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978-0-521-0-2913-1 - Summa Theologiae: Volume 5 - God's Will and Providence,
(1a. 19-26)

Thomas Gilby O.P.

Excerpt

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 19, 1

de voluntate et providentia divina

POST CONSIDERATIONEM eorum quæ ad divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quæ pertinent ad voluntatem divinam:

ut sit prima consideratio de ipsa Dei voluntate;
secunda de his quæ ad voluntatem absolute pertinent;
tertia de his quæ ad intellectum in ordine ad voluntatem pertinent.

Quæstio 19. de voluntate Dei

Circa ipsam autem voluntatem quærentur duodecim:

1. utrum in Deo sit voluntas;
2. utrum Deus velit alia a se;
3. utrum quicquid Deus vult ex necessitate velit;
4. utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum;
5. utrum voluntatis divinæ sit assignare aliquam causam;
6. utrum voluntas divina semper impleatur;
7. utrum voluntas Dei sit mutabilis;
8. utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis imponat;
9. utrum in Deo sit voluntas malorum;
10. utrum Deus habeat liberum arbitrium;
11. utrum sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas signi;
12. utrum convenienter circa divinam voluntatem ponantur quinque signa.

articulus 1. utrum in Deo sit voluntas

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Objectum enim voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.

2. Præterea, voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit

¹cf 1a. 54, 2; 3a. 18, 1. 1 *Sent.* 45, 1. *CG* I, 72 & 73; IV, 9. *De veritate* xxiii, 2. *Compend. theol.* 32

²Considered apart, *absolute*, abstracting from operations of mind. The distinction is conceptual on our part, not real in God, and is required for the *Summa's* method of isolating a topic for consideration.

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WILL IN GOD

God's will and providence

AFTER DISCUSSING divine knowing we now come to matters relating to divine willing:

- and first, in itself (19);
- second, its attributes when considered apart (20-1);
- third, and when considered in conjunction with intelligence (22-6).^x

Question 19. will in God

Here there are twelve points of inquiry:

1. whether there is a will in God;
2. whether God wills things other than himself;
3. whether he is bound to will whatever he does will;
4. whether God's will is the cause of things;
5. whether any motive is to be ascribed to divine willing;
6. whether it is always fulfilled;
7. whether God's will is changeable;
8. whether it imposes necessity on the things willed;
9. whether God has a will for evil;
10. whether he has freewill;
11. whether we can signpost God's will;
12. whether we can fittingly set forth five such signs.

article 1. is there a will in God?

THE FIRST POINT:¹ 1. It would seem not.^a For the objective of will is a good that is aimed at. Yet how can an aim be proposed for God? Hence there is not a will in God.

2. Moreover, willing is a kind of desiring. Now desire or appetite, since

Divine knowledge has been treated 1a. 14-18, Vol. 4 of this series.

Voluntas can mean either or both the power and the activity of will, and will be translated accordingly throughout this treatise. Likewise *intellectus* can mean either or both the ability and the exercise of understanding.

^aCan we apply the notion to the divinity, where there is no bent to an end, no desire, no motion?

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a, 19, 1

rei non habitæ, imperfectionem designat, quæ Deo non competit. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.

3. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, voluntas est movens motum.² Sed Deus est primum movens immobile, ut probatur *Physic*.³ Ergo in Deo non est voluntas.

SED CONTRA est quod dicit Apostolus, *Ut probetis quæ sit voluntas Dei*.⁴

RESPONSIO: Dicendum in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus; voluntas enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus est intelligens actu per suam formam intelligibilem. Quælibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam tendat in eam, et quando habet ipsam quiescat in ea; et idem est de qualibet perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturæ. Et hæc habitudo ad bonum in rebus carentibus cognitione vocatur appetitus naturalis.

Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam intelligibilem similem habitudinem habet; ut scilicet cum habet ipsum quiescat in illo, cum vero non habet quærat ipsum; et utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente intellectum est voluntas, sicut in quolibet habente sensum est appetitus animalis.

Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit in eo intellectus; et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse ita suum esse est suum velle.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei,

²*De Anima* III, 10. 433b16. St Thomas, *lect. 15*. Aristotle is not speaking specifically of the will, but generally of appetite, *orektikon*

³*Physics* VIII, 4, 5, & 6. 258b10. St Thomas, *lect. 7 et sqq*

⁴*Romans* 12, 2

^bCognition and appetite, the two activities consequent on being, under the aspect of respectively being true and being good.

Will in spiritual beings, 1a. 59, 1-3. In human beings, 1a. 82-3. The metaphysics of the good, 1a. 5, and the theology, 1a. 6. The good a final cause, 1a. 5, 4.

The last book of the *Metaphysics* discusses the divine mind, but there is little reference to the divine will, which, together with the divine goodness, takes on a special meaning for the theology of Revelation, a meaning that is progressively developed in this treatise and throughout the *Summa*. God is not just the good or love in a general sense, but the supremely personal good and subsistent friendship, *agapè*. The world is produced by the loving kindness of his choice, and is not a natural emanation of his being. St Thomas is prepared to tackle any philosophical argument on its own showing, and often does so at length even in his theological works, a practice which may lead the unwary reader into forgetting that his thought is always moving in the dimensions of grace.

^cForm: originally the outward shape of a thing. Then the inner principle, *morphè*,

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WILL IN GOD

it is for something not yet possessed, implies non-fulfilment. We should not, therefore, think of him as willing.

3. Furthermore, according to Aristotle the will both sets in motion and is set in motion.² God, however, is the motionless first principle of motion, as proved in the *Physics*.³ Consequently in God there is not a will.

ON THE OTHER HAND St Paul exhorts us to *discern what is the will of God*.⁴

REPLY: As there is mind in God, so there is will; the one involves the other.^b A physical thing has its actual existence through its form of existence, and likewise a mind is actually understanding through having an intelligible form.^c Now the bearing of a thing to a form natural to it is this: that when not possessed it tends there, and when possessed it stays. Such is the case with any natural completion that is a good for the nature in question. When cognition is absent this bearing on good is called 'natural appetite'.^d

A thing of intelligence has a like attitude towards a good apprehended through an intelligible form, so that it makes for that good when it is still to be gained, and rests with it when it is gained: both are functions of willing. Accordingly anything with a mind has a will, just as a thing with sensation has emotional appetite.

Consequently there must be a will in God because he has a mind. And as his understanding is his being, so also is his willing.^e

Hence: 1. Nothing outside himself is God's aim. All the same he him-

determining the matter, *hylē*, and making a thing to be what it is, and hence the embodied idea, *eidos* and *logos*, which makes it intelligible to mind, *forma intelligibilis*.

^aAppetite, *orexis*, *appetitus*: includes all operative relationship, *ordo*, tendency, *inclinatio*, and bearing, *habitus*, towards good. *De veritate* xxv, 1. Ia. 59, 1; 80, 1. 1a2æ. 26, 1; 27, 2 ad 3; 29, 1. III *Sent.* 27, 1, 2.

Appetite is divided into natural appetite and voluntary appetite. The first is the technical term for any bent to good unmediated by knowledge, as in any unconscious subject of final causality. The second, which pursues an apprehended good, is divided into sensitive appetite or emotion, which follows sensation, and intelligent appetite or will, which follows at least some understanding. Sensitive appetite, 1a. 80-1; treatise on the emotions, 1a2æ. 22-48. Will, 1a. 82-3; the components of its activity, 1a2æ. 8-17.

^eThe argument is not for an inner appetite within the mind itself, but for a distinct appetite towards the object apprehended by mind; that mind and will are distinct powers is not admitted by Spinoza. Yet note that while to be perceived by mind or sense is a condition for an object to be willed or emotionally felt, the drive of appetite is towards the thing as it exists in itself, not as a meaning in the mind or phenomenon in the senses: cf 1a. 80, 1 ad 2; 1a2æ. 22, 2. *In Meta.* VI, *lect.* 4 (1027b25). Vol. 1 of this series, Appendix 10, *The Dialectic of Love in the Summa*.

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SUMMA THEOLOGICÆ, Ia. 19, 2

tamen ipsemet est finis respectu omnium quæ ab eo fiunt, et hoc per suam essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est.⁵ Finis enim habet rationem boni.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem; quæ, licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet actum ut appetat quæ non habet, sed etiam ut amet quod habet et delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur, quæ semper habet bonum quod est ejus objectum, cum sit indifferens ab eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.⁶

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas cujus objectum principale est bonum quod est extra volentem oportet quod sit mota ab alio, sed objectum divinæ voluntatis est bonitas sua, quæ est ejus essentia; unde cum voluntas Dei sit ejus essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus. Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet se ipsum.⁷

articulus 2. utrum Deus velit alia a se

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:¹ I. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim divinum est ejus esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult aliud a se.

2. Præterea, volitum movet volentem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in III *De Anima*.² Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se movebitur ejus voluntas ab aliquo alio: quod est impossibile.

3. Præterea, cuicumque volenti sufficit aliquod volitum nihil quærit extra illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas ejus ex ea satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.

4. Præterea, actus voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis ejus sit multiplex, et per consequens ejus esse, quod est ejus velle. Hoc autem est impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.

¹Ia. 6, 3²In the body of the article³*Phædrus* 245 C. *Laws* 894 E. *Timæus* 34 B. cf *Metaphysics* XI, 6. 1071b37. Ia. 9, 1 ad 1⁴cf I *Sent.* 45, 2. *CG* I, 75-7. *De veritate* XXIII, 4⁵*De Anima* III, 10. 433b17. St Thomas, *lect.* 15. cf note 2, preceding art.⁶The first 10 articles of this Question are discussing the divine will properly so called, the *voluntas beneplaciti*, God's gracious will or will of good pleasure, *eudokia*;

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self is the aim for all the things he makes, and is that essentially, since, as we have already seen,⁵ he is goodness itself; to be an aim implies being a good.

2. The will is an appetitive part in our case. Despite the fact that it is named from wanting, 'appetite' or desire is active not only when seeking what is not yet possessed but also when delighting in what is.⁴ It is in the last sense that we attribute will in God, for his will always holds the good which is its objective, since, as we have pointed out,⁶ this is not distinct from the very nature of his being.

3. A will is set in motion by another when its main objective lies outside the person willing. The objective of God's will, however, is his own goodness, and this is his nature. And his will itself is also his nature. Therefore it is not moved by anything other, but by himself alone—if we may employ language which refers to understanding and willing as movements, as Plato did, when he spoke of the First Mover moving himself.^{7e}

article 2. does God will things other than himself?

THE SECOND POINT:¹ 1. How can he? For his willing is simply his being. Since he is not anything other than himself, he does not will anything other than himself.

2. Again, Aristotle notes how the will is stirred by what is willed like any desire by what is desirable.² Were God to will something other than himself, he would be moved by it: which is out of the question.

3. Also, when content with an object the will seeks nothing outside. Now his own goodness is enough for God, and there his will is well-content. Consequently he does not will anything other than himself.

4. And again, will-activity is multiplied by the objects willed. A consequence of God's willing other things as well as himself would be a manifold will-activity on his part, with the result that his being would be manifold as well, for his being is his willing. This is impossible. Therefore he does not will things other than himself.

cf e.g. *Matthew* 3, 17, & 11, 26. Arts 11 & 12 below will discuss a metaphorical usage, *voluntas signi*.

⁸Movement, *motus*, *kinēsis*: sometimes taken broadly for any action, even the immanent activity which as such does not imply change, cf 1a. 9, 2; 18, 3 ad 1. Usually, however, it implies change, *mutatio*, a transition from one condition to another; the term is not limited to changes in place and size, but applies also to instantaneous changes, and to the coming to be and conversion of material substances. *In Physic.* III, *lect.* 1–3. *In Meta.* x, 9. Vol. 2, Appendix 6. cf below 1a. 20, I note g.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 19, 2

SED CONTRA est quod Apostolus dicit, *Hæc est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra.*³

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se; quod apparet a simili prius introducto.⁴ Res enim naturalis non solum habet naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet, sed etiam ut proprium bonum in alia diffundat secundum quod possibile est. Unde videmus quod omne agens, in quantum est actu et perfectum, facit sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis ut bonum quod quis habet aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est.

Et hoc præcipue pertinet ad bonitatem divinam, a qua per quamdam similitudinem derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde si res naturales in quantum perfectæ sunt suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis pertinet ad voluntatem divinam ut bonum suum aliis per similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur vult et se et alia, sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, in quantum concedet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam participare.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit ejus esse secundum rem, tamen differt ratione secundum diversum modum intelligendi et significandi, ut ex superioribus patet.⁵ In hoc enim quod dico, 'Deum esse', non importatur habitudo ad aliquid sicut in hoc quod dico, 'Deum velle'. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen aliquid aliud a se.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod in his quæ volumus propter finem tota ratio volendi est finis, et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet in his quæ volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere potionem amaram nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem; et hoc solum est quod movet ejus voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit potionem dulcem quam non solum propter sanitatem sed etiam propter se aliquis

³1 *Thessalonians* 4, 3⁴Art. 1⁵1a. 13, 4

^{*}Sanctification, *hagiasmos*, to be set apart for God, separated from sin. This, as an effect, belongs to the *voluntas signi*: cf art. 11 below.

^bThe overtones of the language should be neglected, and the argument taken devoid of the 'pathetic fallacy'. Neither Aristotle nor St Thomas read human emotions and wishes into non-rational things. The tendency, *inclinatio*, can be an unconscious sharing in the teleological drive, a sharing in the causality of the Good. The active diffusion of good is especially recognized in living, conscious, and intelligent beings, which are not, as it were, imprisoned in themselves, but can open out to others; cf 1a. 14, 1; 18, 1 & 2. The reflection is dear to Plotinus and Dionysius.

^cBañez, *in loc.*, notes that to be communicative of his goodness is an essential perfection of God, and this is completely expressed within the life of the Blessed

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ON THE OTHER HAND St Paul says, *This is the will of God, your sanctification.*^{3a}

REPLY: That God wills things other than himself, and not himself alone, appears from the comparison we have struck with the world of nature.⁴ A thing has a natural tendency towards its own good, to obtain it when it has not got it and to rest with it when it has, and also, so far as possible, to spread its own good to others.^b Thus we observe that at their highest pitch all active things reproduce their like. Hence a mark of active will is that a person so far as he can shares with others the good he possesses.^c

Especially is this the mark of divine willing, from which by some likeness every achievement derives. If the things of nature when at their best share their good with others, much more is it the characteristic of God's will to share his goodness by making things as like to him as possible. So therefore he wills his own being and the being of others. However, he wills himself as the end, and others as to that end, in that it befits the divine goodness that others also should partake of it.

Hence: 1. Although God's willing is really identical with his being, we form distinct notions of them according to our human manner of thought and expression: we have already discussed this matter.^{5d} By saying, 'God is', we do not imply a relationship to anything else, as when saying, 'God wills'. And therefore, though he is not anything other than himself, he wills something other than himself.

2. When we will things for an end, the whole reason for doing so is that end; this is what moves the will. This is conspicuously the case when our activity is just on account of that end, as in taking an unpleasant dose of medicine our only purpose is health, and this alone prompts the will. The case is different with a grateful draught, which we take for its own sake as well as for health.^e When, as we have remarked, God wills things other

Trinity; but that goodness is communicated to creatures adds nothing to divine perfection. The betterment lies in the receiver, not the giver.

^aAll concepts used of God in theological science are drawn from our experience of creatures.

^bNauseating medicine is merely a means to an end and holds no attraction within itself. Creatures, however, share in God's goodness as being good and ends in themselves, though neither good of themselves nor the final end. They are for an end, *ea quae sunt ad finem*, but not just means to an end. Created persons are subordinate to God as principals, not subservient as pure instruments. They are real things, not shadows. Sin lies in making creatures into idols, or God-substitutes. Such are among the consequences of St Thomas's metaphysics of creation; of the One who is not better or greater for having created the universe, and of the Many who are nevertheless real; cf 1a. 45-7.

On account of, because of, for the sake of, *propter, heneka*: usually, as here,
Footnote e continued on page 10

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 19, 3

velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit nisi propter finem, qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est,⁶ non sequitur quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem ejus nisi bonitas sua. Et sic, sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a se vult volendo bonitatem suam.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinæ sufficit sua bonitas non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi ratione suæ bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus, licet sit perfectus, ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea cognoscit alia.

4. Ad quartum dicendum quod sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non videt nisi in uno, ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas sua.

articulus 3. utrum quidquid Deus vult ex necessitate velit

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult ex necessitate velit. Omne enim æternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult ab æterno vult; alias voluntas ejus esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid vult ex necessitate vult.

2. Præterea, Deus vult alia a se in quantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate vult.

3. Præterea, quidquid est Deo naturale est necessarium; quia Deus est per se necesse esse et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum est.² Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult; quia in Deo nihil potest esse præter naturam, ut dicitur in *Meta*.³ Ergo quidquid vult ex necessitate vult.

refers to purpose, or the order of final causality, yet an object is also said to be 'because of' its efficient, formal, and even material cause; 2a2æ. 27, 3. Thus salvation is because of merits; below 1a. 23, 5. Yet even when this is willed because of that there is a distinction between willing this because that is willed and willing this to be because of that; cf art. 5 below. So charity towards our neighbour because of God is not a case of love me, love my dog, but of loving unaffectedly another as a friend and that he may be truly himself in God; cf 2a2æ. 25, 1.

¹cf 1a. 14, 5-7.

²In the body of the article

³cf CG 1, 80-3; III, 47. *De veritate* XXIII, 4. *De potentia* 1, 5; X, 2 ad 6. 1 *Sent.* 43, 2

⁴1a. 2, 3

⁵*Metaphysics* IV, 5. 1015b15. St Thomas, *lect.* 6

*The necessary, *anagkaion*, what cannot not be. Divided, 1a. 41, 2 ad 5, into the intrinsically necessary, *per se*, and the extrinsically necessary, *per aliud*, in correspondence with the distinction, which will later appear, 1a. 25, 4 & 5, between the absolutely and conditionally necessary.

A thing may be necessitated from outside either by its efficient cause or by its final cause. If we posit an acting necessary cause then an effect inevitably follows; the effect may be natural, e.g. the coming of the dawn, or unnatural or 'violent' (see below note b); if we posit an end, then it may not be attained either at all (*sine quo non*) or conveniently (*ad bene esse*) without some means; cf 3a. 1, 2.

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than himself, though not unless for that end which is his own goodness, the inference is not that anything other than that moves his will.⁶ Accordingly, as he understands things other than himself in understanding his own being, so likewise he wills them in willing his own goodness.

3. Because God's will is content with his own goodness it follows that he wills nothing else except on that account, not that he wills nothing else. So also his understanding, though complete because knowing his own essence, yet still knows therein other things.

4. As God's understanding is single, because he does not see many things save in unity,^f so his willing is single and simple, because he does not will many things save in the unity which is his own goodness.

article 3. is God bound to will whatever he does will?

THE THIRD POINT:¹ 1. Apparently whatever God wills he must. For everything eternal is necessary.^a Yet whatever God wills he wills from eternity, otherwise his willing would be changeable. And therefore whatever he wills is of necessity.

2. Moreover, God wills things other than himself inasmuch as he wills his own goodness. This he does of necessity. In the same way, also, he wills things other than himself.

3. Furthermore, whatever is natural to God is bound to be, since he is necessary of himself and the ground of all necessity, as has been seen.² Now it is natural for him to will whatever he does will, for, as observed in the *Metaphysics*,³ in God there can be nothing over and above his nature.^b Consequently he is bound to will what he does will.

The necessary is contrasted with the contingent, the possible-to-be and possible-not-to-be, or, given that it exists, the could-have-been-otherwise: cf below 1a. 19, 3. Also Vol. 2 of this series, Appendix 8: on the *tertia via*, 1a. 2, 3. The problems of necessary and contingent existence fundamental to medieval philosophers were raised by the Arabic commentators on him rather than by Aristotle himself.

The present inquiry, Cajetan notes, is not about the activity of willing (*exercitium actus*) but about what is willed (*specificato actus*); that is, it is not whether God wills necessarily but whether he necessarily wills what he does will. Recall that there are two issues before freewill, to act or not to act (*libertas contradictionis*) and to act for this or for that (*libertas contrarietatis*); cf 1a2æ. 10, 2; 14, 6. Can God do only what he does do? For divine freewill see below, art. 10. If he does create, is the effect to be for the best? 1a. 25, 6.

^b*Nihil præter naturam, para phusin*, nothing preternatural, besides, against, or 'occurring to' a nature: a case of extrinsic necessity arising from the efficient cause, the compulsive, violent, *biaion*, the force undergone by one particular nature against its own tendency from another particular nature. cf 1a2æ. 6, 4 & 5. In *Meta.* v, lect. 6. *De malo* vi, 1. *CG* III, 88. As will appear, God is the universal cause and

Footnote b continued on page 12