The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 is a seminal event in world history, yet it has been virtually ignored in the Western literature. This is not the case in the East, where, ever since the war, the focus of Chinese foreign policy has been to undo its results whereas the focus of Japanese foreign policy has been to confirm them. Japan supplanted China as the dominant regional power. Such a seismic reversal in the traditional power balance fractured the previous international harmony within the Confucian world and left an aftershock of enduring territorial and political fault lines that have embroiled China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan ever since.

The book examines the war through the eyes of the journalists who filed reports from China, Japan, Russia, Germany, France, Britain, and the United States to show how the war changed outside perceptions of the relative power of China and Japan and to plot the consequences of these changed perceptions, namely, the scramble for concessions in China and Japan’s admission to the ranks of the great powers.

S. C. M. Paine is Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College and author of *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier*, winner of the 1997 Jelavich Prize for diplomatic history.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895
Perceptions, Power, and Primacy

S. C. M. Paine
U.S. Naval War College
To BAE

who said, “You should write a book about this;”
when I ran into the negotiating records for the Treaty
of Shimonoseki in the Japanese Foreign Ministry
Archives.
Contents

List of Maps ........................................................ Page viii
Acknowledgments ....................................................... ix

Part I: The Clash of Two Orders: The Far East on the Eve of the War ....... 1
  1. The Reversal in the Far Eastern Balance of Power ................ 3
  2. The Decline of the Old Order in China and Korea ............. 21
  3. The Rise of a New Order in Russia and Japan .................. 62

Part II: The War: The Dividing Line Between Two Eras .................... 107
  4. The Beginning of the End: The Outbreak of Hostilities ......... 109
  5. Japan Triumphant: The Battles of P’yŏngyang and the Yalu .... 165
  6. China in Disgrace: The Battles of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei .... 197

Part III: The Settlement: The Modern Era in Far Eastern Diplomacy ...... 245
  7. The Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Triple Intervention ........ 247
  8. The Era of Global Politics .................................... 295

Epilogue: Perceptions, Power, and War .................................. 367
Bibliographic Essay .................................................... 371
Bibliography ................................................................... 379
Index ............................................................................ 403
List of Maps

Battles of P’yŏngyang & Yalu ........................................ Page 164
Battles of Port Arthur & Weihaiwei .............................. 196
Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895 ....................................... 246
Foreign Spheres of Influence, 1898 ................................ 294
Acknowledgments

This book is both a by-product of many years of living in and conducting research on China, Japan, and Russia and also a preliminary study for a book about Sino-Russian-Japanese rivalries in northeast Asia during the 1930s and 1940s. The current work has the modest ambition of synthesizing current secondary research on the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and supplementing this synthesis with an extensive reading of newspapers published around the world during the war. The purpose is to plot the evolution of European and American thinking about the balance of power in the Far East, and in doing so discuss the perceptions that both reflected and created that balance of power. The thesis is that military hardware and economic output alone do not determine international power, perceptions also play an important role. This book is aimed at a general audience of those interested in understanding the origins of such key security issues still bedeviling the Far East as the two-China problem, Korean instability, Sino-Japanese animosity, and Russian Far Eastern ambitions.

It is my great pleasure to acknowledge the help of many persons and also to absolve them of any responsibility for the errors that remain in this book. I would like to start by thanking all of my colleagues in the Strategy and Policy Department at the United States Naval War College who collectively have worked to develop and teach a unique and powerful methodology to analyze wars. The combination of civilians, with doctorates in both political science and history, and officers from the different branches of the military set the Strategy and Policy Department apart from so much of academia where theoreticians too often do not come into regular contact with practitioners.

I would also like to give particular thanks to those who took so much of their time to read a draft of this book and correct my many novel departures from standard English usage and from logical presentation. In alphabetical order, they are my best colleague, Bruce A. Elleman; my supportive brothers, John B. Paine III and Thomas M. Paine; the eminent historian of Russia, Marc Raeff; and, special and
Acknowledgments

most well read of family friends, Alice R. Riley. Cambridge University Press was also kind enough to provide the reports of three anonymous readers. One of them, whom I soon tracked down, proved to be the eminent historian of China, Arthur Waldron, who provided extremely helpful suggestions for restructuring the manuscript. I would like to thank my current seminar co-moderator, Colonel Paul L. Aswell USA, for drawing up the maps; my friend and colleague of many years, Yu Minling, for proofreading the Chinese; Colonel Arakawa Ken-ichi, an expert on Japanese military history, for proofreading the Japanese; Nishikawa Sumi, for so patiently tutoring me in reading hand-written documents in archaic Japanese; and my aunt, Elizabeth N. Nicholson, for reading the manuscript in part. At Cambridge University Press, Mary Child, Cathy Felgar, and Frank Smith worked to produce this book, while Elise Oranges oversaw the proofreading.

A variety of libraries made available their collections and their staff. I am most grateful to them for, without their books, this book could never have been written. In chronological order, they are the Diplomatic Record Office of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for allowing me to use the minutes to the negotiations terminating the Sino-Japanese War; International Christian University in Tokyo for making available not only its books but also its photocopying machines; Joyce Martindale at the interlibrary loan department at Texas Christian University for delivering endless reels of microfilm and unusual titles from faraway places; the Mary Evelyn Blagg Huey Library at Texas Woman’s University for more microfilm; Princeton University for so generously sharing its collections, curators, and electrical current so I could both research and write; Yasuko Makino, Martin Heijdra, and Chongsook Lee Kim at Princeton University’s Gest Library for help finding obscure books and information in Asian languages; Alice K. Juda for finding the unfindable and Robin A. Lima for getting the found sent to me at the Henry E. Eccles Library at the United States Naval War College; the Fairbank Center for providing an entrée to Harvard University’s massive collections; Kuniko Yamada McVey at the Harvard-Yenching Library for help with obscure references; and Peter Harrington at Brown University’s John Jay Library for making available the cover illustration.

In addition to acknowledging the help of all the persons and institutions listed above, I would like to explain the rationale for my decision to use the word “face” throughout this work. My use of this term is in no way intended to offend anyone; rather, the choice comes from Chinese usage. Chinese today still frequently use the term in such idioms as “to lose face,” “to give face,” “to have face,” or “not to have face.” The
Acknowledgments

xi

terminology is theirs and not mine. For doubters, I refer them to the references listed in the following footnote.¹

Finally, a technical note: My computer is unable to produce one diacritical mark necessary for Romanizing Korean, therefore, I have used the French circumflex accent instead. This is an upside down rendition of the correct mark. The Romanization systems used are as follows: pinyin for Chinese, Kenkyusha’s Dictionary for Japanese, and the Library of Congress System for Russian. Chinese and Japanese names have been written surname first, given name second.

¹ Research on “face” has been conducted mostly by anthropologists. Historians do not generally avail themselves of these sources. To quote a recent anthropological work on the subject: “Chinese is rich in portraying things that can happen to face. Besides ‘wanting face’ (yao mianzi), ‘losing face’ (diou [sic] mianzi), and ‘having face’ (gei mianzi), one can also ‘borrow face’ (he mianzi), ‘give face’ (gei mianzi), ‘increase face’ (cheng mianzi), ‘contest face’ (zheng mianzi), ‘save face’ (liou [sic] mianzi), and compare face as in the expression ‘His face is greater than ours’ (‘Tade mianzi bi bie da’). The larger one’s face, the more prestige and security one possesses and, therefore, the more self-determination one enjoys in social transactions” (Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors & Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China [Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1994], 196). “Face” also appears in contemporary movies. See director Zhang Yimou’s Shanghai Triad, when the Triad boss refers to face to explain his reasons for preserving the reputation of his mistress even as he has her murdered for infidelity, or director Wayne Wang’s Eat a Bowl of Tea, whose entire plot revolves around the theme of losing face. For examples involving the two key diplomats discussed in the current work, see Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu’s memoirs, Kenkenryoku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95. Gordon Mark Berger, ed. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), page 126; and Li Hongzhang’s remarks after the attempt made on his life discussed in Chapter 7 in the present volume. For other standard academic references, see the extensively footnoted section on “face” in Chapter 9, which cites numerous anthropological, historical, and other works.