Democratic Deficit

Critical Citizens Revisited

Many fear that democracies are suffering from a legitimacy crisis. This book focuses on ‘democratic deficits,’ reflecting how far the perceived democratic performance of any state diverges from public expectations. Pippa Norris examines the symptoms by comparing system support in more than fifty societies worldwide, challenging the pervasive claim that most established democracies have experienced a steadily rising tide of political disaffection during the third wave era of democratization since the early 1970s. The book diagnoses the reasons behind the democratic deficit, including demand (rising public aspirations for democracy), information (negative news about government), and supply (the performance and structure of democratic regimes). Finally, Norris examines the consequences for active citizenship, for governance, and ultimately, for democratization.

This book provides fresh insights into major issues at the heart of comparative politics, public opinion, political culture, political behavior, democratic governance, political psychology, political communications, public policymaking, comparative sociology, cross-national survey analysis, and the dynamics of the democratization process.

Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Her work analyzes comparative democratization, elections and public opinion, gender politics, and political communications. Recent companion volumes by this award-winning author, also published by Cambridge University Press, include Sacred and Secular (2004, with Ronald Inglehart), Driving Democracy (2008), and Cosmopolitan Communications (2009, with Ronald Inglehart).
Also from Cambridge University Press by the Author


*A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies.* Pippa Norris (2000) (Awarded the 2006 Doris Graber award by APSA’s political communications section)


*Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World.* Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2009)
Democratic Deficit

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This study builds on a previous edited book, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, published by Oxford University Press in 1999. Many of the core ideas that are developed, updated, and expanded in this book first arose a decade ago with the earlier volume, and I remain indebted to all the original contributors, not least to Joseph Nye and the Visions of Governance project. Some preliminary ideas from this study were also first presented as conference papers, generating useful feedback from discussants and colleagues at various professional meetings, including the IPSA general conference in Santiago, Chile, in June 2009; the research seminar at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung, Berlin, in September 2009; the ECPR General Conference plenary roundtable in Potsdam, September 2009; the American Political Science Association (APSA) Taskforce on Democratic Indicators at the University of California, Berkeley, in October 2009; a visiting talk at the University of Sydney in January 2010; the University of Connecticut Democracy and Democratization conference in February 2010; and the APSA annual meeting in Washington, DC, in August 2010, as well as the faculty seminar at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

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