Why do international criminal tribunals write histories of the origins and causes of armed conflicts? Richard Ashby Wilson conducted empirical research with judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and expert witnesses in three international criminal tribunals to understand how law and history are combined in the courtroom. Historical testimony is now an integral part of international trials, with prosecutors and defense teams using background testimony to pursue decidedly legal objectives. Both use historical narratives to frame the alleged crimes and to articulate their side’s theory of the case. In the trial of Slobodan Milošević, the prosecution sought to demonstrate special intent to commit genocide by reference to a long-standing animus nurtured in a nationalist mind-set. For their part, the defense calls historical witnesses to undermine charges of superior responsibility and to mitigate the sentence by representing crimes as reprisals. Although legal ways of knowing are distinct from those of history, the two are frequently combined in international trials in a way that challenges us to rethink the relationship between law and history.
Writing History in International Criminal Trials

RICHARD ASHBY WILSON
Human Rights Institute and School of Law
University of Connecticut
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epigraph</strong></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preface and Acknowledgments</strong></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figures and Tables</strong></td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Glossary</strong></td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong> Assessing Court Histories of Mass Crimes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong> What Does <em>International</em> Actually Mean for International Criminal Trials?</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong> Contrasting Evidence: International and Common Law Approaches to Expert Testimony</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong> Does History Have Any Legal Relevance in International Criminal Trials?</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5</strong> From Monumental History to Microhistories</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6</strong> Exoneration and Mitigation in Defense Histories</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7</strong> Misjudging Rwandan Society and History at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8</strong> Permanent Justice: The International Criminal Court</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9</strong> Conclusion: New Directions in International Criminal Trials</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix</strong></td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Index</strong></td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Athena to Orestes and the Furies:

I will appoint the judges of manslaughter,
Swear them in and found a tribunal here
For all time to come.

My contestants
Summon your trusted witnesses and proofs,
Your defenders under oath to help your cause
And I will pick the finest men of Athens,
Return and decide the issue fairly, truly-
Bound to our oaths, our spirits bent on justice.

– Aeschylus, The Eumenides
Preface and Acknowledgments

A sense of shared history is one of the main ways a people come to constitute themselves as a group or nation and to forge a collective identity and a sense of shared destiny. In times of peace and prosperity, this common past may enhance a sense of mutual purpose, instill a pride in public institutions, and fortify a civic patriotism. However, during economic and political crises, some political leaders stir up nationalist sentiments to bolster their increasingly shaky hold on power and legitimacy. Unable to effectively address deepening social and economic problems, they instead vilify an historic enemy, recall past wrongs, and seek to take advantage of the atmosphere of threat and insecurity. If armed conflict breaks out, then historical injuries may be recalled when atrocities are committed against enemy civilians, which are usually justified as reprisals necessary to ensuring the very existence of the group. Although this scenario is neither modern nor new, ethno-nationalist conflicts characterized by extensive civilian casualties became especially frequent after the end of the Cold War.

The politically instrumental use of history during an armed conflict is highly complex and selective. It is not simply a matter of fabricating outright lies, for many of the events that continue to generate a sense of grievance did really happen. As noted in this book, widespread atrocities were indeed committed against Serbs during World War II, and Hutus were cruelly subjugated by Tutsis during the colonial period in Rwanda. Although distortion of the past is widespread, the most common travesty is one of omission, wherein populist leaders neglect to mention the crimes committed by their own side or recollect them in such a way that evades accepting full responsibility. That politicians are so able to evoke historical arguments in these ways results from a prior failure of the society to engage in a full and frank encounter with past wrongdoing. In Tito’s Yugoslavia, for instance, there was a deep-seated avoidance on the part of party officials to engage with the legacy of World War II, to openly
admit the crimes committed by each side, and to accept responsibility. Where a pervasive regime of denial exists, the past can serve as rich pickings for political demagogues seeking to manipulate popular sentiments.

These arguments are widely accepted by many donor governments and UN agencies, which now perceive accurate historical documentation of an armed conflict as a key dimension of creating accountability and the rule of law and as an essential part of any postconflict reconstruction program. Beyond official statements and projects, however, the process of postconflict historical reflection is long-term and occurs along many tracks and in many different venues. It may occur in photographic exhibits or avant-garde art installations, or in the performing arts, such as film or theater. Talented writers of fiction such as Guatemala’s Victor Montejo or South Africa’s Zakes Mda offer subjective insights into the experience of an epoch of violence and insecurity that might not otherwise be imaginable. Museums and places of remembrance can ensure that mass crimes do not slip into obscurity. Teaching critical thinking about history in schools and universities is one of the principal ways in which students come to challenge the generational transmission of past animosities. Official government apologies and programs of reparations for victims have also become increasingly familiar, if uneven, ways of addressing the past. And there are more.

Although political propaganda and nationalist mythologizing is nothing new, what was novel in the post–Cold War era was the array of institutions, from national truth commissions to international criminal tribunals, set up to investigate mass violations of international humanitarian law. In the narrow window of opportunity that existed in the 1990s, an international consensus emerged regarding the need to try war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of genocide in new international criminal tribunals. The first of these was the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created shortly thereafter in 1994. These two ad hoc tribunals indicted more than two hundred individuals for violations of international humanitarian law and have processed a majority of their cases, though their prosecution work is now coming to an end. The permanent International Criminal Court, with jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression was inaugurated in 2003, and its first trials are now under way.

International criminal trials are now prime venues at which a postconflict version of history is investigated, discussed, argued over, and eventually stamped with the imprimatur of a legal judgment. Yet at least since the trials of Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg during 1945–6, commentators have been
asking whether courts ought to write an historical narrative of an armed conflict at all. This debate was reignited during the 1961 Eichmann trial in Israel and intensified during the Holocaust trials in France in the 1970s and 1980s. It took on new relevance during the wave of democratizations in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. Now it is time to critically evaluate the historical accounts produced by modern international justice institutions and ask, Have international tribunals actually provided significant insights into the origins and causes of armed conflict? How have international justice institutions come to comprehend the wider social and historical context surrounding individual violations of international humanitarian law? Do the judgments produced by international criminal courts challenge self-serving lies about the past?

The research for this book was supported by fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities (2009–2010) and the Provost’s Office of the University of Connecticut (2009) as well as by the Human Rights Institute of the University of Connecticut. My sincere thanks go to Gary S. Gladstein for his support of the Human Rights Institute and his sustained engagement with the empirical research on global human rights issues conducted by University of Connecticut faculty.

The initial impetus for this book began in 2000 with a conversation over lunch with my University of Sussex colleague, the Czech-born political scientist Zdenek Kavan. I had just completed a study of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and was rehearsing the argument that, because criminal trials produced impoverished histories of conflicts, it was better for truth commissions to take over the task of writing history. Zdenek informed me, in his civil and urbane manner, that, although this argument might well apply to national criminal courts, it did not accurately describe the experience of international criminal tribunals. He suggested that I read some recent judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and after doing so, I could see his point. I then began to ponder the different approaches to historical evidence of national and international criminal trials and to speak to international prosecutors, defense attorneys, and expert witnesses, and this research project was born.

Over the past ten years, friends, colleagues, and students have continued to set me straight, and I am grateful to all of them. Being neither a lawyer nor a historian, I am either uniquely lacking in the expertise required to conduct this project or reasonably well placed to view the relationship between law and history with an independent eye. Whichever of the two, I have benefited from a great deal of counsel and assistance from generous friends and colleagues. I
especially appreciate the commentaries of those who read sections of the book: Paul Betts, Eleni Coundouriotis, Robert Donia, Dan Saxon, and Ekkehard Wíthof. As usual, Saul Dubow went beyond the call, even when hard pressed for time.

At the three international criminal justice institutions included in this study, a number of staff, former staff, or defense attorneys shared their experiences of international criminal trials and offered invaluable advice on thinking through the issues, including Predrag Dojcinović, Matthew Gillett, Richard Goldstone, Michael Kamavas, Beth Lyons, Daryl Mundis, Navanethem Pillay, Nicole Samson, Paul Seils, Paul Shoup, Sue Somers, David Tolbert, Bill Tomljanovich, Pat Treanor, and Nena Tromp-Vrkić. Andrew Corin was such a rich a source of insights into the research topic that we became coresearchers, and together we developed, implemented, and analyzed the survey on questions of law and history. All staff from the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC quoted in this book have made their comments in their personal capacity, and their remarks do not necessarily represent the views of the ICTY, the ICTR, the ICC, or the United Nations.

While writing this book, I benefited immensely from discussions with University of Connecticut colleagues Jill Anderson, Kerry Bystrom, Emma Gilligan, Shareen Hertel, Rich Hiskes, Peter Kingstone, Alexandra Lahav, and Serena Parekh. I thank Dean Jeremy Paul, Anne Dailey, Michael Fischl, and Mark Janis for welcoming me into the University of Connecticut Law School community. I am grateful to the participants at talks and seminars over the years for their perceptive comments on the ideas contained in this book: the City University of New York, Law and Society Association annual conferences, New York University and New York Law School’s Law and Society seminar, the New School for Social Research, Yale University, University of Connecticut Law School, University College London, and the University of Michigan human rights seminar. Colleagues outside my own institution who helped me think through the issues include Nina Bang-Jensen, Thomas Brudholm, Kamari Clarke, Jane Cowan, Thomas Cushman, Laura Dickinson, Ilana Feldman, John Hagan, Robert Hayden, Toby Kelly, Diana Tietjens Meyers, Wiktor Osiatynski, and Miriam Ticktin. I would like to make special mention of Michael Marrus and Sally Engle Merry – both senior scholars of the law whom one can aspire to emulate.

I acknowledge the diligent research of research assistants Emma Amador, Matt Dickhoff, Lauren Donnelly, Kate Hawkins, Joshua Jackson, and Thomas Wilson. Amanda Fortner did sterling work on the tables and figures under significant time constraints. Ahmad Wais Wardak deserves praise for his involvement in both the technical aspects of the survey and the analysis of the
quantitative data it produced. In adherence to the principle of individual responsibility, all errors of fact or interpretation are my own.

Finally, and most of all, I thank my wife, Helene, and our sons, Kai and Thomas, for their sympathetic encouragement of my seemingly obscure projects.

Figures and Tables

FIGURES

3.1 Which type of criminal trial is more likely to include historical evidence?  
4.1 To what degree have Prosecutors used historical evidence in the Trial Chamber to assist in creating their theory of the case? 
4.2 Is historical evidence relevant for proving mens rea in genocide cases? (all respondents) 
4.3 Is historical evidence relevant for proving mens rea in genocide cases? (Prosecution, Defense, and Expert Witness) 
5.1 The degree to which contextual expert witnesses called by the Prosecution have been appropriately prepared for testimony in the courtroom. 
5.2 Which have been more effective as expert witnesses in the Trial Chamber? 
5.3(a) “In their reports and testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on . . .” 1. History of Yugoslavia; 2. Ideology of Political Movements. 
5.3(b) “In their reports and testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on . . .” 3. Hidden meanings of political statements; 4. Organization of military and paramilitary units. 
5.3(c) “In their reports and testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on . . .” 5. The authority structure of political parties; 6. Regional or municipal histories. 
6.1 How do judges decide between competing historical accounts? 

TABLES

6.1 Comparing Judges’ Receptivity to Prosecution and Defense Expert Witnesses 
6.2 Comparing Preparation of Defense and Prosecution Expert Witnesses
Glossary

Actus reus (Law Latin, “guilty act”): the material element of a crime

Amicus curiae (Law Latin, “friend of the court”): volunteer or appointed by the court to advise on legal issues. Amici have appeared in international tribunals generally when the accused has opted to defend himself or herself.

ARK: Autonomous Region of the Krajina

AU: African Union

Bosniak: Bosnian Muslim

Chetniks: Serb nationalist and royalist paramilitary organization in the Balkans before and during World War II

Dolus specialis (Law Latin, “special intent”): special or specific intent

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)

FPLC: Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo, or Patriotic Force for the Liberation of the Congo


HDZ: Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine, or Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina

HVO: Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane, or Croatian Defense Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina

ICC: International Criminal Court

ICJ: International Court of Justice

ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
JNA: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, or Yugoslav People’s Army
LRT: Leadership Research Team of the ICTY
Mens rea (Law Latin, “guilty mind”): the state of mind the prosecution must prove that a defendant held when committing a crime
MONUC: Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo, or UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OTP: Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC, ICTR, or ICTY
Republika Srpska: Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
RPE: Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC, ICTR, ICTY)
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
SDA: Stranka Demokratske Akcije, or Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDS: Srpska Demokratska Stranka, or Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina
STA: Senior Trial Attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC, ICTR, or ICTY
Tu quoque (Law Latin, literally “you too” defense): a defense based on the allegation that the opposing party to the conflict committed similar atrocities, often accompanied by the allegation that that party was responsible for the commencement of the said conflict.
UNICRI: UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNSC: UN Security Council
UPC: Union des Patriotes Congolais, or Union of Congolese Patriots
Ustashe: Pro-German state in Croatia during World War II
VJ: Vojska Jugoslavije, or Yugoslav Army (replacing JNA in 1992)
VRS: Vojska Republike Srpske, or Bosnian Serb Army