Introduction

This book develops a theory of power in international relations that builds on the idea of smart power.[1] I refer to it as Cosmopolitan power.[2] It is different, and in many circles even considered bold and iconoclastic, because it attempts to cross paradigmatic boundaries that previously were fairly impenetrable, especially on the subject of power. It attempts to construct some overlapping theoretical set from the three main paradigms in international relations on this subject of power – Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism.[3] Because the paradigmatic boundaries have been

[1] The idea of "smart power" suggests that a foreign policy based on the combined use of both hard and soft power can yield superior results to one that relies exclusively on one or the other kinds of power. The work on smart power has been limited both in its theoretical development and its historical/policy applications (being principally restricted to the analysis of contemporary U.S. foreign policy). Hard and soft power will be discussed in Chapter 1. On smart power, see Nossel (2004), *Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power* (2007), and Etheridge (2009).

[2] Beck (2005) uses the term *cosmopolitan* to convey a broad view of the diffusion of power in a new global age from the state to civil society. My use of the term *Cosmopolitan power* is far more state-centric than Beck's vision. It has simply been chosen to denote a more modern and sophisticated view of power that better fits changes in the world system and their impact on the nature of national influence. The vision of Cosmopolitan power does not position itself in any one paradigm; rather, it proposes to represent an overlapping set of tenets across paradigms that could be conceptualized as logically consistent. Thus, it represents a distinct vision of power forged from all three of the major paradigms in international relations – Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism. This is the reason I use the term *Cosmopolitan* rather than more cumbersome synthetic terms such as *Cosmopolitan Realism* or *Realist Liberal Constructivism*.

[3] By presenting these paradigms as single entities, this analysis obfuscates the great diversity of theories within each paradigm, each of which is a battleground. The citations in the last chapter are useful sources for clarifying the competing strands within the respective paradigms.

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so imposing, such syntheses have remained elusive at best. Moreover, attempting a synthesis among the three paradigms in the context of the issue of power appears even more imposing because power may be the most salient point of conflict among the paradigms. Realism has been known as the paradigm that embraces the idea of power seeking, whereas Neoliberalism and Constructivism have been viewed as antithetical (even subversive) to the idea of power seeking. However, such attempts to balance various strands among competing paradigms may prove fertile ground for building more useful theories of power – theories that hold the key to enhanced influence for nations.[4] Greater power may be achieved through balance than through paradigmatic parochialism. Moreover, the synthesis proposed by Cosmopolitan power suggests that not only does a common intersecting set emerge among the paradigmatic tenets, but that the various paradigms actually rely on each other to achieve the important goals each espouses with respect to national influence.

There have been attempts to integrate some or all of these paradigms at both specific and more general levels. These have come principally from the Neoliberals and Constructivists. There has been little interest from the Realists (Sterling-Folker 2002, 74; Copeland 2000). Whereas Constructivists and Neoliberals appear to overlap significantly by embracing institutions (i.e., principles, norms, rules, regimes, and other phenomena undergirding cooperation among nations), the two paradigms traditionally have been seen by Realists as antithetical (Barkin 2003, 325).[5] Yet even the limited forays into the quest for paradigmatic syntheses have failed to venture into the very issue that, as Berenskoetter (2007, 1)

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[4] In following Baldwin (2002, 177), this book will not make cumbersome distinctions between power and influence. Hence, the two terms will sometimes be used interchangeably to convey common elements gravitating around the capacity of a nation to attain its objectives in international politics.

[5] Wendt, in a personal correspondence, notes that attempts to integrate Realism and Constructivism come almost exclusively from the Constructivist side. On attempts to synthesize Realism and Constructivism, see Wendt (1999), Barkin (2003), Williams (2003), Sterling-Folker (2002), Johnston (2008), Onuf (2008), and Hall (1997). Some works from scholars who have demonstrated a more Realist orientation come from Jervis (1970), Copeland (2000), and Walt (1987), although such works are somewhat more crypto-attempts at bridging the gap. Fukuyama (2006), Kupchan (2004), and Ikenberry and Kupchan (2004) have issued representative attempts to synthesize Realism and Neoliberalism (using terms such as *Realistic Wilsonianism*, *Real Democratik*, and *Liberal Realism*). On this synthesis, see also Niou and Ordeshook (1994). On the relation between Realism and Neoliberalism, see Keohane and Nye (1989), Baldwin (1993), and Niou and Ordeshook (1994). On the relation between Neoliberalism and Constructivism, see Sterling-Folker (2000). On Constructivism, see especially Onuf (1989), Wendt (1999) and Adler (2002).

notes, holds the study of world politics "together" – that of power. As noted, power has been seen as the point of greatest divergence among the paradigms (Wendt 1999, 114).[6] Because the theory of Cosmopolitan power marshals an integration of power relations among the three paradigms – the issue thought to be least likely to bridge the theoretical gap – these findings could be considered both compelling and "crucial" from a scientific point of view (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2004, 347; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 209–12).[7] Moreover, Cosmopolitan power generally supports important tenets of Realism; the augmentation of power, the optimization of power, and the quest for security are all legitimate goals of the state, and power relations unfold in what is fundamentally an anarchic environment. In this respect, the paradigmatic integration represented by Cosmopolitan power will potentially generate greater interest for Realists who previously have been reluctant to consider a theoretical interfacing with Constructivist and Neoliberal categories.

Continuing the search for alternative visions of international power, such as Cosmopolitan power, and how their implications can enhance national influence, is an especially important venture today. There is a need to better understand processes of power in international relations for scholarly and practical reasons. Even more importantly, the world today is experiencing an especially tumultuous and sensitive period, with greater dangers, but also greater opportunities for the augmentation of national influence. This situation promises to be with us into the future. Although the issue of power is at the very core of interactions among nations, the study of international power is still (notwithstanding the volumes of scholarship) underdeveloped relative to its importance in international politics (Baldwin 2002; Berenskoetter 2007). Moreover, the traditional theories of power in international politics are poorly suited to understanding the modern world system; there is a significant need for a more complex or "polymorphous" theory of power in world politics (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 40). The global system is in flux, while the power of nations continues to be the principal instrument for determining our collective fate as a planet. In terms of an historical time line,

[6] In fact, various scholars have proclaimed that there is much more convergence among Realists and Constructivists on the centrality of power than has been traditionally acknowledged (Wendt 1999, 97; Barkin 2003, 327).

[7] In that integrative properties appear in an area considered to be least fertile (i.e., a least likely case) for theoretical synthesis, the idea of more general integration of the paradigms becomes all the more compelling.

there has been a greater transformation in the lives of human beings during the last hundred years than in the preceding twelve thousand (since the emergence of farming communities). We are presently caught in this breakneck wave of change. In a sense, the modern world system has placed us in an environment in which everything is occurring more dramatically and faster than ever before. With this speed and magnitude of outcomes, we are faced with greater threats and opportunities involving national power.[8]

Technology continues to evolve, bringing with it manifold possibilities for both dangers and opportunities. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continue to develop in ways that increase the speed and magnitude of threat. It may be the case that the level of national power and the capacity to use it are outpacing the ability of nations to control it. The world politic demonstrates both processes of splintering (i.e., movements for independence) and collectivization (regional and global integration). Shifting political boundaries and identities continue to present a potential source of instability both between and within nations. Forces and processes that previously were under the public and scholarly radar (environment, demographics, disease) have reared an ugly head and demonstrated that the dangers facing us in the twenty-first century are far more extensive and pernicious than we perceived just several generations ago. New dangers from non-state actors in the form of terrorism and their potential access to WMD have made it all the more difficult to assess, monitor, and manage threats to national security. Shifts in power among the great nations of the world promise a different configuration of influence in the future. Globalization and growing interdependence have continued to reshape relations among nations, resulting in great opportunities as well as instability. The changing fates of democracy and capitalism have generated points of convergence as well as points of conflict in world politics. The income gap has increased between rich and poor, even after decades of concerted efforts on the part of nations and institutions to address such asymmetries. Beck (2005) has noted that the changes in the world have created a far more "hazy power space" than has previously been embraced by scholars and decision makers. National power itself has been transformed by the principal changes in world politics, and these

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[8] On a theoretical level, Guzzini (1993, 445) identifies a period of "crisis" in the study of international relations due to the advent of new research areas and subdisciplines. The resulting disciplinary "disarray" has created a greater need to reconceptualize the process of power in ways that better fit this transformation in prevailing scholarship.

changes have made it far more difficult to gauge and consequently manage power. This hazy power space requires new questions about power and its changing role in international politics.

In this dangerous but opportunity-laden new world, no more influential means exist to shape international relations in the modern world than national power. Thus, leaders will continue to be animated in pursuing national strength. In light of this power quest, the principal lessons of this book about power appear even more relevant to the national interest. The problem of power augmentation in the face of a dynamic world polity requires the utmost vigilance and perspicacity among national leaders. The quest for power requires a far more enlightened and sophisticated vision of the process of power accumulation and the pervasive threats inherent in the process itself, one that matches the challenges of a complex and changing world. Cosmopolitan power holds much promise for generating such a vision.

The Argument and Plan of the Work

Cosmopolitan power is a theory of power that envisions the optimization of national influence deriving from a balance among sources of power underscored within the three leading paradigms of international relations. The sources of power have been synthesized within two general subsources – hard power and soft power.[9] Hard power draws from common tenets of Realist theory. This source of influence relies on the ability of nations to compel other nations to act in a manner consistent with the interests of the former (i.e., the target nation is pushed to do what it otherwise would not do without coercion or bribes). Soft power derives from Neoliberal and Constructivist visions of power. This source of power emanates from the admiration and respect garnered by nations acting in accordance with appropriate behavioral modes posited in the paradigms – nations with soft power endear themselves to other nations. Such endearment causes other nations to voluntarily act, without being compelled, in the interests of the nations with soft power. In this respect, hard power extracts compliance, whereas soft power cultivates it. The process of cultivating influence through soft power is referred to as soft empowerment, one of Cosmopolitan power's three main signature processes. In being wedded to a vision of hard power, the Realists have effectively missed the boat. The exclusive use of hard power is risky and often self-defeating.

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[9] Both hard and soft power will be more fully defined and analyzed in Chapter 1.

Attempts to gain influence only through hard power sources can actually weaken a nation (what is referred to as hard disempowerment – another of Cosmopolitan power's three main signature process). This has always been a limitation of Realism, but changes in the world system have promised to raise the effectiveness of soft power relative to hard power, so the Realist approach to influence in the modern world will be even more frustrated. The Realist lexicon of power requires greater reliance on soft power if Realism's prime prescriptions – the optimization of power and the quest for security – are to be attained.

Conversely, both Neoliberals and Constructivists, to some extent, have threatened to throw the baby out with the bathwater. In reacting to Realist claims about prevalent power relations in international affairs with such counterpoised categories, they have failed to embrace the potential usefulness of hard power sources. In this respect, they have been equally guilty of missing the boat in producing a viable alternative of power. Like the Realists, Neoliberals and Constructivists also require help from the other side (in this case, hard power) to achieve their most treasured objectives: peace, stability, justice, prosperity, and national autonomy. Moreover, all three paradigms have missed opportunities to embrace soft power in ways that would attend to all of their goals: the use of soft power to empower rather than simply restrain behavior (soft empowerment). Neoliberals and Constructivists have underscored the use of soft power as a means of restraining the actions of nations but have failed to embrace the ways in which soft power can increase the influence of nations. Realists have been equally guilty of under appreciating the empowering effects of soft power and how those effects might contribute to increasing national influence. Ultimately, diversification among soft and hard power resources will be the only effective means of optimizing national influence (the third of Cosmopolitan power's main signature processes). This diversification, however, will prove challenging because of its requirements in the face of the pervasiveness of a power curse (of which hard disempowerment is an element) and because of common cognitive limitations on the part of decision makers. In this respect, decision makers will have to be ever vigilant and perspicacious by employing five fundamental strategies in assessing and monitoring national power.

Chapter 1 builds a theory of Cosmopolitan power by analyzing its component parts (soft and hard power) and how they coalesce, articulating its fundamental principles and prescriptions for its operationalization as a policy, and demonstrating the mechanics of the theory's signature

processes of soft empowerment, hard disempowerment, and diversification. A more formal model of power optimization in the context of the hard and soft power nexus is relegated to the Appendix.

A compelling testament to the importance of soft power, and to the importance of a Cosmopolitan theory of power as a bridge for all three paradigms, is provided in analyses of the great books of the founding fathers of Realism: Thomas Hobbes, Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, E. H. Carr, and Hans Morgenthau. Close textual analyses of the works that inspired contemporary Realist theory in international relations strongly attest to the importance of the signature processes of Cosmopolitan power, notwithstanding these writers' famous arguments about the utility of hard power. An acute awareness of the importance of these processes (soft empowerment, hard disempowerment, and, ultimately, the need to diversify between hard and soft power resources), in fact, pervades the great inspirational works of Realism. In this respect, these authors could more accurately be referred to as Cosmopolitan Realists. Although the sources of soft power vary among the respective authors, there is a pervasive theme that actors that endear themselves within their environments – even within anarchic environments – can leverage such assets into enhanced influence and safety among the actors with which they interact (soft empowerment). Concomitantly, they exhibit an acute awareness of the influence that may be lost when such endearing qualities are compromised by excessive reliance on hard power strategies (hard disempowerment).

Finding such a pronounced awareness of the virtues of soft power and the dangers of hard disempowerment in the most inspirational texts for contemporary Realist theory serves as a crucial-case testament to the importance of the vision of Cosmopolitan power. More specifically, the theoretical and prescriptive value of the vision of Cosmopolitan power is enhanced, given that is has been located in less likely places (i.e., the great works of Realism). Thus, the textual analyses serve as crucial-case studies that generate important inferential qualities about the importance of the theory of Cosmopolitan power in a scientific context.

Chapters 2 and 3 marshal crucial-case textual analyses of the great works of these founding fathers of Realism: *The Leviathan*, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, *The Prince*, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, and *Politics among Nations*.

The manifestations of Cosmopolitan power also can be seen across time, geography, and issue areas. To this end, case studies of the components of Cosmopolitan power are undertaken. Four case studies analyze

the soft side of Cosmopolitan power in demonstrating the process of
soft empowerment. A fifth case study looks at the hard side of the the-
ory by analyzing the process of hard disempowerment. All five cases
illuminate the need for nations to attain some golden Cosmopolitan
mean between the extreme poles of hard and soft power. They attest to
how both sources of power can work together to optimize influence and
show that failure to embrace such joint sets ultimately leads to inferior
outcomes.

The first three cases look at the economic and political benefits of soft
empowerment as manifested through a process of emulation. One of the
manifestations and empowering effects (i.e., soft empowerment) of the
endearment generated by soft power, principally as a result of admira-
tion, is emulation. There is no greater testament to the influence generated
by such endearment than one nation emulating the policies of another.
The benefits are numerous and manifold; ultimately, they translate into
greater influence for these role-model nations in the world at large. How-
ever, few case studies have been completed on the precise benefits of being
emulated. The three cases I present are attempts to fill this gap. First, the
rise of free trade in Western Europe in the mid–nineteenth century, to
a large extent, was driven by admiration of the British economic mir-
acle. Early and vigorous industrialization was a potent force in driving
other European nations to emulate Britain's policy of freer trade and
open up their markets. Britain came to enjoy a myriad of benefits from
other nations pursuing more liberal trading practices. Second, Britain also
proved to be a financial role model a bit later in the nineteenth century,
in the 1870s, when developed nations followed its lead and adopted gold
standards. As with trade, many leaders were compelled by the British
economic miracle and attributed such success to its early adoption of a
gold standard (other nations being either on silver or bimetallist). Thus,
emulation was perceived as a vehicle to similar economic gains. Con-
vergence on gold, like free trade, produced a number of benefits for the
British economy and the British state. The reversion to gold bolstered the
benefits that Britain was already reaping from the fact that sterling had
become the leading international currency for clearing trade, investment,
and bank reserves. Third, many nations more recently have chosen to
adopt the American dollar as a currency (i.e., dollarization). This finan-
cial emulation, like the adoption of gold standards and sterling among
developed nations in the nineteenth century, attests to the soft power
of modern America as a role model. Emulation in this regard manifests
admiration of economic characteristics such as a sound financial system

and a dominant economy. It also manifests faith in the stability of the American financial system. Dollarization has produced benefits for the United States quite similar to those enjoyed by Britain from gold standards and the use of sterling, in that all of these represent a form of monetary and financial convergence. In all three cases, emulation significantly raised the economic and political influence of both Britain and the United States in the world political economy in the respective issue areas during the respective historical periods.

These three cases of soft empowerment illuminate a Cosmopolitan process. They show endowments of hard power being supplemented by soft power in the augmentation of economic and political influence. In all three cases, the principal sources of soft empowerment were the endearing qualities of the economic policies of the United States and Great Britain. These endearing qualities, which resulted from the admiration and respect generated by the economic primacy achieved by these nations in specific issue areas, caused other nations to emulate the policies of these role-model nations. Emulation created a greater political-economic milieu that was favorable to the interests and goals of the role-model nations. In each case, already powerful economic actors found their economic and political influence augmented by economic and political opportunities provided by the cultivation of soft power. This enhanced influence, in turn, generated even greater economic primacy and political influence. This reflects a Cosmopolitan compound reinforcement effect between hard and soft power, in that a source of admiration and respect augmented the preponderant hard economic power resources of the role-model nations (i.e., their economic primacy and political influence). Emulation fundamentally created expanded opportunities for the role-model nations to achieve even greater economic primacy and political influence. This enhanced primacy fed back to reinforce the soft empowerment enjoyed by the role-model nation through emulation.

These three case studies in soft empowerment through emulation are undertaken in Chapter 4.

With respect to the hard side of the power continuum, there is great danger and risk, especially in the modern world, in strategies that are founded on the enhancement of national influence through excessive reliance on hard power. Such strategies will be counterproductive and ultimately self-defeating because they will often diminish rather than augment national influence (i.e., hard disempowerment). American foreign policy under the Bush Doctrine of 2001 through 2008 is a case in point. Bush's quest to achieve his three most cherished goals (limit terrorism,

spread democracy and capitalism, and limit the spread of WMD) was founded on perceptions of American primacy in the world. Such primacy was conceptualized as a preponderant arsenal of hard power resources with which to coerce and compel. Inspired by the Bush Doctrine, the administration attempted to deliver the big three foreign policy goals through the use of force and coercion. In doing so, the administration deviated from a more effective Cosmopolitan mean in conducting foreign policy. Such excessively hard strategies proved counterproductive and ultimately self-defeating across all three goals. Invasions and coercion raised the specter of terrorism, as vituperation against the United States grew across the global spectrum, swelling the ranks of prospective terrorists and making states less enthusiastic to cooperate in America's war against terror. The threat of WMD was raised all the more, as these tactics gave nations an incentive to develop or increase their stockpiles as deterrents against America's threatening posture. Similarly, the prospects for regime change were set back, as vituperation against U.S. aggression and coercion undermined indigenous political elements in nations that would champion transitions to democracy and capitalism. In relying fundamentally on such resources in pursuing his crusade to achieve his goals, Bush rendered the United States weaker and more vulnerable to the dangers he feared most. Moreover, such a strategy made the attainment of such goals even more difficult. In the end, Bush's quest for enhanced influence delivered only a disempowered nation.

More than anything else, the failures of the Bush administration were failures in decision making. The administration was deficient in following important prescriptions about assessing and monitoring national influence. It proved rigid and unimaginative in managing the means of foreign policy. These deficiencies led the administration to rely excessively on hard power solutions to the exclusion and detriment of important soft power solutions.

Chapter 5 is a case study of hard disempowerment under the Bush foreign policy.

Soft empowerment also has been visible in the compelling nature of modern American culture. Perhaps no greater example of soft power exists in the modern global system. The pervasiveness of American culture is a dominant characteristic of our present age, and the forces of globalization have served as an effective chariot for compounding such soft empowerment. America's ideas, products, educational systems, lifestyles, institutions, and even the English language have disseminated an allure and magnetic endearment that have enhanced the opportunities for both