First published in Latin in 1516, Thomas More’s *Utopia* is one of the most influential books in the Western philosophical and literary tradition and one of the supreme achievements of Renaissance humanism. This is the first edition of *Utopia* since 1965 (the Yale edition) to combine More’s Latin text with an English translation, and also the first edition to provide a Latin text that is at once accurate and readable. The text is based on the early editions (with the Froben edition of March 1518 as copy-text), but spelling and punctuation have been regularized in accordance with modern practices. The translation is a revised version of the acclaimed Adams translation, which also appears in Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. The edition, which incorporates the results of recent Utopian scholarship, includes an introduction, textual apparatus, a full commentary and a guide to the voluminous scholarly and critical literature on *Utopia*. 
Thomas More

Utopia

Latin text and English translation
Thomas More

UTOPIA

LATIN TEXT AND
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

EDITED BY
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AND
CLARENCE H. MILLER
Germano Marc’hadour
Amabili et eximio amico Mori
et
Amicorum Mori
CONTENTS

Preface xi
Textual practices xv
Introduction xvii
Part I: Interpretative contexts xxxii
Part II: The Latin text xxxii
Brief guide to scholarship xlii
Utopia: Text and translation 1
Appendix: The early editions and the choice of copy-text 270
Works cited 277
Index 285

ix
This edition of *Utopia* is a revised and expanded version of the one that Robert M. Adams and I prepared for the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (1989). That edition printed More's book only in translation; this one adds a redaction of the Latin text, together with a textual introduction and notes, and an appendix on the choice of copy-text. It also incorporates changes to the introductory materials and annotations of the earlier edition, prompted by the addition of the text and apparatus and the attendant redirection of the edition to a partly different readership from the undergraduate students to whom the Cambridge Texts series is primarily directed. The present edition also incorporates corrections of some errors in the earlier edition, as well as many revisions to its translation.

In presenting the Latin text, the readers we have had primarily in mind are specialists in fields such as English literature or the history of political thought; that is, readers who have some Latin but are not Neo-Latin scholars. With such an audience in view, we have – as the textual introduction explains in detail – modernised our copy-text (the Froben edition of March 1518) in three respects. First, we have regularised spellings to conform to standard modern orthography for Latin. Second, we have divided the text into paragraphs. Third, we have thoroughly repunctuated it. Punctuation in the early editions of *Utopia* is (as with other early books) based on principles partly different from those underlying modern punctuation, employs a partly different set of marks, and is, moreover, erratic. Repunctuation is not nearly as simple as it may sound. Having undertaken it, we have constantly had to confront problems of syntax and meaning that Father Surtz (as editor of the conservative reprint in the Yale edition) generally passed over in silence. We hope that our solutions to these problems will meet with approval; at the least, the discussion of them in the apparatus may direct attention to matters that have not previously received as much of it as they deserve.

I should explain how the Cambridge Texts pair of editors came
PREFACE

to be expanded into a trio. When the present edition was in what
I took to be nearly final form, I asked Clarence Miller if he would
give it a critical reading. With no expectation of recompense beyond
the usual acknowledgement in the Preface, he agreed to do so. But
when he returned the manuscript, the quantity and quality of his
annotations on all parts of it were such that it seemed obvious that
he should be named (if indeed he were willing to be named) as one
of the editors. To my great satisfaction, he agreed to be associated
with the edition in this way, and also to perform various tasks in
its completion. I was, too, particularly eager to have him join the
project because other commitments had forced Adams to withdraw
from further participation in the preparation of the edition, just
after he had examined the same version of it that I had sent to
Miller.

The division of labour in this edition and its Cambridge Texts
predecessor, then, is as follows. For the Cambridge Texts edition,
Adams revised the translation he had previously published with W.
W. Norton & Company and made new translations of some of the
ancillary letters and poems that buttress More's text in the early
editions; for the present edition, he prepared the Latin text and the
textual introduction and notes. For both editions, I provided the
other introductory materials and the commentary; and for this one
I added the appendix on copy-text. Adams and I thoroughly vetted
each other's contributions; and, as I noted above, Miller sub-
sequently vetted all parts of the edition, correcting errors in the
text and making suggestions for changes in the apparatus and in the
translation and commentary. As coordinator of the project, I was
finally responsible for accepting, rejecting or modifying suggestions
made by my co-editors – and I am therefore wholly responsible
for all remaining errors and infelicities.

On my own and Adams's behalf, I take this opportunity to
record again our gratitude to Quentin Skinner and Richard Tuck
for their valuable comments on the introductory materials in their
earlier form, and to Ruth Sharman, whose reading of the Cam-
bridge Texts edition on behalf of the Press prompted many
improvements. Skinner also vetted the introductory materials of the
present edition. We are indebted to the late, and greatly lamented,
John Benedict, Vice President and Editor of W. W. Norton, for
securing Norton's acquiescence in our publication of a revised ver-
sion of Adams's translation. For the new edition as for its predeces-
sor, Karen Donnelly provided indispensable help of several kinds.

xii
PREFACE

Mike Smith solved many computer problems - a few of them tricky even for him. Virginia Catmur, the Press's editor for the new edition, ideally combined care, erudition and patience.

Our greatest debt - one both general and particular - is reflected in the dedication of the edition to Father Germain Marc'hadour. As a More scholar of unmatched breadth and intensity, and as paterfamilias of the international community of those who study and admire More and his works, Father Marc'hadour merits acknowledgement in every piece of More scholarship. But he also performed a particular service for this one. Shortly after the publication of the Cambridge Texts edition, I asked him if he would read through it, with a view to identifying flaws that should be avoided in the new edition. In his usual thorough and precise fashion, Father Marc'hadour voluminously annotated the book from front to back, suggesting many changes that have been incorporated into the introduction, translation and commentary of the present edition.

G. M. L.
TEXTUAL PRACTICES

(1) References. CW = Yale Complete Works of St Thomas More; Selected Letters = St Thomas More: Selected Letters, ed. Elizabeth F. Rogers; CWE = Toronto Collected Works of Erasmus. References to the Bible are to the Authorised (‘King James’) Version – except for the Apocrypha, where references are to the Vulgate. Except where otherwise specified, references to Greek and Roman classics are to the editions of the Loeb Classical Library. Three important exceptions are Aristotle’s Politics, which we quote from the edition of Sir Ernest Barker, and Plato’s Republic and Laws, quoted from the Penguin editions by, respectively, H. D. P. Lee and Trevor J. Saunders. For all other works, initial references include publication data; place of publication is London unless otherwise specified. Subsequent references are made as brief as is compatible with clarity. Publication data are repeated in ‘Works cited’, which also gives these data for the Loeb Classical Library editions quoted.

(2) Names. Names of historical figures of More’s era are spelled as in Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation (ed. Peter G. Bietenholz and Thomas B. Deutscher). The sole exception is Pieter Gillis, for whom we use the familiar anglicised form Peter Giles.

(3) Modernisation. Whenever sixteenth-century English is quoted, spelling (and sometimes punctuation) is silently modernised. Spelling and punctuation in the Latin text are also modernised: for specifics, see the textual introduction. Greek words appearing in the commentary are given in transliterated form.

(4) Gendered language. Where More uses nouns or pronouns that can, in classical Latin, encompass not just males but human beings of either sex (for example, homo, puer and nemo), we have employed similarly inclusive English equivalents in the translation. We have also avoided gendered pronouns in passages where the Latin permits us to do so, and where More may plausibly be thought not to have intended to restrict his reference to males. But Utopia – like all other Renaissance
works, and despite the fact that one of its notable features is the nearly equal treatment that the Utopian republic accords to women and men in education, work and military training and service – is the product of a culture in which intellectual and political life were generally regarded as almost exclusively male domains; and the truth is that we have probably translated into gender-neutral language some passages where More had in mind only males.
INTRODUCTION

PART I: INTERPRETATIVE CONTEXTS

_Utopia_ treats fundamental issues of human nature and society, and brings to bear on them a seldom-matched combination of classical learning, practical experience and depth and complexity of mind. Richly allusive and endlessly enigmatic, intriguing to scholars in several disciplines and inspiring to reformers and revolutionaries, More’s little book has spawned an unusually varied interpretative tradition. As editors, we are not called upon to promulgate a comprehensive interpretation of our own – even if we could agree on one. We do, though, believe that any interpretation needs to take into account certain fundamental facts about _Utopia_ and its background, and that it is our role to provide the necessary starting points for interpretation, by setting the book in its contexts in More’s life and times, and in the history of political thought. In this process, Part I of the Introduction provides the broad outlines, and the annotations to the text fill in details; in turn, these annotations, together with the ‘Brief guide to scholarship’, point the reader to the most important texts on which a fuller and deeper understanding of _Utopia_ and its critical tradition depends.

More to Utopia

Thomas More was born in London on 7 February 1478, or possibly 1477.¹ His father, John More, was determined that his eldest son should follow him into the legal profession. Thomas spent a few years at St Anthony’s School, learning the fundamentals of Latin grammar and composition. At the age of about twelve, he was placed as a page in the household of Henry VII’s Lord Chancellor, John Morton. (Morton was also Archbishop of Canterbury and, from 1491, a cardinal.) This placement was ideally suited to expos-

INTRODUCTION

ing More to the ways of public life, and to securing him a powerful patron. After two years at Mortons, the boy was sent to Oxford, presumably to sharpen the skills in rhetoric and logic that would be important to a legal career. He was then, at about sixteen, brought back to London to begin legal training in the Inns of Court.

During his years as a law student, however, More came increasingly under the influence of a group of literary scholars, central figures of the emerging tradition of humanism in England. As Paul Oskar Kristeller has taught us, Renaissance humanism was not a philosophical position but a particular scholarly orientation. The term ‘humanist’ derives from studia humanitatis, a Ciceronian phrase that came to designate a family of disciplines: grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and moral philosophy. In the Renaissance as in the Middle Ages, Latin was the normal language of learning. Beginning in the fourteenth century, humanists like Petrarch attempted to revive the classical form of that language; by the early fifteenth century, they had undertaken a parallel attempt for classical Greek. More studied Latin composition with the grammarian John Holt, and Greek under William Grocyn. He also fell strongly under the influence of John Colet. Like Grocyn, Colet had studied in Italy, the centre of humanist learning. After his return to England in 1496, he gave several series of lectures at Oxford on the epistles of St Paul, lectures that constituted the earliest English application of some of the exegetical and historiographical techniques of Italian humanism; later he became Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral, and founded there the first of the humanist grammar schools in England. And in 1499, More made the acquaintance of the great Dutch humanist Erasmus, who in that year first visited England.

Indeed, at this period More seems to have been at least as intent on the pursuit of literary scholarship as of the law. He also seriously considered becoming a priest – doubtless in part because scholarship was almost exclusively the province of clerics. According to a biographical sketch of More that Erasmus wrote in 1519, for a time he applied his whole mind to the pursuit of piety, with vigils and fasts and prayer and similar exercises preparing himself for the priesthood (CWE, VII, 21). In fact More seems to have tested his vocation not merely for the priesthood – a calling that, as Morton’s example shows, need not have precluded a legal career – but also for a life of religious withdrawal. The biography by his son-in-law

INTERPRETATIVE CONTEXTS

William Roper says that at about this time More lived four years with the Carthusians, the strictest of the monastic orders.¹

Eventually More made his choices. In late 1504 or early 1505, he closed the door to the priesthood and monasticism by marrying Joan Colt;² nor is there any sign, in the years following his marriage, that he thought of abandoning the law. Given the necessity of supporting a growing family – Joan bore him four children before her death in 1511, after which More married a middle-aged widow, Alice Middleton – he could scarcely afford to entertain such thoughts.

In the decade following his first marriage, More rose rapidly in the legal profession. Roper says that he was a member of the Parliament of 1504, and he almost certainly represented the City of London in that of 1510. In the same year, he began to act as a city judge, having been appointed an undersheriff of London. Increasingly he won assignments that drew on his literary and rhetorical as well as his legal skills. By August 1517, and perhaps somewhat earlier, he had entered Henry VIII’s council.³ His first conciliar assignment was as a diplomat, in a trade mission to Calais. And though his subsequent tasks spanned a broad range of activities, his main employment, before he became Lord Chancellor in 1539, was as secretary to the king. He also served frequently as the king’s orator. And when Henry decided to write against Martin Luther (in 1520), More acted as his literary adviser and editor.

In the earlier part of his professional life, More also managed to carry out a substantial amount of independent scholarship and writing. It is striking how precisely his works of this period conform to the five associated disciplines of the studia humanitatis.⁴ As grammarian (in the Renaissance understanding of the term), he translated Greek poems and four short works by the Greek ironist Lucian. As rhetorician, he wrote a declaration in reply to Lucian’s Tyrannicide. (The declaration was a standard rhetorical exercise, a speech on a paradoxical or otherwise ingenious topic, often involving the impersonation of some historical or mythical figure.)

INTRODUCTION

Erasmus reports a lost dialogue, evidently in the spirit of a declama-
tion, defending the community of wives advocated in Plato’s
Republic. Several of More’s longer, polemical letters of these years
belong to the rhetorical subgenre of invective. As poet, he wrote,
in addition to a few English poems, a large number of Latin epi-
grams. As historian, he practised the humanist genre of historical
biography, in Latin and English versions of his unfinished History
of King Richard III (a splendid, sardonic work that, having been
incorporated into the chronicle histories, became the main source
of Shakespeare’s play) and in his translation of a biography of the
fifteenth-century Italian philosopher Pico della Mirandola. As
moral and political philosopher, he wrote Utopia. The publication
of Utopia came near the end of this phase of More’s literary career.
Apart from three long polemical letters in defence of Erasmus and
humanist learning, for several years after 1516 he wrote little other
than what was required of him in his profession; and when he
resumed writing books in the 1520s – works opposing the Lutheran
‘heresy’, and a series of devotional works – they no longer fitted
the humanist categories.

The composition of Utopia

Utopia was conceived in the summer of 1515. In May of that year,
More left England for Flanders, as a member of a royal trade
commission. The negotiations conducted by this commission and its
Flemish counterpart at Bruges were suspended by 21 July, but More
did not return to England until 25 October. In the three months
from late July to late October, he enjoyed a rare period of leisure;
it was during this period that Utopia began to take shape.

At some point in the summer More visited Antwerp, where he
met Peter Giles, to whom Erasmus had recommended him. Giles
was a man after More’s own heart. He was a classical scholar and
an intimate of Erasmus and his circle; he was also a man of practical
affairs, city clerk of Antwerp and as such deeply involved in the
business of that cosmopolitan shipping and commercial centre.
Book 1 of Utopia opens with a brief account of the trade mission,
which leads into an account of More’s acquaintance with Giles. At
this point, the work glides from fact into fiction. More says he
encountered Giles after Mass one day, and Giles introduced him
to Raphael Hythloday, with whom they proceeded to have the
conversation that is recorded in Utopia. This fictional conversa-

xx
tions between More and Giles.7 Be that as it may, More’s visit to Antwerp served to crystallise and fuse a range of concerns most of which had (on the evidence of his earlier writings) been in his mind for years.

We have no direct information as to when More began drafting Utopia. In his biographical sketch, Erasmus reported that More wrote the second book ‘earlier, when at leisure; at a later opportunity he added the first in the heat of the moment’ (CWE, VII, 24). As J. H. Hexter argues, if More wrote Book II first, it seems very likely that he initially regarded it as a complete work; probably this version of Utopia was well in hand by the time he returned to England.8 Back in London, though, he found reason to add the dialogue of Book I.9

Hexter points out that the first version of Utopia must have included not only the account of Utopia that now occupies all but the last few pages of Book II but also an introduction something like the opening of the present Book I. Otherwise it would not be clear who is speaking in the monologue on Utopia, and under what circumstances. The second phase of composition must have begun, then, not with the embassy to Bruges and the diversion to Antwerp but with the dialogue of Book I. Indeed the precise point where More, as Hexter says, ‘opened a seam’ in the first version of Utopia to insert the dialogue can be identified with some confidence (see below, p. 49n). After writing the dialogue, More must also have revised the conclusion of the work as a whole. In the final paragraph of Book II, as Hexter points out, the narrator recalls that Hythloday ‘had reproached certain people who were afraid they might not appear knowing enough unless they found something to criticise in the ideas of others’. But Hythloday’s censures occur in the dialogue of Book I (p. 53), so that this allusion to them must have been written after the dialogue.

The fact that Utopia was composed in this odd sequence presumably has implications for its interpretation. As with many other facts about the book, though, this one cuts two ways. On the one

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7 Giles seems to hint as much in the commendatory letter he wrote for the first edition of Utopia: see below, p. 25.
9 Hythloday’s narrative of an imaginary meeting of the French privy council includes (pp. 84–5) references to Milan as under French control (it was recaptured by France in September 1515) and to Ferdinand II of Aragon as a force to be reckoned with (he died in January 1516). These allusions suggest a time-frame for the composition of Book I that is consistent with Erasmus’ claim.
INTRODUCTION

hand, it may suggest that More split open a complete, unified book to insert a dialogue which, though interesting in itself, doesn’t really belong with the original material – that Utopia is really two books. Or it may suggest that More had second thoughts about the account of Utopia and saw a need to insert a new section which would be in effect an introduction to it. In any event, the dialogue affects our view of Utopia. For one thing, it gives us a much sharper sense of Hythloday, who is both our only source of information about the island commonwealth and its foremost enthusiast.

Shaping forces

More’s book benefited greatly both from his experience in law and politics and from his humanist learning. Though the social problems Utopia addresses are perennial, the particular formulations of them, and the data of recent and contemporary English and European life that the book deploys, reflect More’s personal and professional experience. But the intellectual paradigms that he brings to bear on the understanding of these problems, and the form and style of his book, derive primarily from his literary humanism.

The most obvious relation between Utopia and More’s humanist learning is that with the central Greek works of political philosophy. The full title of More’s book – De optimo reipublicae statu deque nova insula Utopia – identifies it as belonging to the oldest genre of political writing, the discourse on the ideal commonwealth initiated by Plato’s Republic and Laws and continued in Aristotle’s Politics – and subsequently in many other works. Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions of the ideal commonwealth are, however, purely argumentative, whereas the Utopian part of More’s book consists of Hythloday’s fictional travelogue. The decision to present his imaginary society in the form of a long speech by a fictional personage is responsible both for much of the book’s interest and for much of its enigmatic quality. Fictions are attractive, but in their very nature they are unapt to resolve into unambiguous meanings.10

For the debate of Book 1, the primary formal models are the dialogues of Plato – and, perhaps even more, those of Cicero. Like

10 More’s decision to present Utopia as a fiction has also been responsible for much of his book’s influence: the literary genre of the utopia, which Utopia initiated, differs from the philosophical discourse de optimo reipublicae statu precisely in that it offers a fictionalised account of the ideal commonwealth as if it already existed. In the second of the two letters on Utopia that More addressed to Giles, he commented obliquely on the advantage of this way of proceeding. See p. 269.
INTERPRETATIVE CONTEXTS

Utopia and unlike the Platonic dialogues, Ciceró’s dialogues consist mainly of long speeches punctuated by brief interruptions; like Utopia, too (and like other humanist dialogues and again unlike Plato’s), Ciceró’s dialogues are more concerned with expounding alternative positions than with reaching definite and prescriptive conclusions. There are also precedents for the main topic of More’s debate, in humanist as well as classical literature. Arguing about whether Hythlodeway should join a king’s council is a way of getting at the general, and very frequently discussed, problem of ‘counsel’: the problem of ensuring that rulers get – and take – appropriate advice. As Quentin Skinner observes, this problem could be approached either from the point of view of the ruler, in which case the focus is on ‘the importance of choosing good councillors and learning to distinguish between true and false friends’, or from the point of view of the prospective councillor, when the focus is on the question of whether a scholar should commit himself to practical politics.11 Viewed in this second perspective, the problem amounts to one formulation of the ancient question of the relative merits of the active and contemplative lives.12 Since, as Skinner says, ‘humanists tended to see themselves essentially as political advisers’, counsel was the political topic that most intrigued them. More himself had special reason to be intrigued: he had been edging closer to full-time royal service, and, in the period when he wrote the dialogue of Book I, seems to have been pondering a first invitation to join Henry’s council.13 This would be a professional move toward which all his training and experience as lawyer and diplomat pointed, and yet contemplating it would have prompted some anxiety in a man who was also imbued with the ideals of scholarly and religious detachment.

Though the topic of counsel is commonplace, More’s treatment of it is distinctive. This is also the case with his treatment (in Hythlodeway’s account (pp. 55–77) of a debate he had taken part in at John Morton’s table) of the problem of theft, which expands into

12 Influential – and durably interesting – treatments of this issue are found in Plato (Republic VI. 496C–497B and Epistle VII) and Seneca (‘On leisure’ and ‘On tranquility of mind’, in Dialogs), who make the case for non-involvement, and in one of Plutarch’s Moralia, ‘That a Philosopher ought to converse especially with men in power’. Ciceró sees merit in both courses (De officiis 1.x.x.69–xxi.72, xiii.113–xiv.116).
INTRODUCTION

A general analysis of the condition of England. More's handling of these matters differs from that of most other social or political writers of the period in what we may call its systemic or holistic approach. As Hexter puts it, More sees 'in depth, in perspective, and in mutual relation problems which his contemporaries saw in the flat and as a disjointed series' (CW, IV, c). He understands that the problem of counsel cannot be solved by sending a few wise men to court, because, in the existing structure of society, most of the people they would encounter there— including especially the rulers— are motivated by blinkered self-interest. Similarly, the problem of theft cannot be solved by punishing thieves, because theft stems primarily from poverty, which is in turn the product of a number of social factors. The polity as a whole is a complex network of reciprocally-acting parts.

The social analysis of Book I is also distinguished by its passionate intensity, its pervasive moral outrage at the status quo. The analysis of the problem of theft constitutes a scathing indictment of a system of 'justice' in which the poor are 'driven to the awful necessity of stealing and then dying for it' (p. 57). The root cause of this situation lies in the pride, sloth and greed of the upper classes. Noblemen live 'idly off others' labour, and also 'drag around with them a great train of idle servants' (p. 59), who, when they are later dismissed, know no honest way of making a living. The practice of enclosure (fencing common land as pastureage for sheep) deprives farm labourers of their livelihood and sets them to wander and beg— or to steal and be hanged.

Though it is Hythloday who delivers this indictment, one can hardly doubt that it embodies More's own views; and in fact More portrays himself as concurring in Hythloday's analysis (p. 81). In the debate on counsel, however, More portrays Hythloday and himself as taking opposite positions, with Hythloday opposing involvement and More favouring it. Both positions are powerfully argued, and they are never bridged: at the end of Book I, the disputants simply drop the topic and go on to another— the desirability of abolishing private property— about which they also never reach agreement.

These facts suggest another aspect of the relation between Utopia and its author's character and experience: that the personality and views of More's two main characters project his own persistent dividedness of mind. That 'More' closely resembles the author is clear. Yet it is equally clear that this cautious, practical lawyer and family man is More without his passion and vision, a More who...
INTERPRETATIVE CONTEXTS

could not have written *Utopia*, nor ever have chosen martyrdom.
The most obvious literary models for Hythloday – notwithstanding
that his name is a Greek coinage that means something like ‘non-
sense peddler’ – are the stern experts on comparative politics of
Plato’s political dialogues. In the book’s generic economy, Hythlo-
day corresponds to the austere Stranger of the *Stateman* or the
Old Athenian of the *Laws*, whose detachment from practical affairs
enables them to see and speak the truth. But this is as much as to
say that Hythloday is to some extent More’s fantasy – partly wist-
ful, partly critical – of what he himself might have been, had he
made different choices a decade earlier; even as ‘More’ is his slightly
decrating representation of the practical man he had become.15

More’s dividedness of mind is also related, via his humanist learn-
ing, to the seriocomic mode of *Utopia*. Here the key author is
Lucian, four of whose works, as we noted above, More had trans-
lated. (These were published in 1506, together with some additional
translations by Erasmus.)

A Syrian sophist of the second century AD, Lucian was one of
the last writers of classical Greek. In a series of dialogues and other
short prose pieces, he played a key part in the development of a
tradition of making serious points under the guise of jokes, other
examples of which are the *Golden As* of Apuleius, numerous mock
orations and festive treatises (like those listed as precedents in
Erasmus’ preface to *The Praise of Folly*), and works of later writers
like Rabelais and Swift. This tradition is sometimes characterised
by the phrase *serio ludere* – ‘to play seriously’.16

As More says in his preface to the translations of Lucian, this
kind of writing satisfies the Horatian injunction that literature
should combine delight with instruction (*CW*, III, Part 1, 3); in his
second letter to Giles, he indicates that this was why he chose a
seriocomic mode for *Utopia*. But More was also attracted to the
tradition of *serio ludere* for another, deeper reason. The divided,
complex mind, capable of seeing more than one side of a question
and reluctant to make a definite commitment to any single position,

14 On the derivation, see below, p. 53n. Dominic Baker-Smith points out that Soc-
rates is accused of peddling nonsense (Greek bythlos) in the *Republic*. See More’s
15 Hythloday also recalls Pico della Mirandola, who was to More a particularly
intriguing modern exemplar of philosophic *atium*. On Pico and *Utopia*, see Baker-
Smith, pp. 15-21.
16 See, for example, Edgar Wind, *Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance*, rev. edn (New
INTRODUCTION

has a proclivity for ironic discourse; and serio ludere – in which the play can serve to qualify or undercut any statement – is one of the great vehicles of irony. The first major humanist work in the Lucianic tradition is The Praise of Folly (written in More’s house in 1509). This is a declaration of bewilderingly complex irony, in which Erasmus has Folly (supposed to be a goddess) praise folly, thus setting up a sort of verbal hall of mirrors. The situation in Utopia is equally complex: a ‘nonsensical peddler’ condemns Europe and praises Noplace (the meaning of the Greek nonce word ‘Utopia’);17 and his views – many of which are clearly not nonsense – are reported by a character who bears the author’s name, and who dissociates himself from most of them.

Book 1

The dialogue of Book 1 constitutes a debate on a course of action: should Hythloday join a royal council? Moreover, this debate encompasses several others, on questions of public policy. At Morton’s table, the topic is that of the best policy for dealing with the problem of theft; and, after recounting this debate, Hythloday goes on to describe imaginary meetings of two royal councils, debating respectively policy choices in foreign and domestic affairs. Finally, the book concludes with an exchange on the merits of communism.

For a Renaissance humanist like More, steeped in the tradition of classical rhetoric, debates on policy questions could scarcely fail to be conceived and developed in accordance with the theory of deliberative oratory, the oratory of persuasion and dissuasion. (Deliberative is one of the three genera of classical rhetoric, along with the demonstrative genre and the judicial.) A fundamentally important consequence of the affinity of Book 1 with deliberative oratory is that the arguments of the book are uniformly structured by the central topoi of the deliberative genre. The topoi (of which rhetorical manuals, like textbooks of logic, provided long lists) are the catalysts of inventio, subject-matter categories that suggest appropriate arguments for the different genres; in the deliberative genre, invention is channelled by two paired, dominant topics, boni estas and utilitas – honour and expediency.18 The deliberative orator

17 See below, p. 31n.
18 On the key role of these topics, see, for example, Cicero, De inventione II.i.156–
8, or Quintilian, Institutio oratoria III.viii.1–3, 22–3.

The fact that Utopia is closely akin to oratory in inventio (and in dispositio or arrangement) should not be taken to mean that its style is also oratorical. More’s book exemplifies the genus humile, the so-called ‘plain’ or ‘Attic’ style (see below, p. 51 and note). As Cicero explains in the Orator (X.IX.63–4), the plain style is

xxvi
normally argues that a particular course of action is advisable on the ground that it is honourable, or on the ground that it is expedient — or argues that it is unadvisable, as being either dishonourable or inexpedient. Naturally, the strongest case is made when it can be shown that considerations of honour and expediency point in the same direction.

This turns out to be the nature of Hythloday’s argument not only on the problem of theft but on all the questions he addresses. The discussion of theft opens with the question of why this problem continues unabated despite the execution of so many thieves. Hythloday’s response begins with, and is organised by, the contention that executing thieves is neither moral nor practical: ‘The penalty is too harsh in itself, yet it isn’t an effective deterrent. Simple theft is not so great a crime that it ought to cost a man his head, yet no punishment however severe can restrain those from robbery who have no other way to make a living’ (p. 57). By contrast, Hythloday argues that the milder punishment he recommends is both just and expedient. Similarly, to ‘More’ and Giles he argues that joining a king’s council would be neither honourable nor useful, since kings use councillors only to tell them how best to accomplish dishonourable and destructive ends. In his two narratives of imaginary privy council meetings, Hythloday portrays himself as arguing that the supposedly expedient courses recommended by the other councillors are both immoral and self-defeating. When ‘More’, at the climax of the debate on counsel, argues for an ‘indirect’, temporising approach, in which the councillor, knowing that he cannot turn all to good, will at least try to make things as little bad as possible, Hythloday responds that such a strategy is neither practical nor consistent with Christian morality. Indeed, we get the strong impression that he would say that the moral and the expedient never truly conflict, that correct analysis will always show that a dishonourable course is also impractical. This position links him with the Stoics, for whom (as Cicero explains in De officiis) the identity of the moral and the expedient is a key doctrine.

characteristic of philosophical writing; the correct term for this species of eloquence is *sermo* (‘conversation’) rather than *oratio*. The comparative simplicity of the plain style should not, however, be confused with ariteness. The Attic stylist, Cicero observes, cultivates the ‘*non ingratam neglegentiam de re hominis magis quam de verbis laboranti*’ (77: ‘*not unpleasant carelessness on the part of a man who is paying more attention to thought than to words*’). Cf. More on Hythloday’s ‘neglects simplicitas’ (10:11–12). More’s observation that Hythloday’s *sermo* was ‘*subitarius atque extemporalis*’ (10:8–9) may be intended to recall another standard authority, Demetrius’ *On Style*, where we read that the style of dialogue reproduces an extemporaneous utterance’ (IV.244).
INTRODUCTION

Evidently the question of the relation of the moral and the expedient interested More deeply, as it did other humanists. The claim that the two are identical was a standard theme of early humanist political thought, which is permeated by Stoicism; but in the fifteenth century, some Italian humanists began to assert that honestas is not always the same as utilitas. In 1513, Machiavelli produced, in The Prince, the most famous of all statements of this position. More could not have known Machiavelli’s book (it wasn’t published until 1532), but he certainly knew the tradition of thought that it crystallised.

It is also evident that the question of the relation of honestas and utilitas is linked with the subject of the best condition of the commonwealth. If the moral and the expedient – the practical – are ultimately identical, then it is theoretically possible to design a viable commonwealth that would always act morally. But if the moral and the expedient cannot be fully reconciled, then this ideal could never be achieved, even in theory.

That More recognised the importance of this issue to the theory of the ideal commonwealth seems clear from what follows the exchange about the indirect approach to counsel. The question of the validity of this approach is never resolved – surely because More was of two minds about it. In More’s fiction, though, the question is left unresolved because it is sidetracked by Hythloday’s sudden confession that he thinks the abolition of private property offers the only route to social justice. ‘More’ disputes this claim, but on the ground that communism is unjust, but on the basis of arguments (derived from Aristotle’s critique of the Republic) that it is impractical. The commonwealth cannot be stable, prosperous and happy without private property and the inequality that goes with it. Hythloday counters that More would think differently if he had seen Utopia: for that commonwealth embodies the equality that More thinks impractical, and yet it is uniquely happy and well-governed, with institutions that are both ‘wise and sacred’ (p. 101).

This, then, is the context that More provided for the account of Utopia: a dispute about the degree of compatibility of the moral and the expedient in political life, and in particular whether the ideal of equality is compatible with stability and prosperity.

Book 11

If Book 1 of Utopia is affiliated with deliberative oratory, Book 11 has an equally clear connection with the demonstrative or epideictic genre, the oratory of praise or blame. Whatever More’s readers (or...
INTERPRETATIVE CONTEXTS

More himself) might think of Utopia, for Hythloday it is ‘that commonwealth which I consider not only the best but indeed the only one that can rightfully claim that name’ (p. 241). Praise of a polis or eirene was a recognised subsynonym of demonstrative oratory, and a perusal either of Quintilian’s discussion of the praise of a city or of the list of topoi for this subgenre in Menander Rhétor’s treatise on epidictic raises the question of whether such passages may not have suggested some features of the order of topics treated, and perhaps a few of the topics themselves, in Hythloday’s long speech.19

If the order and selection of topics in the account of Utopia to some extent reflect the dicta of rhetorical theory, though, the structure of the commonwealth itself certainly derives from political theory. First, More took many of the institutional arrangements of Utopia from the discussions of the ideal commonwealth by Plato and Aristotle, and from idealised accounts of historical politics and their lawmakers by such authors as Tacitus and, especially, Plutarch. These appropriations range from small (but often striking) items such as the Utopians’ custom of having wives stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ (p. 211) with their husbands in battle (which seems to have been inspired or authorised by a passage in Plato’s Republic: see p. 213d) to fundamental features of Utopian life such as the restrictions on property and proving the institution of the common tables, and the heavy use, in the inculcation of desirable behaviour, of what we should call positive and negative reinforcement.20

Second (and even more important), the structure into which the


20 Our notes to the translation call attention to many of these appropriations; fuller treatments of the subject are found in the commentary in the Yale edition, and in several monographs: Edward L. Surtz, SJ, The Praise of Pleasure (Cambridge, Mass., 1957) and The Praise of Wisdom (Chicago, 1957); Thomas I. White, ‘Aristotle and Utopia’, Renaissance Quarterly, 29 (1976), 635–75; and George M. Logan, The Meaning of More’s ‘Utopia’ (Princeton, 1983).

An interesting question is whether More also borrowed from Renaissance discussions of the best commonwealth, especially those by Plutarch, Beroaldo and Francesco Patrizi of Siena. More never mentions any modern work; but since an aversion to mentioning modern works (however much one may happen to be indebted to them) is a convention of humanist discourse, the absence of allusions does not imply that he did not profit from such books. As the Yale commentary makes abundantly clear, there are many parallels between the account of Utopia and writings of these moderns, especially Patrizi. But it seems to be impossible to say whether the parallels represent borrowings, or simply the fact that More and the Italians read the same classical books.
INTRODUCTION

borrowed institutions are fitted appears to have been constructed by applying the method for designing an ideal commonwealth devised by Plato and Aristotle. In this method, creating such a commonwealth is not simply a matter of piling together all the desirable features one can think of. On the contrary, the design premise is the principle of autarkia, self-sufficiency: the best commonwealth will be one that includes everything that is necessary to the happiness of its citizens, and nothing else. Starting from this economical premise, Plato developed, and Aristotle refined, a four-step procedure for constructing an ideal commonwealth. First, one must determine what constitutes the happiest life for the individual. This is the central question of ethical theory, and, as Aristotle explains at the beginning of Book VII of the Politics, its answer constitutes the starting point of political theory. Second, from these conclusions about the most desirable life, the theorist derives the communal goals whose attainment will result in the happiness of the citizens. Third, it is necessary to form a sort of checklist of the physical and institutional components that the commonwealth must include: a certain size of population will be required, and a certain kind and extent of territory; certain occupational functions will have to be performed; and so on. Finally, the theorist determines the particular form that each of these components should be given in order to assure that, collectively, they will constitute the best commonwealth. For More, most of these forms are (as we noted above) appropriated from Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions of the ideal commonwealth and from idealised accounts of actual commonwealths.

Though there are many other useful things to say about Book II of Utopia, it seems beyond dispute, and fundamental, that the book presents the results of a best-commonwealth exercise performed according to the Greek rules. This fact is obscured by More’s decision to present his results in the form of a speech in praise of a supposedly existing commonwealth – the decision, as it were, to invent the genre of the utopia instead of writing a work of political theory. This decision entailed suppressing or disguising the various components of the dialectical substructure of his model. But once we recognise that Book II of Utopia embodies a best-commonwealth exercise, some mystifying aspects of the work begin to make sense. In particular, this recognition tells us how to take the lengthy account of Utopian moral philosophy (pp. 159–79);

21 See Plato, Republic II.369b–372c; Aristotle, Politics VII.i–viii.

xxx
and it suggests an answer to a key question about the book: why did More create an imaginary commonwealth that seems (pace Hythloday) so clearly not ideal in some respects?

The passage on moral philosophy is in fact the cornerstone of the Utopian edifice: it constitutes the first step of the best-commonwealth exercise, the determination of the happiest life for the individual. The Utopians (who take it for granted that self-interest is the basic fact about human nature) maintain that pleasure is the goal of life, but they find that the most pleasurable life is the life of virtue. This is also the conclusion of Plato and Aristotle, but for them the virtuous life is that of contemplative leisure, made possible by the labour of slaves and artisans whose happiness is not a goal of the commonwealth. By contrast, the Utopians conclude that individual felicity is incompatible with special privilege, and think that the foremost pleasure ‘arises from practice of the virtues and consciousness of a good life’ (p. 171). Thus, though the Utopians are not Christians and their arguments consider only self-interest, they conclude that the best life for the individual is one lived in accordance with the moral norms of Christianity. Moreover, parallels between their arguments and passages in others of More’s works confirm that he thought these arguments valid – though many readers have found them convoluted and strained.

But even if we grant that, for each individual, morality is always expedient, is this also true for the commonwealth as a whole? For the most part, Utopia supports this view. If, as the Utopians conclude, one’s happiness is incompatible with spoiling the happiness of others, then it follows that the institutions of the commonwealth, whose goal is to maximise the happiness of its citizens, must be structured so as to implement the Golden Rule. Indeed, the institutions and policies of Utopia (many of which, as noted above, derive from previous treatments of the ideal commonwealth) are on the whole much preferable to those of European nations and are in many respects completely consistent with Christian standards, as those are interpreted in the writings of More and his associates.

Yet some Utopian practices are incompatible with these standards, and would seem to be justifiable only on grounds of expediency. To take the most disturbing examples, there is, first, the severe restriction of personal freedom. In Book 1, Hythloday criticises repressive policies on the ground that ‘it’s an incompetent monarch who knows no other way to reform his people than by depriving them of all life’s benefits’ (p. 93), and this attitude harmonises with many passages in the writings of More’s humanist
INTRODUCTION

circle. The Utopians themselves believe that 'no kind of pleasure is forbidden, provided harm does not come of it' (p. 143). But in fact their lives are hedged round with numerous prohibitions: many activities are either forbidden, stigmatised or rigidly channelled – even the use of leisure time is limited to a few approved activities.

Then there are the troubling aspects of Utopian foreign policy. For the most part, the Utopians are generous toward their neighbours. They distribute their surplus commodities among them 'at moderate prices', and they are always happy to provide them with skilful and honest administrators (pp. 147, 197). They detest war, and, whenever it cannot be avoided, go to great lengths to minimise its destructiveness. Yet it turns out that they will go to war for a good many reasons – including to obtain territory for colonisation, whenever the Utopian population exceeds the optimum number. Furthermore, some of their military tactics are of very dubious morality. They offer rewards for the assassination of enemy leaders. They employ mercenaries to do as much of their fighting as possible – and the mercenaries they prefer are the savage Zapoletes, whose use is hard to reconcile with the aim of minimising war's destructiveness. Moreover, despite their compassion for the common citizens of enemy nations, the Utopians enslave the prisoners taken in wars in which they have employed their own forces.22

The explanation of these discrepancies between Utopian practices and More's own ideals would seem to lie in his recognition of the fact that even in the best commonwealth there will always be conflicts between valid goals – a problem that occurs but rarely to theorists of the ideal commonwealth or writers of utopias. More's awareness of the conflict of goals is first apparent in the section on moral philosophy. Utopian ethics is a strange fusion of Stoicism and Epicureanism. One feature of Epicureanism that would seem to have interested More greatly is the so-called 'hedonic calculus', Epicurus' rule that, in choosing among pleasures, one should always choose a greater pleasure over a lesser, and should reject any pleasure that will eventually result in pain: this formula occurs three times in one form or another in the passage on moral philosophy. Presumably More thought that similar principles should be applied

22 Robert P. Adams shows that many of the 'antichivalric' Utopian military practices are consonant with Stoic and Erasmian humanist ideas (The Better Part of Valor (Seattle, 1962), pp. 152-4). But this argument cannot account for the particular practices mentioned here.

xxxii
THE LATIN TEXT

to resolving conflicts between goals at the political level; and it is possible to understand most of the unattractive features of Utopia in terms of such principles.

More was evidently impressed by the Aristotelian objections to egalitarianism that he has ‘More’ voice near the end of Book I. If Utopia does not manifest the chaos that ‘More’ had claimed would be inevitable in a communist society, the explanation would seem to lie in the elaborate system of constraints that More has built into it. Apparently he believed that too much freedom would threaten the stability and security of the commonwealth – which, in the nature of things, has to be the political goal of highest priority.

The same line of explanation can be applied to the disturbing Utopian practices in foreign policy. It is impossible to believe that More approved of all these practices; yet apparently he thought them necessary. The internal arrangements of Utopia or any other commonwealth will not really matter unless the commonwealth can be made externally secure; and as long as other commonwealths are not utopian, it is hard to see how to secure it without indulging in some practices that are expedient but certainly not moral.

Despite its abundant wit, Utopia is in fact a rather melancholy book. More evidently shared with St Augustine (whose City of God he had expounded in a series of lectures about 1501) the conviction that no human society could be wholly attractive; and he seems to have thought, too, that even the attractive arrangements that are theoretically possible are in practice very difficult to achieve. Is there any reason not to take at face value the final judgement of ‘More’ that Utopia includes ‘many features that in our own societies I would wish rather than expect to see’? Yet ‘More’ also insists, in the debate on the ‘indirect approach’ to counsel, that things can be made at least a little less bad, by working tactfully on rulers and their councillors. Here as in other ways history has generally borne him out. Many of the reforms proposed in Utopia have been effected in the centuries since it was written – though not always by peaceful means, and not always resulting in clear net improvements.

PART II: THE LATIN TEXT

There is no holograph or other manuscript of Utopia. The first four printed editions, in which More or his direct agents might conceivably have had a hand – though in fact he was in England,
INTRODUCTION

and all four printings were made on the continent – are dated 1516 (Louvain), 1517 (Paris), and March and November 1518 (both Basel, in the shop of Johann Froben). For various reasons (set forth in the Appendix), our copy-text has been 1518 March, which we accordingly follow except in places where there is compelling reason to follow another text, or to depart from the texts altogether in favour of an emendation. We have footnoted all alternate readings that seemed potentially moot; but we have silently ignored the great mass of variants, patently erroneous and/or trivial in themselves. Our controlling principle has been to produce a Latin text that could be used by a reader with even the rudiments of the tongue to check the English version across the page.

All the editions abound in mechanical errors. An occasional letter may be dropped out, as when 1517 prints Cuhberti for Cathberti (40:13); a  or an  may be mistakenly printed upside down, as when 1517 gives inventa for inventa (54:23); or an  may be picked up in error for a , as when 1517 prints cum for cum (16:12). These errors are understandable when one thinks, not of keyboarding a manuscript, but of lifting tiny bits of lead from the type-boxes into which they had been distributed by busy and not always attentive boys. More had friends, or friends of friends, at the three printing establishments that worked on Utopia, but he could not exercise close control. The range of variants that resulted may be studied in the edition of André Prévost, or in the Yale edition of Surtz and Hexter.23 In the present version, most are silently disregarded, along with variants from editions later than 1518N, when they contribute nothing to an understanding of the text.24

Certain conventions of sixteenth-century printers, perfectly unremarkable in that age and understood without effort by readers, have become obsolete over the centuries and look exceedingly strange today. Following scribal practice, early printers made free use of abbreviations, especially in Latin texts, where standardised case endings and enclitic formations made the practice easy. In the light of our controlling principle, and following the example of

23 Neither edition records every variant spelling, abbreviation, or detail of punctuation, though Prévost records more of them than Yale.
24 Odd variants, mentioned here only so readers will see the kind of thing they do not have to cope with, are the fondness of 1518N for printing all forms of Rome with an  (Rhomaei, Rhomanorum, etc.); the pleasant error of 1517 in making Cardinal Morton dismiss the parasite with a nupta (marriage) instead of a nata (nodes) (60:13); and 1516’s alternative to having the Utopians collect rain, pluvia (118:12), in cisterns. They collect instead pluvia – rare objects indeed, unknown to any dictionary.

xxxiv
THE LATIN TEXT

most modern editions, we have silently expanded all these abbreviations. We should add, though, that the abbreviations are not always free from ambiguities. The most common one, a superior bar (\(^\uparrow\) ), may stand either for an omitted \(m\) or an omitted \(n\); it may refer to a previously as well as a subsequently omitted letter – \(ev\) (where \(i\) is also omitted) stands for \(enim\), as \(no\) stands for \(non\). In general, the printer’s marks were but crude and limited imitations of the much greater variety of marks used by medieval scribes, the all-but-infinite range of which may be explored in Adriano Cappelli’s *Dizionario di abbreviature latine ed italiane.*

Aiming at ease of comprehension, we have paragraphed the Latin text, as the original typesetters did not; by making Latin paragraphs correspond with English paragraphs, we hope to have made equivalent passages easier to locate. (In passing, we note that our paragraphing of the text, though executed without any such deliberate intent, brings out a frequent function of the marginal glosses, in marking transitions to new topics.)

Early printers had no quotation marks, and we have not introduced them into the Latin, feeling that their presence in the English suffices. Again, early fonts did not include the exclamation mark. The question mark doubled for interrogatories and exclamations; and sometimes we have replaced a question mark in the copy-text by an exclamation mark. Sometimes, too, we have cut a sentence in the middle with a question mark, when the question seemed to be over, but then allowed some subordinate clauses to trail on in declarative form, without the formality of a separate sentence. This practice is not alien to More’s style: he does not always cut off his sentences crisply or start new ones decisively. Parentheses also called for frequent adjustment, to keep the parenthetical unit from gobbling up some essential unit of the surrounding sentence.

The early printings of *Utopia* do not employ the semicolon; but it occasionally seems an indispensable aid in clarifying More’s syntax, and we have therefore not scrupled to use it. Similarly, we

25 6th edn, Milan, 1961. Cappelli’s prefatory treatise has been translated by David Heimann and Richard Kay, as *The Elements of Abbreviation in Medieval Latin Palaeography* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1982). A brief treatment of ‘Abbreviations and contractions in early printed books’ constitutes Appendix IV (pp. 319–24) in Ronald B. McKerrow’s *An Introduction to Bibliography for Literary Students* (Oxford, 1927). The Latin text in Prevost’s edition is a photographic facsimile of 1518V, and his Introduction includes a guide to expanding the abbreviations in that text (pp. 268–9).

26 Sometimes the 1518M printer failed to place a gloss precisely opposite the passage to which it refers: in such cases we have silently repositioned the gloss.

xxxv