Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be “intellectualist” in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until fairly recently, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains why Socrates believed that emotions, desires, and appetites can influence human motivation and lead to error. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith defend the study of Socrates’ philosophy and offer a new interpretation of Socratic moral psychology. Their novel account of Socrates’ conception of virtue and how it is acquired shows that Socratic moral psychology is considerably more sophisticated than scholars have supposed.

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SOCRATIC MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Many of those who are the targets of our sharpest and most sustained criticism in this book, especially Mark McPherran and Terry Penner, are not only personal friends, but also scholars for whom we have the utmost respect and whose work we read with the greatest interest and enthusiasm. Anyone who has actually engaged in the practices of philosophy or scholarship knows very well that the ones from whom we learn most are usually those with whom we can argue amiably and at length, and who express the clearest and most compelling versions of views with which we do not agree. The galvanizing effects of Daniel Devereux’s work on us is evident everywhere in this book. In recent years, a growing number of scholars have joined Devereux and us in rejecting the standard account of Socratic intellectualism, in favor of various views that recognize explanatory roles for the appetites and passions. Among these, Jessica Moss and Rachel Singpurwalla have now made several significant contributions, whose details we will occasionally contrast herein to our own non-standard account. We owe much to all of those whose views we criticize, for their scholarly contributions have not only provided instruction, but have also given us, the authors, reason to debate between ourselves and, in the end, to settle on our own positions.

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