To survive, all forms of government require popular support, whether voluntary or involuntary. Following the collapse of the Soviet system, Russia’s rulers took steps toward democracy, yet under Vladimir Putin Russia has become increasingly undemocratic. This book uses a unique source of evidence, eighteen surveys of Russian public opinion from the first month of the new regime in 1992 up to 2009, to track the changing views of Russians. Clearly presented and sophisticated figures and tables show how political support has increased because of a sense of resignation that is even stronger than the uncertain economic reliance on exporting oil and gas. Russia is not only an outstanding example of popular support increasing for a government that rejects democracy, but is also representative of a surprising number of regimes around the world that have been able to mobilize popular support for undemocratic regimes.

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Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime

The Changing Views of Russians

Richard Rose, William Mishler and Neil Munro
Contents

List of figures vi
List of tables vii

Introduction: The need for popular support 1
1 Democratic and undemocratic models of support 11
2 Changing the supply of regimes 27
3 Putin consolidates a new regime 45
4 Increasing support for an undemocratic regime 64
5 Individual influences on regime support 84
6 Time tells: there is no alternative 104
7 Finessing the challenge of succession 124
8 The challenge of economic reversal 142
9 Maintaining a regime – democratic or otherwise 156

Appendix A: New Russia Barometer samples 177
Appendix B: Coding of variables 183

References 186
Index 204
### Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Models of political support</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Democracy endorsed in both undemocratic and democratic countries</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Support for democratic and undemocratic regimes</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Consequences of perestroika evaluated</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>New constitution gets pessimistic support</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Decline of confidence in President Yeltsin</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Oil price boom during Putin’s presidency</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Impact of the Putin administration</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Russians puzzled about what’s left, right</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Nationwide recognition of United Russia’s dominance</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Subjects support United Russia</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>What post-Communist citizens associate with democracy</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Gap between democratic demand and elite supply</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Popular support for post-Communist regimes</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>The kind of democracy that Russia needs</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Trends in support for Russia’s regime</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Wide dispersion in support for the regime</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Generations’ support goes up and down together</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Russians adapting to transformation</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Economic change and evaluations of the economy</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Expectation of suspension of the parliament</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Differential impact of time and economy, 1992–2009</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Dynamics of political influences, 1992–2009</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Gap in approval of Putin and of government</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Choices facing Putin: the public’s view</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Popular economic anxieties, 2009</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Compliance now prime response to regime change</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>The life space of Russians</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Oil price volatility, 2007–2010</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>Resilience of Russia’s currency reserve, 2002–2010</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables

3.1 Hurdles to getting on the Duma ballot  page 57
4.1 What matters for regime support: four hypotheses  81
5.1 Limited influence of socialization on regime support  88
5.2 Political influences on regime support  92
5.3 Economic influences on regime support  98
5.4 Combining influences on regime support  101
6.1 Adding expectations to a model of regime support  114
6.2 Contextual influences on regime support, 1992–2009  115
6.3 Taking time into account: an HLM analysis  118
7.1 Evaluation of fairness of elections  136
7.2 Influences on perceived election unfairness  137
7.3 Effect of unfairness on regime support  140
8.1 Ups and downs in Russian economy after crises  144
8.2 Economic crisis and regime support  152
8.3 Influences on economic evaluations  154
9.1 Testing the effect of regime support  173
9.2 Political support and preventing coups  174
9.3 Political support and economic growth  175