If there is one value that seems beyond reproach in modernity, it is that of the self and the terms that cluster around it, such as self-esteem, self-confidence, and self-respect. It is not clear, however, that all those who invoke the self really know what they are talking about, or that they are all talking about the same thing. What is this thing called ‘self’, then, and what is its psychological, philosophical, and educational salience? More specifically, what role do emotions play in the creation and constitution of the self? This book proposes a realist, emotion-grounded conception of selfhood. In arguing for a closer link between selfhood and emotion than has been previously suggested, the author critically explores and integrates self research from diverse academic fields. This is a provocative book that should excite anyone interested in cutting-edge research on self issues and emotions that lies at the intersection of psychology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and moral education.

Kristján Kristjánsson received his PhD in moral philosophy from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. He has taught at the University of Akureyri, Iceland, and at the University of Iceland, where he is currently Professor of Philosophy of Education. He has been a Visiting Fellow at Cornell University, University of Konstanz, St. Edmund’s College (Cambridge University), and Institute of Education (University of London). Kristjánsson has written four books in English and three in Icelandic. He has published numerous articles on topics in moral philosophy, emotion theory, and moral education in international journals. He is a member of the International Society for Research on Emotions and a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Moral Education.
For my beloved one, Nora (Chia-jung), who helps me sustain my selfhood.
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Contents

List of Tables xi
Acknowledgments xiii

1 Introduction 1
   1.1 The Age of the Self 1
   1.2 ‘Bracketing’ the Author 7
   1.3 Aristotelian Presuppositions 12
   1.4 Interdisciplinary Focus 16
   1.5 A Roadmap 18

2 What Selves Are 25
   2.1 Personality, Character, and Self 25
   2.2 Realism and Its Discontents 28
   2.3 Problems with Anti-Realism and Some Realist Alternatives 37
   2.4 Interlude: A Narrativist deus ex machina? 42
   2.5 Out of the Impasse: Humean Soft Self-Realism 46

3 Exploring Selves 53
   3.1 Fence Crossing or Fence Mending? 53
   3.2 Four Types of Naturalism 55
   3.3 ‘Psychologised Morality’ versus ‘Moralised Psychology’ 58
   3.4 Self Research as a Test Case 62
   3.5 Moving Forward in Unison 68

4 The Emotional Self 70
   4.1 Emotions and Selfhood 70
   4.2 Self-Creation and Emotion 73
   4.3 The Self-Conscious Emotions 77
## Contents

4.4 The ‘Gappiness Problem’ 86  
4.5 An ‘Integrative Model’ of Moral Selfhood? 94  

5 Self-Concept: Self-Esteem and Self-Confidence 99  
5.1 The Self-Esteem Industry 99  
5.2 The Debate about Global Self-Esteem 104  
5.3 Domain-Specific Self-Esteem and Self-Confidence 112  
5.4 Beyond Mere Self-Concept: Implicit Self-Esteem 116  
5.5 Self-Esteem, Emotion and Value 120  

6 The Self As Moral Character 128  
6.1 The Situationist Challenge 128  
6.2 The Psychological Experiments and Their Alleged Implications 130  
6.3 Two Initial Objections to Situationism 134  
6.4 The Two Aristotelian Objections to Situationism 137  
6.5 Rejoinders and Implications 142  

7 Self-Respect 148  
7.1 Self-Respect Instead of Self-Esteem? 148  
7.2 Psychological Misgivings about Self-Respect 151  
7.3 Kantian or Aristotelian Self-Respect? 153  
7.4 Measuring the Components of Aristotelian Self-Respect 161  
7.5 The Objectivity of Self-Respect Revisited 164  

8 Multicultural Selves 167  
8.1 Culture-Specific Self-Concepts? 167  
8.2 Interdependent versus Independent Self-Concepts 168  
8.3 Four Initial Responses and Why They Fail 174  
8.4 Self-Cultures and Emotion 181  
8.5 The Possibility of Synergic Selfhood – or Phronesis Revisited 183  

9 Self-Pathologies 191  
9.1 Pathologies of the Actual Full Self and of Self-Concept 191  
9.2 The Self-Conflicts of Suicide Terrorists 192  
9.3 The Case of ADD/ADHD 197  
9.4 Medicalised Selves 200  
9.5 The Hedonistic Self-Concept 209  

10 Self-Change and Self-Education 218  
10.1 Conceptual Preliminaries 218  
10.2 The Crystallised Self 221
Contents ix

10.3 The Incremental Self 224
10.4 The Homeostatic Self 228
10.5 Conclusion – and Some Educational Implications 232

References 249
Index 267
## List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>The ‘Dominant’ Self-Paradigm versus the ‘Alternative’ Self-Paradigm</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Contrasts between the Kantian and the Aristotelian Concepts of Self-Respect</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Contrasts between Traditional and Western/Liberal Self-Conceptions</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Explanations of Excessive Medicalisation</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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