Published in 1797, the *Doctrine of Right* is Kant’s most significant contribution to legal and political philosophy. As the first part of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, it deals with the legal rights that persons have or can acquire, and aims at providing the grounding for lasting international peace through the idea of the juridical state (*Rechtsstaat*).

This commentary analyzes Kant’s system of individual rights, starting from the original innate right to external freedom, and ending with the right to own property and to have contractual and family claims. Clear and to the point, it guides readers through the most difficult passages of the *Doctrine*, explaining Kant’s terminology, method and ideas in the light of his intellectual environment. One of the very few commentaries on the *Doctrine of Right* available in English, this book will be essential for anyone with a strong interest in Kant’s moral and political philosophy.

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Kant’s

Doctrine of Right

A Commentary

B. SHARON BYRD AND
JOACHIM HRUSCHKA
To the memory of
Mary Gregor
1928–1994
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