Introduction

On the eve of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, all the major powers of Europe, except France, were monarchical states. The extent of the power of the monarch over individual areas of state policy varied from country to country. In Russia, the power of the Tsar was unlimited until 1905, in theory if not in practice, whereas in Britain, two centuries of political evolution, dating back to the conflict between crown and parliament in the seventeenth century, had by the end of the nineteenth century created a situation in which the power of the monarchy had been greatly eroded. Between these two extremes, politically and geographically, lay the German empire, a state where a national parliament existed, but where the right to appoint government ministers, together with considerable powers regarding foreign and military policy, continued to be the prerogative of the Emperor.

The statements made above ought to be uncontroversial. Indeed, a standard textbook states that in Europe before 1914 ‘the monarchs were justified in considering themselves the most important persons in the . . . political arena.’¹ However, if one examines the historiography, a very different impression emerges. Monarchs are either almost completely ignored,² or else they are treated as decorative irrelevances, whose high-profile visits abroad were insignificant politically,³ and whose advisers had the dominant voice in decision-making and the conduct of foreign policy.⁴

The central aim of the present study is to seek to redress this imbalance in academic research through an examination of the diplomatic

role of monarchs in the years preceding the outbreak of war in 1914. Previous attempts to study international relations in this era have not been wholly convincing because they have failed to take into account the fact that in addition to socio-economic factors, and diplomatic decision-making at the governmental level, a further component has to be taken into consideration. In Europe before the First World War, the political views and prejudices of monarchs, together with the changing relationships between the dynasties themselves, could, in certain circumstances, have a bearing on relations between different states and on the future of Europe as a whole. To write the history of a continent in which monarchy was the prevalent form of government without reference to the monarchs themselves represents a distortion of the past.

In general two historiographical ‘schools’ have dominated the study of international relations, in turn, since 1945. Until the 1960s, history writing was dominated by a genre which can be characterised as the ‘bureaucratic’ school. Historians of this type sought to analyse foreign policy and diplomacy from the perspective of governments and diplomats. They paid only limited attention to the domestic pressures which inevitably influenced the contexts in which decisions were made, and played down the importance of ‘anachronistic’ individuals and institutions, such as monarchs and royal courts, in the conduct of diplomacy.⁵

Since the 1960s, historians have turned their attention towards the social and economic pressures which influenced the formation and conduct of foreign policy, placing much emphasis on the processes of modernization within European society. Thus, considerable attention has been given to issues such as industrialization, the creation of a mass society, and the rise of democratic and revolutionary forces on the European continent. As a consequence, declining elements within European society, such as artisans, peasants, aristocrats and monarchs, have become increasingly marginalised in academic history. A concern that contemporary scholarship was in danger of predating Europe’s transition to modernity led the American historian, Arno J. Mayer, to write a book in which he sought to emphasise the continued vitality of certain pre-industrial elements in Europe before 1914. In doing so, he put forward a powerful case for a change in the direction of historical research.⁶ Mayer’s attempt to stress ‘the persistence of the old’ contrasted sharply with a more orthodox view of turn of the century Europe set out shortly afterwards by Norman Stone. Stone concentrated on the

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⁵ Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, xx-xxxiv, p. 428.
forces of modernization which began to change the social, economic and, to a lesser extent, political structure of Europe before 1914. His analysis of economic and social change was simultaneously wide-ranging and penetrating. However, the political role of monarchs was rarely addressed, and when it did receive a mention, it was usually in dismissive terms.⁷

An analysis of modern historical scholarship as it has been applied to the history of individual countries supplies some of the clues as to the relative neglect of monarchy as an institution, and monarchs as individuals, by historians. The example of the historiography of Wilhelmine Germany is instructive in this regard. The tragic history of Germany in the twentieth century has contributed towards certain peculiarities in the approach of German historians to their own country’s past.⁸ In the 1920s, German historians sought to dispel the stigma of war guilt which had been attached to their country by the victors in the Treaty of Versailles.⁹ In Klaus Hildebrand’s view, the problem with this genre of research was that political interests took precedence over empirical knowledge.¹⁰ Even the great collection of documents on German diplomacy before 1914, Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette,¹¹ the most important bequest of the historians of the 1920s to those of today, was, as Hildebrand and Barbara Vogel have pointed out, selectively edited in order to remove material deemed damaging to the cause of German rehabilitation into the international community.¹² Two of Germany’s leading historians in the inter-war years, Hans Delbrück and Erich Brandenburg, even went so far as to blame Russia and France for the outbreak of the First World War,¹³ as did retired diplomats in their memoirs.¹⁴

¹⁰ Hildebrand, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, p. 54.
¹² Hildebrand, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, pp. 54–7; Barbara Vogel, Deutsche Russlandpolitik, 1900–1906: Das Scheitern der deutschen Weltpolitik unter Bülow 1900–1906 (Düsseldorf, 1973), pp. 8, 173.
¹³ Hildebrand, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, p. 66.
After the defeat of the Nazi dictatorship, and the division of Germany which resulted from this, historians in West Germany sought to emphasise that Hitler’s régime had been an aberration, out of keeping with the development of Germany in previous generations towards a civilised, modern society. As in the 1920s, the political motives for this approach were obvious. By arguing that German traditions were embodied by ‘great men’, such as Luther and Frederick the Great, and by worthy bureaucrats, such as Bethmann Hollweg, they sought to play down German guilt and responsibility for the Nazi régime and the Holocaust. As John Röhl has pointed out,¹⁵ the political motives of the historians also had the effect of marginalising Germany’s last monarch, Kaiser Wilhelm II, from scholarly discussion of the period of German history which bears his name. The last Kaiser, whose style of government was characterised by a tendency to make belligerent speeches, and whose neurotic personality led Edward VII’s close friend Lord Esher to conclude that he had inherited the madness of King George III,¹⁶ was passed over in embarrassed silence by historians who were more interested in discontinuity than continuity between the Second Reich and the Third Reich.

The publication of a major book on Germany’s war aims in the First World War by Professor Fritz Fischer, in 1961,¹⁷ shattered the comfortable assumptions of the conservative, nationalist historians with regard to their country’s recent past. Fischer argued that Germany pursued an expansionist policy during the Great War, which prefigured the aims of the Nazis in the Second World War. He followed this argument up in a later work, in which he argued that the German leadership had systematically planned, as early as December 1912, to unleash a European war in the summer of 1914.¹⁸

The ‘Fischer controversy’ had two major consequences which concern the historian of foreign policy and monarchy. First, although Fischer and his colleagues were not hostile to the discussion of the role of personalities, his conservative opponents sought to deflect attention from the disturbing continuities, which Fischer had discovered in early twentieth-century German history, by contrasting the good qualities of

¹⁶ Lord Esher, journal entry, 21 November 1908, Esher Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, ESHR 2/11.
¹⁷ Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf, 1961); English translation: Germany’s Aims in the First World War (London, 1967).
Bethmann Hollweg with those of the evil Hitler. The abuse of the role of personalities by Fischer’s opponents caused the generation of historians which emerged in the 1960s to shy away from explanations which gave weight to the behaviour of individuals in favour of approaches which stressed impersonal factors.

In the aftermath of the Fischer controversy, a new school of historians came to dominate historical scholarship of the German empire within West Germany. Taking on board much of Fischer’s evidence concerning continuities in German history, they sought to analyse the structure of German society in the Wilhelmine era in order to understand the reasons for the rise of the Nazis in the 1930s. The technical German name for this type of historiography is Gesellschaftsgeschichte or the ‘history of society’. Its leading practitioner is Professor Hans-Ulrich Wehler, whose history of the Kaiserreich has become standard reading for students of the period.¹⁹ The model of interpretation favoured by Wehler was referred to by one of his opponents as representing the ‘new orthodoxy’ in the study of imperial Germany,²⁰ whereas another critic of Wehler’s warned that Gesellschaftsgeschichte risked stifling debate on the history of the Kaiserreich.²¹

As sceptics were quick to point out, many of the theoretical and ideological standpoints which characterised Gesellschaftsgeschichte were flawed. One British historian noted that the revisionist historians who emerged in West Germany in the 1960s ‘retained much of the framework favoured by their conservative opponents but turned the moral judgements upside down’.²² Thus, the attention given previously by historians to foreign policy was replaced by the doctrine of ‘the primacy of domestic politics’ – a belief that the foreign policy of Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany was part of a manipulative strategy on the part of the country’s pre-industrial élites, who wished to deflect the attention of the masses away from aspirations for democracy or social revolution.²³ The sociologist Max Weber was one of the key intellectual influences on the practitioners of Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Weber’s own conviction that the faulty political structure of imperial Germany, rather than the unstable personality of Wilhelm II, was the root cause of the empire’s political malaise,²⁴ helps to explain why Wehler almost completely ignored the

¹⁹ Wehler, German Empire.
²³ Wehler, German Empire, p. 177.
role of the Kaiser in his analysis of the *Kaiserreich*. A Weberian influence on the system of government, rather than the personalities of the political actors, was complimented in *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* by a historically determinist view of the development of German society, clearly derived from Karl Marx.

By the end of the 1980s, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* was reckoned even in Germany, ‘to have failed as a theoretical model and methodological concept’, and it was criticised by Lothar Gall for the ‘banality of the argumentation, the “relativity” of the perspective and the “dependence and historicity” of its approach’.²⁵ The credibility of the Marxist theories of *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, and the belief of its practitioners that the course of history could be determined, was dealt a fatal blow by the collapse of the GDR in 1989, which none of them had predicted. In addition, they had always stressed that structures rather than personalities were the crucial factors in the historical process, yet the collapse of the Honecker régime was made possible by the decision of the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, not to intervene. Thus the events of 1989–90 proved in an emphatic manner that individuals can, in certain circumstances, leave a profound mark on the course of history. It was a development with which the revisionist historians had difficulty coming to terms.²⁶

However, Wehler’s thesis had come under sustained attack long before the late 1980s. His characterisation of the Reich’s constitution under Bismarck as a ‘Bonapartist dictatorship based on plebiscitary support and operating within the framework of a semi-absolutist, pseudo-constitutional military monarchy’²⁷ was derided by Otto Pflanze as a distortion of the historical reality. Pflanze observed that, although Wehler was hostile to a discussion of the role of individuals in history, paradoxically, he seemed to attribute the powers of a Machiavellian genius to Bismarck. Pflanze was also concerned by Wehler’s tendency to give theoretical models, drawn from Marx and Weber, precedence in his work over empirical evidence.²⁸

Wehler’s analysis of Wilhelmine Germany has similarly been the


²⁷ Wehler, *German Empire*, p. 60.

subject of attack from historians. Wehler asserted that after Bismarck’s dismissal, there was ‘a permanent crisis of the state behind its façade of high-handed leadership’. He dismissed the idea that Wilhelm II was the dominant political figure in Berlin, preferring the view that power had been exercised by ‘the traditional oligarchies in conjunction with the anonymous forces of an authoritarian polycracy’. 29 John Röhl, in particular, has made perceptive criticisms of Wehler’s characterisation of the power structure of the Second Reich. In his view, there is no evidence to support Wehler’s claim that there was a permanent political crisis after 1890. Röhl also took Wehler to task for denying the significance of Wilhelm II, when the last Kaiser’s contemporaries were convinced of his central importance in German politics. In addition, both Röhl and Geoff Eley have pointed out that Wehler’s theory of power had a comforting aspect, which, by placing all the blame on an unnamed élite, absolved the vast majority of the German people from blame for the disastrous course of German history between 1871 and 1945, when the historical reality was more complex and disturbing. 30 In addition, Wehler’s stress on ‘the primacy of domestic politics’ was understandably criticised by diplomatic historians. Klaus Hildebrand, in particular, castigated Wehler for seeking to substitute Gesellschaftsgeschichte for the history of foreign policy. He pointed out that Gesellschaftsgeschichte, which set out to understand the dynamics of industrial society, failed to recognise that many of the concepts used to describe international rivalry, such as ‘hegemony’ and the ‘balance of power’, were in existence long before the industrial age, and were not changed fundamentally by its consequences. 31

The relative ascendancy of Gesellschaftsgeschichte, and its opposition to the discussion of the role of personalities in politics, together with the dominant preference of historiography in general for social and economic approaches, contributed to the neglect of the role of courts and monarchs by German historians down to the 1980s. However, research on the Kaiserreich by British and American scholars has contributed,

29 Wehler, German Empire, pp. 62–4.
recently, to a greater level of academic interest in the role of Kaiser Wilhelm II in German politics. This research is above all associated with the work of John Röhl.

In a path-breaking analysis, published in 1967, Röhl reopened the controversy as to whether there was a monarchical 'personal régime' in Wilhelmine Germany.\(^{32}\) He asserted that such a régime had existed, and backed up his thesis with the aid of many primary sources which had never been examined by historians before. He claimed that by 1897, through his control over bureaucratic appointments, and under the guidance of his confidant, Philipp Eulenburg, Wilhelm II had managed to create a government committed to putting his wishes into practice. The Kaiser’s power was, in turn, bolstered by his personal military, naval and civil cabinets, which became instruments of monarchical authority. He countered the argument that Wilhelm could not have ruled personally by placing emphasis on the imperative of the executive to act in line with the monarch’s wishes.\(^{33}\) The reception of Röhl’s book by the practitioners of Gesellschaftsgeschichte was predictably unfavourable,\(^{34}\) but it is more generally considered to have contained a ‘pioneering’ thesis, which ‘set a new standard of archival scholarship for work on Wilhelmine political history’.\(^{35}\)

Since the 1960s, Röhl has refined his argument in the light of new discoveries, and in response to his critics. He has introduced the concept of ‘negative personal rule’ to refer to the measures which government officials did not initiate because they appreciated that the Kaiser and his courtiers would oppose them.\(^{36}\) In addition, he has placed emphasis on the ‘kingship mechanism’, whereby all government officials were forced to court the favour of the Kaiser if they wished to reach the heights of power and influence.\(^{37}\) His edition of the correspondence of Philipp Eulenburg revealed much new information about the high politics of Wilhelmine Germany,\(^{38}\) as did the work of one of the historians inspired by Röhl, Isabel Hull, on Wilhelm II’s entourage.\(^{39}\) Even previously


\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 279.

\(^{34}\) Wehler, German Empire, p. 274, note 34.


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sceptical historians, such as Wolfgang Mommsen, have found it impossible to ignore the results of this research.⁴⁰ However, debate over the reality of ‘personal rule’ has continued. Geoff Eley stressed the practical limits on Wilhelm II’s authority, and claimed that there was a reduction in his political involvement after 1900,⁴¹ as did Volker Berghahn in a recent textbook.⁴² Hull, in a convincing rebuttal to Eley’s argument, emphasised that he had failed to come to terms fully with the significance of Röhl’s stress on the ‘kingship mechanism’ and ‘negative personal rule’. She noted that Eley had concentrated his argument on domestic politics, whereas foreign and military policy were the spheres where the Kaiser’s personal powers were most evident. Hull observed that there was much evidence, even after 1900, that Wilhelm II had played a key role in these areas. In addition, she refuted Eley’s contention that Bernhard von Bülow, the Chancellor from 1900–1909, was able to pursue his own policies, independent of the Kaiser,⁴³ as did a recent major study of Bülow’s chancellorship.⁴⁴ New research on the German monarchy has not been restricted solely to the issue of ‘personal rule’. Prior to the 1980s, no academic historian had written a biography of Wilhelm II based on primary sources. However, in the last few years, several have appeared, most notably by Lamar Cecil and John Röhl.⁴⁵ One historian has even established that Wilhelm II’s role during the First World War was more significant than his image as a ‘shadow emperor’ during this period would suggest.⁴⁶ Thus, the absence of studies of the Kaiser himself, which represented a shaming gap in the historiography of the period of German history associated with him, is now being rectified.

However, although the German monarchy may now be taken seriously

by historians concerned with German politics and diplomacy, this cannot be said with confidence for the history of other major European monarchies. Russian history of the pre-1917 era has been dominated by explaining the Russian Revolution. Western historians have tended to ask whether liberal democracy could have triumphed in imperial Russia, whereas Soviet historians were inclined to view the history of the last years of tsarism as a prelude to the ‘inevitable’ triumph of communism. This situation meant that hardly anyone sought to examine the tsarist régime on its own terms, as a form of government, which was outdated by the early twentieth century, but one which had evolved out of Russian traditions, and may perhaps have been the only real alternative to communism in a country which lacked strong liberal forces.

As a consequence, Nicholas II, the last Tsar, has generally been portrayed in a negative light by the academic community. Western historians have derided him for his weakness, commitment to reactionary policies, and for upholding an anachronistic system of government. Biographies of Nicholas II have generally concentrated on his tragic family history, and have devoted very little attention to his political role. Indeed, the first genuine political biography of Nicholas II, by Dominic Lieven, only appeared in 1993, although a work of more restricted scope had been published in 1990.

It is in Lieven’s work that the first signs of a new approach to the study of the Russian monarchy can be discerned. In his magisterial study of the state council under Nicholas II, published in 1989, he lamented the absence of a serious political biography of Nicholas II. Lieven compared the situation unfavourably to that of the Prusso-German monarchy, and suggested that an approach, similar to that adopted by Röhl towards the history of the Kaiserreich, was now necessary for Russia as well. His own biography of the last Tsar combined the methodology adopted by Röhl and Hull in their studies of the court of Wilhelm II with an older approach, that of the Russian nationalist historian S. S. Oldenbourg. Oldenbourg examined the reign of Nicholas II from a conservative

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50 Dominic C. B. Lieven, Russia’s Rulers under the Old Regime (London and New Haven, 1989).
51 Ibid., pp. 278–89.
52 S. S. Oldenbourg, The Last Tsar: Nicholas II, His Reign and His Russia, 4 vols., English translation (Gulf Breeze, FL, 1975–77).