

Index

- A*-coherence, 177
A-liability to want, 69
 Achinstein, 25
 Albert, 108
 Alston, 41, 99
 Armstrong, 35, 37
 assurance, 8, 14–17; α -, 48, 55–65; β -, 48, 115–32; γ -, 176; evidential, 16–19, 27–9, 31–3, 137–43; experiential, 16–22; and freedom, 50–5; intuitive, 20–2, 42–8; radical, see radical assurance; sensory, 20–2, 66, 74–7; ultra-regressive, 32–3
 Austin, 17, 18, 90, 92
 Ayer, 79, 99, 117, 129, 174
- B*-coherence, 181
B-liability to want, 69
 Baker, 144, 150
 Bartley, 108
 belief systems, desiderata for, 66–72; essential cores of, 67–72; stability of, 177–83, 184–7
 Blackburn, 30, 132, 144–5, 148, 155, 158
 Bonjour, 101–2, 105–6
 Braithwaite, 94–5
- Chisholm, 44, 72
 Cohen, 32, 117
 consequentially rational belief, 8–16
 Cornman, 39
 criteria, see evidence, criterial
 critical rationalism, 89–90, 108–14
 decision theory, 12–13, 171–2
 Deutscher, 59–60, 90, 98
- Edgley, 11
 Empson, 172
 ethical naturalism, 166–72
 Euclid, 24
- evidence, 22–31; coherence principles of, 106–8; criterial, 23, 144, 150–1, 165; and explanation, 24–5, 106–7; inductive, 133, 136; overriding, 29–30; and reasons for believing, 30–1
 experience, intentional objects of, 19–20, 74–5; mystical, 74–7; ‘theory-ladenness’ of, 80–2
- Fogelin, 129
 free action, 50–5, 155–6
 Friesian trilemma, 112–13
- God, 13–14, 51, 74–7
 Gödel, 43
 Goodman, 152–3
 Grice, G. R., 154, 168–70, 172
 Grünbaum, 58
- Hacking, 13
 Hamblin, 26–7
 Hare, 157
 Harman, 100–1
 Holland, 159–60
 Hume, 93, 143, 160, 174
- incorrigible propositions, 1, 3, 46–7, 158
 induction, and deduction, 94–5; Humean scepticism about, 134, 137–51, 162–6; inductive justification of 140–2; non-Humean scepticism about, 134, 151–4, 162–6
- Jaeger, 29
 justification of belief, 5, 37–42, 89–114; coherence theories of, 4–5, 100–6; by experience, 6, 96–9, 123–4; foundational theories of, 4–6, 100–6; and infinite regression, 57–62, 89–114, 124, 138–9; ‘no-need’ theories of, 6, 90–6; self-justification, 96–100

194

Kant, 43, 116
 Kenny, 131, 144
 Kierkegaard, 75
 knowledge, 4, 35–7, 72–4, 94–5; a priori
 and a posteriori, 46

Lakatos, 112–14, 186
 Lehrer, 38–9, 46
 Levi, 14
 Lewy, 145–8, 161
 Luce, 12

McIver, 35–6
 Mackie, 19, 31, 47, 80, 122
 Meynell, 172
 Montaigne, 7
 Moore, 144–8, 161, 165
 moral propositions, basic, 161; evidence
 for, 161–72; simple, 156
 moral realism, 156–61, 175–6
 mysteries, 156–9

Nagel, T., 158
 naturalistic fallacy, 144–8, 165
 necessary truth, 47–8
 π -set, 176

Pascal's wager, 13–14, 30
 Pastin, 38
 Peirce, 58
 Plantinga, 122
 Pollock, 40–1, 43, 59–61
 Popper, 111–14, 185
 private language argument, 124–32
 probability, and evidence 31; experiential,
 97, 123
 propositions, identity of 131, 147; and
 statements, 117–18
 providence, 177
 Pyrrho, 7

question-beggingness, 26–7

Index

Quinton, 97–8, 90, 123–4

radical assurance, 33–40; consolations
 for lack of, 3, 93–4, 176–87; coexten-
 sionality with β -assurance, 48, 50, 55–
 65, 106, 115; desire for, 2–3, 65–88, 90–
 6, 173–87; and inductive scepticism,
 135, 137–42, 161–6; and moral scepti-
 cism, 155–72, 176; rationale for want-
 ing, 174–5

Raiffa, 12
 rationalism, 49
 Reid, 72
 Rescher, 104
 Richards, 170–2

scepticism, 'Cartesian', 3, 7, 70; deter-
 ministic, 50–5; inductive, see in-
 duction; moral, see moral propositions,
 moral realism; about radical assurance,
 1–7, 50, 89, 173
 science and pseudo-science, 184–6
 self-defeatingness, 3, 6, 51, 116
 self-evident propositions, 45–9, 76, 99–
 100
 Skyrms, 140–1
 Stegmüller, 166
 stoicism, 93, 174
 Strawson, 120–2
 supervenience, 158–9
 Swift, 174
 Swinburne, 14, 153

transcendental arguments, 120–2
U-proposition, 119
 universalisability, 156–8, 187

verificationism, 4, 6, 117–20

Warnock, 170, 172
 Wiggins, 51–2
 Williams, 9–10, 70
 Wittgenstein, 90, 92–3, 124–32