

### Megaprojects and Risk

Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multibillion-dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be essential reading in its field for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians, journalists and interested citizens.

BENT FLYVBJERG is Professor in the Department of Development and Planning at Aalborg University, Denmark, and author of the highly successful *Making Social Science Matter* (Cambridge, 2001) and *Rationality and Power* (1998).

NILS BRUZELIUS is Associate Professor at Stockholm University and an independent consultant on transport and planning.

WERNER ROTHENGATTER is Head of the Institute of Economic Policy Research and of the Unit on Transport and Communication at the University of Karlsruhe, Germany.





# Megaprojects and Risk

An Anatomy of Ambition

Bent Flyvbjerg Nils Bruzelius Werner Rothengatter





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