This book presents a novel and comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to undercut dualistic accounts of qualitative states. Other topics include visual awareness, visual appearances, emotional qualia, and meta-cognitive processing. This important work will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

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CONSCIOUSNESS

CHRISTOPHER S. HILL

Brown University
For Lee Warren
Wise, generous, antic
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Acknowledgments

I have been helped tremendously, at several stages, by conversations with Anil Gupta. He has played two roles – that of critic and that of midwife. I am deeply grateful for his advice and support. I have also been helped considerably by conversations and e-mail exchanges with David Bennett, Ned Block, Justin Broackes, Anthony Brueckner, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Paul Copcock, Ivan Fox, Christopher Frey, Jeremy Goodman, Anjana Jacob, Sean Kelly, Jaegwon Kim, Uriah Kriegel, Joseph Levine, Heather Logue, William Lycan, Jack Lyons, Brian McLaughlin, Kevin Morris, Maxwell Pines, Jeffrey Poland, Eoin Ryan, Joshua Schechter, Eric Schwitzgebel, Thomas Senor, Sydney Shoemaker, Susanna Siegel, Ernest Sosa, Michael Tarr, James Van Cleve, Barbara Von Eckardt, and William Warren. I am especially indebted to Bennett and Warren.

Several chapters and parts of chapters provided the basis for talks at the Australian National University, Cornell University, Monash University, the University of Arizona, the University of Arkansas, the University of Connecticut, the University of California, Davis, the University of Manitoba, the University of Melbourne, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Sydney. Questions and comments from audiences at these institutions improved my understanding of the issues considerably, as did the questions and comments following talks at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and a conference at the University of Magdeburg. I remember with particular appreciation an observation by John Bigelow following my talk at Monash.

Anil Gupta, Joseph Levine, and two anonymous referees for Cambridge University Press read the penultimate version of the manuscript and provided extremely insightful criticisms and suggestions. Their comments have resulted in many improvements, both great and small.

I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Brown University, which granted me two leaves of absence while I was working on this
Acknowledgments

project, the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University, and the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Early versions of the ideas in this work appeared in books or journals edited by Murat Aydede, Alex Byrne, Rocco Gennaro, Uriah Kriegel, David Sosa, and Ernest Sosa. I very much appreciate their encouragement, insight, and patience.


The photographs reproduced in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 were taken by Barbara Von Eckardt.