CHAPTER I

Introduction

This study explores the significance and the meanings of nation, homeland and patriotism under the conditions of socialism in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The GDR hardly constitutes a 'typical' socialist state. A central pillar of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and a frontline state in the Cold War, the GDR remained under tight Soviet control until 1989. What made the GDR unique within the socialist bloc was the absence of a distinctive nationhood, which was constantly challenged by the larger and more prosperous part of Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). For this reason, those scholars who have considered the issue have argued that in the GDR, nationalism played next to no role 'as movement, as political idea, and as popular sentiment' before 1989.[1] The idea of the nation, such as it existed, was closely tied to the promise of consumerism in the FRG – 'DM Nationalismus', as Jürgen Habermas called it. National identity appeared to be of little consequence in assessing the history of the GDR and its collapse. Even German reunification 'was not so much a nationalist idea as a route for East Germans to an imagined world of prosperity and freedom'.[2]

This book shows that the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) was extremely concerned to construct a GDR-specific sense of nationhood precisely because the Federal Republic provided a constant threat to the viability of the GDR, with socialism having only a tenuous hold over the majority of the population. From the 1950s, the SED tried to construct an

[1] Mary Fulbrook, 'Nationalism in the second German unification', in John Breuilly and Ron Speirs (eds.), *Germany's Two Unifications: Anticipations, Experiences, Responses* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 241–60; here p. 243.

[2] The arguments advanced by Mary Fulbrook and John Breuilly are very similar indeed. John Breuilly, 'Conclusion: nationalism and German Reunification', in John Breuilly (ed.), *The State of Germany: The National Idea in the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern Nation-State* (Harlow: Longman, 1992), pp. 224–38; here p. 231. Fulbrook, 'Nationalism', pp. 241–60. Mary Fulbrook, 'Nation, state and political culture in divided Germany, 1945–90', in Breuilly (ed.), *The State of Germany*, pp. 177–200.



1. The GDR and its districts, 1952–90

emotional attachment to the GDR that would be reflected in individual identifications and popular practices. This study explores how the party invented the GDR as a distinctive 'nation', and how citizens and communities responded to this. In examining the SED's ability to realize its ideal of national identity in popular practice, this book provides a new understanding of the power of socialism in everyday life.

This examination of how nationhood was constructed in socialist Germany helps to overcome a tendency to perceive the GDR as a special case in history, in relation both to Eastern Europe and to Germany. In other states under Soviet domination, socialist parties came to rely on an ethnic construction of nationhood to sustain their legitimacy.[3] Soviet scholars have argued that during the Stalinist era 'nation' came to replace 'class' as the primary category for social ordering, with the 1936 constitution formalizing the transition from 'class' to 'people' (*narod*).[4] Similarly, historians of Eastern Europe have shown that as communist regimes matured in the 1960s, they sought to engender popular support primarily in relation to claims of national, rather than social, belonging.[5] In contrast to other states in Eastern and Central Europe, the GDR could not lay claim to an ethnic sense of nationhood. However, the party could, and did, develop a socialist ideal of nationhood that defined itself through class, local affinities, and the local and regional traditions that were specific to the GDR. As in other socialist states, the party tried to appropriate popular notions of locality and place to define traditions that expressed the socialist nation.

More striking even than the parallels to other socialist states are the ways in which the party, despite its claims to break with the German 'capitalist'

[3] Yuri Slezkine, 'The USSR as a communal apartment, or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism', in Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Stalinism: New Directions* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 313–47.

[4] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 2001); here pp. 449–50. Greg Castillo, 'Peoples at an exhibition: Soviet architecture and the national question', in Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko (eds.), *Socialist Realism without Shores* (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 91–119. Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation*, 2nd edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), ch. 13. Francine Hirsch, 'The Soviet Union as work-in-progress: Ethnographers and the category of nationality in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 census', *Slavic Review* 56 (1997), 251–78.

[5] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania*, 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Gail Kligman, *The Wedding of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics and Popular Culture in Transylvania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Gail Kligman, *Căluş: Symbolic Transformation in Romanian Ritual*, 2nd edn (Bucharest: The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, 1999). Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy* (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1980), pp. 40–3.

past, attached its ideals of nationhood to a German tradition of heimat. Literally translated as 'homeland', during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries heimat acquired rich connotations of protectedness, familiarity and order. In German history, heimat expressed notions of community and belonging through a physical, geographical sense of place. It also allowed the articulation of that which was lost: one's childhood, the community of times past, and, especially after 1945, one's birthplace.[6] Heimat acquired its significance over time through its malleability. It could accommodate the transformations of modernity and the political changes of the twentieth century. It allowed individuals to experience these challenges through the traditions of the locality, the familiar and communal relations that defined it, and the physical environment expressed in landscape, monuments and buildings. Heimat, in other words, allowed Germans to maintain a sense of community in the face of constant territorial, political, economic and social ruptures. It was located at the centre of an emotional and political discourse about place, belonging and identity throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Germany,[7] and the GDR era was no exception.

This work contributes to a flourishing academic debate about the relationship between locality and nationhood in Germany. In her pioneering work, Celia Applegate argued that heimat mediated the emergence of the nation state, reconciling the 'local world with the larger, more impersonal national one'.[8] Further studies have demonstrated just how close nationhood was to local notions of belonging in the German-speaking lands from the middle of the nineteenth century.[9] Debates about the nature of the locality, and its relation to the German nation, existed not just in more remote small towns and regions, but also in fast-changing towns like Hamburg or Frankfurt.[10]

[6] Johannes von Moltke, *No Place like Home: Locations of* Heimat *in German Cinema* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 6–18.

[7] Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of* Heimat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), ch. 1 ('Heimat and German Identity'). See also Elizabeth Boa and Rachel Palfreyman, Heimat: *A German Dream. Regional Loyalties and National Identity in German Culture, 1890–1990* (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 23–9.

[8] Applegate, *Nation*, p. 115.

[9] David Blackbourn and Jim Retallack (eds.), *Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930* (Toronto University Press, 2007).

[10] Jennifer Jenkins, *Provincial Modernity: Local Culture and Liberal Politics in Fin-de-Siècle Hamburg* (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 2003); here pp. 218–19. Jan Palmowski, *Urban Liberalism in Imperial Germany: Frankfurt am Main, 1866–1914* (Oxford University Press, 1999), esp. ch. 4. Till van Rahden, *Juden und andere Breslauer: Die Beziehungen zwischen Juden, Protestanten und Katholiken in einer deutschen Großstadt von 1860 bis 1925* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000).

While the significance of heimat for the construction of German nationhood has become widely accepted, Alon Confino has challenged precisely how the locality related to the nation. Confino argues that the imagination of the German nation through heimat became so ubiquitous that heimat turned into an interchangeable representation of the local, the regional and the nation. The nation, in this reading, was not imagined through a specific local context; rather the heimat became a universally applicable metaphor for state and nation.[11] The value of Confino's work lies not only in generating a debate about how the locality related to the imagination of the nation; he also highlighted the significance of Germany's component territorial states in the construction of German national identity. The ways in which such states and their rulers shaped a memory culture of their own further complicated and affected individual and communal notions of locality and nationhood.[12]

The disagreement about the nature of heimat and national identity reflects the quintessential ambiguity of heimat, which allowed Germans to project on to it shifting notions of place and identity over time.[13] In the GDR, by contrast, the socialist party developed very clear ideas about how heimat, socialism and nationhood should relate to one another. What happened when the idea of heimat was appropriated so comprehensively by the state, and how did this impact upon popular culture? In the administrative reform of 1952, the SED replaced the federal states with fourteen districts, in order to improve central control over the regions. The boundaries of these districts were drawn according to economic and political criteria, in an attempt to overcome regional traditions tied to historical dynastic and ecclesiastical boundaries. How successful could the party be in reshaping popular traditions that signified the joy of socialism, given the obduracy of heimat culture? These questions raise a wider issue which scholars of nationalism have discussed: what, if any, are the limits on the ability of political elites to 'construct' nationhood, particularly as regards the extent to which successful concepts of nationhood rely on pre-existing

[11] Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); here p. 184.

[12] Andreas Fahrmeir, 'National colours and national identity in early nineteenth-century Germany', in David Laven and Lucy Riall (eds.), *Napoleon's Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), pp. 199–216. Jim Retallack, '"Why can't a Saxon be more like a Prussian?" Regional identities and the birth of modern political culture in Germany, 1866–67', *Canadian Journal of History* 32 (1997), 26–55. Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 2001). Siegfried Weichlein, *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Kaiserreich* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004).

[13] Von Moltke, *Place*, p. 8.

'cultural resources'?[14] For the GDR, this book explores the limitations of the state and party's ability to invent 'national' traditions.

Inasmuch as the GDR has featured in discussions about heimat, scholars have largely limited their focus to the 1950s. In looking at the production of popular heimat culture, and the organization of heimat practices, historians have found a surprising accommodation between socialism and heimat.[15] However, we still have little sense of how the idea of heimat developed beyond the 1950s, while even for that decade the compatibility of heimat and socialism is unclear. Ultimately, Alon Confino argued, 'poetics of nationhood and the ideology of class' could not be reconciled.[16] If this was so, what was it about class that was so much more incompatible with German concepts of nationhood than capitalism? Moreover, if socialist ideology had such a detrimental effect on conceptions of heimat in the GDR, how did successive ideological reformulations of socialism affect the construction of heimat? This study explores in more depth how heimat related to socialist ideology, and how this relationship evolved from the 1940s to the 1980s. In doing so, the book shows that both in socialist ideology and in popular custom, ideals and practices of heimat proved remarkably responsive to ongoing changes in socialist ideology.

Heimat was not the only ideal through which the party attempted to construct legitimacy. Scholars have shown how the party used anti-fascism to define a country that in overcoming the past was distinct from West Germany and morally superior to it.[17] Moreover, as this book confirms, the party's claims to be constructing a socialist society that could provide a

[14] Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity* (Oxford University Press, 2003); here pp. 42–3.

[15] Willi Oberkrome, *„Deutsche* Heimat*": Nationale Konzeption und regionale Praxis von Naturschutz, Landschaftsgestaltung und Kulturpolitik in Westfalen-Lippe und Thüringen (1900–1960)* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004). Thomas Schaarschmidt, *Regionalkultur und Diktatur: Sächsische Heimatbewegung und* Heimat-*Propaganda im Dritten Reich und in der SBZ/DDR* (Weimar/Cologne/Vienna: Böhlau, 2004). Jan Palmowski, 'Building an East German nation: the construction of a socialist heimat, 1945–61', *Central European History* 37 (2004), 365–99. Von Moltke, *Place*, ch. 7. Thomas Lindenberger, 'Home, sweet home: desperately seeking heimat in early DEFA films', *Film History* 18 (2006), 46–58.

[16] Alon Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), pp. 93, 111.

[17] Josie McLellan, *Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: Remembering the International Brigades, 1945–1989* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). On the problems and internal contradictions in the GDR's anti-fascism ideal, see Annette Leo and Peter Reif-Spirek (eds.), *Vielstimmiges Schweigen: Neue Studien zum DDR-Antifaschismus* (Berlin: Metropol, 2001). Benita Blessing, *The Antifascist Classroom: Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945–9* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Insa Eschenbach, 'Zur Umcodierung der eigenen Vergangenheit: Antifaschismuskonstruktionen in Rehabilitationsgesuchen ehemaliger Mitglieder der NSDAP, Berlin 1945/46', in Alf Lüdtke and Peter Becker (eds.), *Akten, Eingaben, Schaufenster: Die DDR und ihre Texte* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1997), pp. 79–90.

preferable alternative to capitalism also became constitutive of the GDR.[18] What distinguished heimat from these ideals was that it did not just help reinforce the legitimacy of the second German *state*: it allowed the party to go further and lay claim to a distinctive *nationhood* for the GDR.

For the party, the invention of the GDR as a socialist nation was as difficult as it was important because of the deep-seated, and continuing, unpopularity of Germany's division. Moreover, at the Yalta Conference in 1945 the Allied powers had defined the GDR's borders according to geopolitical rather than cultural and historical considerations. When the GDR was created in 1949, there were no specific sites of memory that were shared by its composite regions but not by West Germany. If the party wanted to ensure the viability of the GDR as a 'nation' it was crucial that it create such sites of memory, by redefining places of all-German importance in exclusive relation to the GDR.

The party could succeed in forging a distinctive nationhood only if it managed to capture the popular imagination. Since anti-fascism and socialism never acquired sufficient popularity on their own, these sources of legitimacy were also increasingly formulated through images and practices of heimat. This allowed the party to relate its ideals to local traditions shaped by amateur choirs, hobby groups and beautification activists. Heimat affinities were also the subject of countless songs, publications and television shows. This was a culture which resonated amongst a majority of the population, in north and south, in towns and in the countryside. Of course, cultural practices relating to heimat can easily be dismissed as a sphere of cultural banality in which politics had no place.[19] However, the state's attempt to construct a 'national' identity through heimat became so pervasive that even the most acerbic teenager could not have remained unaware of the party's 'socialist heimat' ideal. The political significance of heimat lay precisely in its apparent banality and its omnipresence. It could potentially enable the party to reach the majority of the population on whom socialism alone had little impact.

By investigating how nationhood and the imagination of the GDR were constructed and popularized, this book addresses a question that is central not just to the study of heimat, but also to GDR historiography more generally, namely how the party's actions affected its citizens, and how the citizens responded. How did individuals and communities respond to the

[18] Peter C. Caldwell, *Dictatorship, State Planning and Social Theory in the German Democratic Republic* (Cambridge University Press, 2003). Jonathan R. Zatlin, *The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[19] Sandrine Kott, 'Zur Geschichte des kulturellen Lebens in DDR-Betrieben: Konzepte und Praxis der betrieblichen Kulturarbeit', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 39 (1999), 167–95.

appropriation of their heimat identifications as acts of socialist citizenship? To what extent did heimat offer a viable framework in which actors could appropriate socialism in their own way, and what strategies were left to individuals to keep the party's influence at bay through strategies of subversion or foot-dragging? Because of the singular importance which heimat acquired both in socialism and in popular practices, it provides a unique perspective through which we can examine the relationship between power, ideology, cultural practices and individual meanings.

In its subject and its methodology, this book makes a distinctive contribution to the historiography of the GDR. Since the 1990s, scholars have focused on the formal mechanisms through which the SED and its fellow mass organizations exercised power. Their work suggests that the SED was the lynchpin of power, leaving individuals and communities with little autonomy.[20] Such overviews have been accompanied by research into the country's economic, political, military and legal structures.[21] Combined with vigorous research on the workings of the state security services (the Stasi),[22] these works have yielded much valuable insight into how the party exerted control over institutions and structures, and how it co-opted elites.[23] Closely related to some of these concerns was the renaissance of 'totalitarian' approaches as a conceptual framework. Emphasizing the 'totalitarian' aspects of power allowed historians to study the GDR in a comparative framework, not least in relation to the preceding German dictatorship, the Third Reich.[24] Power and repression, from this point of view, were imposed by the party, so

[20] Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR 1945–89* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992). Klaus Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat: Partei, Staat und Gesellschaft, 1949–1990* (Munich: Hanser, 1999).

[21] Hermann Wentker, *Justiz in der SBZ/DDR 1945–53: Transformation und Rolle ihrer zentralen Institutionen* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001). Dierk Hoffmann, *Aufbau und Krise der Planwirtschaft: Die Arbeitskräftelenkung in der SBZ/DDR 1945–63* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002). Hans Ehlert and Mathias Rogg (eds.), *Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR* (Berlin: Links, 2004) as well as other volumes in the series of the Military Research Institute (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt) in Potsdam. Curiously, there are more monographs now on the client parties of the SED than on the SED itself: Theresia Bauer, *Blockpartei und Agrarrevolution von oben: Die Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands, 1948–1963* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003). Ulf Sommer, *Die Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands: Eine Blockpartei unter der Führung der SED* (Münster: Agenda, 1996).

[22] The best overviews are Jens Gieseke, *Die hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit: Personalstruktur und Lebenswelt 1950–1989/90* (Berlin: Links, 2000), and Jens Gieseke, *Der Mielke-Konzern: Die Geschichte der Stasi 1945–90*, 2nd edn (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006). The research department of the BStU has produced a wealth of information on the workings of the Stasi: www.bstu.bund.de.

[23] John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech and Polish Higher Education* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

[24] For an excellent overview of this approach and its results, see Günther Heydemann and Detlef Schmiechen-Ackermann (eds.), *Diktaturen in Deutschland – Vergleichsaspekte* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2003).

that the collapse of the GDR in 1989 could be understood only as a breakdown of political (and economic) power.

Against this perspective, a host of scholars have pointed to ever more limitations on the reach of state and party. Not only did the party fail in its economic goals,[25] but its ideal of the classless society was belied by the persistence of inter- and intra-class divisions.[26] The party also found it difficult to reach the population ideologically. In relation to youth culture, for instance, the party had difficulty in inculcating the young with many of its own values,[27] and found it even harder to dissuade them from habits which it considered to be subversive.[28] Even in relation to the party itself, citizens were not quite as powerless as more structural accounts suggest. The tone, number and subjects of petitions sent in to the state show that the population was far from docile. Citizens had apparently learned to 'play the rules' of the political system, forcing the party in turn to respond and sometimes even concede the petitioners' demands.[29]

Paradoxically, then, GDR research has established the sometimes extraordinary reach of the party and its security apparatus, while also noting the wide spheres of autonomy that individuals maintained and even acquired vis-à-vis the party. Pointing to the 'limits of dictatorship', Richard Bessel and Ralph Jessen suggested that state and party were so concerned to invade every facet of private and public life, enlisting almost every citizen into at least one of their mass organizations, that this attempt at 'total' control could not fail to create individual spheres of autonomy in the process.[30]

[25] Jeffrey Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945–1989* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). André Steiner, *Von Plan zu Plan* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004). Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2005).

[26] Hartmut Kaelble, Jürgen Kocka, Hartmut Zwahr (eds.), *Sozialgeschichte der DDR* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1994).

[27] Alan McDougall, *Youth Politics in East Germany: The Free German Youth Movement, 1946–1968* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).

[28] Mark Fenemore, *Sex, Thugs and Rock'n'Roll. Teenage Rebels in Cold-War East Germany* (New York / Oxford: Berghahn, 2008). Mark Fenemore, 'The limits of repression and reform: youth policy in the early 1960s', in Patrick Major and Jonathan Osmond (eds.), *The Workers' and Peasants' State: Communism and Society in East Germany under Ulbricht, 1945–71* (Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 171–89. Alan L. Nothnagle, *Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945–89* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1999). Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

[29] Ina Merkel, *Wir sind doch nicht die Meckerecke der Nation! Briefe an das Fernsehen der DDR* (Berlin: Schwarzkopf, 1997).

[30] Richard Bessel and Ralph Jessen, 'Einleitung: Die Grenzen der Diktatur', in Richard Bessel and Ralph Jessen (eds.), *Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1996), pp. 7–24; here pp. 14–16.

Others have noted that in many areas, such as in welfare policies, the party did achieve genuine support, so that for many citizens the dictatorial aspects of the regime receded into the background.[31] Mary Fulbrook has even suggested that the GDR is best understood as a 'participatory dictatorship'. Taking full account of the repressive mechanisms at the regime's disposal, she argues that, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, it was nevertheless possible for most citizens to lead 'normal' lives. Given that there were millions who assisted state and party through voluntary offices (which included that of unofficial informer for the state security services), it appears that most individuals had accepted the 'normality' of their existence, without necessarily losing their critical distance.[32]

The notion of the 'participatory dictatorship', like so many others, rephrases rather than solves the central issue of how everyday practices related to the dictatorial regime of the party. What did it signify for their commitment to the state when individuals became unofficial informants for the Stasi, when they joined the Cultural League, or when they volunteered for participatory campaigns organized by the National Front? We still have insufficient knowledge about how activity within the institutions of state and party affected the ways in which individuals identified with their circumstances. Nor is it sufficiently clear how the citizens' participation in the GDR's mass organizations and its other institutions helped to sustain existing power relations; after all, millions of citizens continued to be active in this manner until 1989, when the socialist order imploded nonetheless.

This book addresses these issues by looking more closely at how the power of state and party was appropriated, subverted, and even resisted in everyday life. By exploring contestations of heimat and 'national' identity in day-to-day situations, it seeks to examine some of the social and cultural practices through which people learned to 'make do' with their circumstances.[33] This perspective is essential for avoiding an understanding of history that is partial at best. By taking seriously the meanings of the 'many', those who normally remain 'nameless' in historical accounts,[34]

[31] Konrad Jarausch (ed.), *Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR*, trans. Eve Duffy (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 1999).

[32] Mary Fulbrook, *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). Her idea of normalization is rigorously defended by Jeanette Madarász, *Working in East Germany: Normality in a Socialist Dictatorship, 1961–79* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[33] Alf Lüdtke, 'Alltagsgeschichte – ein Bericht von Unterwegs', *Historische Anthropologie* 11 (2003), 278–95.

[34] Alf Lüdtke, 'Introduction: what is the history of everyday life and who are its practitioners?', in Alf Lüdtke (ed.), *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life* (Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 3–40; here esp. pp. 3–4.