history, and a discussion of thinkers who have helped him to understand the significance of that history. This will not be either reminiscence or autobiography. On the one hand, it will describe the contours of a narrow mind. On the other, it will celebrate the eminences of some Christian Conservatives who have written in England in the twentieth century. From both angles, it will suggest a need to examine the role of religion in English public thought.

The intellectual history of modern England has not of late been studied very adequately. There have been important studies of small subjects, but there have been few synthetic essays and there has been hardly any incandescence. It may be that incandescence has been missing because historians have forgotten, or have not yet understood, that the subject could be made to yield significant difficulties if it were approached properly. It is much more likely to be the case that incandescence is missing because the difficulties are too significant and too
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close for safety, and demand too embarrassing an invigilation of historians' assumptions, especially about religion.

It is from religion that modern English intellectual history should begin. That it does not so begin - that it begins rather with the history of political, philosophical, literary, critical, aesthetic, economic or educational activity, or with religion considered as the history of theology or ecclesiastical history - registers historians' reluctance to give critical consideration to the culture to which they belong. In particular, it registers reluctance to consider the complicated connection between its professional academic character on the one hand and its secular, liberal character on the other.

Secular and liberal may be used of learning which avoids Christian commitment; they may be used of learning which aims to replace Christian commitments by non-Christian ones. The division between the two uses is thin, and not all writers have understood it. Some of the most influential who have written in England in the last century and a half have failed signally to understand it - have failed to see that secularization, so far from involving liberation from religion, has involved merely liberation from Christianity and the establishment in its place of a modern religion whose advocates so much assume its truth that they do not understand that it is a religion to which they are committed.

It would be glib to say that in modern culture universities have replaced churches as repositories of Truth. But it is not glib to say that modern university education makes claims to Truth which historic Christianity made for itself, and that the academic university is a fragment from a larger culture in which learning was inseparable from religion. It is the liberation and professionalization of this fragment, and the development of a corporate interest among its guardians, that makes even the most sensitive insensitive to the arbitrariness of their foundations.

What may be said of historical writing and of academic culture may be said more generally. In the modern world a mainly Christian culture has been replaced by a mainly post-Christian one. This is a momentous transformation. In approaching it, these volumes will dissolve the abstractions that mark subjects, professions or activities off from one another. They will treat monarchy, government, politics, art, science, medicine, philosophy, literature, technology, criticism, architecture, education, music, engineering, economics and so on, not as demonstrations of what their practitioners have claimed to be doing, but as
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Evidence of what they think the English can be persuaded to believe. Whether attention is turned to Elgar or to Eddington, to Galsworthy or to Gladstone, to Pugin, to Patmore or to Plumb, and even when the works involved seem least religious in their content, they will be considered as answering the questions, what should the English believe? should they believe in Christianity? what rôle should religion play in the public realm?

This may be judged an arbitrary undertaking, a rack on which to extract answers which the practitioners of public utterance did not wish to give. In fact more practitioners have given answers than it is normal to suppose, and many more have made gestures which leave their answers unmistakable. Some of the practitioners discussed in this work would have denied that their intention was doctrinal. Even when this is so, however, even when a practitioner assumes rather than states, assumes because he prefers not to state, or conceals a subversive or traitorous intention in stating, he may still be judged to have contributed to doctrine.

Doctrine ought to mean a teaching that is formal, authorized and explicit. But in England such teaching can scarcely be said to exist. In England there is a sea of voices with a plurality of doctrines which are joined together by the liberal doctrine that plurality is desirable. In these circumstances even thinkers who avoid doctrine have a more doctrinal effect than they intend, and the history of doctrine must be nothing less than the whole history of the intelligentsia.

In England the emergence of an extended intelligentsia has been a twentieth-century phenomenon. England, however, has not really had an alienated intelligentsia. The salient feature of the twentieth-century expansion has been not impotence or resentment, but a successful self-expression, which has been achieved through parliament, the civil service, the law, the media, the citizen army, the professions, science, literature and the universities. It is this that has led the way, providing an entry into every part of the nation's life and turning the nation's mind into a subject for experiment - an atom to be bombarded with whatever charges seem suitable.

The ultimate aim must be to estimate the bombardment's effect. But it is necessary in the first place to consider its content. In this work the content is being considered as religion.

A religion includes not only belief and liturgy but also a structure of public action. In English Christianity, all three have been established over so many centuries and at levels so deep that a sudden replacement
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would have been impossible. The facing may flake or be chipped away while the building remains. The time may come, however, when the building will crumble. Many modern thinkers are Christians in modern dress, but many more are not, and it seems likely that many more will not be in the future. If it cannot yet be said that Christianity has crumbled, it must certainly be judged to have suffered severe challenges as a public doctrine.

To consider Christianity as a public doctrine is to pre-empt discussion of its character. Many of the writers who will be discussed in this volume have emphasized that Christianity ministers to the private personality; even when it has been ecclesiastical Christianity that they have had in mind, they have insisted that "the gospel and the action of the Church is to individuals". In this they have been right. It is an important Christian truth that this is so. But there is another truth which most of these writers have also understood – that the gospel and the Church will not be heard if the visible panoply of public power is directed towards Christianity's subversion.

The present volume will discuss thinkers to whom the author is related intellectually. Some of these have had followings and reputations throughout the world: a few were scarcely known outside Cambridge. This is not, however, as incongruous as it may seem. Every thinker has his own narrowness. Behind every world-thinker there is a locality, and, since few thinkers address themselves at first to any locality but their own, few will be properly intelligible outside it. In this volume the universal messages that have been contributed to thought about the public function of religion by Whitehead, Toynbee, Eliot, Knowles, Collingwood, Butterfield, Oakeshott, Churchill, Waugh and Salisbury are made intelligible by appearing in the context from which they emerged: the context in which they and innumerable other thinkers around them were considering the fate and future of English Christianity.

As an approach to these questions, volume I has been divided into four main parts. Prelude discusses Whitehead and Toynbee as exponents of a complicated type of modern, liberal latitudinarianism. Recessions describes three sorts of anti-liberal Christianity as they are to be found in the writings of some inter-war Cambridge thinkers, of T. S. Eliot, and of David Knowles when young. Recessions deals with Collingwood, Oakeshott, Butterfield and Churchill as subverters of
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The attitudes described in Receptions, Recognitions contains accounts of one Victorian (Salisbury), of Evelyn Waugh, of Edward Norman and Enoch Powell, and of a number of other writers who have contributed to Christian, or to religious, thought in the last two decades.

The four-part division represents phases in the author’s opinions. Whitehead and Toynbee describe the main items of furniture that he took to Cambridge with him as an undergraduate in 1943 along with the reactionary spiritual amoralism that he had derived, eclectically, from Belloc, Bergson, Shaw, Wordsworth, Macaulay and Carlyle. Three Anglican Reactionaries describes the polemical Anglicanism that cured him of Whitehead and Toynbee, and dismissed liberalism in general, in a year spent in Cambridge before the three and a half years of military service that were begun at the time of his eighteenth birthday. Eliot describes an influential variant of this type of Anglicanism, and Knowles a Christian doctrine that was important both in a second period as an undergraduate after military service, and in a period as a young don in the early 1950s.

In certain negative respects Knowles provided a Roman Catholic version of the doctrine of Three Anglican Reactionaries: in other respects he acted as a Roman Catholic dissolver. The doctrine was further dissolved in this period by the influences described in Butterfield, Oakeshott, Collingwood and Churchill.

Butterfield had some points of contact with the Anglicanism of Three Anglican Reactionaries and other points of contact with Knowles. But he had a sect-type mind which, though illuminating about power, was residually suspicious of both power and ecclesiasticism, and, despite important negativities, broad Christian sympathies, and a virtual Anglicanism in later life, taught a revitalized Liberalism which gave little explicit encouragement either to Toryism or to the Church of England. Collingwood was as much the liberal embodiment of Oxford Greats as Toynbee had been, and presented, as fluently as Toynbee had done, an amalgamation of politics, history, theology and philosophy which carried with it many of the more questionable assumptions that had characterized Oxford Idealism from the 1870s onwards. Oakeshott had fought his own version of the battles which are described in Three Anglican Reactionaries but, by 1948, had developed a rational political Conservatism which showed little interest in religion and, so far as it did so, was attuned much more to latitudinarian, modernist or liberal Anglicanism than to the Anglicanism of the second half of that chapter. Churchill, whose intellectual importance derived
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from his rôle as a towering public figure, was a pessimist with roots in Darwinism, Science and the rationalistic enlightenment of Gibbon, Lecky and Winwood Reade.

If the author had gone to Cambridge before 1939 or before the 1939 war had got under way, or if he had gone first at any time after 1945, he might have approached adult thinking through teachers who had been pre-war undergraduates. Going there in 1943 was significant for two reasons. First, because many younger dons having left for the war, he had no contact with dons who had been undergraduates in the 1930s. Second, because, that being so, he was blown by the last gust of a reactionary wind which, having been blowing on the intellectual young in the 1920s, had been blown back in the decade following by the progressive, psychoanalytical, para-marxist egalitarianism which had constituted the undergraduate movement of the thirties and which, when emasculated into average wisdom by association with victory over Hitler, was to exercise predominant influence on English public thought until the late 1960s.

Having missed the fashion which was followed by the young in the 1930s, the author has always despised the anti-marxism which succeeded it. Marxism is not so much untrue as, for certain purposes and in limited respects, true and unimportant. The same may be said of Weberianism. Weber was an enemy of religion who concealed his enmity by considering religion as ideology. Religion can certainly be considered as ideology, and also as Freudian illusion, but it is emptied in the process and lost in a brutal reductionism. It is also the case that many of the defences of thought against reductionism that were made in England in the 1950s and 1960s were contaminated by effluent from Continental secularism.

In the dominant English writers of that period and in their successors there have been moralism, social concern and a concern for human freedom. But there has been little irony (except, vulgarly, in Snow), and none of the subtlety that is essential to an intelligent religion. When Williams succeeded Leach in a symbolic stronghold, a crafty enmity


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replaced a naive one. As Thomas, Skinner and Runciman experience middle-age, a cunning religious acerbity is as essential an antidote to them as anything that Bradbury and Sharpe can supply to the imperviousness, solemnity and ultimate triviality of the secular, professional academic intelligence.

For as long as he can remember the author has hated these modes of thinking. He hated them when they were in the ascendant in the 1950s and is no nearer to liking them in the forms that they are taking now. He is more grateful than he can say to the Anglican apologists who enabled him to deduce from the doctrine that they presented in 1943 the conclusion that resentment is a duty.

In 1943, Church–State Anglicanism was presented as political belief and religious observance, and as an instrument of intellectual correction. It also supplied an academic version of the temptation Waugh claimed to have been saved from by Roman Catholicism — the temptation to fall for the Church of England’s mediæval cathedrals and churches, the rich ceremonies that surround the monarchy, the historic titles of Canterbury and York, the social organization of the country parishes, the traditional culture of Oxford and Cambridge and the liturgy composed in the heyday of English prose style.

Since 1953 this has receded. The author has experienced no recession in certainty about Christianity. But there has been a gap between assent and observance. There has been pain, or shame, and a pervasive embarrassment in recollection. There has been a sad sorrow about the condition of the Church of England and there has been a determination to avoid the enthusiasms of the past, including the confusing of

4. For Malcolm Bradbury (1932— ) as secular enemy of the secular academic intelligence, see Eating People is Wrong 1959 and The History Man 1975.
5. For Tom Sharpe (1928— ) in the same rôle, see especially Sir Godber Evans in Porterhouse Blue 1974, and Dr Louth, the Oxford Leaviste, in The Great Pursuit 1977.
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Christianity with the enmities through which it had been approached in the first place.

Why Christianity should not include enmities, how in the modern world it could exist without them, has not been the primary consideration. The primary consideration has been disappointment on discovering that the Christianity which had supplied a stimulus to thought was a polemical flag masking a religious void which no amount of excitement could conceal. Polemical excitement produced two books in the 1960s, Mill and Liberalism and The Nature and Limits of Political Science, which were hangovers from the excitements of the 1940s. As polemical excitement gave way to cynical deflation, it came to be a problem to know what could be said about Christianity in a modern context.

In Inge, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Dostoievsky it seemed that something important had been said. But Dostoievsky wrote out of disorder; Kierkegaard’s Christianity was a call to privacy; Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion absorbed Christianity into philosophy; and Inge, who was a brilliant publicist and had a sensible doctrine about the Church of England, had wrapped it in a mysticism that was as woolly as Toynbee’s. If the two writers who are discussed first in Recognitions seemed more relevant, this was because, though neither was an Anglican and one was not even a Christian, both had found ways of writing without wooliness or embarrassment about the fate of religion in face of modernity; while the challenge which Salisbury had presented to latitudinarianism in the 1860s not only made him a better embodiment than Eliot of what two out of the Three Anglican Reactionaries would have meant if they had understood his significance, but had also produced the most articulate, disillusioned and eloquent delineation of a public doctrine that modern Anglicanism has yet had.

As a child, the author was not really introduced to Anglicanism. His mother went to church occasionally, but she did not go often when he was young and he did not often go with her. His father believed in God but not in organized religion. He believed in education as both social ladder and cultural enrichment. He was also a pessimist and an admirer of Winwood Reade’s book, The Martyrdom of Man. His piety was of a rational, socially uneasy, politically Conservative anti-church type which was very common amongst thoughtful people in the lower-middle-class London suburbs.

At school – a suburban day school which was evacuated from
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London in 1939 – there were daily assemblies and Cadet Corps church parades, but there were no clergy and there was no suggestion that any church was significant. The most significant master claimed to be a mystic, but his mysticism was a romantic mysticism about Nature. The author, too, was a romantic, about Laud and the Stuarts, about rural society, and about the silent devotion with which recusant families had preserved the faith from Waugh’s Camilion onwards. These were fantasies. The only religion he encountered was as an evacuated schoolboy in the home of a Salvation Army mother and spinster daughter and in a bank manager’s house in the middle of Hertford from which he went to the parish church.

Being ready for both reaction and religion, he found them in Cambridge through the process described in chapter 3. During military service, he was an Anglican and considered ordination. On returning to Cambridge, he encountered teachers whom he respected,1 but whose intellectual formation, though in some ways reactionary and at all points contemptuous of academic self-importance, found no room for religion; he also encountered a reactionary atheistic intelligence whose interest in religion was close and satirical and whose contempt for Christianity was limitless.2 On drifting away from ordination, thereafter he made a number of false starts. While friends and contemporaries3 were beginning professional careers, he failed to complete an anti-liberal book about Lord Acton which, much later,


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became an anti-liberal book about John Stuart Mill. Where others spent a post-graduate year in the United States, he went to India, where recollection of service in the Indian Army, archival study of the nineteenth-century Indian Empire and conversation with secularized Indians orchestrated by a highly articulate secularized Jew,1 led to the realization that modernity had impinged on Islam, Hinduism and Judaism as well as on Christianity, and that politics could be understood as an elitist activity in which the elite is autonomous in relation to pressures from below, even when it is fearful for its continued existence. A brief period on the outer fringes of the English polity,2 though insignificant and unsuccessful in itself and over by 1959, drew attention to differences between political society and society at large, and between average opinion and the opinions of the intelligentsia, which sowed the seed of the conceptions of high politics and public doctrine around which books were published from 1963 onwards.

Why these conceptions had not been turned into books a decade earlier is a question about temperament and capability. It is also a question about climate. Many of the ingredients had been present in the education of 1943. But by the time at which books ought to have been published ten years later, the most important of those who had been teachers then had left academic life, and the intellectual climate was as inimical to a Conservative–Christian standpoint as it was to a Marxist one. The Lib–Lab positivism and anti-totalitarian complacency which infected English thinking in the 1950s ought to have provided something to attack. But, since it treated most questions as closed, it was difficult to attack it. Kedourie attacked it on a specialized front.3 MacIntyre4 and Mackinnon5 looked like attackers from a mistaken

2. In the Foreign Office, as a parliamentary candidate, as a leader-writer on The Times and on the staff of the Daily Express after an agreeable holiday month writing leading articles for A. P. Wadsworth on the Manchester Guardian.
3. See below, chapter 10.
5. For Donald Mackinnon (1913– ). Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity at
angle. Gellner’s attack, in *Words and Things* in 1959, in addition to being infected, was confused. Confusion was increased by the fact, which *Recessions* will make clear, that those to whom the author attached importance intellectually in his second period as an undergraduate were also infected.

At this time, therefore, while retaining a sense that something significant would be found in Burke after 1789, Newman before 1845 and Salisbury before 1867, as well as in Mallock between 1877 and 1905, the author lacked support and guidance to give it precision. Lady Gwendolen Cecil’s biography of Salisbury, and Salisbury’s letters as India Secretary in the 1870s, suggested that Salisbury had a central intelligence. But recession from Anglicanism had destroyed one conception of centrality without putting any similar conception in its place, and the dismissal of the politics of principle, which had been acquired in Cambridge (and developed by misunderstanding, of Hegel certainly and probably of Nietzsche as well), had to be transcended by a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between principle and practice before Salisbury or any other central intelligence could be given sympathetic consideration. The Marxism that was adopted by the young in the late 1960s and early 1970s, by opening up the closed minds of the 1950s, or by showing how closed they were, suggested that sympathetic consideration was now a possibility.

In the 1950s, in spite of Trevor-Roper, Taylor, Oakeshott, Butterfield and Namier, English public thought had seemed so uniformly flat that Waugh alone amongst living writers had seemed to have


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features. This was not, however, the tedious Waugh who was writing at the time, but the Waugh whose career had ended with The Loved One in 1948, and whose pinnacles of achievement had been A Handful of Dust, Robbery Under Law and Brideshead Revisited. It was in the 1950s also that Kedourie was encountered, with his hatred of liberalism, and his conviction that English government was conducted in so innocent a fashion that a day of reckoning was unavoidable.

At this time, like Kedourie, the author was knitting without a guillotine and, although he could see that something odious was going on, he could not explain what it was. The attack made in The Nature and Limits of Political Science was not only crudely Oakeshottian: in the emphasis that it placed on the possibility of value-free explanation it was mistaken. Lloyd-Jones, 1 Shackleton Bailey 2 and others demonstrated the possibilities of the short-tempered reactionary sensibility. But they did so in so self-consciously perverse a fashion and with so little expectation of recognition or acclaim for doing so, that their positions seemed almost deliberately eccentric. It was not until the beginning of academic associations which were formed in the late 1960s and 1970s – with Vincent, 3 Jones 4 and Bentley 5 on the one hand with Watkin, 6 Scruton 7 and their collaborators on the other – and through the transformation in the tone of Conservative expression

1. See above, p. xix
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which was effected by Powell, Welch, Utley, Wharton, Norman, Ingram and the younger Waugh that the political aspect of these long-standing resentments seemed to have transcended eccentricity.

The transition from an obsession with religion to an obsession with politics was as common amongst Victorian Liberals as it has been amongst twentieth-century Marxists. The author's transition was not, however, a transition of this kind. He did not claim for political causes the categorical sanctions of religion, and he was at pains to establish that politics is a broken-backed activity which cannot supply religious satisfactions. Throughout the period in which he wrote about politics, he was clear that writing about politics was not a substitute for, but merely a prelude to, writing about religion.

Up to 1953, so far as religion was concerned, the author had in some sense been a participant. On ceasing to be a participant he had become a voyeur who wrote about politics because he did not know what to write about religion and drifted into becoming a professional historian despite an intense conviction, acquired early and never lost, that professional history is an illusion and historical writing an instrument of doctrine, whatever historians may imagine. It is in this spirit that chapter 13 begins by describing the assumptions made in a professional institution, the Cambridge History Faculty, since the author joined it in 1961. It is in this spirit also that Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England will not only emphasize the fragility of the structure by which all professional learning is sustained but will also supplement

1. See below, pp. 432 et seq.
5. See below, pp. 441 et seq.
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its own account of the history of public doctrine with a self-conscious contribution to its development.

Some of the judgments made of individual thinkers in the present volume may seem distorting. Whitehead is not always thought of as a latitudinarian, nor Toynbee as a spoilt Roman Catholic; nor is despondency the best-known characteristic of Salisbury, Churchill, or even Eliot. The emphases that are given to Collingwood's liberalism, to Butterfield's antinomianism and to Oakeshott's rationality, may be thought unusual. So may the emphases on Powell's Anglicanism, Knowles's enmities, the uncertainty of Waugh's Catholicism, the religious character of Kedourie's Conservatism, and the conception of Ullmann as a prophet of modernity.

In this connection three assumptions are important. First, that any thinker who is discussed in his own terms and at length will display, more systematically than it will be possible to do in an historical work, the deep structure of the doctrines that he assumes. Second, that chronological consideration of the full range of a thinker's writings will reveal structures which are concealed by reading single works, or even a number of works, from a standpoint and chronology other than the thinker's own. Third, that to discover structures in the work of a thinker whose writings the author read fragmentarily when young, is to systematize what he absorbed unsystematically in looking for something else, and that the account that he gives of a thinker now, though often different from the account he would have given after a fragmentary reading then, suggests the nature of the impact he experienced, even when the experience was unconscious. This applies to all of these thinkers to some degree. It applies particularly to Whitehead, Toynbee, Collingwood, Butterfield, Oakeshott and Churchill, who were confused with one another and absorbed into a reactionary Conservative Christianity which none of them would have accepted.

In one direction, therefore, the argument is disjunctive; it shows how little these thinkers had in common. But the main argument is synthetic; it is by fusing the development of the author's opinions with the opinions of these thinkers severally that the damage suffered by Christian images and aspirations and the pervasive character of the conflict between Christianity and its enemies, is perceived as the problem which the main work will pursue historically through all its ramifications in the life of modern England.

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February 1980