Chapter 1

Another way of telling: Marxist perspectives in archaeology
Matthew Spriggs

Photographs so placed are restored to a living context: not of course to the original temporal context from which they were taken — this is impossible — but to a context of experience. And their ambiguity at last becomes true. It allows what they show to be appropriated by reflection. The world they reveal, frozen, becomes tractable. The information they contain becomes permeated by feeling. Appearances become the language of a lived life.

John Berger (1982: 289)

Where from?

Marxism is a rich tradition, having been an element in Western social science since the late nineteenth century. Now that this partially hidden tradition has come into prominence it is time to examine its strengths and weaknesses, if only to transcend its limitations. The increasing interest in Marxist theories in the social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s has had a profound effect on history, sociology and anthropology but has only more recently come to influence archaeological thinking. This interest is the result of a general crisis in the social sciences, the widespread recognition of the inadequacies (theoretical, political and practical) of established approaches in the wake of major world-wide economic and political changes from the mid-1950s onwards (Copans and Seddon 1978: 1–2). In anthropology more specific influences have come from theoretical developments in France, from the radical critics of anthropology as a child of colonialism, and
from the so-called Hegelian and phenomenological Marxist theorists (Kahn and Llobera 1981: 264). The history of the recent interest in Marxism and anthropology in France, Britain and the USA has been discussed in general terms by Copans and Seddon (1978), and its early strong focus in France in more detail by Kahn and Llobera (1981: 264–300). There has been a growing feeling in the social sciences (expressed well by Goddler) that there is:

the need to carry out a theoretical revolution in the humanities, a revolution that becomes daily more urgent if we are to rescue these sciences from the deadends of functionalist empiricism or the helplessness of structuralism in the face of history. It seems to me that such a revolution must today proceed by way of the reconstruction of these sciences on the basis of a Marxism that has been radically purged of all traces of vulgar materialism and dogmatism.

(Goddler 1972: xii–xiii.)

Archaeology too was not unaffected by the crisis, but both in the USA and Britain the ‘new archaeology’ took the form of a positivist and functionalist vision reflecting more the tenets of the 1950s ‘orthodox consensus’ in American sociology (cf. Giddens 1979: 234–59) than the new directions developing elsewhere in the social sciences. This is all the more surprising since archaeology had already produced in V. Gordon Childe an early dissentant (from a Marxist perspective) of many of the themes that came to the fore in social science in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly concerning the ‘sociology of knowledge’ (for instance Childe 1947; 1949a; 1949b; 1956; cf. Gathercole, Kus, Rowlands, this volume). While Childe doubtless influenced students, it is interesting that no significant Childean theoretical ‘school’ developed in the 1940s and 1950s.1

One of the more positive aspects of the ‘new archaeology’ was its insistence that, ‘Archaeology is anthropology, or it is nothing’ (Phillips 1955: 246–7; cf. Binford 1962). There was a concern among archaeologists to break down the barriers between their discipline and sociocultural anthropology (a concern at that time very rarely reciprocated by the anthropologists). The question was inevitably raised of the kind of anthropology archaeology should become, bringing the latter at one remove into wider social science debates. As one commentator put it, ‘if archaeology is pre-Marxian (British) anthropology it would be nothing’ (Groube 1977: 79). The recent renewed interest in Marxist theory among Western archaeologists thus largely developed via the influence of trends in sociocultural anthropology (Spriggs 1977: 3–5),2 and Childe was only later discovered as a revered ancestor. As Klein has written (1977: 20), ‘A quarter century ago, Childe was a white crow among Western archaeologists. We are now witnessing a certain “Childeization” of Western archaeology.’

For many years, of course, there has been an interest in Marxist ideas among archaeologists in the socialist countries; and Soviet archaeology had a formative influence on Childe’s Marxism. Since Childe, however, Soviet archaeological theory has had little influence on Western archaeologists except perhaps on those working in Western Asia (Kohl 1981a; this volume). Summaries of recent Soviet theoretical perspectives are given by Klein (1977), Bulkin et al. (1982) and in a volume edited by Gellner (1981). Chang has summarized developments in Chinese archaeology since 1949 (1977; 1981: 166–8).

Where?

Marxism means many things to many people and today it is by no means the monolithic system of thought it is often represented to be. As Kahn and Llobera point out (1981: 301–6) there can be no ‘pure’ Marxism in a contemporary context. Giddens notes (1979: 234) that recent Marxist theorizing has tended to replicate the theoretical divisions and conceptions of previous social science approaches, producing functionalist Marxism, structuralist Marxism, and so on. Following Giddens (1979: 150–3) we can distinguish at least seven views of Marx’s materialism which various commentators (pro and con) have adhered to, a diversity of views reflecting the often ambiguous and contradictory descriptions of the ‘materialist interpretation of history’ in Marx’s own writing. These views are:

1 A methodology for historical analysis developed in opposition to Hegel’s idealist philosophy.
2 A conception of human praxis ‘emphasizing that human beings are neither to be treated as passive objects, nor as wholly free subjects’ (1979: 150–1), a view opposed both to idealism and Feuerbach’s ‘mechanical materialism’. The objects of study are definite social practices geared into human needs.
3 An associated viewpoint emphasizing the significance of labour in the development of human society, where labour is understood either as the ‘interplay of human activity and material nature’ (1979: 151) (a concept of labour shading into that of praxis), or alternatively as having the more limited meaning of work process, economic activity. Very different kinds of history are produced using these two different conceptions.
4 A theory of social change stressing determination by economic factors. Precise definitions are again crucial here, particularly of ‘economic’ (cf. Gregory, this volume) and of ‘determination’. Ambiguities in Marx’s own formulation have allowed economic and technological determinist interpretations of Marxism to be developed, such as the cultural materialism of Harris (1968; 1979).
5 A functional theory of the relations between infrastructure (‘base’) and superstructure stressing the need (in opposition to idealist perspectives) to connect political and ideological institutions to economic institutions as parts of a totality. As Giddens notes this viewpoint is explicit or implicit in much Althusserian and structural-Marxist anthropology.
Another way of telling

6 A reductionist theory of consciousness treating the content of human consciousness as determined by 'material factors', ideas being considered as reflecting the material conditions of social life and having little or no autonomy.

7 A theory of the central importance of class divisions, where 'the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles' (Marx and Engels 1968: 35).

These various interpretations of Marx's materialism are not all mutually exclusive and current Marxist perspectives may stress one or a range of them. Giddens himself accepts the validity of 1, 2 and in part 3, 4 and 7 (1979: 153). The discerning reader can perhaps find all seven views represented in this book. Several current perspectives in Marxist anthropology can be loosely delineated: the Althusserian Marxists (Meillassoux, Rey and Terray), the structural Marxists (early Friedman, Godelier) and the World Systems Approach (Ekholm, later Friedman) being most easy to pinpoint. In addition there are the Critical Theorists, the so-called Hegelian Marxists and the phenomenological Marxists (Diamond, Habermas, Krader, Scholte). Many individual anthropologists (and archaeologists) cannot be so neatly typed, however, and use approaches drawn from aspects of the above and other traditions such as Weberian theory. Eric Wolf (1981) and Peter Worsley (1981) are examples, offering influential viewpoints which are not closely associated with any of the previously mentioned perspectives. This is not the place for a detailed summary of the different Marxist perspectives in anthropology. Several recent publications in archaeology and anthropology have presented and discussed these viewpoints in detail.3

While it is necessary to stress the divergence of viewpoints that a phrase such as 'Marxist anthropology' hides, there are a series of positions which unite the views of many Marxist anthropologists and archaeologists. These are summarized below:

1 All view Marx as an important intellectual ancestor and their analyses as being ultimately inspired by ideas he first developed. All however would also accept that there is much 'dead wood' in Marx's work as well as ambiguities and underdeveloped theory which need to be critically examined. As Kahn and Llobera put it (1981: xi–xii): 'A unified human and social science cannot exist without being inspired by the theoretical insights and theoretical contributions of Marx; Marxism cannot survive as a creative endeavour without constantly borrowing from new developments in the social sciences.'

2 Following from this many would accept the need to break down current disciplinary boundaries and aim to produce a unified human and social science in history. In this sense 'Marxist anthropology' or 'Marxist archaeology' are self-contradictory terms and the idea of a 'Marxist economic anthropology' even more so (cf. Copans and Seddon 1978: 40; Gledhill 1981;

Kahn and Llobera 1981: ix–x). So far this acceptance is more honoured in the breach.

3 There is a general dissatisfaction, as mentioned in the beginning of this paper, with previous approaches in the social sciences such as functionalism, structuralism and phenomenology. There is wide divergence, however, on the question of the contribution other approaches can make to developing Marxist theory, particularly in regard to structuralism. While Marxists have developed often devastating critiques of other approaches, particularly of functionalism, they are often prone to employ functionalist arguments in practice.

4 There is a concern to reject the ideal/material and subject/object dichotomies traditional to much of Western thought. 'The chief defect of all existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively' (Marx and Engels 1970: 121). O'Lauglin puts the point well: 'thought can appropriate the concrete; material structure is knowable' (1975: 343; cf. Kus, this volume).

5 Social reality is seen as a contradictory reality, following from 'the conception of social structure as a unity of opposites and from differences of interests between individual agents and groups. Contradiction and conflict of interest provide an initial basis for an understanding of change, domination and legitimation of the social order' (Tilley 1982: 37).

6 Social structures are viewed as dialectical, dynamic processes, relations between being and becoming, and so cannot be known positively through their surface form. As in structuralist thinking reality cannot be understood on the surface of things (O'Lauglin 1975: 343). 'All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided' (Marx 1894: 817).

7 There is a recognition of the social basis of knowledge. Knowledge is historically dependent and so the positivist goal of absolute certainty is unobtainable (see the works of Childe previously referred to, Gathercole, Kus, Pearson, Rowlands, this volume). As recognized by Merleau-Ponty: 'We can never be the past: it is only a spectacle before us, which is there for us to question. The questions come from us, and thus the responses in principle do not exhaust historical reality, since historical reality does not depend upon them for its existence' (1964: 194).

This book is not an attempt to develop a Marxist 'school' of archaeology. For reasons I hope have become clear such a project is both impossible and undesirable. The selection of papers presented here has been deliberately eclectic, designed to represent a range of Marxist perspectives on questions of
interest to archaeologists. Several major themes are examined by the authors, sometimes from widely divergent positions. These are discussed below.

It has been stressed already that Marxism is not a dogma, and that a critical stance is general among those developing Marxist perspectives in the social sciences. One of the important themes of this book is to examine a range of Marxist concepts in order to separate living ideas in Marx’s work from ‘dead wood’, a theme taken up in detail by Gathierole, Gilman, Gledhill, Gregory, Kus and Pearson. One central concern is the dynamic of history. All would probably agree that contradiction and conflict provide an initial basis for an understanding of domination, legitimation and change. Giddens, contrasting functionalism and Marxism, has put the point well: ‘Don’t look for the functions social practices fulfill, look for the contradictions they embody!’ (1979: 131). The levels at which contradictions and conflicts operate in any particular historical situation, however, are open to debate.

The most classic formulation is that of the contradiction between forces and relations of production, many contributors following Marx’s classic statements from the 1859 Preface. Gilman (this volume) sees this contradiction as the key to the Upper Palaeolithic Revolution and as long as the tendency (found in many earlier Marxist writers) of reducing this to technological determinism rather than dialectic relation is avoided, it remains a useful concept (cf. Pearson, this volume). Giddens (1979: 154; 1981: 88–9) is surely mistaken, as Pearson points out, to suggest that this contradiction is only of importance within capitalism. There are many cases in history where this dialectic can be examined (cf. Spriggs 1981). As Bate points out in Part 2 on ‘Situating the economic’, if we are to gain a clear appreciation of this dialectic a more quantified approach to the consideration of productive forces is necessary. This point is further taken up by Tosi in relation to craft specialisation and the division of labour in emerging class systems.

A second contradiction (also discussed by Pearson) is between the appropriation and consumption of surplus and the social organization of its production, a theme handled sensitively by Gledhill in his contribution. This of course links to the idea of the central importance of class struggle in Marxist thought, raising the question of how Marxism can understand the pre-class societies of history and prehistory (Gilman, Gledhill, Pearson, this volume). Both Gilman and Pearson stress the tensions and divisions underlying the corporate solidarity of the social group in pre-class societies. Gilman points out that distinct ‘interest groups’ do occur – males versus females, elders versus cadets, and so on (cf. Torell 1972). Looked at in this way the tiresome debate among Marxist anthropologists about whether women or cadets form a ‘class’ in the classic sense of the term might be resolved.

When we discuss class interests and power, we have to consider the questions of ideology and the legitimation of power. These topics are covered in Part 3 on ‘Representation and ideology’. Giddens (1979; 1981) has made an important contribution in this field, an area of theory where Marx is the inevitable starting point but which is in need of considerable development. In this volume Kristiansen, Kus and Pearson consider current notions of ideology and their limitations, criticizing the commonly held position that ideology is determined by the economy rather than co-existing in a reflexive relationship with it (cf. Kus 1979; 1982; Leone 1982; Tilley 1982). As Tilley suggests, ‘The degree, and the nature of the legitimation of the social order, would appear to be a key element in maintaining social reproduction rather than transformation and the strongest form of this legitimation is likely to involve ideological forms of manipulation, which serve to justify the social order’ (1982: 36).

A reductionist view of ideology owes much to a base—superstructure model of social totalities, with a strongly determinist notion of an economic ‘base’ in relation to the ideological and juridico-political ‘superstructure’. As Gathierole (this volume) notes, the usefulness of a base—superstructure metaphor has been a subject of debate within Marxist circles for some years. It is often discussed among Marxist anthropologists in terms of the problem posed by kinship for the idea of a determinist economic base (cf. Gregory, this volume). The structural-Marxist reformulation of the concept of mode of production has satisfied some but Kus (this volume) considers that this concept has outlived its usefulness and that rather than developing it further it should simply be dropped. We are close to a watershed in Marxist thought on this question, one considered in detail by Giddens (1981), Gledhill (1981) Kahn and Llobera (1981: 285–300; 306–14) and Rowlands (1982), and the reader is referred to their discussion of the issue.

The major break with much of Marxist anthropology that Kus is suggesting is a step most other contributors are not at present prepared to take. Their arguments are not with the concept of mode of production itself but about the usefulness of particular modes of production as units of analysis. All would, however, agree on a basic division between pre-class and class formations. The controversy over the concept of an ‘Asiatic mode of production’ has raged in Marxist circles for almost a century (Giddens 1981: Chapter 3; Godelier 1978b). Gledhill (this volume) considers it a useful concept not because similarities between European feudalism and other systems do not exist but because more general classifications such as Amin’s ‘tributary mode of production’ do not offer a better point of departure. Gilman (this volume) favours a division of ‘tributary’ and ‘kin-ordered’ modes of production, and further defends the idea of a ‘primitive communist’ mode as representing the pristine form of human social organization. Bate on the other hand uses the term primitive communism in a more general way to represent pre-class or kin-ordered society. As well as the original formulations of modes of production by Marx (primitive communist, ancient, slave, germainic, asiatic, feudal and capitalist), recent years have seen the putting forward of many others — among them the ‘African’ mode (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1975), the ‘Lineage’
Another way of telling

mode (Rey 1975), the 'Domestic' mode (Sahlins 1972) and more recently the 'Foraging' mode (Lee 1981), none of which has achieved any general acceptance.

Closely linked with questions about the validity of the mode of production concept is a concern among some contributors over the relevant spatial units of analysis. This is the question of global systems (cf. Wallerstein 1974; 1980) – whether the single society as usually studied by anthropologists is a sufficient unit of analysis, given the larger socio-economic systems of which all societies are a part. The Global Systems Approach produces a critique of the mode of production concept from a different perspective than that of Kus, seeing a mode of production as only a partial system within a larger total system of reproduction (Ekholm 1980; Friedman 1976). While several of the authors represented in this volume discuss the importance of regional and even 'global' considerations in their analyses, some see problems with Ekholm's and Friedman's particular formulations (see Gledhill, Kohl, this volume; cf. Schneider 1977).

Questions of relevant units of analysis lead us to a necessary discussion of the level of generalization we seek to achieve in explanation. The new archaeology has tended to concentrate on general explanations ('laws'), as having primacy over consideration of particular details. This search for universal 'laws of human behaviour' however has yet to yield significant results. Pearson (this volume) discusses some of the inherent problems involved, noting that the general cannot usefully be given precedence over the particular. Kohl (this volume) is essentially making the same point in his critique of evolutionism: 'Clearly, the attempt to draw comparisons among different societies is a legitimate and appropriate exercise, but this effort should not obscure or gloss over fundamental differences that distinguish societies and that must be explained in terms of each society's specific historical development.' Hodder (1982b: 9–14; 1982c: Chapter 10) in formulating what he calls 'contextual archaeology' has similar concerns, even tipping the symbolic hat to Childe along the way, but the lengths to which he goes not to mention the links of his approach to Marxism are somewhat disconcerting. Part 4 of this volume deals with the social transformations of concrete societies in history viewed 'contextually', not as abstract ideal stages of social evolution (cf. Rowlands 1982). These case studies and the others throughout the book are intended to show that specifically Marxist accounts of non-capitalist societies are possible and can provide new explanatory frameworks for studying social change, building on but transcending past approaches.

A theme of several of the papers is the evaluation of these past theoretical approaches. There are clearly divergent opinions presented here, particularly as regards the importance of the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss. Gregory uses Lévi-Strauss to expand Marx's concept of reproduction, and vice versa: 'Marx's concept of reproduction overlooks the exchange of people necessary for biological reproduction, while Lévi-Strauss' concept of reproduction is concerned almost exclusively with the exchange of people.' It is clear from his paper, however, that he does not consider himself a structural-Marxist in the usual sense of the term. While not discussing the structuralist influence on current Marxist theory in detail, Gilman refers to it as 'effete Marxism', whereas Kristiansen conceives of structural-Marxism as a starting point to develop theory in concert with Ekholm and Friedman's Global Systems Approach. A similar divergence of opinion on the value of Lévi-Strauss's structuralism to archaeology and detailed critiques of that and related approaches can be found in the papers of Hodder's (1982a) Symbolic and Structural Archaeology. The criticisms of functionalism raised by the contributors to that volume would also be shared by the authors represented here (cf. Friedman 1974; Giddens 1979 (especially Chapter 7); Gilman 1981; Godelier 1972: vii–xiii). Other associated approaches closely linked to the new archaeology such as cultural ecology, cultural materialism and evolutionism are discussed in detail by particular authors in their substantive contributions (Gilman, Gledhill, Kohl, Kristiansen, Pearson). Childe has already been mentioned as an early discussant of many of the themes mentioned above and several of the contributors evaluate aspects of his ideas (Gathercole, Gregory, Kus; cf. Hodder 1982b: 12–13; Spriggs 1977: 5–9; Thomas 1982). In discussing previous approaches the concern is to build on the theoretical and methodological advances they embody, while transcending their evident limitations.

Where to?

The studies in this book are in many cases tentative explorations and can be seen more as steps towards the development of Marxist perspectives in archaeology rather than as fully developed analyses. In 1976 when I last considered the question of Marxism and archaeology (Spriggs 1977) it was easier to see structural-Marxism as a potentially unifying perspective, and difficulties with the approach were less obvious than they appear today. At that time there was a slowly growing interest in Marxism among Western archaeologists but few substantive case studies. The considerable development of theory and increasingly sophisticated applications since then suggest that the next few years will see increasing consideration of the value of Marxist perspectives in archaeology. Perhaps, as Kristiansen argues: 'Marxist theory may be able to offer a long-needed theoretical and explanatory "superstructure" that can cope with the impressive methodological developments of the last two decades.' In discussing this point Gregory notes that: 'The ultimate test of the superiority of one conceptual approach over the other is whether or not it can produce theories that have greater explanatory power.' It is at this level that the usefulness of Marxist perspectives in archaeology will ultimately be judged by the uncommitted (cf. Gledhill, Kristiansen, this volume).

In this respect it is interesting to note the convergence between the views of some of the contributors represented here (see Part 3 for example), those represented at the Cambridge Seminar on Symbolic and Structural Archaeology
Matthew Spriggs

(Hodder 1982a), the sociology of Giddens (1979; 1981) particularly his notion of structuration, and the historical anthropology being developed by Sahlin. All of these are concerned to incorporate a notion of practice in structure, and structure in practice and so avoid a narrowly ‘idealist’ or ‘materialist’ position: ‘The great challenge to an historical anthropology is not merely to know how events are ordered by culture, but how, in that process, the culture is reordered. How does the reproduction of a structure become its transformation?’ (Sahlin 1981: 8).

This convergence, called by Tilley ‘dialectical structuralism’ (1982: 26), is in part based on a concern with questions of representation and the legitimation of the social order, concerns that we can expect to see increasingly addressed in the archaeological literature in future as the role of material culture in social processes is further explicated.

As well as enriching archaeology as a discipline, the development of Marxist perspectives in the subject are likely to lead also to a richer anthropology and sociology. Gilman (this volume) has pointed out that Marxist accounts of non-capitalist social formations have until now largely been based on ethnographic studies, whose time span is insufficient to provide evidence for examining the dynamic of social change within such formations. Add to this the traditional distrust of history by sociocultural anthropologists, associated with a functionalist emphasis on social statics, and most Marxist analyses become difficult to distinguish from cultural ecology or synchronic structuralism (Gledhill 1981). As Gilman reasons: ‘The only way out of this practical and theoretical impasse is to place at the centre of our attention the archaeological record. With all its defects this provides the only (and thus the best) evidence for the long-term trajectories of kin-ordered societies.’ For a long time anthropologists tended to scoff at history. Now, in part because of the influence of Marxist theory, they are coming to realize that history cannot be ignored. But the history they seek is often prehistory and, however grudgingly, they will have to seek out the archaeologists to get to it. This is equally true of sociologists such as Giddens, whose otherwise stimulating arguments are at their weakest when dealing with prehistory, dismissed as representing ‘cold’ societies in Lévi-Strauss’s unfortunate term and categorized in a static, functionalist model using outdated secondary sources (see Giddens 1981: 69–108). It becomes increasingly clear that serious Marxist social scientists will need to become at least conversant with the work of historians and archaeologists. Certainly few would now doubt that, in Giddhill’s words, it is ‘difficult to see how we could become fully conscious of the nature of either the colonial object or capitalism without reworking our consciousness of history beyond the temporal boundary of these phenomena’ (1981: 4).

One of the formative influences in the renewed interest in Marxism and anthropology was from the critics of anthropology as a child of colonialism, writers such as Gough (1968) and Asad (1973). Archaeology as practised in much of the world has an equally questionable history. Marxist perspectives in archaeology should help question the practice of our craft as well as its explanatory frameworks. For instance, often we are engaged in writing someone else’s prehistory but the political implications of this are rarely examined and the legitimate concerns of their descendants rarely addressed (cf. Trigger 1980). A closer examination of the political implications of writing prehistory is necessary, as discussed by Kohl, Gathercole and Rowlands. Archaeological data are not neutral, they can and are being used to serve political ends and these ends need to be scrutinized (cf. Ford 1973). As usual, Childe considered this question in some detail but discussion of the sociology of knowledge has since been muted in the archaeological literature. ‘It is no good demanding that history should be unbiased. The writer cannot help being influenced by the interests and prejudices of the society to which he belongs — his class, his nation, his church’ (1947: 22), and, as a growing number of feminist studies show, ‘his’ sex. We can expect in future to see more consideration given to the implications of this.4

It would be unfortunate if the perspectives offered here are rejected (or blindly accepted) simply because of the political connotations of the label Marxist. That said, if Marxist perspectives offer convincing explanations of prehistory these have obvious implications in terms of modern history and, as Marx was always at pains to stress, in terms of action in history. If these perspectives in archaeology provide another way of telling, they must also suggest another way of doing. ‘Marxism is still very young, almost in its infancy, it has scarcely begun to develop. It remains therefore, the philosophy of our time. We cannot go beyond it because we have not gone beyond the circumstances which have engendered it’ (Sartre 1968: 30).

Notes
1 Marx and Engels were themselves dimly aware of the developing discipline of archaeology, but for reasons relating to the structure and practice of the subject they remained ill-informed of its potential contribution to their theories. Archaeology thus had no appreciable influence on them, and vice versa (Kohl, in press).
2 In making this statement I cannot speak for archaeologists outside of North America, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and France. For instance, the strong revolutionary Marxist tradition in Central and South America has clearly had an influence on archaeologists there, as has the work of V. Gordon Childe, and there is only minimal reference to other Western Marxists (Lorenzo 1981).
3 Several edited volumes in English contain many of the major papers in Marxist anthropology, critical reviews of particular theoretical positions and extensive bibliographies. These include Marxists and Social Anthropology (Bloch 1975), The Evolution of Social Systems (Friedman and Rowlands 1978), Relations of Production (Seddon 1978), Toward a Marxist Anthropology (Diamond 1979) and The Anthropology of Pre-Capitalist Societies (Kahn and Liibera 1981). The major ‘schools’ of thought are represented by papers in these various volumes. The collection edited by Kahn and Liibera (1981) is particularly important for its critical reviews of various approaches and extensive bibliography. Other major sources of Marxist anthropology are journals such as Critique of Anthro-
Another way of telling


While it cannot be discussed here the growing interest in Marxism among geographers should also be noted: see Geography and Marxism (Quinlin 1982) which contains an excellent annotated bibliography by Russell King.

4 This is a point made forcefully by Leone in an important review article. He discusses in some detail the necessity of critical self-reflection in interpretation, urging that: ‘The archaeologist must have an active involvement with the ideological process in order to distinguish between that knowledge of the past that is needed to understand the present accurately, and that knowledge of the past that present society would emphasize in order to reproduce itself as it is now constituted’ (1982: 754). However, after discussing the issue persuasively in explicitly Marxist terms it is disappointing that he concludes by saying that, ‘It is better to label such ideas materialist and leave the political involvement with Marxism behind’ (1982: 757). This would appear to represent a classic example of the ‘vulgar history’ he was earlier criticizing!

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Bibliography


Matthew Spriggs


1982. The formation of tribal systems in later European prehistory:

8
Another way of telling


PART 2
Situating the economic

Chapter 2

The economy and kinship: a critical examination of some of the ideas of Marx and Lévi-Strauss
C.A. Gregory

Introduction
The object of this paper is to examine critically Marx's historical materialism in the light of some of the theories developed by Lévi-Strauss. As the author is an economic anthropologist rather than an archaeologist it is necessary to begin by situating the discussion vis-à-vis archaeology.

Archaeology, according to David Clarke (1968: 14), consists of three spheres of interrelated activity: data recovery, systematic description, and thirdly, the integrating, synthesizing process of generating models, hypotheses and theories. Clarke (ibid.: xiii) also adds that 'Archaeology is an undisciplined empirical discipline. A discipline lacking a scheme of systematic and ordered study based upon declared and clearly defined models and rules of procedure. It further lacks a body of central theory capable of synthesizing the general regularities within its data in such a way that the unique residuals distinguishing each particular case might be quickly isolated and easily assessed.'

If this account of archaeology has any validity — a debatable point of course — then theoretical development in other social sciences, such as anthropology and economics, can assist the archaeologist in the hypothesis generating stage of the archaeological process. Clarke has opted for cybernetics, a new approach to the analysis of structural wholes developed in the 1940s by Weiner. A central concept in cybernetics is 'feedback' and the method has been applied to a wide range of