The symbiosis between democracy and war: the case of ancient Athens

DAVID M. PRITCHARD

Introduction

This edited collection significantly advances our understanding of the two-way relationship of causation between democracy and war in world history. In particular it explores the almost entirely neglected question of the impact of the democracy of the classical Athenians on their waging of war. Today ancient Athens is not widely known for its intensification and transformation of war-making among the Greeks. It is famous instead for what is arguably the most fully developed democracy of pre-modern times and for its innovative culture, which helped to lay the foundations for the arts, literature and sciences of the ancient and modern worlds. In 508/7 BC the Athenian dēmos (‘people’) rose up against a leader who was once again aiming for tyranny, expelled him and the foreign troops backing his attempt, and arrested and executed his upper-class supporters (Ath. pol. 20.1–21.2; Hdt. 5.65.5–74.1).\(^1\) They could no longer tolerate the internecine struggles of the elite and demanded an active role in the decision-making

of the city. This was quickly realised by the reforms of Cleisthenes, which made the assembly and a new popular council of five hundred members the final arbiters of public actions and laws. By the early 450s the people had consolidated their new dēmokratia (‘democracy’) by making decisions on an increasing range of public affairs and by taking over entirely the administration of justice and the oversight of magistrates (e.g. Ath. pol. 25.1–26.2; Plut. Cim. 15.1–2). Admittedly Athenian leaders were still members of the upper class, struggling for preeminence with each other. Now, however, their rivalries were played out in agōnes or political debates, with the final decision to support this or that politician resting with predominantly non-elite assembly goers and councillors. To win over such notoriously boisterous and censorious audiences, politicians were forced to negotiate and articulate the self-perceptions, norms and perceived interests of lower-class Athenians. Out of this dynamic of mass adjudicators and elite performers in competition with each other emerged a strong popular culture, which supported the liberty and political capability of every citizen, the rule of law and the open debating of policies and ideas.

We now know that several other Greek poleis (‘city-states’) experimented with popular government in the course of the sixth century.
Thus the invention of democracy can no longer be attributed to Athens. However, in contrast to the other democracies of the Greek world the Athenian example avoided the *stasis*, or civil strife, which destroyed so many others and, with the exception of short periods of oligarchy in 411 and 404, enjoyed two centuries of continuous operation. In addition the Athenian democracy handled a significantly larger amount of public business, while its strong budgetary position meant it could spend around 100 talents per annum on pay for assembly goers, councillors, jurors and magistrates, which allowed a wider social spectrum of citizens to be politically active. As a consequence the ideological and practical development of the Athenian democracy was very much fuller than any other of pre-modern times. Indeed no subsequent democracy has ever enjoyed the same extraordinary levels of engagement and participation among its citizens. For example, the frequent assembly-meetings of classical Athens were attended by several thousand, while in the fourth century two-thirds of the city’s 30,000 citizens willingly served for one or two years on the Council of Five Hundred. Not without reason Athens has been an inspiration for modern democrats since the nineteenth century.

But its invention can still be attributed to the Greeks, for while there have long been attempts to push democracy back to the Levant and Mesopotamia (e.g. Isakhan 2007; Jacobsen 1943; 1957; Keane 1995: 101–26), they founder for want of evidence for the broad membership and political preeminence of the assemblies in these early city-state cultures (e.g. Barjamovic 2004; Cartledge 2009: 55–6; Robinson 1997: 16–25).

For the other democracies of classical Greece, see O’Neil 1995. For the ubiquity of violent regime-change as a result of civil strife and foreign intervention, see Hansen 2006a: 125–6; and especially Gehrke 1985.

For studies of political participation in classical Athens, see, for example, Phillips 1981; Sinclair 1988. Hansen costs the democracy’s honorary decrees and its payment of assembly goers, councillors and jurors at 92 to 112 talents per year in the 330s (1991: 98, 150, 189, 241, 254–5, 315–16). There had been pay for the city magistrates in the later fifth century until the oligarchic regime of 411 stopped this practice (e.g. *Ath. pol.* 29.5; [Xen.] *Ath. pol.* 1.13; Thuc. 8.56.3, 8.67.3). Since the surviving sources from the late fifth century onwards do not mention the restoration of pay for magistrates, Hansen plausibly concludes that they did not receive a *misthos* in the 330s (e.g. Hansen 1991: 240–1; contra Gabrielsen 1981). A century earlier Athens may not have provided pay for assembly goers, which was introduced only around 400 (Loomis 1998: 20–2), but this was offset by the sizeable salary bill for magistrates, whose number had grown enormously to meet the administrative tasks of the empire. At this time there were probably 700 magistrates at home and the same number again working overseas (*Ath. pol.* 24.3 with Hansen 1980 and Meiggs 1972: 215). Therefore around 430 the running costs of the democracy were probably not significantly lower than what they would be a century later (Kallet 1998: 46).

For participation in the assembly and its near-weekly meetings, see Hansen 1991: 124–36. For participation in the council and the volunteering of individual citizens to be candidates in the sortition of councillors from their deme, see Lys. 31.5, 33; Hansen 1991: 247–8; Pritchard 2004a: 210 n. 9; Rhodes and Osborne 2003: xvii.
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century. George Grote and other leading liberals of Victorian England assiduously employed this example of a prosperous and stable democracy to build political support for extending the right to vote. Athens today is celebrated as the ancient predecessor of our democracies and its participatory politics increasingly studied for new ways to address current political challenges.

Classical Athens was also the leading cultural centre of the Greek world. The disciplines of the visual arts, oratory, drama and literature were developed to a far higher level of quality in this city than any other, with many of the works produced there becoming canonical for Graeco-Roman antiquity. Admittedly these innovations were dependent on the extraordinary wealth of classical Athens and its upper class and the ability of both to spend significant sums on festival-based agônes or contests and publicly displayed art. Between 430 and 350 khôrêgoi (‘chorus-sponsors’) and the city’s magistrates, for example, spent a total of 29 talents on each celebration of the City Dionysia, while public and private spending on the full programme of polis-based festivals probably added up to 100 talents per year. But ever since Johann Winckelmann – the eighteenth-century founder of Classical Archaeology – this so-called cultural revolution has been interpreted primarily as the product of Athenian democracy. Certainly the new requirement for elite poets, politicians and litigants to compete for the favour of mass audiences drove rapid innovations in oratory and drama. For example, the celebrated plays of Athens were performed in front of thousands of citizens at festival-based contests. While the eponymous archon selected and paid the poets, the training and the costuming of the performers were the responsibility of chorus sponsors (e.g. Ath. pol. 56.3). These elite citizens had a great deal riding on the performance of their choruses.

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16 For these cost-estimates of the City Dionysia and the festival programme, see Wilson 2008 and Pritchard 2011 respectively.
18 For the impact of this performance dynamic on oratorical practice in fifth-century Athens, see Yunis 1998, especially 228–32. Yunis writes (231): ‘Where so much daily depended on competitive speecmaking before mass audiences of average, anonymous citizens; … and where, finally, politicians and litigants had such enormous incentive to find the best way of putting their case and the need for efficient public communication was becoming distressingly obvious – here the conditions that would favor the development of rhetoric were all in place. ‘This was a new situation.’
Victory translated into political influence and support, while the generous financing of choruses could be canvassed during legal trials to help win over lower-class jurors. For the sake of their careers poets too wanted to be victorious (e.g. Ar. Vesp. 1043–50). Although the judging of choral contests was formally in the hands of randomly selected judges, they were guided by the vocal and physically active responses of the largely lower-class theatre goers (e.g. Ar. Av. 444–7; Ran. 771–80; Pl. Leg. 659a–c, 700a–1b). Since the regular attendance of ordinary citizens at dramatic and choral agônes continually enhanced their appreciation of the different forms of performance, sponsors and poets found a competitive advantage by pushing the boundaries of the genre, whether it be tragedy, comedy, satyric drama or dithyramb.

This common dynamic of mass adjudicators and elite performers in competition did not constrain Athenian historians, philosophers and treatise-writers of the later fifth and fourth centuries, who wrote only for upper-class readers. Therefore they were free to express anti-democratic biases and elite preoccupations. However, we now have a better understanding of how their works were critical responses to the democracy, shared some of its ideological assumptions and were facilitated in part by its championing of personal liberty and open debate. Finally the visual arts of classical Athens greatly influenced the artists and architects of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while echoes of its surviving literature continue to resound in our own cultures today.

Certainly never praised and not widely known is the contemporaneous military revolution. During the fifth century Athens ‘widened, amplified, and intensified’ the waging of war, regularly attacked other democracies and was ‘a constant source of death and destruction’ among the Greeks. More than any other polis this city invented or perfected new forms of combat, strategy and military organisation and was directly responsible for raising

21 For the political advantages, see, for example, Plut. Nic. 3.1–3. For so-called festival liturgies as a plus in legal proceedings, see, for example, Lys. 3.46, 12.38, 18.23, 20.31, 21.1–6, 25.12–13, 30.1.
23 Revermann 2006, especially 113–15. For the competition-driven innovations of each of these four genres, see Burian 1997: 206; Bremer 1993: 160–5; Seaford 1984: 44; Zimmermann 1996: 53–4 respectively.
27 Eyres 2006.
the scale and destructiveness of Greek warfare to a different order of magnitude. In so doing the Athenian dēmos overcame popular prejudices which elsewhere tended to stifle military innovations. By the time its dēmokratia was consolidated Athens was the dominant military power in the eastern Mediterranean and had long moved large forces over hundreds of kilometres for campaigns which lasted months or, in the case of sieges, up to a few years.29 War now dominated the politics of the city and the lives of thousands of upper- and lower-class citizens. Foreign policy was the mainstay of political debate, with war and peace being a compulsory item on the agenda of the kuria ekklesia or main assembly-meeting of each prytany (Ath. pol. 43.4; Ar. Ach. 19–27).30 Fifth-century Athenians waged war more frequently than ever before: they launched one or more campaigns in two out of three years on average and never enjoyed peace for more than a decade.31 They also directed more public money to war than to all other polis-activities combined, spending, for example, between 500 and 2,000 talents per year on their armed forces during the Peloponnesian War.32 By the 450s military service was also perceived as the duty of every citizen, which the Athenian dēmos appears to have taken very seriously.33 They passed laws stripping political rights from those found guilty of draft-dodging or desertion (e.g. Ar. Eq. 443; Vesp. 1117–21; Ps.-Xen. Ath. pol. 3.5), conscripted whole swathes of the citizen-body, on several occasions, to man the ships (e.g. Thuc. 3.16.1, 17.1–3; 7.16.1; Xen. Hell. 2.6.24–5) or march against a neighbouring city (e.g. Thuc. 2.31.1–3; 4.90.1, 94.1–2) and continued to accept the high numbers of citizens which were regularly killed in action.34 For example, in 460/59 one of the city’s ten tribal subdivisions lost 177 members in battles by land and sea in mainland Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Phoenicia (IG I3 1147; cf. 1147bis). Even more extraordinary is the impact of the Peloponnesian War and the plague during its early years on Athenian demography: in 431 there were most probably 60,000 citizens living in Attica, but, after twenty-five years of war, only 25,000 adult citizens were left.35

This chapter analyses this military revolution of fifth-century Athens and evaluates what contributions this edited collection makes to our

32 Pritchard 2011.
34 For these laws, see Balot 2004a: 419; Hamel 1998a; Pritchard 1999a: 84–6. For the conscription of large numbers of citizens, including the lowest of the four Solonian telē, in such military emergencies, see Gabrielsen 2002a: 206–8.
understanding of the symbiosis between democracy and war in world history. It divides into eight sections. Section 1 studies the character of Athenian war-making in the century before the democracy to set benchmarks against which the military changes of the fifth century can be measured. Section 2 canvasses the post-508/7 increases in the scale and frequency of Athens’ campaigns and the participation-rate of its citizens as soldiers. In addition this section clarifies what was innovative about the numerous military reforms of fifth-century Athens and identifies as two major causes of its military revolution the large public income from the Athenian Empire and the demographic advantage which the city had over its rivals. Section 3 explains that although there is a prima facie case that democracy is the third major cause of this revolution in military affairs, disciplinary and cultural factors have discouraged sustained analysis of democracy's impact on war.

The next two sections of this chapter make clear how the collection as a whole suggests that the democracy of classical Athens affected its war-making in a pair of divergent ways. Section 4 details how the dynamic of mass adjudicators and elite performers in competition led to a pronounced militarism, which encouraged lower-class Athenians to be soldiers in larger numbers and to start wars much more frequently. But section 5 explains how the foreign-policy risks of this pro-war culture were reduced by the open debating of proposals for war, which also facilitated military innovations and efficiency and helped to develop the initiative of the Athenians on the battlefield. Section 6 employs the military record of fourth-century Athens to determine the importance of democracy relative to the two other major causes of the previous century’s revolution in military affairs. Section 7 acknowledges the limits of this volume’s treatment of the impact of military affairs on Athenian democratisation and, in light of the collapse of our long-standing understanding of this relationship, proposes new directions for research into the causes of democracy’s emergence and consolidation in ancient Athens. Section 8, finally, canvasses the value of ancient Athens as a case study for political scientists and policymakers. In particular it spells out how explanations of Athenian foreign policy can help to identify underlying assumptions about contemporary democracy and the waging of war and suggest new ways for thinking about their interaction.

1. Athenian war-making before the democracy

The intense and innovative warfare of fifth-century Athens represented a qualitative change from the city’s past military record. The traditional
oration which was delivered at the public funeral for the fallen soldiers of the classical period made out that the Athenians had waged war with the same intensity and modus operandi from the age of the heroes to the present.36 In reality nothing could have been further from the truth: before the late-sixth-century reforms of Cleisthenes, Athens did not have a publicly controlled army or any institutional means for mobilising soldiers, while the small numbers of Athenians who bothered to march out for battle did so very infrequently. Admittedly the military ventures and public events of archaic Athens are poorly documented because knowledge of them was only conveyed by word of mouth for around a century before Herodotus and Thucydides wrote elements of these oral traditions down. While private individuals and families had good reason to recall past wars as proof, for example, of ancestral courage, much tends to be lost in this oral transmission of history from one generation to the next.37 Nevertheless it does seem significant that from the attempted coup of Cylon, in the later seventh century, to the assassination of Hipparchus, in 514/3, we know of fewer than twelve recorded campaigns.38 ‘This catalogue of Athenian military ventures’, Frank Frost concludes, ‘for a period of something over a century is surprisingly modest for a people who were supposed to have been so fond of fighting and for whom the evolution of hoplite tactics was supposed to have been so politically significant’.39

War does not seem to have dominated public life in sixth-century Athens. What campaigns there were usually had a limited goal: the winning of new agricultural land either on the borders of Attica (e.g. Ath. pol. 14.1; Hdt. 1.59.4, 139.2) or in colonies overseas (e.g. Hdt. 6.36). A good example of this limited style of war-making is the venture which Solon led to take the island of Salamis from the neighbouring city of Megara.40 He rekindled Athenian interest in doing so by performing a ‘nationalist’ poem in the city’s marketplace and promised its land to those wishing to volunteer for the campaign (Plut. Sol. 9.2). Five hundred Athenians did come forward, with the portion

37 For this fragility of oral tradition, see Thomas 1989, especially 123–30.
38 For the testimonia of these ventures, see Frost 1984; Sealey 1976: 140–5. My tally counts the coups of Cylon and Pisistratus, in 546/5, as two ventures each. See Frost (1984: 291) I believe the Pisistratids involved citizen hoplites in their campaigns until 514/3 (see below). Thus I include their campaigns against Sigeion (Hdt. 5.94–5) and Naxos (1.64.2; Ath. pol. 15.3) but not those against the Spartans and Alcmeonids after the assassination of Hiparchus (Hdt. 5.62–3).
40 See Dem. 19.252; Dio 16.46–8; Polyaeus, Strat. 1.20.1–2; Paus. 1.40.4; Plut. Sol. 8–10. Along with Frost (1984: 289), I prefer the more detailed version of the actual fighting for the island at Plut. Sol. 9.2–10.1 to the other involving youths cross-dressing (8.4–6; Polyaeus, Strat. 1.20.2).
charged with capturing the island’s settlement fitting on one ship (9.3). The same type of war-making was waged by the other mainland cities of sixth-century Greece. They went to war infrequently and for the sake of contested border land. Their campaigns took days or weeks to decide, were normally settled by a solitary clash of hoplite phalanxes and, due to a lack of military capacity, usually did not result in the subjugation, occupation or taxation of the defeated city. Indeed even in the classical period those cities which did not aspire to be regional or imperial powers like Athens, Sparta and Thebes persisted with this limited style of land warfare.

Before Cleisthenes the military campaigns of Athens were not initiated or supervised by the city’s rudimentary political institutions nor led by leaders who had been publicly appointed. During the first tyranny of Pisistratus in 561/0, for example, Miltiades, the son of Cypselus, accepted the invitation of some Thracians of the Chersonese to lead them in their wars against their neighbours (Hdt. 6.34–7). Once he had done so, however, he did not consult with the city’s Council of the Areopagus or tyrant nor seek appointment as a general or the city’s polemarkhos (‘war-leader’). Instead Miltiades sought personal reassurance from the Delphic oracle that he should become the tyrant of these Thracians and, ‘having gathered together everyone of the Athenians who wished to be part of the naval expedition’ (6.36.1), simply sailed to the Chersonese where he and his relatives conducted wars for two generations as they saw fit (1.136.2–3; 6.35.2–41; Paus. 6.19.6). Miltiades and the other Athenians who initiated and led naval expeditions appear to have relied on the standard fifty-oared ships of the period, which were

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42 The exception is archaic Sparta, which reduced the defeated Messenians to a state of slavery (Cartledge 2001a: 299–307 for the ancient testimonia) and turned itself into an armed camp to maintain their subjugation (see especially Finley 1968). Cf. van Wees 2003; 2004: 28–33.


46 For the ad hoc recognition of individual aristocrats as the commanders of military ventures before the creation of the magisterial board of generals in 501/0, see G. Anderson 2003: 149–50; Ostwald 1986: 22 n. 72; Rhodes 1981: 264–5 with bibliography. While classical-period writers assumed the polemarch was one of the city’s oldest magistracies (e.g. Ath. pol. 3.2; Thuc. 1.126.8), surviving sources shed no light on what roles he may have played in the campaigns of the sixth century (Gabrielsen 2007: 251; Singor 2000: 109). At the battle of Marathon, in 490, the polemarch served bravely, but the real commanders of the army were the board of generals (Hdt. 6.109–111, 114; Ath. pol. 22.2; Hamel 1998b: 79–83; Meiggs and Lewis 1969: no. 18). Much later his duties were confined to religious and legal affairs (Ath. pol. 58).
frequently painted on Attic pots and which individual aristocrats privately maintained in order to compete in overseas games, visit guest friends, engage in trade and initiate or join overseas military ventures (cf. Hdt. 5.41, 47; 8.17). Vincent Gabrielsen puts it beyond doubt that the older view that Athens of the sixth century had a publicly controlled navy must now be ‘abandoned altogether’. According to this view, Attica was divided into forty-eight naukrariai or so-called ship-providing districts, in each of which wealthy men serving as naukrakoi supplied and commanded a warship for the city. But Gabrielsen explains how the association of naukrariai and ships only appears in lexicographers from the second century of our era and is probably based on their false inference that the term’s prefix can only signify a nau or warship (e.g. Poll. 8.108). By contrast, Athenian writers of the classical period believed the naukrakoi to be financial magistrates of one kind or another and never linked them or the funds which they managed to the navy (Ath. pol. 8.3, 21.5; Hdt. 5.71.2).

The employment of volunteer soldiers in these expeditions of Miltiades and Solon could be put down to their essentially discretionary character: they were acquisitive rather than defensive and hence the city was under no pressure to raise adequate forces quickly. But such an interpretation is ruled out by the decidedly ineffectual responses of archaic Athenians to actual invasions of their territory, which suggest that Athens before the democracy simply lacked an institutional mechanism for mustering soldiers in any circumstances. The Athenian aristocrat Cylon, for example, some years after his victory at the Olympics of 640, endeavoured to establish himself as tyrant (Hdt. 5.70.1; Plut. Sol. 12.1–9; Thuc. 1.126). With a small force of Megarians and ‘friends’ he invaded Attica and seized the Acropolis unopposed (Thuc. 1.126.5). Learning of this, Thucydides writes, the Athenians came to the rescue pandemei or in full force (7–8), which has understandably been interpreted as a formal mobilisation.

After all, Thucydides and Xenophon do employ this adverb or panstratriai to describe those mobilisations of the fifth century in which Athenian generals compelled the regular corps of the armed forces and all other able-bodied men to take part in the invasion of neighbouring territories (e.g. 47 Gabrielsen 1994: 24–6; 2008: 57; Haas 1985: 39–41; Humphreys 1978: 166–8; Morrison and Williams 1968: 73–117.


