KANT’S DOCTRINE OF
TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION

This major study of Kant provides a detailed examination of the development and function of the doctrine of transcendental illusion in his theoretical philosophy. The author shows that a theory of “illusion” plays a central role in Kant’s arguments about metaphysical speculation and scientific theory. Indeed, she argues that we cannot understand Kant unless we take seriously his claim that the mind inevitably acts in accordance with ideas and principles that are “illusory.” Taking this claim seriously, we can make much better sense of Kant’s arguments and reach a deeper understanding of the role he allots human reason in science.

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KANT’S DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION

MICHELLE GRIER

University of San Diego
For Scott and Marissa
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This work began as a doctoral dissertation, written during my studies at the University of California, San Diego. There, I was fortunate to have on my doctoral committee a number of very distinguished philosophers whose work collectively served as an example in my own attempts. Among this group I must mention Robert Pippin, Frederick Olafson, and Patricia Kitcher, each of whom offered invaluable comments on my work and many insights into Kant’s *Critique*. I must especially thank Henry Allison, who directed my dissertation and who, more than anyone else, cultivated my interest in Kant studies. I have continued to profit from his work since writing the dissertation on which this book is based. Even in my disagreements with him, my philosophical indebtedness to Henry Allison is apparent throughout this work, except of course in those places where I may have erred in my understanding of Kant.

Other debts have been incurred during the revision of the work. I received a number of Faculty Research Grants from the University of San Diego, which minimized my heavy teaching load, and I am grateful for these. I must also include special thanks to Leeanna Cummings, who assisted in the preparation of this manuscript, and who managed a number of crises in this regard.

On a more personal note, I should like to recognize the support generously provided by my husband, Scott, and my daughter, Marissa. Personal debts are impossible to quantify, and equally impossible to identify adequately in a few sentences. Suffice it to say that, by the age of seven, my daughter was already expressing relief that Kant didn’t write a “fifth antinomy” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Although I am not entirely certain that Kant did not do so, I must thank my daughter and my husband for their patience with me in my efforts on this book.
Finally, I am grateful to the editors of a number of journals for permission to reprint revised versions of material previously published. Much new material on Kant’s theory of reason and the Dialectic has appeared since I first wrote the dissertation on Kant’s doctrine of illusion. I have tried to accommodate some of this material while revising and expanding my work, despite strong inclinations to start over entirely from scratch. Material for both my Introduction and some of Chapter 5 appeared in “Illusion and Fallacy in Kant’s First Paralogism,” *Kant-Studien* 83 (1993): 257–282. Some of the material from Chapter 8 of this work is contained in “Kant on the Illusion of a Systematic Unity of Nature,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1997): 1–28. Similarly, portions of Chapter 6 previously appeared in “Transcendental Illusion and Transcendental Realism in Kant’s Second Antinomy,” *British Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6, no. 1 (1998): 47–70. Chapter 7 contains some material presented at the Eighth International Kant Congress, held in Memphis in 1995, and appears in my “Kant’s Rejection of Rational Theology,” in *Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress*, ed. Hoke Robinson (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 641–650. I gratefully acknowledge the editors of these journals and collections for their kind permission to reuse this material.
NOTE ON REFERENCES
AND TRANSLATIONS

References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second editions. Quotations in English are from Norman Kemp Smith’s translation, *Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1929). In cases where I have modified or diverged from Kemp Smith’s translation, I note this in the footnotes. Passages in German are from Raymund Schmidt’s German edition (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1954). All other references to Kant are to the *Gesammelte Schriften* of the Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1922) and are cited by volume and page. In those cases where a translation has been quoted or consulted, the corresponding English pagination follows the reference to the volume and page of the German text, and the distinction is marked by a semicolon. In such cases, the particular translation used is stated in the footnotes.