Introduction

How should we educate for peace? In asking that question, I do not mean to confine the discussion to work done in our schools. We are educated more broadly by the culture and subcultures in which we live. Many cultures, perhaps most of those in highly developed nations, are overtly or subtly militaristic. Their histories are organized around wars, and the virtues highly admired are often explicitly or derivatively those of the warrior. Forces in the larger culture make it difficult for schools to pursue the aim of educating for peace.

This book is an attempt to identify and deliberate on topics that should be addressed if we are serious about educating for peace. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the book is about educating for peace *and* for war – that is, it is a discussion of what citizens should know about war and peace. The hope is that such an education will encourage more people to oppose war but, even if that does not happen, debate on the topic should be better informed.

When I started this project, I planned to give considerable space to the meaning of peace and what it means to live in peace. To my increasing astonishment, I found hundreds of books on the topic. Any appreciative reader would have to conclude that we know what it means to live in peace or, at least, that we have been generously informed on the topic again and again. Why then do we so often choose to go enthusiastically to war? That question became the center of my exploration. I do not spend much time on topics already discussed in our schools – for example, conflict resolution, cross-cultural understanding, and global citizenship – although all of these should be more widely studied.[1] Nor do I give much attention to the role of big business and other selfish interests. If people were less easily

manipulated, even these powers would be less effective in maintaining a culture of war. The book's special contribution, I think, is its frank treatment of topics often neglected or treated with nationalistic bias: masculinity, patriotism, hatred, religion's frequent support of war, women's opposition to war, and war as an arena for the discovery of existential meaning. What follows is a brief introduction to each chapter. Its main purpose is to establish the book's structure and to reveal how each topic leads logically to the next.

In Chapter 1, I discuss the centrality of war in history. Despite the efforts of individuals and organizations devoted to peace, little has been done to change the culture that supports war. Students in today's schools may hear occasionally about peace movements, and they may be aware that a handful of heroic peace advocates have risked their public reputations and positions to protest against war. But the usual treatment of history and civics in our schools puts emphasis on the political and economic causes of war, its conduct, and its political effects. In some American history textbooks, the word *peace* does not even appear in the index, and the units may be organized along chronological lines from one war to the next.

In the last two decades, hope has arisen that the world's nations have reached the end of this horrific history, but that hope may be premature, and even if we have reached a point at which people reject war between nations, civil wars and other forms of organized violence continue to threaten our peace.

Chapter 2 concentrates on the destruction caused by war. Instead of presenting the cold facts about casualties, money spent, buildings destroyed, ideals upheld, and medals presented, perhaps we should spend more time telling the stories of lives disrupted, bodies mangled, nature trampled, and moral identities shattered. This last – the loss of moral identity – will be an important theme in the chapter and throughout the book. Relevant stories are widely available, but they are rarely included in the school curriculum, and when they are read, the focus is rarely on this theme. For example, most students read parts or all of the *Iliad*. That great poem tells of the destruction of bodies in gory detail, and it portrays the loss of moral identity in Achilles as he goes berserk on the field of battle, but too often teachers concentrate on the names of characters and Homer's poetic devices. Rarely are students asked to read Simone Weil's essay

"The Iliad, Poem of Might" as a vivid, horrified comment on the loss of moral control in the *Iliad*.[2]

I am certainly not the first to advocate the study of art and literature as part of peace education, and as we examine tales of destruction in Chapter 2, I will acknowledge that these efforts, from Virginia Woolf to Susan Sontag, have had little effect. Indeed, many people enjoy stories of destruction, and some even enjoy participating in the actual destruction and violence of war. J. G. Gray notes three attractions of war: "the delight of seeing [war as spectacle], the delight in comradeship, the delight in destruction."[3] This topic leads naturally to the next.

In Chapter 3, we look at what might be called the *cult of masculinity* and the warrior. What supports war? School studies emphasize the competition for resources, hatred born of cultural misunderstanding, and the struggle for power, and today's schools should be praised for introducing powerful work on multicultural understanding and conflict resolution. However, I will argue that it is also necessary to examine human nature from evolutionary and psychological perspectives. Are males violent by nature? If, as many evolutionists believe today, males have indeed inherited an evolutionary tendency to violence, why do our patterns of socialization aggravate the tendency by promoting a model of masculinity that makes the willingness and ability to fight virtues? Can this pattern of socialization be changed?

Closely related to the evolutionary tendency to male violence is the equally powerful tendency for altruism to occur along bloodlines. Humans are naturally constituted to protect those genetically related to them. Moral philosophers have often ignored this fact about human nature, supposing that clear reasoning about moral problems will allow us to make universal judgments about right and wrong. Without declaring that standing with one's own – whether they be right or wrong – is a moral principle to be followed, I will argue that any moral system that ignores our natural tendencies is likely to be ineffective in guiding moral life. None of this talk of evolutionary legacies, human nature, or natural tendencies should be taken to mean that *all* males are violent or that altruism never occurs between strangers. The obvious fact that exceptions occur fairly often should lead us to explore how we might overcome the tendencies to which we object and make the exceptions the norm.

Cultural views of masculinity have produced and sustained admiration for the warrior, and virtue ethics is heavily influenced by a long tradition of starting the discussion of virtues by describing the virtues of warriors. Some of our best-loved stories center on the exploits of warriors and the heroism and tragedy induced by war. There is a vast literature on the topic, some extolling and some condemning war. William James identified the virtues of the warrior explicitly with masculinity (or manliness) and asked whether war might be "our only bulwark against effeminacy."[4] As a confessed pacifist, he rejected this idea and sought a moral equivalent of war, but unfortunately, he inadvertently supported war by defending the notion of masculinity.

Chapter 4 looks at patriotism. Education for patriotism elevates the inclination to defend our own to the national level and to encourage admiration for the warrior. Even those who find the ethics of care too parochial in locating the origins of moral life in the maternal relation often ignore that evaluation when the discussion moves to the national level and patriotism. National self-interest is publicly and proudly defended. Indeed, hardly anyone is held in greater contempt than one who betrays his or her country for whatever reason. Even when no betrayal is involved, a declaration of world citizenship can lead to bitter disapproval, even condemnation. To overcome this, some educators and philosophers recommend educating for cosmopolitanism. How likely is it that people can be educated to think of themselves as citizens of the world first, Americans second? Can we endorse such a notion?

How does patriotism support war, and can it be redefined to sustain love of country and yet reduce its identification with the military and war? We'll consider several possibilities, including the idea of a moderated or chastened patriotism,[5] but we have to recognize the power of nationalistic patriotism and how it is exalted in story, ritual, song, prayer, poetry, and memory.

Chapter 5 examines hatred. Patriotism does not always in itself provide sufficient motivation to induce people to fight. Historically, hatred (or at least contempt) for the declared enemy has often been deliberately aroused in both military and civilian populations. It is perhaps natural for human beings to try to forget the dreadful slogans and hateful comments their country used so powerfully in past wars. I think, however, that we should remember these shameful reactions and inform our children honestly about them. Memories

of past hatreds – even those long put away – should help to immunize us against future attempts to arouse hatred and contempt for possible enemies.

But not all hatreds are induced by war. Sometimes long-standing hatreds smolder and encourage war, and we need to ask what supports these hatreds and keeps them alive.

Perhaps the most difficult topic related to the psychological support of war is the role of religion in sustaining it. In Chapter 6, I make an attempt to do this. Religious institutions have not been entirely innocent of encouraging hate and war. Although the major religions often claim that they are religions of peace, history does not bear out their claims. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism all have bloody histories. Hinduism and Buddhism, too, have supported violence. From the time of Augustine, Christianity has recognized that its survival depends on, or is at least closely connected to, the well-being of the states in which it operates. Church and state have cooperated by means of elaborate rituals to maintain religiously endorsed patriotism. Today's Western democracies can generously tolerate dissent, even antiwar sentiment, by small sects, but how would they react if one of the larger Christian groups condemned their military activities? Even relatively small groups of pacifists among the larger denominations have experienced strong opposition, sometimes verging on persecution. Genuine education should include an appreciative and critical examination of the role played by religion in both advocating peace and supporting war.

Chapter 7 addresses pacifism. There is a surprisingly large literature on pacifism and peacemaking. However, little of it appears in the curriculum of our public schools. As thought on pacifism has developed, there has been a shift from absolute pacifism to modified versions such as contingent pacifism, pragmatic pacifism, relative pacifism, or conditional pacifism. What pushes peace lovers away from absolute pacifism toward one of its modifications? Are the modifications worthy of the name, or should we simply drop the word *pacifism*?

Chapter 8 considers the role of women in rejecting or supporting war. I offer a brief overview of peace movements led or strongly supported by women. Special attention is given to the contrasting styles of Virginia Woolf and Jane Addams in rejecting war. We can learn a great deal from both of them. Of the two, Woolf may have had a clearer notion of the psychological factors that encourage war.

Chapter 9 explores the connection between war and existential meaning. Both opponents and proponents of war see it tied up with questions of existential meaning. Some have claimed that war brings out the best in a nation's people: solidarity, willingness to sacrifice, courage in battle or hardship, even greater personal meaning. Others have argued that it brings out the worst in us: cruelty, hatred, a perverted pleasure in destruction, brutish behavior, and a reprehensible disregard for the property and lives of enemies.

Paul Tillich has said that we live in an age characterized by an anxiety of meaninglessness.[6] The search for meaning, conscious or unconscious, has been aggravated by the debates over the freedom of consciousness that arose in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To what degree are we free to choose our attitudes and inner commitments, and to what degree are we shaped by our environment? These are questions to which schools give too little attention, and it is not surprising that we produce citizens who are confused and easily manipulated.

On the positive side, both women and men are beginning to think more seriously about home and place as centers of existential meaning. What does it mean to make a home? What does it mean to look at one's country as a home-place and not an ideology? What does it mean to be homeless? I discuss at some length the centrality of love and care for our homes, backyards, and neighborhoods. If, as Gaston Bachelard wrote, "the house shelters daydreaming, the house protects the dreamer," must it not be a center of existential meaning?[7] Why do we not give more attention to the matters of everyday life that might help us to construct existential meaning?

Finally, in Chapter 10, I explore how far we might go in schools to educate students on the psychology of war and peace. There are powerful forces working against such a program. Drawing on recent work on critical history and the power of memory, I suggest that we must be careful to examine both the factual side of history and the affective side of human memories. We must create a climate in which dramatically different views are discussed with respect and sympathy. Critical history – the facts as nearly as we can establish them – can be used to gently reshape memory, but memory cannot be obliterated, nor should it be scorned.

A program designed to promote understanding of human attitudes toward war and peace requires conscientious preparation of

the field of discussion. We Americans pride ourselves on our freedom to speak, to say what we believe. But of what use is it to speak if only those who already agree with us listen? A first step toward the abolition of war is learning to listen with respect and sympathy. Can we create a climate in which teachers are both free and competent to construct and implement such a program?

1

The Centrality of War in History

There can be no doubt about the centrality of war in the history of nations. History has very nearly been equated with accounts of war. Indeed, Francis Fukuyama claimed that, with the widespread embrace of liberal democracy, war between nations has become unlikely and, with no more war, history itself would end.[1] Although minor wars and civil skirmishes will continue, the existential threat to democracy has ended. The response to this pronouncement has been varied – many denying that war has become obsolete – but the centrality of war in history has not been challenged. Samuel Huntington has warned that the next wars will be "clashes of civilizations" and their defining religions, not the traditional wars between politically defined nations.[2] And Robert Kagan has described a frightening resurgence of national interests and military competition – a "return of history."[3] For those of us who would like to define future history in terms of *peace*, these are not encouraging signs.

One might challenge Fukuyama's thesis in several ways. Huntington's clash of civilizations is a possibility. Kagan's resurgence of military nationalism is another. But the degeneration of one or more democracies is still another possibility. Liberal democracies are not always stable; we can't count on the proliferation of such democracies to guarantee the end of war. It does seem right to claim that older democracies are likely to be more stable, but this is almost a tautology.[4] And perhaps many contemporary democracies contain seeds of discontent comparable to those that made Germany susceptible to Nazism. But, of course, it was *war* – World War I and the oppressive peace that followed it – that tipped the balance and opened the political door to Hitler. War begets war. With all the explanations,

it is still baffling and chilling to think how a nation so advanced in literature, philosophy, art, music, religious thought, and industry could accept National Socialism. But it is clear that fledgling democracies can be derailed by tragic occurrences.

Even well-established democracies can be badly shaken by violence, especially the organized violence of war. War undermines democracy, and a weakened democracy makes further war more likely. In the United States, for example, war has often threatened democratic processes. In the Civil War, habeas corpus was frequently denied, federal forces occupied telegraph offices, and they were frequently called upon to restore civil order. The murder of blacks in the South often went unpunished, and draft riots disrupted the North. In World War I, the Espionage and Sedition Acts prescribed punishment for speech that was disloyal to the government or against the war. There was widespread abuse of German American citizens, and some orchestras even refused to play the music of Brahms, Beethoven, and Mozart. Internment of Japanese Americans in World War II was a shocking violation of civil rights, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki raised serious questions about the possibility of waging war according to principles that forbid deliberate attack on civilians. In the cold war, loyalty tests and oaths were widely applied; the McCarran Act, making it a crime to promote dictatorial forms of government, was passed over President Harry Truman's veto, and McCarthyism caused havoc in the entertainment industry. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, the government used illegal wiretaps and highly questionable methods of retaining and interrogating prisoners. So far, our democracy has held up. It is hard to say, however, what might happen in this well-established liberal democracy if terrorist attacks were to become more frequent and widespread.

There is another reason to doubt the end of war. It does seem true that stable democracies will not wage war against one another, but they frequently find reasons – justified or unjustified – to attack others. Although nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945, it hardly seems right to say that the conduct of war by the democracies has been restrained. Robert O'Connell, for example, writes that the United States exhibited "halfhearted belligerency" in Korea and Vietnam:

> In both Korea and Vietnam the United States' unwillingness to apply sufficient force to achieve victory can be traced to concerns

> about provoking general war.... So the urge to be perceived as prudent and always allowing our adversaries acceptable alternatives to all-out war came to outweigh the pursuit of victory.[5]

The "restraint" exercised by the United States in Korea and Vietnam nevertheless culminated in 5 million deaths. The claim made by O'Connell and others that war has become obsolete does not seem justified.[6] Indeed, one might argue – with considerable evidence to back the contention – that the liberal democracies have found more and more effective ways to reduce their own military casualties at the expense of civilian populations in the areas of military action.

The centrality of war is underscored by a consideration of who figures in our historical accounts. In the United States, presidents who fought in or presided over wars tower over all others, and nations successful in conquest and empire building dominate world history. Clark Wissler comments on the lack of celebrated heroes among the Pueblo Indians:

> Wars seem necessary to reveal such greatness. Had the Pueblos terrorized the settlements, massacred women and children, left a trail of blood and destruction behind them, they would hold a high place in history, as we know it.[7]

Much recent work has concentrated on the origin and causes of war, and attention has been drawn to the role of agriculture and settled communities in giving birth to both nations and war. Protection of property, the drawing of boundaries, and the establishment of forts and military bases are all related. On these accounts, war – like agriculture – is a relatively recent phenomenon. But, beyond armed conflict between nations, war may be defined as organized violence, and violence has always been part of human life. If the inclination to violence is somehow built into humans, then it makes sense to look for origins in our evolutionary ancestors.[8] Understanding that biological legacy may help us to create educational theories and practices to counteract it. Ignoring it will perpetuate attempts to find the political and economic causes of war – and these efforts are certainly worthwhile – but they will not explain why war has been *central*, so widely embraced, in human history.

Both philosophy and religion have supported war. In classical philosophy, the dominant view was that war is a part of nature and, moreover, it is the engine of a state's or nation's success. This view