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Introduction

In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003, an old question has received new attention: How does war affect the state and its citizens? This line of inquiry has been pursued by thoughtful citizens and thinkers for most of human history, and it counts Thucydides and Aristotle among the many who have contributed to the discussion. The book that follows is an attempt to shed new light on this ancient and universal question in the American context.

This question is particularly timely to consider in the United States, not only because events of the last decade have (once again) thrust it to the forefront of the nation's consciousness, but also because political scientists – ideally, a source to which today's thoughtful citizens and thinkers might turn for insights into these kinds of perennial concerns – have largely avoided it. Political scientists studying the United States usually limit their causal variables to those that can be found within the nation's borders. Regrettably, this narrow approach leaves out an enormous explanatory factor: foreign wars. The under appreciation of major U.S. wars as a causal variable in the domestic realm limits our understanding of American politics and government. A few leading scholars have recently pointed out this deficiency. As David R. Mayhew contends:

> Wars have been underexamined as causal factors in American political history.... Political scientists who study American domestic politics have underappreciated [their] effects.... In general, the study of elections, parties, issues, programs, ideologies, and policy making has centered on peacetime narratives and causation.[1]

Similarly, Ira Katznelson has noted this omission in the American political development (APD) literature, arguing that "the neglect of international forces is pronounced in the subfield of APD.... APD scholars have been attuned

[1] David R. Mayhew, "War and American Politics," *Perspectives on Politics* 3:3 (Sept. 2005), 473. See also: Mayhew, *Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 156–8.

almost exclusively to internal processes and developments. . . . [The resulting] loss to intellectual vibrancy has been considerable. . . . None of the subfield's landmark books . . . has made international subjects integral to its analysis."[2] Mayhew and Katznelson zero in on a blind spot that is all too common among political scientists studying the United States. The domestic and international realms are generally treated as separate entities, existing independently of one another. Like brief thunderstorms, international events are cast as temporary distractions that can make the lights flicker on Capitol Hill; once the storms pass, however, normal business resumes unperturbed and in accordance with previously scheduled events.

John Gerring's otherwise fine treatment of party ideologies is representative of the problem. To his credit, he directly explains his domestic focus, arguing that "because foreign policy has rarely played a significant role in American electoral politics, I focus primarily on domestic policies." He continues in a footnote:

> Foreign policy issues have entered debate at infrequent intervals (generally under conditions of open or imminent military conflict) after which politics has resumed its normal pace and usual domestic preoccupations. . . . [P]arty views on foreign policy have not corresponded neatly with the historical development of party views on domestic policy matters; which is to say, foreign policy ideologies have changed at different times and (often) for different reasons than domestic policy ideologies. Therefore, foreign policy provides a somewhat misleading guide to the public political identities of the American parties, and is best analyzed separately.[3]

This explanation raises some questions. First, exactly how rare and infrequent are major foreign policy issues? In its approximately 220 years as a country, the United States fought "hot wars" for more than 40 of those years, was immersed in the Cold War for decades, and has been involved in numerous smaller international conflicts. So, not all that rare. Second, how can domestic and foreign policy ideologies be considered in total separation? In reality, far from existing in isolation, each interacts with and influences the other. Third, why then are foreign wars virtually absent in the American political science literature? The short answer, it seems, is that addressing foreign *and* domestic policy is hard. As Gerring says, wars and other international events have not always "corresponded neatly" with the standard domestic-based accounts of American political history. That is, major international events throw a kink into academic narratives. Grand theories get undermined by these ornery wars.

[2] Ira Katznelson, "Rewriting the Epic of America," *Shaped By War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development*, eds., Katznelson and Martin Shefter, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 7–8. This book is an early response to this problem, offering an edited collection of "exploratory" essays probing the ways international forces influence domestic politics. Theda Skocpol issued an earlier and unheeded call for more research in this area: Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," *Bringing the State Back In*, eds., Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[3] John Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7.

Perhaps as a result, wars and other foreign irritants get ignored. The obvious problem with this approach is that it overlooks what any reasonable observer would have to acknowledge: Wars have had a major and ongoing influence on domestic American politics.

In short, what is missing from typical political science accounts of American politics is an understanding of how domestic and international factors relate to one another. To the extent scholars of American politics recognize that international factors might play a role in domestic politics, they seem to view them as side issues that temporarily help or hurt a rigid, preexisting domestic agenda. Lost is the possibility that international influences might alter or upset domestic politics in a meaningful and lasting manner.

War and American Political Development

The broad, historically based American political development (APD) subfield within the larger American politics literature would be a natural home for this kind of scholarship. Skeptical of the adequacy of rational choice modeling and comprehensive theoretical systems to effectively address core political questions, APD embraces historical analysis to explain how certain factors contribute to specific outcomes and constitute patterns.[4] In contrast to political history, though, APD is more rooted in political thought and maintains the political scientist's tendency to categorize and make connections across time. Four main approaches can be seen in APD work. In one approach, scholars, including Stephen Skowronek, Richard Bensel, and Elizabeth Sanders, study key periods of state development in American history and the set of causal factors that defined them.[5] A second approach, typified by Theda Skocpol, Rogers Smith, Daniel Kryder, Jacob Hacker, and James Morone, examines a crucial subject such as race, religion, or social policy over the course of American history or at particularly important junctures.[6] A third segment of APD scholarship addresses institutional development, as seen in the writings of Nelson

[4] On APD, see: Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, *The Search for American Political Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[5] These works (far from an exhaustive list) concern development of the American state in particular eras or with reference to particular movements: Progressive Era: Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). The Civil War and Reconstruction: Richard Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Populism: Elizabeth Sanders, *Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers and the American State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

[6] Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Daniel Kryder, *Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State During World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jacob Hacker, *The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); James Morone, *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).

Polsby, Jeffrey K. Tulis, Sidney Milkis, Skowronek, Gerring, Eric Schickler, and Daniel Carpenter.[7] A final portion of the APD field, represented by scholars such as Theodore Lowi, Samuel Beer, Michael Sandel, and James W. Ceaser, is dedicated to political ideas.[8]

Clearly, this APD subfield – with its emphasis on critical historical periods and the American state's development – is tailor-made for scholarship concerning war's influence on domestic politics. This is particularly true of the first and second approaches (the study of critical periods of change and the study of a crucial topic over time). Yet, like the larger American politics literature, the APD subfield has generally overlooked foreign affairs.

Segmentation: International and Domestic Events

The failure to address these matters in the broader American politics literature (and the APD subfield) is partially due to academic boundaries. Wars have typically fallen within the ambit of international relations. Because of this subfield segmentation, American politics scholars have tended to ignore international origins of domestic politics, while international relations experts avoid explicit study of the United States. As a result, the American politics and international relations literatures have been constrained by an artificially restricted universe of variables.

International relations scholars have addressed the relationship between international politics and domestic politics theoretically, if not in direct relation to the American case. In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars emphasized how domestic politics affects foreign policy via interest groups, class, and national goals.[9] And in 1978, Peter Gourevitch, influenced by the Primat der Aussenpolitik school, focused on the flip side by suggesting that international events

[7] Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62:1 (1968), 144–68; Jeffrey K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997); Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America: 1828–1996*; Eric Schickler, *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[8] Theodore Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest Group Liberalism," *American Political Science Review* 61 (1967). Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969); Samuel Beer, "In Search of a New Public Philosophy," *The New American Political System*, ed., Anthony King (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Michael Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: American in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); James W. Ceaser, *Nature and History in American Political Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

[9] Prominent works include: Richard H. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burtin Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: Free Press, 1962); Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War* (New York:

can also affect domestic politics.[10] In essence, his "second image reversed" argument holds that the causal arrow points both ways. Although some maintained that domestic events were the prevailing causal factor,[11] momentum had shifted by the late 1980s. Stressing the work following Gourevitch's pivotal piece, Robert D. Putnam concluded that international events exert far greater influence on domestic politics than vice versa.[12] Currently, however, the tide has shifted again, with the dominant strain in the international relations literature now suggesting that domestic politics affects decisions in the international realm. These scholars examine national politics to discern influences on a wide range of international political issues varying from war to trade policies.[13] In sum, while American politics scholars generally look only at domestic factors, international relations scholars have been much more prone to explore the relationship between international and domestic events, albeit with varying and

Random House, 1968); Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[10] Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32:4 (Autumn 1978). The Primat der Aussenpolitik school, led by Otto Hintze and Leopold von Ranke, argued that wars and external pressures, as opposed to national character (Innenpolitik), shape states. See: Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed., Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 178–215; Theodore von Laue and Leopold von Ranke, *The Formative Years* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). Also relevant here is *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*, ed., Peter J. Katzenstein (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

[11] For example: Aristide Zolberg, "Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link," *World Politics* 33 (January 1981); Zolberg, "Beyond the Nation-State: Comparative Politics in Global Perspective," *Beyond Progress and Development*, eds., J. Berting, W. Blockmans, and U. Rosenthal (Rotterdam, Netherlands: Erasmus Universiteit, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Election Cycles and War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:2 (June 1991), 212–44.

[12] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988). See also: James E. Alt, "Crude Politics: Oil and the Political Economy of Unemployment in Britain and Norway, 1970–1985," *British Journal of Political Science* 17 (April 1987), 149–99; Peter B. Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[13] See, for example: Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998), 289–313; Susan Peterson, *Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Richard N. Rosencrance and Arthur A. Stein, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

conflicting conclusions being favored during different eras. This book relies on the theoretical work of these international relations scholars in assessing how international events affect domestic U.S. politics.

This book also speaks to another key international relations debate over the role war plays in state building and political development.[14] Bruce D. Porter and Charles Tilly, following Otto Hintze and Leopold von Ranke, argue that war and external pressures shape states; are often key catalysts for political development, centralization, and bureaucratization; and can create fault lines within states.[15] Indeed, Tilly goes so far as to suggest that wars have "made" states because they require states to meet significant institutional and logistical challenges. Porter argues that in the case of these war-induced state expansions, "what goes up seldom comes down."[16] In other words, state expansion only moves in one direction. Citizens acquiesce to a larger role for government even after the crisis that brought about the "ratchet effect" has passed. Similarly, politicians and bureaucrats find new ways to spend the money and have their own interests in maintaining an expanded government footprint.[17] Most of this work has centered on countries other than the United States.[18] In general, this body of work has not substantially informed American politics research, at least so far as it is considered by political scientists.[19] One exception is

[14] Other relevant work not mentioned in this paragraph includes: Matthew Kroenig and Jay Stowsky, "War Makes the State, but Not as It Pleases: Homeland Security and American Anti-Statism," *Security Studies* 15:2 (2006), 225–70; Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, "War Making and State Making: Government Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars," *American Political Science Review* 75 (1985), 491–507.

[15] Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1994); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1990); Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State;" Laue and Ranke, *The Formative Years*. See also: Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, *War and State Making* (Boston: Unwin, Hyman, 1989).

[16] Porter, 14.

[17] On the "ratchet effect," see: Porter. Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, *The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[18] Tilly. Porter. Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Fernando Lopez-Alves, "The Transatlantic Bridge: Mirros, Charles Tilly, and State Formation in the River Plate," *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America*, ed., Miguel Angel Centeno and Lopez-Alves (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). In contrast to Tilly and Porter, Herbst and Lopez-Alves contend that the "war makes the state" process has generally not occurred in Africa and Latin America.

[19] One partial exception is the early presidency literature, which places considerable emphasis on the importance of war and the U.S. role in foreign affairs as an explanation for the increased importance of the presidency. See, for instance: Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," *Transaction* 4 (Dec. 1966), 7–14; Clinton Rossiter, *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948); Edward S. Corwin, *The President's Control of Foreign Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1917). For a more recent exception see: Andrew J. Polsky, "The Presidency at War," *The Presidency and the Party System*, ed., Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 557–75.

Aaron L. Friedberg, who argues that in the American case, war is not necessarily the mother of the state. Rather, he argues that the United States's geographical isolation, combined with its founding antistatist principle, has created a "rollback effect" at the point other countries experience a ratchet effect. This uniquely American impulse to resist centralization and to protect unfettered liberty helps explain the comparatively weak connection between war and state growth in the United States – particularly during the Cold War, Friedberg's focus.[20] In any event, taken as a whole, this work serves to frame a critical debate for consideration of the American state. Amid much work on war-induced ratchet effects, the most prominent American political development accounts of the state tend to overlook wars, whereas Friedberg emphasizes U.S. antistatism, even during wartime. What follows is, in part, a study of the wartime American state. One aim is to assess the extent to which the American state has been "made" by war.

THE ARGUMENT

The rise and fall of political regimes has been a central focus for American politics scholars, especially those studying institutions and American political development. Political regimes, or orders, refer to periods in which a political coalition creates, consolidates, maintains, and eventually loses control over the nation's political agenda.[21] Commonly identified regimes include the post-1800 Jeffersonian Democrats, Jacksonian democracy, the Civil War and Reconstruction, the "System of 1896," the Progressive Era, the New Deal, the 1960s (usually taken to mean the late 1960s and early 1970s), and, perhaps, the rise of various types of conservatives in the 1980s. Scholars have frequently centered regime analysis on a particular institution. Skowronek, for instance, traces the primacy of the presidency in the rise and fall of regimes throughout American history.[22] Other work focuses on one particular regime or, as an offshoot of this concept, a policy regime.[23]

[20] Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[21] Polsky offers careful definitions of regimes. See: Polsky, "The 1996 Elections and the Logic of Regime Politics," *Polity* 30:1 (1997), 153–4. Polsky, "A Theory of American Partisan Regimes," Philadelphia American Politics Research Seminar, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1 November 2002, http://urban.hunter.cuny.edu/~apolsky/REGIMETHEORY.htm, last accessed 23 April 2009.

[22] Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*. Significant work has also placed Congress or parties at the center of regimes: Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A Politico-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Elaine K. Swift, *The Making of an American Senate: 1787–1841* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996*.

[23] For the New Deal, see: John J. Coleman, *Party Decline in America: Policy, Politics, and the Fiscal State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Milkis, *The President and the Parties*. For the Progressives: Daniel T. Rogers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

Yet what stands out most in the regime scholarship is the central role played by political parties. The party realignment literature has produced perhaps the most influential and acclaimed work assessing political regimes.[24] Indeed, it is no stretch to say that realignment theory has long offered the primary framework for understanding American political history, particularly as it relates to the party system. It suggests that important "realigning" or "critical elections" result in major shifts in the parties' relative electoral strength and upset each party's internal composition. The dominant party falls into minority status, while the opposition party (or a new party, like the Republicans in 1860) takes power in Washington. This shift is accompanied by a new policy agenda reflecting the new majority party's ideology. The realignment genre's widely identified critical elections include 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932. However, Mayhew's recent broadside attack on realignment theory has called its key assumptions into serious question. Finding that it fails to satisfy its own requirements when confronted with empirical evidence, Mayhew concludes that realignment theory "does not come close to working."[25] Other work has, to one degree or another, questioned the whole enterprise of periodization.[26]

With his critique of realignment theory, critics worry that Mayhew has done to the political scientist what Frederick Nietzsche did to modern man – that is,

University Press, 1998). For policy regimes, see, for instance: Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*; Martha Derthick, *Policymaking for Social Security* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1979); Jonathan Oberlander, *The Political Life of Medicare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); W. Elliot Brownlee, "Tax Regimes, National Crises, and State-Building in America," *Funding the Modern American State, 1941–1995*, ed., Brownlee (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[24] There is a vast realignment literature. Among the most important works are: V.O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17 (1955), 3–18; Key, "Secular Realignment and the Party System," *Journal of Politics* 21 (1959), 198–210; E.E. Schattschneider, "United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government," ed., Sigmund Neumann, *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 194–215; Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960); James L. Sundquist, *The Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973); Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," *American Political Science Review* 59 (1965), 7–28; Burnham, "Party Systems and the Political Process," eds., William N. Chambers and Burnham, *The American Party System: Stages of Political Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970).

[25] Mayhew, *Electoral Realignments*, 156. There were also earlier critics of realignment theory; see especially, *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras*, ed., Byron E. Shafer, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991).

[26] Mayhew, "Suggested Guidelines for Periodization," *Polity* 37 (2005), 531–5; Orren and Skowronek, *In Search of American Political Development*; Orren and Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a New Institutionalism," *Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations*, eds., Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 311–30; Robert C. Lieberman, "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 96:4 (2002), 697–712.

undercut crucial foundational pillars for the entire basis of society (or, in Mayhew's case, the discipline).[27] Thus, political scientists are left collectively grasping for a firm foundational theory upon which to rest their regressions. Yet while Mayhew undeniably knocked down a pillar of the political science literature, he suggested three alternative ways of understanding American political history. They may be less unified and ultimately less satisfying than the neat and tidy realignments you can set your watch by, but Mayhew's hypotheses offer some hope to the disoriented political scientist teetering on the edge of theoretical abyss. The first such alternative to explain "long stretches of American history, in drawing together elections, parties, and policy making" – and the one explored here – is "bellicosity," or wars.[28] Mayhew notes that the five major wars fought between the 1750s and the 1860s create a compelling explanatory framework for the first third of American political history.

This book examines how major wars affect American domestic politics, arguing that they provide an explanatory framework that ties together American state building, democratic rights policy making, and the political party system. I suggest that American domestic politics is inevitably intertwined with international events and that foreign wars influence domestic politics in three important areas. First, government responses to the crises arising from wars engender alterations to the American state. Second, wars have frequently brought about the extension of full citizenship and civil rights to previously marginalized minority groups that contribute to a war effort. Finally, because wars are such disrupting events that have the ability to fundamentally upset the political landscape, they have frequently influenced the party system.

It is also worth noting that by better understanding the past we should be better positioned to intelligently grapple with current international conflicts and their domestic ramifications. Thus, while striving to advance our understanding of American political history, this book also seeks to utilize that knowledge as a resource in coming to terms with the contemporary political situation. In sum, to overlook wars in the study of domestic American politics is to miss a key causal variable.

War and the American State

According to political philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the primary reason governments are formed is to provide security.[29] Individuals

[27] Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, *Red Over Blue: The 2004 Elections and American Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 21–30.

[28] Mayhew, *Electoral Realignments*, 156. The other possibilities he suggests are race and economic growth. Mayhew notes: "... the elections figuring in these stories have not necessarily exhibited lasting wrenches, or indeed sometimes any wrenches at all, in voter alignments. Instead, conventional historical evidence about what seems to have happened when and why is the guide. Policy themes and an eye for electoral verdicts, irrespective of their statistical properties, are the starting points" (156–7).

[29] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651); John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (1689).

willingly forfeit the benefits inherent in the "state of nature" in order to gain a basic level of security for their lives and property in a state of law and order. Although modern states play a much larger and influential role in society than Locke imagined – and a far different one than Hobbes anticipated – protecting its citizenry remains the most basic and essential role of the state.

Drawing on Max Weber and Otto Hintze, a government, or state, is generally thought to encompass those institutions that exercise control over a specified region and its inhabitants.[30] For Theda Skocpol, the state includes "the administrative, judicial, and policing organizations that collect and dispense revenues, enforce the constitutive rules of the state and society, and maintain some modicum of domestic order."[31] Especially central to a state, according to Skowronek, are its bureaucracy, its military, and its economic regulation.[32] State building, then, can be thought of as an organizational process in which new governing institutions are created, existing institutions are expanded or strengthened, or the relationship between government and society is altered. It should be noted that, although state building has received extensive attention, it is also possible for the state to undergo changes that decrease its power, influence, or array of responsibilities.

Work on the American state has generally centered on two expansionary periods. The first encompasses those decades between the Civil War and the Great Depression during which the national government expanded its authority and created a professionalized bureaucracy. With regard to this period, Skowronek details the development of national administrative capacities, Skocpol explains the emergence of new benefit programs for veterans and poor mothers, and Bensel and Sanders establish the importance of regional conflicts and reform movements.[33] The second widely studied period of state building is the New Deal. This body of work argues that Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress responded to the economic calamities of the Great Depression by establishing new programs overseen by new agencies within the federal government.[34] Still other accounts put political parties, the bureaucracy, Congress, the presidency, or professionals at the center of state building.[35]

[30] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, eds., Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*.
[31] Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, 43.
[32] Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 4.
[33] Skowronek, *Building a New American State*; Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*; Bensel, *Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880–1980*; Sanders, *Roots of Reform*.
[34] See, for instance: Edwin Amenta, *Bold Relief* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
[35] Martin Shefter, *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Milkis, *Political Parties and Constitutional Government: Remaking American Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Scott C. James, "A Party System Perspective on the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," *Studies in American Political Development* 6 (1992), 163–210; James, "Building a Democratic Majority: The Progressive Party Vote and the Federal Trade Commission," *Studies in American Political Development* 9 (1995), 331–85; James, *Presidents, Parties and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884–1936* (New York: Cambridge