Natural Law and Practical Rationality

Natural law theory has recently been undergoing a revival, especially in political philosophy and jurisprudence. Yet, most fundamentally, natural law theory is not a political theory but a moral theory, or more accurately a theory of practical rationality.

The theory of practical rationality aims to identify and characterize reasons for action and to explain how choice between actions worth performing can be appropriately governed by rational standards. The natural law view holds that the basic reasons for action are intrinsic goods that are grounded in the nature of human beings. It also holds that the rational standards that govern choice are justified by reference to features of the human goods that are fundamental reasons for action.

*Natural Law and Practical Rationality* is a defense of a contemporary natural law theory of practical rationality, exhibiting its inherent plausibility and engaging systematically with rival egoist, consequentialist, Kantian, and virtue accounts. It will be of interest to professionals and students of moral philosophy, the philosophy of law, and political theory.

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a divine gift
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