The Durham Report and British Policy
A Critical Essay

1 THE PLACE OF THE REPORT IN COMMONWEALTH HISTORY

Historians of the British Empire have given the very highest praise to Lord Durham’s Report on the Affairs of British North America, and its author has been regarded as the founder of the Commonwealth. ‘Today he needs no vindication’ wrote J. L. Morison in 1930 ‘for the later history of the British Empire has been the fulfilment of his dreams through obedience to his precepts.’ To Sir Reginald Coupland, the Report ‘became, to use a cant phrase, the Magna Carta of the Second British Empire’. As late as 1963 Gerald M. Craig could write that ‘no attempt to debunk or deflate the great Report would be very successful’. For Professor Mansergh, the logical point at which to begin his fine survey of the Commonwealth Experience was Durham’s ceremonial entry into Quebec, astride a white charger, at the outset of the mission which produced the Report.¹

By no means all historians have gone to the lengths of Lucas, New and Coupland in their assessment.² ‘To some extent the report has been overpraised’, wrote E. L. Woodward in 1938, and here he echoed a reviewer of 1907.³ But if many historians have tended to pitch their comments in a lower key, there can be no doubt that they have fundamentally accepted the verdict of Durham’s most enthusiastic

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admirers. This can be seen in the treatment of the subject in three very different surveys of Commonwealth history written in the nineteen-sixties, those of W. D. McIntyre, R. A. Huttenback and Professor Mansergh.4

In some respects the task of the critic is made oddly difficult by the more moderate received view of the Report’s significance. Many of the points made in this essay have been conceded long ago but — clear evidence of the extent to which historians have subscribed to the myth — the inferences and conclusions which should logically have been drawn from such concessions have never been made. Thus it has been accepted that the Report contained many inaccuracies, without realising that it cannot be maintained that it was a valuable source of information to the British public. It has been recognised that the Report was poorly received in England, but not appreciated that it is therefore difficult to argue that it was an influential document in relation to Canadian Union, although this may be because the extent of its poor reception among friend and foe alike has not been fully understood. If the criticisms of the Report and its place in imperial history which are offered here seem fierce, and on occasion to be attacking positions which by consensus historians would now regard as too extravagant to defend, it is because this moderate consensus is still one which rests upon an earlier assessment little short of hagiographical.

If the extreme view of the Report’s significance is in some respects difficult to attack because of the muted tones in which it now appears, there are problems too for the critic in its full-blooded expression by New and Coupland. The problem is that the influence of the Report on subsequent events, such as Canadian Union or the introduction of responsible government, has been either assumed or argued on post hoc ergo propter hoc lines. A case which offers so little proof is peculiarly immune to conclusive disproof. In both the cases mentioned it would be impossible to maintain that the Report failed to exercise the slightest influence even on a single individual. In short, however strong an assault is mounted, the traditional assessment of the Report can probably never be destroyed, simply because it is based so extensively on

4 W. D. McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, London 1966, pp. 46-8, 57; R. A. Huttenback, The British Imperial Experience, New York 1966, pp. 20-37; P. N. S. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, pp. 30-41. An interesting recent comment on Durham is that of Peter Burroughs in his review of the 1969 reissue of New’s biography, ‘Our sober, detached appraisal of Durham’s career has little in common with the emotional, patriotic involvement evinced by writers of a former generation when the British empire was in its heyday...’ (Canadian Historical Review, LII, June 1971, pp. 190-1). The process of revision has tended to concentrate more on the extravagant presentation of the traditional view than upon that view itself.
assumption and so little on evidence. It is nonetheless the argument of this essay that the evidence shows the Report to have been remarkably uninfluential in Britain at the time of its publication, that it exercised little influence on British policy and that it owes its high position in imperial historiography mainly to later symbolic misconceptions, especially in the twentieth century.

One qualification must be made about the scope of this work. It examines the influence of the Durham Report in Britain and on British policy. This is a reasonable limitation, since in the mid-nineteenth-century major policy decisions regarding the Empire were still by and large made in Britain. This is not to say that British decisions were not influenced by events in the colonies — indeed colonial realities frequently dictated a course which London could obstruct only to its own inconvenience. But to accept this is not to accept that British policy was determined at one remove by the Durham Report. There is relatively little information about the reception of the Report around the Empire. In British North America it seems to have been the subject of lively discussion, mainly on party lines. Sir Francis Head certainly feared that the circulation by the Reformers of a cheap edition of the Report was ‘a poison which by day and by night is sickening unto death the loyalty of the Canadas’. Head was perhaps a natural alarmist. A recent historian has stated that in Canada ‘the note of criticism was loud and even strident’. Outside British North America it is hard to measure the influence of the Durham Report. ‘It has now gone the round, from Canada, through the West Indies and South Africa, to the Australasias, and has everywhere been received with acclamations,’ wrote Wakefield in December 1839. The Colonial Gazette said that ‘in every colony where the English race has settled in considerable numbers, that document is a sort of political text-book’. The Gazette made it clear that the Report exercised a greater influence in the colonies than in Britain. But how great or how lasting this influence was it is

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5 Lord Durham’s recommendation of responsible government arguably includes him among those who were prepared to let colonial reality dictate imperial policy. On the other hand, his wish to limit the extent of that self-government in the manner he proposed, his insistence on the anglicisation of French Canada, and his support for Wakefield’s theories of settlement hardly support the claim.

6 Chester W. New, Lord Durham, pp. 528-43.

7 Public Archives of Canada, Derby Papers, microfilm A-30, 8, memorandum by F. B. Head, 62 Park St, Grosvenor Square, 25 May 1839.


9 Wakefield to Durham, 26 December 1839, in Chester W. New, op. cit. p. 528.

10 Colonial Gazette, no. 90, 12 August 1840, p. 529 and see ibid. no. 88, 29 July 1840, p. 503.
hard to say. Only one point will be made here. It would be at least plausible to argue — even though it would not be true — that in Britain nothing was known about colonial self-government until the Durham Report provided for the first time an intelligent basis for discussion. But it would be utterly implausible to suggest that the ideas Durham put forward had never occurred to anyone in Australia or South Africa. That being so, the influence of the Report in the colonies would be limited mainly to its propaganda value, as Sir Francis Head feared, and the prestige which the support of an English earl gave to the Reformers. How valuable was the Report as a rallying cry and debating point cannot be said. Certainly one recent survey of the responsible government controversy in New South Wales is singularly sparse in its references to Durham.\textsuperscript{11} The fact too that settler colonies advanced to self-government at very different speeds is a reminder that many other factors have to be taken into account. Thus while British policy was undoubtedly influenced by developments in the colonies, it would be still going beyond the evidence to assume from this that it was the Durham Report which provided ‘the living force of the whole British Empire’.\textsuperscript{12}

2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE DURHAM MISSION

To measure the significance of the Report it is necessary to place it in its proper context — of over twenty years of Canadian history; and of Durham’s own mission to Canada. Too often the Report has been presented as a unique event in imperial history, or magnified out of proportion to its historical context, and it is not therefore surprising that it should have acquired an unwarranted importance. The problems of Lower Canada were not left unsolved because no one of Durham’s vision has appeared to settle them, but because they were practically insoluble within the existing Empire. From 1819 onwards the French-dominated House of Assembly had attempted to make its grant of supply conditional on the control of all government expenditure, no


\textsuperscript{12} C. P. Lucas, editor, \textit{Lord Durham’s Report}, I, p. 316. In 1971 an article appeared which was strongly critical of the intolerant certainty which characterises most expressions of the Durham myth. The article, by Professor R. S. Neale, pointed to the existence of alternative proposals. Colonial self-government ‘was probably the result of pressures within the colonies which were scarcely recognised let alone understood by Durham’. This is perhaps the most explicit criticism to come from the academic world. (R. S. Neale, ‘Roebuck’s Constitution and the Durham Proposals’, \textit{Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand}, XV, 1971, pp. 479-90.)
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matter from what source the revenue had come. By 1827 relations between Governor Dalhousie and the Assembly hit rock-bottom. The Assembly refused to vote any money at all, and by way of reprimand it was dissolved. The radicals came back in even greater strength after the elections and Papineau, their leader, was elected Speaker. As in British Parliamentary practice, the formal consent of the Crown was requested to his election. Dalhousie refused to give it, and the Assembly retaliated by bringing constitutional government to a dead halt. A petition was sent to London, backed by 9,000 signatures and 78,000 crosses, and a Parliamentary Committee at Westminster examined the problem in 1828. It did not solve it, for the simple reason that the problem was insoluble.¹ By demanding control of expenditure, and an elective upper chamber, the French radicals were in effect asking for the creation of a second independent government in the Empire. This the British could not agree to in 1828, in 1839, or at any time down to 1846, because the Empire then formed a single tariff unit and therefore required a single executive. The real divide in imperial history is the ending of Protection in 1846, and the Durham Report, which is so often seen as the end of the imperial dark ages, is as much a product of them as any of the other deliberations on colonial policy before the eighteen-forties. The problem of Canada’s position in the Empire failed to find a solution before the eighteen-forties, because the only possible solution—that of virtual independence—was not acceptable to the British until the introduction of Free Trade. It has often been argued that Durham was the first British statesman to express his faith in the possibility of a permanent connection between Britain and the colonies. This assertion is based mainly on a sentence from a letter written by Robert Baldwin to Durham,² and should in itself be regarded more as evidence that Durham was known to respond to flattery than as a definitive statement about British attitudes to Empire. All that can be said is that if the British were really so lukewarm about the connection, they showed a surprising determination to maintain a real measure of control over their most troublesome dependency. It is true that some, like Russell, foresaw a day when the colonies might be large enough and powerful enough to sever their links with Britain. But Durham too foresaw the same possibility, and was perhaps freer in his use of terms like ‘colonial nationality’ than many of his contemporaries. Both men in fact would have agreed with Roebuck, who told Howick of his strong preference of the connection between this country & Canada to its being joined to

¹ The Report of the 1828 Committee is in Parliamentary Papers, 1828, VII, 569, pp. 375-730.
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the United States. The British, then, were not lukewarm about their colonies, and precisely for that reason they had not ‘solved’ the problem of Lower Canada.

That the problem of Lower Canada could not be solved within the framework of a mercantilist empire was underlined by the failure of the Howick Act of 1831. The Act was a bold and optimistic attempt at compromise, worthy of the vision of Lord Howick, the Under-Secretary for Colonies largely responsible for it. The Assembly’s claim for control of expenditure was conceded, in exchange for a reserved Civil List of £19,500, designed to ensure the continuation of at least some form of government under all circumstances. The Act reflected the Whig belief in the ability of compromise to reconcile opposites, and their faith in human nature — if you go half-way to meet your opponent, he will come half-way to meet you. Regrettably it soon appeared that Papineau was not a Whig. Far from being appeased by the Howick Act, he moved further towards extremism. He broke first with John Neilson, leader of the English-speaking liberals of Lower Canada, and then quarrelled with the Catholic Church. The Orleanist revolution in 1830, the cholera of 1832, and the violent by-election in Montreal the same year all increased the pace of French nationalism. The control of supply given by the Howick Act as a gesture of generous compromise, was used year by year to cut off all revenue to the colonial government. ‘The truth is Howick led us into a Scrape,’ wrote one ex-Whig to another in 1838. Significantly the letter continued, ‘Will Durham get us out of it? ’

Thus by the middle of the eighteen-thirties Canada provided the Whigs with a problem which was not simply practical but theoretical too. The great Whig administration of 1830 was running out of steam. Essentially the Whigs were very conservative reformers. Even Howick and Durham, who were close to the radicals, were both firm supporters of the Established Church. Whig reform was intended to save, and not destroy the existing order — expressed in Russell’s verdict of ‘finality’. But paradoxically the Government which set out to make the world

4 Peter Burroughs has dismissed the idea that British statesmen were indifferent to the colonial connection as ‘factually untrue’ (Canadian Historical Review, LII, June 1971, pp. 190-1). Compare this with Review of Historical Publications relating to Canada, XI, 1907, p. 90. ‘In 1837 the Whig leaders wished, if they decently could, to break the political tie with Canada...’
5 This sketch of political developments in Lower Canada is based on C. E. Fryer, ‘Lower Canada (1815-1837)’ in Cambridge History of the British Empire, VI, pp. 234-50
6 University Library, Cambridge, Graham Papers (microfilm no. 30) Bundle 35, Graham to Stanley, private, Netherby, 21 January 1838.
safe for Whiggery had unintentionally revealed a world which was neither to its liking nor within its comprehension. In Ireland Whiggery was proving inadequate, in Canada it was at best irrelevant, at worst, as in the failure of the Howick Act, completely counter-productive. They were brought face to face with the unpleasant fact that the kind of solution applicable to Canada was too dangerous in its implications for Britain. In 1836, for instance, they had contemplated the abolition of the Legislative Council in Lower Canada, in order to circumvent Papineau’s demands to have it made elective. William IV objected violently, saying that it would lead to the abolition of the House of Lords, and threatened to have Melbourne impeached if he went any further. The King was to say the least eccentric, but there was little doubt that others would have raised the same objection, and no such measure would have passed the Lords. Roebuck, the spokesman in Parliament for the Assembly of Lower Canada, regretted that the question of the Canadian upper house had arisen ‘at an inopportune moment when we ourselves are discussing the merits of our own House of Lords’. Roebuck, however, thought the Lords did themselves little honour by supposing that their fate must be determined by that of the unpopular Legislative Council of Lower Canada. Unable then to take action on the scale that could have broken the deadlock, the Whigs could only drift along with an insoluble problem. When Normanby handed over the seals of the Colonial Office to Russell in 1839 he explained that the real art of governing the colonies was to decide which problems needed immediate solution and which might by postponement dispose of themselves — a process to which you will find after a little practise (sic) many Colonial questions are not unapt to yield’. Bankruptcy of dogma made this into Whig policy.

So too did tactical necessity. The General Elections of 1835 and 1837 left the Whigs heavily dependent upon the well-organised Irish and the unorganised radicals. For religious and political reasons both groups were sympathetic to the French Canadians, and the need to hold their support was a further reason for cautious inactivity on the part of the Government. Whig dependence on the O’Connellites was underlined at the start of the 1838 session of Parliament, when Peel was able successfully to challenge the preamble to Durham’s instructions because

8 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, XXXVII, 14 April 1837, cols. 1209-29.
9 Public Record Office, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/3D. Normanby to Russell, n.p., n.d. (22 September 1839), fos. 1280-7. This letter appears to be a copy of a less legible letter at fos. 1245-52.
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The Holyhead coach was late in delivering the Irish members. The radicals mattered less as a group because they were less compact, but they became increasingly dissatisfied with the Government over Canada. The principal importance of the radical viewpoint was that it was shared by Lord Howick. The eldest son of Earl Grey, Howick sat in the Commons where he and Russell were the only real men of business on the Whig front bench. (It was their joint threat of resignation in February 1839 which obliged Melbourne to dismiss Glenelg from the Colonial Office—a fall which had nothing to do with the Durham Report, as alleged by Wakefield.) Howick was not himself a radical so much as an advanced Whig—he ended his long life a Conservative, in perfect fidelity to his fixed beliefs: dislike of democracy, disestablishment and Gladstone. But he seemed more radical than perhaps he was, and certainly he had long felt that there was 'a real difference of opin[10] on colonial politics (sic) between me & the majority of the cabinet'. An attack by the radical MP Warburton on the Government's handling of the Canada question was so close to his own opinions that it 'made me feel very uncomfortable'. Fundamentally Howick was a sensitive man, who hid his emotions behind an abrupt and sometimes brutal manner. He was a difficult Cabinet colleague, apt to threaten resignation if he failed to get his way. Yet a Government as weak in personnel as Melbourne's could not afford to lose a man of such ability. When rebellion broke out in Canada, when force finally became unavoidable, Howick was still bitterly insisting that repression must be combined with conciliation, and it was largely to appease him that Durham was sent to Canada.[12]

10 The Times, 26 January 1838.
11 Wakefield to Durham, n.d., quoted in Chester W. New, op. cit. p. 493. In fact Glenelg was dismissed after an ultimatum from Howick and Russell, and the immediate cause of their concern was Glenelg's handling of the Jamaica problem. Certainly neither man referred to the impending appearance of the Durham Report, although New attempts to bolster Wakefield's unfounded claim with the statement that among the ministers Howick and Russell 'were presumably the most favourable to Durham...' (University of Durham, Grey Papers, Russell to Howick, confidential, Wilton Crescent, 31 January 1839, and Journal of 3rd Earl Grey, C3/4, 2 February 1839 et seq., Chester W. New, op. cit. p. 393). This is one small example of the process of post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning which has been employed to establish a causal connection between the Durham Report and subsequent events in imperial history. For Glenelg's resignation, see Edith Dobie, 'The Dismissal of Lord Glenelg from the office of Colonial Secretary', Canadian Historical Review, XXIII, 1942, pp. 280-5.
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But this is looking ahead a little. In 1835 the Whigs simply did not know what to do about Canada, and even if they had, they lacked the power to do it. So they did what any other set of politicians would have done in the same position. They appointed a Royal Commission, headed by the Earl of Gosford, and hoped that the problem would by postponement dispose of itself. The appointment of a Royal Commission was of course a device used very successfully by the Whigs in their programme of domestic reform. The Gosford Commission however was set to solve a problem already almost beyond reach of legislation, and not surprisingly it failed to agree on any significant course of action. It is difficult to escape the belief that its appointment was at least partly a product of desperation, The Times was to condemn it as ‘a frivolous and toad-eating embassy’. ‘Every honest man declared that it was a temporizing mission, a bribe to the Radicals in the British Parliament to tolerate the Whig Ministry …’.13 Howick recalled that he had opposed the creation of the Commission ‘on the ground that we were then as well aware as we could be after receiving their Reports’ of what was wrong in Canada. To Howick the Gosford Commission was ‘merely a device for postponing any decision on the policy to be adopted’.14 But the Commissioners did their work carefully and conscientiously. Sir Charles Grey, who frequently disagreed with his colleagues Sir George Gipps and Gosford, produced a plan for dividing Lower Canada into a federation of five units – arranged to give an English majority.15 This was taken up in the Colonial Office, and produced a round-about revival of the scheme for union of the Provinces attempted in 1822, since provision could be made for Upper Canada eventually to become the sixth unit in the federation.16 But

Her Majesty’s Diaries between the years 1832 and 1840 (2 vols.), London 1912, I, pp. 263-4 (25 January 1838), pp. 251-2 (4 January 1838); Howick to Melbourne, private, Holland House, 29 December 1837 in Lloyd C. Sanders, editor, Lord Melbourne’s Papers, London 1889, pp. 423-4; Public Record Office, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/3A, Howick to Russell, private, Whitehall Place, 1 January 1838, fos. 1-2, and his Paper on Canada, fos. 18-29, of which original drafts, dated 29 December 1837, are in University of Durham, Grey Papers, Colonial Papers 100-1.

The Times, 23 December 1837.


Parliamentary Papers 1837, XXIV, 50, pp. 1-408, esp. pp. 246-8, for Sir Charles Grey’s minute of 17 November 1836.

overall the Gosford Commission failed to come up with any startling or novel solution. Nor was this to be wondered at. T. F. Elliot, Secretary to the Commission, wrote privately to dampen Howick’s optimism. Papineau, in Elliot’s opinion, had chosen to make an issue of the composition of the Legislative Council precisely because it was a non-resolvable grievance. ‘Negotiation with Papineau appears to me to be hopeless’.\textsuperscript{17} Certainly one of the most convincing arguments which was later to be urged for responsible government was that an Assembly with real power would never have fallen under the sway of so negative an agitator.\textsuperscript{18} But the predictable failure of the Gosford Commission to break out of the political deadlock should not cause it to be written off altogether. It delivered a whole series of informative reports, adding to the mass of evidence previously published by the Committee of 1828. It investigated the Crown lands, the claims of the Assembly, responsible government, the Legislative Council, the vexed question of the lands of the Seminary of Montreal, as well as miscellaneous complaints. These were questions which were to be considered in the Durham Report, based on a much briefer mission than that of the Gosford Commissioners, and acknowledged by its admirers to be inaccurate and misleading in many places. Yet one of the major claims made on behalf of the Durham Report is that it was a valuable descriptive work. ‘For the British Government and people at the time, woefully ignorant in regard to Canada, its informative value far outweighed its misleading features’.\textsuperscript{19} Even if the internal inconsistency of this statement is overlooked — how were the British to know which parts were misleading? — it is a view which can only be sustained by divorcing the Report from its context of previous official reports, pamphlets, articles and editorials. Many people were indeed ignorant about Canada, but their ignorance was not caused by lack of official and unofficial information about the subject. Certainly the failure of politicians to solve its problems was not the result of ignorance on their part. The Durham Report was unquestionably livelier than the Gosford Report, but this did not necessarily make it more reliable or influential. Indeed, Russell broadly hinted that its comments on the French Canadians were not simply lively but lurid.\textsuperscript{20} But whatever the merits or demerits of the presen-

\textsuperscript{17} University of Durham, Grey Papers, Elliot to Howick, Montreal, 18 July 1836, in answer to Howick to Elliot (copy), private, War Office, 19 May 1836.

\textsuperscript{18} E.g. by Joseph Howe in his ‘Letters to Lord John Russell’ in H. E. Egerton and W. L. Grant, \textit{Canadian Constitutional Development shown by selected speeches and despatches, with introductions and explanatory notes}, London 1907, pp. 190-252, esp. p. 245.

\textsuperscript{19} Chester W. New, \textit{op. cit.} p. 496.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates}, 3rd series, XLVII, 3 June 1839, cols. 1254-75.