

Hitler, Chamberlain and appeasement

Frank McDonough





For Ann

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521000482

© Cambridge University Press 2002

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2002 5th printing 2007

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-0-521-00048-2 paperback

Text design by Newton Harris Design Partnership

Map illustrations by Kathy Baxendale

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Cover, © CORBIS; 45, 61, 70, reproduced with permission of Punch Ltd; 51, Hulton/Archive; 53, David Low/Evening Standard 30.9.38, Centre for the Study of Cartoons and Caricature; 72, John Frost Newspapers.

Picture research by Sandie Huskinson-Rolfe of PHOTOSEEKERS.

The cover illustration shows Chamberlain and Hitler at the 1938 Munich conference at which Chamberlain agreed to allow Nazi Germany to annex the Sudetenland.



Contents

Introduction	1
Anglo-German relations, 1918–33	3
The legacies of the First World War	3
The Paris peace conference	4
The Treaty of Versailles	5
The reparations problem	9
The Locarno treaties	10
The impact of the Great Depression	12
German foreign policy, 1929–33	13
Document case study	14
2 The impact of Adolf Hitler: foreign-policy aims and actions,	1933–37 17
What were Hitler's aims in foreign policy?	17
The early years of Hitler's foreign policy, 1933–35	18
The problem of German rearmament	21
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and its consequences	22
The Rhineland crisis	24
The Spanish Civil War	25
Hitler moves from strength to strength	25
The search for an Anglo-German alliance	26
Document case study	27
3 Why appeasement?	31
The impact of the First World War	31
Economic difficulties	32
The crisis of French will	32
Hostility towards Soviet communism	33
The imperial dimension	33
National defence	33
The mass media	36
Public opinion	36
The supporters of appeasement	36
The logic of appeasement	38
Alternatives to appeasement	38
Critics of appeasement	39
Document case study	39

© Cambridge University Press w

iii



Contents

4 Chamberlain and appeasement (1):	
the period of hope, May 1937–October 1938	43
Neville Chamberlain: early life and character	43
Chamberlain's views on the European crisis	44
Chamberlain's new direction	44
The Hossbach memorandum	46
Hitler makes key changes	47
Chamberlain's conflict with the Foreign Office	47
The union between Germany and Austria	48
The Czech crisis	49
The aftermath of Munich	53
Document case study	55
5 Chamberlain and appeasement (2):	
the road to war, October 1938–September 1939	61
The backlash against the Munich agreement	61
Difficulties with further appeasement	63
The foreign-policy options facing Chamberlain after Prague	65
The guarantee to Poland	65
The search for an alliance with the Soviet Union	68
The Nazi–Soviet pact	69
The outbreak of war	71
Document case study	73
6 The historical debate	77
The Hitlocentric interpretation	77
The revisionist view	78
Neville Chamberlain – 'guilty man'?	80
Modern revisionism	81
A post-revisionist era?	84
Conclusion	86
Select bibliography	87
Chronology	89
Index	91

iv



Introduction

In spite of the many viewpoints which have been put forward to explain the outbreak of the Second World War, two interpretations dominate the historical debate.

The first view suggests that the key reason for the start of the war was Adolf Hitler's cold-blooded desire for European expansion. This interpretation is enshrined in the final judgement at the famous Nuremberg trials of the leading (living) Nazis, which were held shortly after the end of hostilities. Although many new details have emerged concerning the conduct of German foreign policy under the Nazi regime, the central view of Hitler as a uniquely evil and brutal dictator plotting and scheming a war of conquest for *Lebensraum* (living space) in the east from the moment he came to power until the outbreak of war has not been substantially modified or revised.

The second key explanation of the outbreak of the Second World War concentrates on the role played by Neville Chamberlain and the policy of appeasement. This policy did prevent a major European war starting in 1938 through the signing of the Munich agreement, but it ended in humiliating failure when Germany attacked Poland in September 1939. In the popular mind, appeasement has been viewed (and is still generally viewed by world leaders) as a totally disreputable policy of shameful surrender which 'sacrifices principles' in order to 'buy off' a potential or actual aggressor. However, among historians, using more objective methods, the original view of Chamberlain as an incompetent leader and appeasement as a morally bankrupt policy doomed to failure has undergone a quite remarkable transformation. It has, indeed, now become commonplace for 'revisionist historians' to portray Chamberlain not as a weak and ineffective leader but as a complex and able politician with a clear-sighted approach to a foreign policy, who sought peace while at the same time preparing for war.

The main aim of this book is to examine the central roles played by Hitler and Chamberlain in the events which led to the outbreak of the Second World War. The book seeks to adopt a balanced approach to the subject, but does not flinch from giving fresh insights or offering critical assessment when it is deemed necessary. The major focus of the study is, of course, on Anglo-German relations from 1918 to 1939, with particular attention paid to the key events from 1937 to 1939, when Hitler pursued a bold and aggressive foreign policy, while Chamberlain strove energetically to satisfy the 'legitimate' demands made by Hitler, in the hope that this would prevent war.



Introduction

The book begins with a brief survey of the key events in Anglo-German relations from 1918 to 1933. In Chapter 2, the foreign-policy ideas, aims and actions of Adolf Hitler in the period from 1933 to 1937 are explored. Chapter 3 examines the factors which help to explain why appeasement became the policy adopted by the British government to deal with the growing tension in European relations during the 1930s. Chapters 4 and 5 concentrate on events in Anglo-German relations from 1937 to 1939. The book concludes with an extensive analysis of the changing nature of the debate over the roles of Hitler and Chamberlain in the origins of the Second World War.